



Terrorism as a factor geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel region¹

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Abstract:

Since the beginning of the new millennium, extremism has emerged as a major challenge facing the African continent. This phenomenon significantly impedes economic and political development, prompting individual states to fight terrorism through various initiatives. Despite these efforts, tangible results have been elusive due to the transfer of extremist ideologies across state borders, leading to external interventions under the guise of the “fight against terrorism in the Sahel.” Although jihadist terrorist groups have long been present in Africa, the Sahel countries and African organizations have not adopted effective strategies to combat violent extremism. Since 2011, terrorist organizations have seized control of areas in the Sahel, with Boko Haram conducting numerous operations that threaten regional security and stability. In response, African organizations such as the African Union and regional bodies have implemented policies and initiatives aimed at curbing the spread of violent extremism through military interventions and economic and social development projects in the Sahel. These efforts include alliances like the Lake Chad Basin Commission and G5 Sahel, comprising five Sahel countries. Given the regional and international ramifications of extremism on Western interests and economically powerful states, African nations and organizations have engaged in serious cooperation with the international community and major powers. This collaboration includes efforts with the United Nations, France, and other entities in peacekeeping missions and initiatives to combat terrorism and extremism.

Keywords:

Africa; Sahel; geopolitics; terrorism; war; counterterrorism; military intervention; security.

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1. Introduction

The Sahel region faces enormous security and political challenges, ranging from violent extremism to terrorism. Terrorism is a crucial factor reshaping the geopolitical dynamics of this important region of the African continent. The Sahel region is culturally, ethnically, and linguistically diverse, but it is increasingly active with terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Islamic State in the Sahara. This situation has multiple negative impacts on the security and stability of the entire African continent. Over the past decades, states in this region have been subjected to constant threats to their security, stability, and economic development. Terrorism is a major factor in the geopolitical restructuring of the Sahel region, where extremist organizations manipulate religion and ideology to advance their agendas. The fight against terrorism in this region has become a crucial issue for the countries of the Sahel and the international community, as governments and regional and international organizations seek to ensure security and stability in the region. However, growing security challenges and changing geopolitical dynamics are reinforcing the role of terrorism in restructuring the region's political and economic landscape.

The fight against terrorism in the Sahel requires comprehensive strategies that combine military, security, economic, and social dimensions. Local states should work in cooperation with other African states and regional and international organizations to exchange information, promote military cooperation, encourage sustainable development, and provide young people with economic opportunities to prevent them from joining terrorist groups. There is also a need to strengthen the capacities of security services and provide training and equipment for counterterrorism. Ensuring stability and security in the Sahel region is a major challenge, but it is essential for sustainable development and prosperity in these countries. Addressing the security and geopolitical challenges associated with terrorism in this region is an important step to reshape the political and economic landscape for the benefit of African countries and their future.

It is crucial to understand the role that the fight against terrorism plays in redefining the geopolitical dynamics in the Sahel. This requires a thorough study of the political, security, economic, and social transformations in the region and an analysis of the effects of terrorism on the international system and regional relations. In this context, international cooperation and regional coordination are increasingly important to address security challenges, combat terrorism, and strengthen the capacity of Sahel countries to face current threats. The question is how terrorism and its struggle became a gateway for geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel region of Africa.

The fight against terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel is an arena of competition between the major powers of the region, encouraging each power and state to defend its interests as they seek to redefine their geopolitical objectives in the Sahel and Africa in general. One of the most pressing justifications for the geopolitical restructuring of the Sahel is to study how terrorism has become a key factor since the beginning of the new millennium for geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel.



This research aims to highlight the role of the fight against terrorism in redesigning the geopolitics of the Sahel, analyse the challenges and opportunities arising from this context, and explore strategies and measures that can be taken to enhance security and stability in the region. By understanding the multiple dimensions of this complex issue, we can develop effective strategies to combat terrorism and reduce its negative impacts on the region and Africa. The first axis will focus on African initiatives to combat terrorism, the second on foreign interventions under the name of "war against terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel region," and the third will focus on new strategies to combat extremism in Lake Chad and the Sahel following the withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Burkina Faso.

2. African initiatives to combat terrorism in the Sahel

Many African state authorities have become unable to control their geographical areas due to endemic conflicts and internal political tensions. This insecurity and instability have led to the emergence of terrorism and violent extremism, particularly those based on religious ideology. The countries of the African Sahel are facing numerous problems, the most significant being a very complex geopolitical situation. The main issue is not merely the problems themselves but the challenge of reaching consensus and acceptance. The difficulty lies in recognizing and accepting differences. Consequently, the challenges faced by many African countries remain invisible and unaddressed even after sixty years of independence, as they have been unable to control their desert and forest territories. Lake Chad, located in north-central Africa, spans regions of north-eastern Nigeria, the far north of Cameroon, western Chad, and south-eastern Niger. It has a unique social and cultural environment that contributes to the region's rich diversity. The peoples bordering Lake Chad have cultural values, traditional beliefs, and practices shaped by their relationship with the natural environment, which affects environmental sustainability. It is one of the poorest regions in the world, with high population growth, extreme weather conditions, and a climatic intersection. The area represents a cultural and geopolitical nexus between West Africa, Central Africa, Dry Africa, and Wet Africa. For many informed observers, the Sahel and Lake Chad are at the centre of the future of global geopolitics, considering their untapped resources and the outbreak of war in the heart of the European continent.

For many observers, Africa is at the centre of future global geopolitics due to its untapped resources and the recent conflicts in Europe. We face the direct consequences of the formation of new geopolitics in the Sahel, which has not been well thought out by African countries or the international community (including the United Nations), which has a role in promoting global peace. Terrorist groups have become influential in the geopolitical changes on the African coast, particularly in terms of controlling regions and territories. The European Union is also aware of the attempts by military or rebel groups to control central governments through coups. The desert areas of the Sahel and Sahara remain the most challenging for central administrations to assert authority.

Despite numerous security responses from countries on the African continent, terrorism and violent extremism remain significant challenges. They threaten security and political stability and hinder all development and economic initiatives. Terrorism in the Sahel and on the African continent in general has evolved; it is no longer localized but has spread from the coast to the Swahili states of West Africa, such as Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo, and Ghana.

There is no doubt that terrorism and violent extremism are complex and vary from region to region, necessitating specific responses depending on the context. The solution to this dilemma is to change the conditions that fuel violence by actively investing in the process of establishing and maintaining peace. This conviction has been further strengthened since the launch of the Regional Dialogue for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violent Extremism (IPI, 2018).

The African Union is tasked with consolidating political and security stability on the continent through regional integration and building an African force capable of countering any threats against African countries. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war has completely changed the world order, including African geopolitics, which is increasingly at the heart of global geopolitical balances.

In response, a space has been created for exchange and an approach to violence prevention in the Saharan coastal region. The International Institute of Peace, in collaboration with the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWAS), the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the African Centre for Terrorism Studies and Research of the African Union, supported by the Algerian government, organized the third round of regional dialogues for the prevention of terrorism and extremist violence.

With sporadic security incidents in West Africa, particularly along the Senegal-Mali border and between Burkina Faso, Benin, and Togo, concerns have increased over the potential spread of violent extremist groups into south-eastern Senegal, near the gold-rich Mali border. Extremist groups have also spread to the Gulf of Guinea (Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Togo, and Ghana), countries that have never previously experienced extremism. Consequently, states are compelled to develop new strategies to combat the expansion of extremist groups along the West African coast (Faye, 2021).

The Lake Chad basin region has been particularly troubled for some time by extremist groups. Countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are seeking to coordinate local efforts to counter the threat of extremism. To define an effective approach to rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconciliation, it is essential to understand why individuals become radicalized. To combat violent extremism, countries are trying to establish new pathways for consolidating peace and long-term stability (Akum, 2021).

Despite the presence of several hotspots of violent extremist groups in different regions of the African continent, the southern region has historically remained unaffected by these movements and operations. However, the current situation in Mozambique indicates that this perception is now outdated. The continent has become a vital area and an attractive ground, and even an emerging source, for these extremist movements.

Since October 2017, Mozambique has witnessed increasing attacks targeting both police and civilians. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, known locally as "Al Shabaab" in Mozambique, launched its first operations on 5 October 2017, targeting a police headquarters and army barracks in the northern town of Mocímboa da Praia (Ero, 2021).

The Islamic State appears to be closely monitoring developments in this African country, particularly following the discovery of oil and the evolution of offshore natural gas volumes since the first exploratory drilling operations in 2007. Mozambique has become the fourth-largest source of natural gas in the world, emerging as an energy superpower. (Idem.)

Since March 2015, both the Sahel and Lake Chad regions have witnessed the emergence of Islamic State - West Africa Province (Rewardsforjustice, 2023) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ECFR.EU, 2023). These groups have carried out terrorist attacks targeting both armed forces and civilians. According to Martin Ewey, the presence and expansion of ISIS on the African continent have exacerbated the crisis. The group has expanded its influence across the continent, affecting all five geopolitical zones defined by the African Union. At least 20 countries in Africa experience direct ISIS activity, while more than 20 other countries serve as logistics hubs for fundraising and other resources (فورونكوف, 2022).

While the continent grapples with security and political instability, it has become a crucial area for the recruitment of young people, particularly in the Lake Chad basin and the Sahel, which are the group's largest areas of operation. ISIS, like other extremist groups, closely monitors regional developments and the discovery of resources. It finances its activities through the extraction of conventional gold, smuggling of weapons, goods and currency, drug trafficking, and other lucrative illegal activities ("Financement Du Terrorisme En Afrique de l'Ouest," n.d.).

The African continent is indeed moving towards a new concept of African geopolitics, particularly in response to terrorism. This threat is deeply rooted on the continent, not only in the Sahel region but also in other areas with weak countries that are unable to control their territories and lack good local governance.

3. Foreign interventions under the name of "the war on terrorism and violent extremism in the Sahel region of Africa"

On the African continent, terrorism has become the main threat to peace. Due to its spread, the United Nations and other powers often justify intervening in the internal affairs of certain African countries under the pretext of combating extremist groups or terrorists. The African continent is currently the region most affected by the spread of extremism and religious violence, making it a vital area for extremists over the last two decades. Consequently, there is growing interest from the international community and major powers in fighting extremism in Africa, leading to increased efforts to combat extremist groups on the continent.

Foreign intervention in Africa is not new. Since the independence of African states, many countries have experienced violence and conflict (civil wars), prompting the deployment of various UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. In 1960, the first peacekeeping operation in Africa was established in the Republic of the Congo to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian troops, assist the government in restoring law and order, and provide technical assistance.

Since extremist groups began taking control of territories in African countries, new UN missions with expanded mandates have been deployed. For instance, MINUSMA in Mali was established not only to maintain peace but also to help tackle extremism that seeks to alter the country's governance system. Since then, thousands of peacekeepers have been deployed to Africa, with the most recent peace process established in 2014 in the Central African Republic. Violent extremism undoubtedly has political, religious, and economic dimensions. Today's reality shows that the fight against extremism has sometimes been manipulated to achieve purposes and interests that have inadvertently contributed to the growing spread of extremism and religious hegemony.

Since the launch of the UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2015, several related programs have been launched around the world to reduce the growing threat of violent extremism. Many programs to prevent and combat violent extremism are implemented, in terms of the involvement of local civil society organizations, and international NGOs, which play an important role on the continent.

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Fragile states and weak governments in Africa continue to experience ongoing violence, including the use of extremism to trigger civil wars, political violence, insurgencies, and terrorism. In 2020, 20 of the 46 sub-Saharan countries were engaged in some form of armed conflict resulting from extremism (United-Nations, 2023).

The Sahel, Sahara, and East Africa regions have been prime focuses of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism in Africa, driven by the presence of extremist groups threatening U.S. and Western interests (Schraeder and Crouzel, 2005). American views on counterterrorism in Africa align with those of other Western countries, considering Africa's future wealth and strategic positions. The Sahel countries, located in the Sahara Desert and West Africa, are rich in oil, gas, gold, uranium, and other minerals (United-Nations, 2023).

In response to the military intervention in Mali following the adoption of UN Resolution 2085, France intervened against extremist groups with the support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This marked the first



cooperation between ECOWAS and France in combating terrorism. The primary objective was to support Mali in fighting terrorist groups advancing southward. However, while the official objective was geographically limited to Mali, the actual goals extended beyond its borders, as extremism is a cross-border phenomenon threatening French interests throughout the Sahel and West Africa. It can be argued that the strategic objective of the intervention in Mali was to protect French security, economic, and political interests in the Sahel and West Africa (Martial, 2013).

France's military intervention in Mali began with Operation Serval, later replaced by the Barkhane force in the Sahel region. France recognized that all Sahelian states were suffering from violent extremism spreading from Mali to the rest of the region, particularly the Sahel and West Africa. According to some security officials in the Sahel states, France decided to establish a sub-regional organization with a military force to help Sahelian states combat violent extremism, which poses a real threat to the region's development and investment. The establishment of the G5 Sahel and the Barkhane Force are key elements of change in the Sahel's geopolitics (Dieng, n.d.). The issue of combating violent extremism remains pertinent to foreign interventions in the region, as evidenced by French President Emmanuel Macron's speech last November, confirming the end of the Barkhane process and the announcement of a new strategy in Africa. The specifics of this new strategy, including its timeline and geographical scope, remain to be detailed (Boy and Rodrigues, 2022).

4. New strategies to combat extremism in the Lake Chad and the Sahel following the withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Burkina Faso

Since the Malian junta demanded the withdrawal of French military forces from the country, following 10 years of French presence in the fight against terrorist groups in the Sahel, relations between Paris and Bamako have deteriorated. On 15 August 2022, the French army completed its withdrawal from the country, and the last contingent of the Barkhane force in Malian territory crossed the border between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso amidst growing hostility towards France from the Transitional Authority and the local population. Despite some criticism of the efforts to combat terrorism by the Malian transitional authorities, they continue to reaffirm their commitment to work alongside all states that wish to fight terrorism and uphold the stability and coexistence of societies in West Africa (ICI.Radio-Canada.ca, 2022).

The French military presence in the region has been reduced by half to about 2,500 soldiers. Niger has agreed to maintain an air base in Niamey and support 250 French soldiers for its military operations on the borders of Mali and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma region). The deterioration in relations between Mali and France has led to the suspension of French public and humanitarian aid to Mali, and French NGOs have relocated their activities to other Sahel countries (Ismail, 2023).

Chad appears to continue hosting a French military base and force in N'Djamena, and France had hoped to keep a Special Forces battalion in Ouagadougou. However, on 18 February 2023, the French Special Forces announced their withdrawal from

Burkina Faso. This withdrawal followed the end of the one-month period granted to France to leave the country after the collapse of the military defence agreement between Paris and Ouagadougou. Since Captain Ibrahim Traoré came to power following a coup in September 2022, ending the presence of the French force "Sabre" was a primary demand of demonstrators, who regularly gathered in Burkina Faso's capital to support the Military Council. This mistrust grew as armed terrorist groups extended their control over the country, now controlling 40% of Burkina Faso's territory. Meanwhile, Paris is looking to other countries in West Africa to support efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism, with the Gulf of Guinea being a particularly sensitive area (Bensimon, Le Cam, and Vincent, 2023).

Most of the 400 French Special Forces have already left Ouagadougou, but the French "Sabre" force has relocated to other West African countries. France maintains reserve bases in the region, notably in Côte d'Ivoire, where it has one of its largest military bases on the African continent. In Niger, much of the French military equipment from the "Barkhane" force, which withdrew from Mali in 2022, is stationed. French President Emmanuel Macron stated on 13 July 2022 that French military interventions would take a different approach. France will not repeat its history in the Sahel (Mali and Burkina Faso) with a strong military presence but will instead assist countries requesting weapons and military training (Bensimon, Le Cam, and Vincent, 2023).

In Burkina Faso today, the political and security situation is dire. The country has been experiencing a growing deterioration for several years, with the effects of successive coups and the control of terrorist groups in various areas, especially in the centre and south near the border with Benin. About 40% of Burkina Faso's territory is controlled by terrorist groups, and there are nearly two million displaced people within Burkina Faso, as well as refugees in neighbouring countries (Gravellini, 2023).

In response to the recent deterioration of the security situation in Burkina Faso, the transitional authorities have adopted a new strategy by supporting the Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP). The authorities have recently recruited many civil society volunteers into the National Defence Corps to help the armed forces fight terrorism, a decision that concerns human rights defenders. President Traoré announced his appointment of a civil society organization leader as the head of the Volunteers for the Defence of the Nation (VDP) (BBC-Afrique, 2023).

Mali and Burkina Faso are currently pursuing strategies to achieve economic stability through the formation of several partnerships, with a preference for domestic mining companies and investments in natural resources, according to official statements by the transitional authorities of both countries.

In terms of military cooperation with external powers, Mali and Burkina Faso are looking to Russia, especially for security and military cooperation in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. It is not excluded that the Wagner Group is already supporting the Malian army in combating terrorism. Burkina Faso is now inspired by Mali's model of turning to Russia, involving Wagner's forces to strengthen its army and Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP) (Millecamps and Toulemonde,



2023). However, the President of the transition in Burkina Faso, when asked about the possible presence of Wagner mercenaries, replied that “if they claim we have Wagner, we tell them that the strength of the volunteers is like our Wagner.” (Tiéné, 2023).

The rise of anti-French sentiment in West Africa and the Sahel is striking against the backdrop of the war in Europe (Russia-Ukraine). This tension seems far from temporary, as demonstrations against French military bases are multiplying in Chad and Niger, where French troops are present. This is evidenced by the numerous diplomatic and political mistakes committed by France in the Sahel, and the continued support of the French authorities for the transitional government of Chad, despite its violation of the Transitional Charter, raising questions about the double standards in French politics.

In Niger, the fight against terrorism and reintegration efforts have adopted an approach combining military action and dialogue. This approach has gradually stabilized north-western Niger, allowing economic, agricultural, and pastoral activities to resume, as well as the distribution of food and free medical consultations in some parts of the country. In the Lake Chad basin, Nigerian authorities use dialogue and outreach policies to encourage disengagement among local populations fighting in terrorist groups, as part of a program supporting the surrender of veterans who have contributed to instability in the Diffa region (border with Nigeria), where Boko Haram is active. Niger's combined approach of dialogue and military action makes it an exception in the Central Sahel region, where the trend is toward increasing militarization of the fight against extremist groups (Koné, 2023).

On 10 February 2023, Niger suffered an attack on an army convoy in Banibangou, northeast of the Tillabéri region, bordering Mali and Burkina Faso. The attack resulted in 17 soldiers killed, 13 wounded, and 12 kidnapped, following a few months of calm in the region, which has seen several acts of terrorism over the past two years (Koné, 2023).

In Chad, since the institutional coup of 21 April 2021, the army has declared Mohamed Déby as interim president and head of the Military Council following the announcement of his father's death, Idriss Déby Itno. (“Tchad : le président promet la libération de 12 hommes accusés d’avoir tenté un ‘coup d’État’”, 2023). Demonstrations with slogans like “France, get out!” and “No to colonialism” have been held in N'Djamena against the French presence, accusing it of supporting the junta and inheriting power. Demonstrators have burned the French flag and sabotaged Total gas stations, symbolizing French influence. The Chadian transitional authority, particularly President Mohamed Déby, has been supported by the international community, France, the European Union, and the African Union, given the role of the Chadian army in combating terrorism in the Sahel and Lake Chad against Boko Haram (Le Figaro, 2022).

Regarding the G5 Sahel, after Mali's departure from the organization, many experts suggest that “a de facto Mali withdrawal indicates the death of the G5 Sahel.” Changes in the region, such as the withdrawal of French forces or differences within the G5 Sahel group, present opportunities for terrorist groups to demonstrate strength and expand. On 13 December 2022, the Sahelian branch of ISIS released a propaganda video

showing a ceremony of loyalty to the new caliph of the jihadist group, demonstrating its military capabilities with several hundred fighters, four months after the departure of the last French soldier from Mali (Hutton, 2022).

In the Sahel, terrorist groups operate openly. Since the French forces left the border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, terrorist groups have imposed control over many areas, outmatching local authorities and expanding their geographical reach. On 1 May 2023, northern Benin was hit by two attacks over consecutive days, killing twenty people in Kaoubagou and Kimbagou, likely by jihadists aiming to expand into the Gulf of Guinea (Lepidi, 2023).

The countries of the Gulf of Guinea are developing mechanisms to avoid falling into the same security issues as the Sahel. This includes the French president's visit to Cotonou, Benin, on 27 July 2022, and statements from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in December 2022, recognizing the creation of a "joint anti-terrorism task force" and the Accra Initiative as part of counter-terrorism efforts. France also announced its intention to launch a new military strategy in the coming months. The Gulf of Guinea countries are developing strategies to address societal issues and prevent recruitment by al-Qaeda or ISIS in the region (Guiffard, 2023).

5. Conclusion

The international scene is marked by current events, particularly the Russo-Ukrainian war, which concentrates global geopolitical changes and power relations. These events have a major impact on the African continent, which has been combating violent extremism for decades. Observers note strong competition between forces in Africa, particularly in the Sahel and Central Africa. In this context, Russia is striving to strengthen its presence on the African continent, aiming to replace the long-standing Western influence that has yielded disastrous results. Countries affected by violent extremism and terrorism remain underdeveloped and lack sufficient armed forces to combat extremist organizations.

Terrorism poses a serious threat to the security and stability of African states, exploiting domestic conditions and international coordination for proliferation and expansion. Terrorism combines extremist ideology with the execution of terrorist operations, representing a real challenge for the African continent and its societies. Addressing this issue requires a security strategy that considers the new changes in the global geopolitical context.

Since the onset of terrorism in the region, it has been a significant factor in restructuring the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. The international community has developed counter-terrorism strategies. Terrorist groups and extremist organizations in the Sahel, such as ISIL in the Sahara, JN, Boko Haram, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, are critical elements affecting security and stability in the region and across the African continent. The extremist religious ideology propagated by these groups enhances their ability to transcend national borders and mobilize militant organizations



in different regions. These groups exploit political, economic, and social crises in the Sahel to gain popular support and affiliation.

The violence and terrorism perpetrated by these groups undermine local governments and threaten state sovereignty and legal systems. Terrorist acts can interfere with the strategic interests of foreign states and major powers, prompting them to intervene in the region, including military missions to protect their interests. One of the challenges in combating terrorism is international and regional cooperation. Regional organizations such as the African Union and alliances like the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the G-5 Sahel (G5 Sahel) coordinate efforts to combat terrorism and promote security and development in the region. Strong states and international partners support these efforts in various ways, including training local security forces, sharing information and intelligence, and providing humanitarian assistance and development aid. Consequently, in the name of fighting terrorism in the Sahel, major powers have seized the opportunity to intervene militarily and build new cooperative relations with the countries of the region.

In general, combating terrorism and achieving geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel requires joint and coordinated efforts by African states and the international community (UN). These efforts should encompass military, security, economic, and political dimensions, focusing on addressing the root causes of ideological extremism and promoting stability and sustainable development in the region.

Notes on Contributors

Mady Ibrahim Kante, PhD in Political Science, is a teacher-researcher committed to the promotion of peace and security and respect for human rights, particularly those of women, in Africa. With recognized expertise in issues of governance, security and conflict prevention, gender, etc., he has held various academic and advisory positions across the continent. His work has covered a wide range of fields, from academic research to practical training in peacekeeping and counterterrorism, women peace, and security. He is an active contributor to academic literature on security challenges in Africa and has received awards for his ground-breaking work. Dr. Kanté is fluent in Soninke, Bambara, French, Arabic and English.

Conflict of Interests

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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