From GIA to the Islamic State (IS): De-radicalization as countering violent extremism strategy in Algeria[1]

Lotfi Sour[2]

Abstract:

Terrorism is not new to Algeria, it had a long history, which dating back to the early 80'. In fact, Islamic extremism in Algeria have indeed existed before the cancellation of the electoral process at the beginning of 1992. Following a series of deadly domestic terrorist attacks in 1990s, the Algerian government started developing robust counterterrorism and deradicalization methods comprising both military and non-military measures (commonly known as hard and soft approaches), to de-radicalize terrorists and insurgents across the country. Besides traditional security, military, and law-enforcement attempts to capture, jail, or eliminate terrorists, the Algerian government also launched a parallel strategy to combat the ideological justifications for violent radicalism and extremism within Algeria including a truce, a reconciliation process, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration programs by engaging non-state actors such as civil society, and zawiyyas, as well as investing in development. Today, Algeria, with its combination of a soft and hard approach, provides a successful example of how to neutralize terrorism after having defeated various terrorist groups between 1993 and 2003 and overseen a transition from civil war to peace since then. This paper outlines the Algerian government's attempts, approaches, and initiatives on combating terrorism and de-radicalization as well as analyses their strengths and limitations. It sketches how the Algerian government, especially since mid-90', dealt, engaged, overcame, and resolves issues and problems of terrorism and extremism. The purpose of the paper is present facts and information about the Algerian experience at fighting terrorism and Algeria's long struggle in the combat of extremist and terrorist threats. The paper also assesses and analyses the effectiveness and ineffectiveness, strengths, and weaknesses of the Algerian successive governments policies and approaches of counterterrorism.

Introduction

The phenomenon of terrorism in Algeria has undergone significant transformations, deeply rooted in the country's socio-political and historical context. The turning point came in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the political landscape of Algeria underwent dramatic changes. The introduction of political pluralism and the subsequent electoral success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1991 elections marked a critical juncture. The government's annulment of the elections and crackdown on the FIS led to a violent backlash, propelling the country into a decade-long civil war known as the "Black Decade." During this period, the Islamic movement fragmented, with some factions resorting to violent extremism as a means of achieving their goals. Groups such as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and later the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) engaged in brutal campaigns of terror against the state and civilians. This era was characterized by widespread atrocities, human rights violations, and a profound impact on Algerian society. Regionally, the Political unrest since the Arab spring and onward in the North Africa and the Sahel and its various implications created new security challenges, and shortcomings which made Algeria vulnerable to terrorist threats. Simultaneously, the various dimensions of each of these environments created a new pattern of terrorism, new violent groups, and a change in the geopolitics of the threat.

Due to its extensive history of animosity and confrontations with terrorist groups, Algeria has gained significant expertise in handling terrorism threats. This expertise underpins the Algerian strategy of deradicalization, which targets a comprehensive range of conditions, including political, economic, social, religious, security, and human rights aspects.

Central to this strategy is a multidimensional approach that integrates preventive, proactive, and reactive measures. Algeria's preventive measures focus on addressing the root causes of radicalization, such as socio-economic disparities, political disenfranchisement, and social alienation. By investing in education, economic development, and social cohesion programs, the government aims to create a more resilient society less susceptible to extremist ideologies. Proactive initiatives include robust intelligence and security operations that anticipate and neutralize potential threats before they materialize, thereby reducing the risk of terrorist activities. Furthermore, Algeria's reactive measures ensure a swift and effective response to terrorist incidents, minimizing their impact and preventing further escalation. The incorporation of religious reforms, emphasizing moderation and countering extremist narratives, has also played a crucial role in the country's strategy. Supported by substantial financial and logistical resources, these efforts have collectively contributed to Algeria's ability to remain largely free from major terrorist attacks in recent years. This paper delves into the intricacies of Algeria's deradicalization strategy, examining its components and effectiveness in fostering a secure and stable environment.

In this sense, out of the numerous questions that could arise, this paper focuses on the following:

Is terrorism in Algeria a local or global phenomenon or a mixture of the two? Is terrorism in the country a side effect or the product of international/transnational terrorism or home extremism?

What are the Algerian government's strategies and tactics in combating terrorism? What are the types of counterterrorism approaches and programs or anti-terrorism policies that the Algerian government used to fight terrorist threats since the early nineties until recently? Are the government's strategies, tactics, approaches, and programs effective, productive, and successful in combating terrorism and radicalism? What are the limitations and weaknesses of the counterterrorism approaches?

How can the Algerian counterterrorism expertise contribute to refining counterterrorism strategies and approaches regionally and internationally?

Historical review of violent extremism in Algeria

Despite the media coverage that terrorist groups in Algeria received starting from the winter of 1992, their history is not linked solely to this period. Numerous precedents clearly demonstrate that some Islamist factions have harboured a persistent desire to use armed violence and sabotage as political and practical means to achieve their ideologically driven agendas. (Layachi, 2004)

Armed Islamist groups are not a novelty in post-colonial Algeria. (Sour, 2016) The first instance of armed insurgency was the MIA (Mouvement Islamique Armé) from 1982 to 1987, led by Bouyali Mustapha until his death on February 3, 1987. Its operations were centred in Algiers and the surrounding region of Blida, with its most notorious action being the 1985 attack on the police school in Soumaa, which resulted in one policeman's death. The MIA is considered the precursor of Islamic radicalism in Algeria. (Berkouk, 1998)

Algeria's armed groups are ideologically, politically, and institutionally diverse. Despite efforts by some leaders to unite them, such as the Congress for Unity in May 1994, they remain numerous. The two most prominent groups are the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) and the AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut). The GIA is known for its sensationalist actions, (Friend, 2021) while the AIS, organized as a nationwide "army" and aligned with the historical leadership of the FIS (Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj), is the best-equipped and centrally controlled, led by Madani Mezrag. (Ashour, 2008) Created in spring 1994 by the FIS's internal leadership to avoid being led into a "fight to the death" by GIA extremists, the AIS targets security forces, condemns civilian and foreign killings, and had an estimated strength of 12,000-15,000 in November 1995. (Hafez, 2000) AIS and all the groups that are in no way affiliated to the GIA have ceased all their "military" activities after the call for a cease-fire that was initiated by the AIS after its approval by both the internal and external leaderships of the PIS. This cease-fire (effective from 1 October 1997) was seen by these groups as the best strategy for distancing themselves from the bloodshed. (Bedjaoui, et al., 1999)

The GIA, established in 1993 due to regime oppression and political disenchantment, represents a radical shift from peaceful politics to terrorism, initially gaining notoriety

for assassinating foreigners. By 1995, it comprised 2,000-4,000 armed insurgents but weakened after internal splits and the 1996 neutralization of its leader, Djamel Zitouni. (Sour, 2018)

During the years 1994 and 1995, this group, which had bolstered its ranks with dozens of young men joining the armed struggle, adopted strategies aimed at exhausting the adversary and inflicting maximum possible damage. (Martinez, 2001) Subsequently, it escalated its violence beyond targeting police, gendarmes, and soldiers to include intellectuals, university professors, doctors, journalists, and foreign nationals. The group then adopted a brutal criminal approach characterized by mass massacres affecting all segments of society, including children, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians who were not involved in the armed confrontation. (Roberts, 2003) Until mid-1995, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) dominated the bloody landscape, experimenting with every tool of killing, destruction, and terrorism, adopting a scorched earth policy. (Le Sueur, 2010) The severe blows dealt by the army further exacerbated the fragmentation and division that characterized the armed struggle scene afterward, leading to the formation of other groups such as the Islamic Movement for Preaching and Jihad (MIPD), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and the Islamic League for Preaching and Jihad (LIDD). (ICG, 2004)

The GIA fractured along doctrinal lines into Salafists (internationalists) and Djaza'rites (Algerianists). Key factions include the group led by Antar Zouabri (Abou Talha) and the "Front for Preaching and Jihad" led by Mustapha Kertali, comprising smaller units following Algerianist ideology. (Pennell, 2019) The primary goal of the GIA was the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria. By 1998, Hassan Hattab, a former GIA regional commander, established the GSPC. (Botha, 2008) The split was driven by ideological and strategic differences. Hattab and his followers opposed the GIA's indiscriminate violence against civilians, which they believed was counterproductive and morally unjustifiable. They sought to adopt a more focused approach, targeting the Algerian state and security forces while attempting to garner support from the local population and international jihadist networks. (Gunaratna, 2002)

At the onset of the first decade of the twenty-first century, some of these groups strengthened their ties with international jihadists and integrated into transnational organizations. Specifically, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) formally linked its relationship with al-Qaeda in September 2006 and, in January 2007, rebranded itself as "al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM). By the time the GSPC officially transformed into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the concept of global jihad in Algeria had effectively collapsed. (Nomikos & Burweila, 2008) Despite significant advances into the Sahara that alarmed U.S. policymakers, these activities were largely rooted in kidnappings for ransom and contraband trafficking rather than genuine global jihad efforts. (Boudali, 2007)

Post-9/11, the United States has viewed Algeria as a pivotal ally in the fight against terrorism. (Zoubir, 2002) The international prominence of AQIM lent credibility to Algeria's longstanding struggles, prompting the West to recognize Algeria's expertise in

countering transnational movements. This recognition underscored the necessity of addressing such movements through a coordinated international framework, grounded in a consensual and unambiguous legal definition of terrorism, free from religious or cultural biases. (Berkouk, 2009) The transition of terrorist activities in Algeria from a national to a regional level, and their integration into an international project, whereby remnants of armed groups have internationalized their affiliations and operated under the umbrellas of international organizations and movements, has reshaped the global terrorism landscape. This has allowed the progression of terrorist activities and their agendas to be fuelled by a new horizon and to operate according to more complex strategies and mechanisms. (Filiu, 2009) Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that Algeria has gained significant expertise in dealing with and managing this new form of terrorism, thanks to its experience with previous phases of armed activity, which remained confined to a few mountainous pockets in the north. This activity has since moved to a new topography in the south, expanding its operations across a vast desert area that encompasses all the Sahel countries. (Larémont, 2011)

The January 2013 attack on the In-Aménas gas facility in south eastern Algeria, bordering with Libya, starkly highlighted the persistent threat posed by radical groups to regional stability. Following the attack, there was a comprehensive overhaul of the country's security strategy. This process culminated in the reorganization of the intelligence agency that was primarily tasked with counterterrorism efforts. Algeria's strategy has thus emphasized increased regional cooperation, deemed essential for combating Islamist groups and criminal networks operating within Algeria and across the broader region. (Gaub, 2015)

AQIM, although weakened, maintained its presence in Algeria through small-scale attacks and attempts to rebuild its networks. Splinter groups, such as Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate), emerged during this period. Jund al-Khilafah pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, marking a significant development in the jihadist landscape in Algeria. The establishment of IS's so-called caliphate in 2014 inspired some Algerian militants to shift their allegiance from AQIM to IS. Jund al Khilafah became the most prominent IS-affiliated group in Algeria, though it never achieved the same level of operational capacity as AQIM. (Krzysztof, 2018) The Islamic State's "Wilayat Jazair," Algeria Province (ISAP) was the first African Islamic State cell to emerge, but was also one that fizzled out quite quickly. ISAP was established by Abdelmalek Gouri, a former senior figure in AQIM, who pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in September 2014; this pledge was officially accepted two months later. ISAP gained significant attention in 2014 for capturing and beheading French hiker Hervé Gourdel, releasing a video of the execution as retaliation for France's airstrikes in Iraq. (Bencherif, 2017)

In this context, IS has leveraged existing extremist networks to establish a foothold, although it faces competition from other jihadist groups. (Gartenstein-Ross, et al., 2017) Since then, the group has drawn members from at least four other AQIM splinter factions and has carried out attacks in Jijel, Constantine, Tiaret, the outskirts of Algiers,

Skikda, and Annaba, with the most recent attack taking place in August 2017. (Lounnas, 2018) It also succeeded in running a short-lived outpost in Jabel Ouahch, overlooking the city of Constantine in north-eastern Algeria, from which it launched several assassinations, IED ambushes and at least one (failed) suicide bombing. However, throughout the course of ISAP's existence, it has faced sustained and often intense pressure from Algerian security forces, on one hand, and antagonistic elements of AQIM, on the other, limiting its growth. When Gouri killed in 2014, The New York Times, referencing anonymous sources, estimated that ISAP had a membership of fewer than 30 fighters. (Zerdoumi, 2014)

Nonetheless, the elimination of its leader, Gouri, by Algerian security forces following Gourdel's death, likely played a significant role in the group's subsequent decline. In 2015, Algerian forces further weakened the organization by eliminating 21 additional ISAP members, thereby neutralizing a considerable portion of an already diminishing group. Presently, experts in the field question whether ISAP's presence is substantial enough to merit serious discussion. Consequently, it can be inferred that the active presence of Islamic State fighters in Algeria is minimal, with estimates suggesting fewer than 25 fighters, if any. The effective neutralization of key terrorist leaders and the dismantling of their networks have significantly hindered the ability of groups like the Islamic State to establish a strong foothold in Algeria. Moreover, Algeria's approach has had a deterrent effect, discouraging the proliferation of extremist ideologies and movements across its borders, thereby contributing to regional stability. (International Crisis Group, 2017) Nevertheless, persistent socio-economic issues and political instability continue to pose challenges, underlining the need for sustained and multifaceted strategies to ensure long-term regional security.

Algerian Approaches to de-radicalization

Generally speaking, Algeria's response to the violent extremism that plagued the nation during the 1990s civil war prompted a robust and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. Key legislative measures include the 1992 Anti-Terrorism Law, which granted sweeping powers to security forces, and subsequent amendments to adapt to emerging threats in an attempt to strike a balance between security and human rights. This approach takes into consideration criticisms from international human rights organizations regarding alleged abuses and emphasizes the need for judicial oversight. (SPS, 2016)

The Legal and Legislative Framework for Preventing and Combating Terrorism

In fact, the legislative framework has historically suffered from a clear gap regarding terrorism as a phenomenon that needs to be combated and prevented. This gap was addressed by the promulgation of Legislative Decree No. 92-03 (issued on September 30, 1992) concerning the fight against sabotage and terrorism. Article 1 of this decree

defines sabotage and terrorism as "any offense aimed at the security of the state, territorial integrity, the stability of institutions, and their normal functioning through any act with the following purposes: spreading terror among the population, creating an atmosphere of insecurity through attacks on individuals, endangering their lives, freedoms, or security, or damaging their properties." (JORA, 1992)

The decree also addresses various forms of terrorism such as obstructing traffic or freedom of movement on public roads and squares, attacks on the environment, means of communication and transportation, public and private properties, and occupying or seizing them without legal justification. Furthermore, it includes attacking symbols of the Republic, obstructing the functioning of public institutions, attacking their personnel or properties, and hindering the enforcement of laws and regulations. (JORA, 1992)

The Legislative Decree No. 93-05 (dated April 19, 1993), which amends and supplements Decree No. 92-03 on combating sabotage and terrorism, retains this definition. (JORA, 1993) It was incorporated into Article 87 bis of the Penal Code, following Presidential Decree No. 95-11 (issued on February 25, 1995) (JORA, 1995), which amended and supplemented Decree No. 66-156 (dated June 8, 1966) concerning the Penal Code. (JORA, 1966)

Accordingly, the Algerian legislator aimed through these three decrees to adapt the criminal reality to the new and complex nature of terrorism as a national and transnational scourge. These provisions clearly demonstrate that Algerian legislation regarding the fight against terrorism and sabotage combines prevention, deterrence, and repression of all foundational activities of terrorism. This includes supporting, justifying, promoting, or concealing such activities, acknowledging that terrorism is a transnational phenomenon requiring international and regional cooperation, while insisting on punishing any Algerian involved in such acts. (Bras, 2007)

To enforce the legislative frameworks for terrorism and sabotage, the Algerian legislator reconstructed the rules and mechanisms for criminalizing terrorist and sabotage activities while safeguarding the rights of defendants in cases brought before Algerian courts. Law No. 01-08 (issued on June 26, 2001), which amended and supplemented Presidential Decree No. 66-155 (dated June 8, 1966) concerning the Code of Criminal Procedure, serves as the new reference text for suppressing terrorist acts. (JORA, 1966)

As discussed earlier, it becomes evident that the legislative provisions on preventing and combating terrorism were initially limited, prompting the introduction and amendment of new laws to address the dynamic, complex, and multifaceted nature of terrorism. Despite the repressive nature of the punitive framework for terrorism, and the effectiveness of the security approach in mitigating the escalation of terrorist phenomena in Algeria and maintaining the state's institutions, the cost was substantial at human, material, and political levels. Consequently, starting in 1995, the public authorities-initiated laws aimed at delegitimizing terrorist groups religiously, removing their political cover, which they used to justify their actions since the electoral process was halted in 1992. This approach sought to garner national support for gradual and progressive initiatives based on a comprehensive equation combining religious

repentance, legal amnesty, and political reconciliation. Thus, the approach transitioned from purely security-based to a combined security-political strategy. (Bahar, 2021)

Algerian context of deradicalization program: Presidential Amnesty Program PAP

Among the legal frameworks implemented by the public authorities starting in 1995 to address the security and political challenges posed by the escalating brutality of terrorism, a new perspective was required. This perspective integrated social, religious, political, legal, and practical dimensions to dismantle terrorist groups and their support networks. By offering partial incentives for members to renounce criminal and destructive acts, three main initiatives can be identified:

Rahma Law (Clemency Law);
The civil concord law (Civil Harmony law);
The charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.

These will be analysed in terms of their scope and content, as well as how these legal instruments fit into the broader context of Algeria's counter-terrorism policies, aiming to address the root causes of extremism through a combination of legal, social, and political strategies.

Rahma Law (clemency law)

The clemency measures were established by Presidential Order No. 95-12 (issued on 25-02-1995) and were based on Article 87 bis 3 of the Penal Code, which grants amnesty to those involved unless they have killed someone, caused permanent disability, or used explosives to harm people or property. (JORA, 1995)

This law primarily addressed individuals who joined terrorist groups that had deviated from the state's public order, using religion to declare the state and society as infidels and wage war against them. The law viewed terrorists as mercenaries and criminals but also as misguided individuals who had strayed from the path of law, truth, and religion. They were called to repent to God and benefit from the Clemency Measures, which provided an opportunity for exemption from legal prosecution, provided they did not commit blood crimes, honor crimes, or bombings, on the condition of declaring final repentance and renouncing the crimes they were involved in. Those who handed over weapons and explosives voluntarily to the relevant administrative and security authorities were also eligible for these measures. (Boumghar, 2015)

The key provisions of the Clemency Law included:

- Reducing the death sentence to 15-20 years imprisonment.
- Reducing life imprisonment to 10-15 years.

- In other cases, reducing the penalty by half as specified in Article 4 of the law.

Despite being an exceptional law, beneficiaries of the Clemency Measures were still subject to the constitutional amnesty provisions (Article 5).

To facilitate the benefit from these measures, the Algerian legislator set forth special procedures as outlined in Articles 6 and 7, summarized as follows:

- Voluntary appearance of those involved in terrorist activities before the judiciary or administrative, security, or military authorities to surrender and receive a receipt for their appearance.
- Referral to criminal courts after verifying their mental and psychological health through medical examination. (JORA, 1995)

These measures not only encouraged numerous terrorists to abandon their criminal activities and submit to the law but also effectively removed the political cover from these groups, especially after the Islamic Salvation Army (the military wing of the dissolved Islamic Salvation Front) announced the cessation of its terrorist operations starting from October 1, 1997. This development deprived the groups, which previously justified violence due to the annulment of the legislative election results of December 26, 1991, of a crucial mobilizing argument. (McDougall, 2017)

The law's implementation faced various challenges, including ensuring the credibility of the process and balancing justice with forgiveness. Despite these hurdles, the clemency law contributed to a decrease in terrorist activities and facilitated the demobilization of numerous combatants. It underscored the importance of legal frameworks that blend punitive and restorative justice measures, promoting long-term stability and peace in Algeria. However, despite the positive outcomes achieved by this law, it was insufficient due to the increasing extremism and radicalization of terrorist groups that refused to benefit from its provisions. (Martinez, Luis, & Entelis John, 2000) These groups committed heinous massacres, sparing neither women, children, men, nor the elderly, including infants and foetuses. Such brutality was unprecedented in human history, surpassing even the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. (McDougall, 2017) In response to this internal crisis, Abdelaziz Bouteflika proposed in his political program as a candidate for the early presidential elections of April 1999 to elevate the clemency measures to a Civil Concord policy, which was implemented immediately after he took office. (MacQueen, 2009)

Civil Concord Policy CCP

President Bouteflika, right after taking the constitutional oath, outlined the Civil Concord policy in his speeches, officially announcing his plan to adopt a policy of conciliatory for armed individuals willing to repent in a speech to the nation on May 29, 1999. (Maamri, 2010) This policy and the Civil Concord Law were developed starting from the Presidential statement on June 6, 1999, which tasked the government

with preparing this project and presenting it to the Parliament for discussion before it was overwhelmingly approved by the lower house (the National People's Assembly) on July 8, 1999, and the upper house with an absolute majority. (Boumghar, 2015) The Civil Concord Law (No. 99-08) was issued on July 13, 1999, and subsequently put to a public referendum, in line with the President's insistence on granting it political and constitutional legitimacy. (Le Sueur, 2010) The results of the referendum on September 16, 1996, reflected the Algerian people's desire to end the cycle of violence and terrorism, with outcomes comparable to those of the independence referendum on July 3, 1962, with over 98.03% approval. The highest participation rates were in provinces most affected by terrorism, such as Chlef (94.76%), Ain Defla (93.70%), Blida (90.93%), Jijel (91.74%), Médéa (93.55%), and Relizane (90.48%). (JORA, 1999) Most of these provinces recorded positive vote rates exceeding 99%, indicating that the residents, including the families of terrorism victims and terrorists, not only participated massively in the referendum but also voted in favor of the Civil Concord initiative. (Ammar, 2018) (Stora, 2001) By the end of 1999 about 80% of the insurgents had surrendered. (Cordesman, 2001)

This broad citizen response was due to the hopes raised by the Civil Concord policy to end the suffering of Algerians. The Civil Concord Law provided measures for those involved in terrorist acts, categorized into three types:

A. Exemption from Prosecution: This extended the provisions of the Clemency Law, adhering to the principle of the more lenient law for the accused. This included those who belonged to terrorist groups but did not commit blood crimes or honour crimes and publicly declared their repentance (Article 3 of the Civil Concord Law). It also included those who possessed weapons and explosives and surrendered them to the public authorities according to Article 4 of the same law. (Ruedy, 2005) The beneficiaries of these measures had to adhere to a set of commitments according to Article 5 of the law, meaning the reduction of the sentence was accompanied by the deprivation of certain rights specified in Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code for ten years from the date of the exemption decision. (JORA, 1999)

B. Placement under probation measures: These are the second category of measures established by the Civil Concord Law for those involved in terrorist acts, as specified in Articles 06 to 26. Probation here means a temporary delay in prosecution for a specified period ranging from three to ten years to ensure the complete reformation of the person subject to it (Article 6). These measures were a way for the Algerian authorities to express their desire to give those who fought against them a chance to review themselves and repent, proving their sincerity and righteousness before any judgment was passed. It was a new procedure established for the first time by the Algerian legislator, managed by regional probation committees. (Jørgensen, 2000)

The categories eligible for probation measures were divided into two groups as defined in Articles 7 and 8:

- The first category included individuals who previously belonged to terrorist organizations and did not commit or participate in committing crimes leading to death or mass killing, did not use explosives in public places, did not commit rape crimes, and expressed their repentance individually or collectively (Article 7). (JORA, 1999)
- The second category included individuals who previously belonged to terrorist organizations, committed individual murders and rapes but did not commit mass murders or use explosives in public places, and declared their repentance collectively (Article 8). (JORA, 1999)

To benefit from the probation measures, the project set several conditions and procedures:

- Informing the concerned authorities of the cessation of all terrorist or subversive activities individually or collectively before January 13, 2000.
- Voluntarily presenting themselves to the concerned authorities individually or collectively.
- Submitting a statement containing information about the weapons, explosives, and ammunition in their possession, as well as the actions they committed or participated in.
- Surrendering weapons and ammunition to the competent authorities within the deadline of January 13, 2000 (Articles 7 and 8). (JORA, 1999)

C. Sentence Mitigation Measures: These measures are outlined in Articles 27 to 29 of Chapter Four of the law, as exceptional measures that encompass three categories of those involved:

- Individuals who were previously affiliated with terrorist organizations and committed acts of individual murder or rape, who were not permitted to benefit from the deferment system, in accordance with Article 27 of this law. (JORA, 1999)
- Individuals who were previously affiliated with terrorist organizations and committed acts of individual murder or rape, who benefited from deferment measures and successfully completed them, as per Article 28 of this law. (JORA, 1999)
- Individuals who were previously affiliated with terrorist organizations and committed repeated murders, mass killings, or used explosives in public places or frequented areas. (JORA, 1999)

The Civil Concord Law granted the concerned authorities and the probation committees the freedom to apply the measures they deemed necessary and appropriate for the interest of the person subject to them, as well as for public security and order. (Abderrahmane, 2001) The Civil Concord Law emphasized national reconciliation and social stability, offering a legal framework for dialogue and forgiveness amidst a backdrop of pervasive violence and political turmoil. By pardoning certain offenses related to the civil conflict, it sought to foster a climate of peace and national unity, although its implementation and effectiveness have been subject to scrutiny and debate. (Martinez, 1999) The law's provisions included mechanisms for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, aiming to dismantle armed groups and reintegrate their members into civilian life. This legal instrument reflected Algeria's dual approach of stringent security measures alongside efforts towards reconciliation and societal healing, aiming to address the root causes of extremism through legal and social strategies. (Boumghar, 2015)

The charter for peace and National Reconciliation CPNR

Despite the significant results achieved through the Clemency Measures and the Civil Concord policy, which led to the surrender of thousands of terrorists and the dismantling of many terrorist networks, there were still groups that continued their criminal activities. (Arnould, 2007) These were primarily small factions within large organizations like the GSPC and other extremist splinter groups that rejected all forms of reconciliation. Given this persistent threat, the Algerian authorities, under the leadership of President Bouteflika, introduced the National Reconciliation and Peace Initiative to address the remaining challenges. (Joffé, 2008)

This initiative aimed to consolidate the gains from the previous measures, provide additional incentives for terrorists to lay down arms, and promote social cohesion and national unity. It was characterized by a comprehensive approach that included political, economic, and social dimensions, reflecting the multifaceted nature of the problem and the need for a holistic solution. (Tamburini, 2021)

The National Reconciliation and Peace Initiative involved several key components:

- Strengthening the legal framework to provide clearer guidelines and more robust mechanisms for dealing with terrorism.
- Enhancing social and economic support for reintegration programs to help former terrorists transition back into society.
- Promoting a culture of tolerance and understanding through educational and media campaigns to counteract extremist ideologies. (Boumghar, 2015)

This initiative underscored the importance of addressing the root causes of terrorism, such as socio-economic disparities, political grievances, and ideological indoctrination, while maintaining a firm stance against those who continued to engage in violent activities. It reflected a strategic shift from purely security-focused measures to a more

comprehensive approach that sought to create lasting peace and stability in Algeria. (Abderrahmane, 2007)

By examining these three main initiatives, it becomes clear that Algeria's response to terrorism involved a dynamic and evolving strategy that adapted to the changing nature of the threat. The combination of legal, social, and political measures aimed to dismantle terrorist networks, reintegrate former terrorists, and address the underlying issues that fuelled extremism. This multifaceted approach highlights the complexity of combating terrorism and the need for a nuanced and sustained effort to achieve long-term security and peace.

This document, which emerged as a complementary initiative to the Civil Concord process, focuses on several core ideas within the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, issued on August 14, 2005, and overwhelmingly approved by the populace in the referendum held on September 29, 2005, with a majority of 97.38%. (Tlemçani, 2008) These include:

a. Gratitude to Security Forces: The Charter calls upon the Algerian people to express their gratitude to the members of the various security and self-defence forces who saved the Algerian Republic. As stated in the Charter: "The Algerian people are eternally grateful to the souls of those who martyred themselves for the survival of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria." The Charter acknowledges the role of security and self-defence forces in combating terrorism and urges the populace to stand against any attempts to undermine state institutions or tarnish their reputation domestically or internationally, especially the National People's Army and the self-defence elements who fought terrorism. (Le Sueur, 2010)

b. Implementation of Measures for Peace: The Charter invites the people to endorse a series of measures aimed at establishing peace, including:

c. Cancellation of Judicial Prosecutions: This pertains to armed individuals who surrendered to the authorities after the period allocated for repentance under the Civil Concord (January 13, 2000), including:

d. Amnesty;

e. Commutation or Reduction of Sentences: For those not covered by the above measures, including wanted individuals or those with final sentences. This implies that individuals involved in mass killings, violations of sanctities, and public bombings, who were not included in the amnesty measures, are given the chance to benefit from sentence reductions if they surrender to the authorities.

f. Reintegration of repentant: The Charter emphasizes the reintegration of repentant benefiting from the Civil Concord and the removal of any harassment against them. (JORA, 2006)

g. Rehabilitation of Dismissed Employees: The Charter calls for the resolution of cases involving individuals dismissed from their jobs due to

their political orientations by reinstating them and settling their social status permanently. (JORA, 2006)

h. Exclusion from Political Practice: The Charter prohibits individuals who manipulated religion, called for jihad against the state, or were involved in violence from political practice, holding them responsible for the crisis. It states: "Although the Algerian people are ready to forgive, they cannot forget the tragic consequences brought upon them by the distortion of Islam, the state religion. They assert their right to prevent a recurrence of such misguidance and decisively reject any political activity under any guise by those responsible for this religious distortion." (JORA, 2006)

i. Resolution of the Disappeared: The Charter acknowledges the disappeared as victims of the national tragedy, offering material compensation and attributing their disappearance to terrorists while recognizing isolated cases involving security personnel. Despite exonerating the state from the phenomenon of disappearances, the Charter acknowledges its civil responsibility to address the issue and its social repercussions through material compensation for the victims' families. (JORA, 2006)

j. Support for Families of Terrorists: The Charter calls for the support of terrorist families, recognizing them as victims of the national tragedy, to promote national cohesion. (JORA, 2006)

To achieve these objectives and uphold these values and principles, several executive texts were issued in February 2006, beginning with Government Ordinance 06-01 (February 27, 2006), which aimed to implement peace-establishing measures. Additional texts issued on February 28, 2006, include:

- Decree 06-93 regarding compensation for victims of the national tragedy.
- Decree 06-94 concerning the reinstatement of families impacted by terrorism.
- Presidential Decree 06-95 outlining the procedures for the surrender of individuals involved in terrorist acts and the handover of weapons and materials used in terrorism before the end of the specified period (six months), which concluded at the end of August 2006. (JORA, 2006)

Based on the aforementioned points, it is apparent that while Algeria's legal approach has seen successes in mitigating terrorist activities, there remains a need for continuous reforms to enhance transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights within the counter-terrorism framework. In addition, the Algerian experience encompasses not only legal frameworks for combating terrorism on the ground but also a human security approach combining law, justice, and socio-economic integration measures (non-coercive measures) for former terrorists, while honouring the sacrifices of security forces

and the army in preserving Algeria's republican character and eradicating a notorious terrorism movement rarely seen elsewhere in the world.

Boosting De-radicalization Capabilities

In the context of undermining the climate that incubates terrorism and inhibits the resentment towards young people against the state, the state was keen to announce the abolition of the state of emergency in 2011, which had been in place for twenty consecutive years. (Tamburini, 2020)

In order to dry up the sources of support and financing of terrorism, the Algeria has also made extensive amendments, including redefining the legal definition of terrorist financing and criminalizing the financing of both terrorist individuals and terrorist organizations, as well as making substantial amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering Law, prohibiting the opening of any anonymous or numbered bank accounts, and obliging financial institutions to report transactions suspected of being linked to any crime, especially terrorism, to the Counter-Terrorism Committee. For the most part, it is not mechanized and therefore relies on old methods. (Euromed Justice, 2018) In the same context, the State added to the Penal Code some provisions that expanded the scope and competencies of the law to include supporters of foreign fighters and their whereabouts, in response to Security Council Resolution 2178.

Counter narrative as a tool in deradicalization

The political tools and measures used by the Algeria in the framework of combating terrorism varied between internal political tools aimed at containing the phenomenon, and external ones aimed at drying up the sources of terrorism and raising the capabilities of the Algeria to confront threats.

Internally, the state has upheld national reconciliation through President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's "Charter for Peace and Reconciliation." (Dutour, 2008) The Algerian state also allowed the existence of Islamic organizational alternatives for Islamists, especially radicals, represented in the "Salafi Scientific Call", which constituted an alternative to Algerians supporting the Islamic Salvation Front and others ideologically affiliated with Salafi-jihadism, as well as the Movement of Society for Peace, which the state allowed to be established to contain young people who have lost confidence in Islamist parties, led by the Ennahda and Reform Party. The state also left room for movement to the Algerian Ennahda Movement and the National Reform Movement, which are ideologically affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. (Ghanem, 2019) In the same context, the state announced in 2012 the opening of the way for the establishment and publicity of new political parties, until the number of political parties in Algeria so far reached 70 political parties, after it was frozen at 24 parties before this date. (US department of state, 2023) A number of laws were enacted since 2012 to reform the political life of the country, the most important of which are four organic laws passed by the parliament:

Law 12-01 related to the electoral system.
Law 12-04 related to the establishment of political parties.
Law 12-06 concerning the right to establish associations.
Law 12-05, the new media law, which opened the door to freedom of expression and allowed private audiovisual media. (Zoubir & Aghrout, 2012)

It is noteworthy that the package of political reforms launched by the Algerian government coincided with what has been called the Arab Spring revolutions. Moreover, many observers refer to an Algerian exception in this regard, due to Algeria's experience with the "black decade" of the 1990s. This period, characterized by a brutal civil war between the government and Islamist insurgents, left a profound impact on the collective psyche of the nation. (Volpi, 2013) The conflict resulted in over 200,000 deaths and created a strong aversion to widespread violence and instability. This memory served as a deterrent against widespread unrest during the wave of uprisings that swept across the Arab world in 2011, as many Algerians were wary of descending into similar chaos. (Dessì, 2012)

The dismantling of extremism and the fight against terrorism, according to the Algerian vision, entails the need to rehabilitate Algeria's religious reference and the values of moderation and tolerance, and to preserve the country's cultural heritage from destructive ideas, with the need to recover mosques from fanatics and takfiris, redefine the educational and social role of religious places of worship, prevent extremist and inflammatory sermons at Friday prayers, and ban any activity that promotes extremist ideology and incites violence. In its early efforts to address extremism, Algeria has implemented a series of measures through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. These measures aim to restore the proper role of religious institutions, ensuring they become strongholds against extremist ideologies and behaviours. (SPS, 2016) The state also decided to regulate religious fatwas in Algeria with the aim of combating any misinterpretation of Islamic heritage, where a national observatory to combat religious extremism and to safeguard the national religious framework will be established, whose mission will be to discuss phenomena related to religious extremism, as well as propose solutions and provide decision-makers with appropriate recommendations in this field. (Counter extremism project, 2023) Moreover, the observatory promotes the values of tolerance, moderation, and peace according to the principles of the Islamic faith.

At the level of official religious discourse, this discourse focused on rejecting exaggeration, extremism and violence and upholding the values of tolerance, which can be evidenced by several evidence, including the content of the Algerian Holy Quran Radio, as well as the memorandum of cooperation prepared by the government between the ministries of interior, communication, education and religious affairs, which stipulated the launch of specialized websites to combat fatwas used by extremists. Additionally, Algeria has introduced a system for revising and employing imams and female religious guides, who play a crucial role in awareness and education against extremism. (IPI, 2010) The Algerian authorities are also relying heavily on Sufi orders

and Quranic schools to succeed in the "strategy of dismantling extremism and fighting terrorism", which the state is betting on to spread the image of moderate Islam and counter extremist ideas among young people. (Hasan, et al., 2012)

In this context, the Algerian government has sought to co-opt Sufi orders as part of its strategy to maintain control and legitimacy. This involves promoting Sufism as a moderate, state-friendly form of Islam to counter radical Islamist narratives. By aligning with Sufi leaders, the government aimed to enhance its religious legitimacy and exert social control, presenting Sufism as a stabilizing force in contrast to the violence of the past. Sufi orders have regained cultural and social significance, having increasingly engaged in political discourse, advocating for social cohesion and participating in dialogues on national identity and unity. This re-emergence underscores their role in promoting a peaceful, spiritual form of Islam. (Werenfels, 2014) In addition, students in Algerian schools are now receiving the values of republicanism, democracy, citizenship, respect for law and the other, the power of the majority and the rights of minorities, as well as the values of national identity with Arabic and Islamic reference, as well as Islamic education inspired by the religious reference of the State and the human and moral values advocated by Islam. (Ministry of foreign affairs Algeria, 2015)

Algeria's efforts to counter extremist narratives also involve preventing the incitement of sectarian and ethnic strife, which are often fuelled by radical and extremist positions. By collaborating with neighbouring countries, especially in the Sahel region, Algeria seeks to mitigate the spread of extremist groups and the influence of radical ideologies. The strategic position of Algeria makes it pivotal in preventing the flow of fighters and curbing extremist activities in the broader region. In 2013, Algeria established the Council of Ulemas, Preachers, and Imams of the Sahel, which includes eight countries (Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Chad, and later Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire). This council aims to combat extremism and promote peace and tolerance through coordinated religious discourse. (Meddi, 2021)

According to the 2020 Global Terrorism Index, Algeria was among the countries that recorded "no deaths for the first time since at least 2011." (Peace, 2020) This remarkable improvement is primarily due to Algeria's intensive counterterrorism operations in its border regions over the past decade. Additionally, government-led deradicalization programs have played a significant role in the recent decline in terrorism-related fatalities. Another highly significant indicator is that Algeria stands out as one of the Maghreb and Arab countries with the least involvement of its youth in terrorist movements. Several factors contribute to this pathological phenomenon, including comprehensive counterterrorism strategies and socio-economic measures that have significantly reduced the allure of extremist groups among Algerian youth. According to the International Crisis Group, Algeria has effectively curbed the influence of extremist groups like ISIS in the region. (International Crisis Group, 2017) Algeria's robust counterterrorism efforts and strategic initiatives have made it less susceptible to youth radicalization and preventing the recruitment of Algerian youth by extremist groups compared to neighbouring countries such as Tunisia and Libya. (Barrett, 2017)

Socio-economic programs as deradicalization tool

Algeria's strategy to combat violent extremism in all of its shapes and forms is built on the dual pillars of security and development, aiming to elevate the living standards of its population and eradicate marginalization and social exclusion, particularly among youth susceptible to radicalization and terrorism due to unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods, who, while often described as reservoir of radicalization, have also served as incubators for de-radicalization. (Ministry of foreign affairs Algeria, 2015) In pursuit of this strategy, Algeria launched developmental economic programs to address the setbacks resulting from stalled infrastructure projects in the 1990s, such as the Economic Revival Program (2001-2004), followed by the Complementary Growth Support Program (2005-2009), and the Economic and Social Development Program (2010-2014), allocated with 21,214 billion Algerian dinars. This funding was distributed across three sub-programs: improving living conditions received the largest share at 45.5%, followed by infrastructure development at 38.52%, and economic development support at 16.05%. Subsequently, the Economic Growth Consolidation Program (2015-2019) was allocated $262 billion to sustain social gains by prioritizing improvements in living conditions, rationalizing social transfers, supporting underprivileged working classes, and achieving a 7% GDP growth rate by 2019. (Talahite, 2022)

These allocations resulted in overall economic indicators improvement, with per capita GDP rising from $4,473.5 in 2010 to $5,498.1 in 2014, peaking at $5,504 in 2013. Additionally, inflation rates decreased to 2.9% in 2014, and unemployment dropped from 10% initially to 9% by 2014. (Macrotrends, 2024) Over 1.6 million young people benefited from professional integration, while approximately 800,000 youth participated in employment and integration contracts. This strategic approach underscores Algeria's comprehensive efforts to foster socio-economic stability and mitigate factors conducive to extremism and terrorism within its borders. (Musette, et al., 2013)

Limitations and challenges of Algeria's deradicalization program

Despite the tangible positive results achieved by the Algerian counter-terrorism strategy, there remain some weaknesses or gaps in this strategy, whose negative impact may increase in the future, especially in light of the escalating challenges, most notably:

1- Addressing Root Causes: While Algeria has made efforts to address some of the root causes of radicalization, such as political grievances and social injustices, these efforts have not always been comprehensive or consistent. (Cragin, 2021) Addressing the underlying issues that contribute to radicalization is essential for the long-term success of deradicalization strategies.

2- The state's excessive reliance on religious forces and parties, whether as an alternative incubator for individuals with Islamic orientations or as economic and social actors

playing some of the state's roles, may inadvertently strengthen the influence of these groups in Algerian society. This is especially true in light of the political environment in recent years, which has allowed some of them to gain real popularity. Conversely, Algerian deradicalization programs have often failed to effectively engage critical stakeholders such as civil society organizations. These organizations face significant restrictions and are frequently under tight government control, limiting their ability to contribute meaningfully to deradicalization efforts, which benefit from diverse societal input and support. (Hasan, et al., 2012)

3- Emptying some counter-terrorism mechanisms of their meaning and then losing an integral part of their positive impact, perhaps the most prominent example of this is the state's intransigence in implementing the "Charter for Peace and Reconciliation", where the state deprives terrorists integrated into society from exercising their political rights, which may prevent some terrorists from retracting their ideas and pushing them to adhere to their radical approach and rely on violence as a mechanism for changing society. The absence of independent oversight bodies meant that the effectiveness of the reconciliation measures was difficult to assess and improve. (Bahar, 2021)

4- Excessive preferential treatment of security services and army employees to ensure their loyalty, as this behavior has a number of negative effects, perhaps the most prominent of which is provoking the anger of a large segment of Algerians, especially with the deterioration of their economic and social conditions.

5- The absence of the human rights dimension from the strategy, which in turn leads to the involvement of some employees of the security services in incidents of torture and extrajudicial killings, especially in light of the state's disregard for holding negligent security personnel accountable, which may push some to think about revenge, thus reproducing the idea of taking up arms and adopting violence against the state. While it aimed to address internal conflict, the lack of accountability for serious human rights violations was at odds with international norms, attracting criticism from human rights organizations. (Mundy, 2014)

6- In the context of drying up the sources of financing of terrorism, the Algerian strategy has tried, as much as possible, to contain the defects of the banking system in Algeria and to impose more supervision on the banking sector, without finding radical solutions to address these defects, which contribute significantly to the expansion of the informal economy, which is difficult for the state to track or eradicate. (FATF, 2023)

7- Ideological Rigor: The programs tend to focus heavily on religious re-education, which may not be sufficient to counter all forms of extremist ideologies despite efforts to promote a more moderate interpretation of Islam. Also, the influence of external

extremist groups and ideologies, particularly through online platforms, complicates local deradicalization efforts. (Hasan, et al., 2012)

8- The implementation of deradicalization programs has been inconsistent across different regions in Algeria. Variations in local governance and resource allocation have led to uneven application of these efforts, often excluding marginalized communities, particularly in rural and underdeveloped areas, resulting in unequal program effectiveness across the country. The national social map reveals that approximately 15,000 shaded regions, housing nearly eight million Algerians out of a total population of about forty-three million, live in difficult conditions, lacking even the most basic necessities. This persists despite efforts to promote development in previously poor municipalities. Notably, these regions include rural areas, villages, and municipalities surrounding major cities like Algiers, with 299 shaded regions registered in its vicinity. In response, the Algerian government prepared an emergency program specifically targeting deprived areas, known as the Emergency Program for Shadow Regions. This program aims to improve living conditions in these areas and provide essential services to reduce social disparities across the country, achieve balanced development between rural and urban areas, and establish social justice among the population. (APS, 2021)

9- There is a lack of rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of deradicalization programs, making it difficult to measure success and make necessary adjustments.

10- The legacy of the civil strife (1991-2002) left deep societal divisions and trauma. The reconciliation process did not fully address the psychological and emotional healing needed in communities affected by years of violence, leaving lingering tensions and mistrust. Unlike successful transitional justice models in other countries like South Africa, Algeria's approach did not fully engage in truth-telling or reconciliation efforts. There was no robust mechanism for uncovering the full extent of the abuses or for providing a platform for victims to share their stories. (Tlemçani, 2008)

11- The long-term sustainability of peace and stability remained uncertain, as the measures taken did not fully eliminate the conditions conducive to radicalization. The absence of comprehensive reforms meant that the risk of resurgence of extremist activities persisted.

These points highlight the multifaceted challenges faced by deradicalization programs in Algeria, emphasizing the complex nature of efforts in environments deeply affected by conflict and extremism. They underscore the need for comprehensive, well-resourced, and human rights-compliant approaches to effectively address radicalization. Addressing these challenges necessitates holistic approaches integrating security measures with socio-economic development and psychosocial support.

Conclusion:

Algeria's extensive experience in counter-terrorism, honed through decades of conflict with extremist groups, has positioned it as a model for other nations confronting similar threats. The country's robust security measures, coupled with efforts to address the root causes of extremism, have fostered a relatively stable internal environment amidst regional volatility. This stability not only bolsters Algeria's national security but also contributes to the broader security of the Maghreb and Sahel regions, where terrorism and insurgency persist as significant challenges.

The success of Algeria's approach is attributed to its adaptability and comprehensiveness, striking a balance between punitive measures and incentives for reintegration, thereby markedly reducing militant activities and enhancing national stability. Similar deradicalization programs inspired by Algeria's strategy are emerging across the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. The recognition that combating extremism requires more than just stringent security measures has prompted other nations to adopt Algeria's approach, marking a notable achievement in the global fight against terrorism. In its deradicalization strategy, the Algerian government has embraced non-coercive measures, emphasizing the importance of integrating amnesty measures with robust security operations, socio-economic development, and community engagement. This shift from purely military responses to a more inclusive approach acknowledges the social and political dimensions of terrorism effectively. By addressing grievances, fostering local partnerships, and promoting socioeconomic opportunities, Algeria aims to undercut the appeal of extremism and build resilience within its communities. This holistic approach not only enhances security but also promotes long-term stability and societal cohesion, crucial for sustainable peace and development.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributors

Lotfi Sour is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Mustapha Stambouli University of Mascara. His articles have appeared in numerous journals. His research is at the intersection of radicalism and politics, with a focus on the Algerian Politics. His research interests include Euromed, gender, race and ethnicity. His current research examines how minorities, specifically women, democratically represented are and where do inequalities in political engagement persist.

References

Abderrahmane, M. (2007). Algérie, La réconciliation entre espoirs et malentendus. *Politique étrangère*(2), 339-350. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.072.0339

Algérie Presse Service (APS). (2021). *Plus de 13.500 zones d'ombre recensées à juin 2021*. Retrieved July 20, 2024 from https://www.aps.dz/regions/124651-plus-de-13-500-zones-d-ombre-recensees-a-juin-2021

Ammar, B. (2018). *Les voies de la paix, Rahma, concorde et réconciliation dans le monde. Alge*. Éditions Anep.

Arnould, V. (2007). Amnesty, peace and reconciliation in Algeria. *Conflict, Security & Development*, *7*(2), 227-253. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800701333028

Ashour, O. (2008). Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures. *The Middle East Institute*(21), 3.

Bahar, M. (2021). *Les politiques de pardon adoptées dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme en Algérie : entre exigences morales et contraintes politiques*. Université de Bordeaux.

Barrett, R. (2017). *Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees*. The Soufan Center.

Bedjaoui, Y., Aroua , A., & Aït-Larbi, M. (1999). *An Inquiry into the Algerian Massacres*. Hoggar.

Bencherif, A. (2020). From Resilience to Fragmentation: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Jihadist Group Modularity. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *32*(1), 100-118. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1351956

Berkouk, M. (1998). The Algerian Islamic Movement From Protest to Confrontation: A Study in Systemic Conflagrations. *Intellectual Discourse*, *6*(1), 43.

Berkouk, M. (2009). *U.S.–Algerian Security Cooperation and the War on Terror*. Retrieved july 15, 2024 from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2009/06/us-algerian-security-cooperation-and-the-war-on-terror?lang=en

Botha. (2008). *Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism: ISS Monograph Series, Pretoria*. Institute of Security Studies.

Boudali, L. K. (2007). *The GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad*. The Combating Terrorism Center United States Military Academy West Point. DOI: https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA466539

Boumghar, M. (2015). Concorde civile » et « Réconciliation nationale » sous le sceau de l'impunité : le traitement par le droit algérien des violations graves des droits de l'homme commises durant la guerre civile des années 1990. *Revue internationale de droit comparé*, *67*(2), 359-367. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3406/ridc.2015.20507

Bras, J. P. (2007). *Le Maghreb dans la guerre contre le terrorisme: enjeux juridiques et politiques des législations -anti-terroristes* (Vol. 2). L'Année du Maghreb. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/anneemaghreb.153

Cordesman, A. H. (2001). *A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb. Conn.* Westport.

Counter extremism project. (2023). *Algeria: Extremism and Terrorism.* Retrieved July 15, 2024 from https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/algeria-extremism-and-terrorism

Cragin, R. K. (2021). Preventing the Next Wave of Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Lessons Learned from the Experiences of Algeria and Tunisia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44*(7), 543-564. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1568005

Dessì, A. (2012). *Algeria: Cosmetic Change or Actual Reform?* Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).

Dutour, N. (2008). Algérie : de la Concorde civile à la Charte pourla Paix et la Réconciliation nationale : amnistie, amnésie, impunité. *Mouvements, 1*(53), 47. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3917/mouv.053.0144

Euromed Justice. (2018). *egal and Gaps Analysis Terrorist financing.* Retrieved July 13, 2024 from https://euromedjustice.eu/wp content/uploads/publications/6_lga_terrorist_financing_en_0.pdf

FATF. (2023). *Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures s in the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria.* MENAFATF.

Filiu, J. P. (2009a). *Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Filiu, J. P. (2009b). The local and global jihad of Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib. *Middle East Journal, 63*(2), 218-220. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3751/63.2.12

Friend, A. H. (2021). *The roots of terrorism in North and West Africa. Dans: M. A. Sheehan, E. Marquardt & L. Collins, éds. Routledge Handbook of U.S. Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare Operations. 1st Edition.* Routledge. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003164500-9

Gartenstein-Ross, D., Zenn, J., & Barr, N. (2017). *Islamic State 2021:Possible Futures in North and West Africa, Washington.* The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Gaub, F. (2015). *Algeria's army: on jihadist alert.* European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

Ghanem, D. (2019). *The Shifting Foundations of Political Islam in Algeria,* . Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Gunaratna, R. (2002). *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror New York.* Columbia University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7312/guna12692

Hafez, M. M. (2000). Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria. *Middle East Journal, 54*(04), 572-591.

Hasan, N., Hendriks, B., Janssen, F., & Meijer, R. (2012). Counter¬Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. *Netherlands Institute of International Relations.*

International Crisis Group. (2017). *How the Islamic State Rose, Fell and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb, Brussels.* International Crisis Group. Retrieved July 15, 2024 from

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2004). *Islamism, violence and reform in Algeria: turning the page.* International Crisis Group.

International Peace Institute (IPI). (2010). *A New Approach? Deradicalization Programs and Counterterrorism.* International Peace Institute.

JoffÉ, G. (2008). National Reconciliation and General Amnesty in Algeria. *Mediterranean Politics*, *13*(2), 213-228. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13629390802127539

JORA. (1966a). *Ordonnance n°66-155 modifiée et complétée, portant code de procédure pénale.* Retrieved July 20, 2024 from https://www.joradp.dz/HFR/Index.htm

JORA. (1966b). *Ordonnance n° 66-156 portant code pénal.* Retrieved July 20, 2024 from https://www.joradp.dz/FTP/Jo-Francais/1966/F1966049.pdf

JORA. (1992). *Legislative decree No 92-03 on the fight against subversion and terrorism.* Retrieved July 20, 2024 from

JORA. (1993). *Décret législatif n° 93-05 modifiant et complétant le décret législatif n° 92-03.* Retrieved July 20, 2024 from https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Algeria/DZ_Decret_legislatif_93-05_1993.pdf

JORA. (1995a). *Ordonnance n° 95-11 modifiant et complétant l'ordonnance n° 66-156 du 8 juin 1966.* Retrieved July 20, 2024 from https://www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/1995/F1995011.PDF

JORA. (1995b). *Ordonnance n° 95-12 portant mesures de clémence.* Retrieved July 19, 2024 from https://www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/1995/F1995011.PDF

JORA. (1999a). *Loi n° 99-08 du 13 juillet 1999 relative au rétablissement de la concorde civile.* Retrieved July 19, 2024 from https://www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/1999/F1999046.PDF

JORA. (1999b). *Proclamation no. 02, correspondant relative aux résultats du référendum du 16 septembre 1999.* Retrieved July 20, 2024 from https://www.joradp.dz/FTP/jo-francais/1999/F1999066.PDF

JORA. (2006). *The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.* Retrieved July 19, 2024 from https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Algeria-Charter_ordinance06-02.pdf

Jørgensen, N. H. B. (2000). The Scope and Effect of the Algerian Law Relating to the Reestablishment of Civil Concord. *Leiden Journal of International Law*, *13*(3), 681-694. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156500000431

Krzysztof, I. (2018). What happens after the Islamic State of Caliphate is destroyed? Current state and trends in global terrorism threats. *Internal Security Review*, *19*(10), 306.

Larémont, R. R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. *African Security*, *4*(4), 242-268. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2011.628630

Layachi, A. (2004). Political liberalisation and the islamist movement in algeria. *The Journal of North African Studies*, *9*, 46 - 67.

Le Sueur, J. D. (2010).*) Between Terror and Democracy: Algeria Since 1989*. Fernwood Publishing. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350218390

Lounnas, D. (2018). *Jihadist Groups in North Africa and the Sahel: Between Disintegration, Reconfiguration and Resilience*. Istituto Affari Internazionali.

Maamri, M. R. (2010). Algerian President's Peace Plan: Political and Psychological Perspectives of Forgiveness. In (pp. 141-148). Brill. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9781848880481_016

MacQueen, B. (2009). *Political culture and conflict resolution in the Arab World: Lebanon and Algeria*. Melbourne University Publishing.

Macrotrends. (2024). *Algeria GDP Per Capita 1960-2024*. Retrieved July 19, 2024 from https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/DZA/algeria/gdp-per-capita

Martinez, L. (1999). Les obstacles à la politique de réconciliation nationale. *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, *38*, 119-136.

Martinez, L. (2001). Algérie : les massacres de civils dans la guerre. *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, *08*(01), 43-58. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3917/ripc.081.0043

Martinez, L., & Entelis, J. (2000). *The Algerian Civil War*. Columbia University Press.

McDougall, J. (2017). *A History of Algeria*. Cambridge University Press.

Meddi, A. (2021). *Contre le djihadisme, les oulémas du Sahel proposent leur manuel*. Retrieved July 16, 2024 from https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/contre-le-djihadisme-les-oulemas-du-sahel-proposent-leur-manuel-20-12-2021-2457632_3826.php#11

Ministry of foreign affairs Algeria. (2015). *lgeria and deradecalization an experience to share*. Retrieved July 19, 2024 from https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/PCVE/Algeria.pdf

Moussaoui, A. (2001). La concorde civile en Algérie. Entre mémoire et histoire. In A. Mahiou & J. Henry (Eds.), *Où va l'Algérie?* (Vol. 71-92). Karthala. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/books.iremam.399

Mundy, J. (2014). Transitional Justice: Algeria and the Violence of National Reconciliation. In D. B. Monk & J. Mundy (Eds.), *The Post-Conflict Environment: Investigation and Critique* (pp. 120). University of Michigan Press.

Musette, M. S., Lassassi , M., & Meziani, M. M. (2012). *Employment Policies and Active Labour Market Programs in Algeria*. European Training Foundation (ETF).

Nomikos, J. M., & Burweila, A. (2009). Another Frontier to Fight: International Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism in North Africa. *International Journal of*

Intelligence   and   CounterIntelligence,   *22*(1),   50-88.   DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600802254822

Peace, I. F. E. (2020). *Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*.
Retrieved   July   12,   2024   from   https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf

Pennell, C. R. (2021). The Algerian State, Islamist Insurgents, and Civilians Caught in
Double Jeopardy by the Violence of the Civil War of the 1990s. *Terrorism and
Political   Violence*,   *33*(7),   1447-1468.   DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1629910

Roberts, H. (2003). *The Battlefield: Algeria 1988–2002*. Verso.

Ruedy, J. (2005). *Modern Algeria: The origins and development of a nation (2nd
edition)*. Indiana University Press.

Society for Policy Studies (SPS). (2016). *De-radicalization in Algeria: A success story*.
Society for Policy Studies.

Sour, L. (2016). Understanding political Islam in Algeria: experiences, past and present.
Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, *16*(1), 121-137.

Sour, L. (2018). Islamic Insurgency in Algeria: An Operational Causal Analysis. *Revista
UNISCI / UNISCI Journal*(47), 18. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31439/UNISCI-1

Stora, B. (2001). *La guerre invisible: Algérie, années 90*. Presses de Sciences po. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.3917/scpo.stora.2001.01

Talahite, F., & Patnaik, P. (2021). Monetary Policy in Algeria (1999–2019): An economic
and monetary history approach. In M. B. Gadha, F. Kaboub, K. Koddenbrock, I.
Mahmoud, & N. S. Sylla (Eds.), *Economic and Monetary Sovereignty in 21st
Century   Africa*   (1   ed.,   pp.   105-128).   Pluto   Press.   DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv244ssnb.8

Tamburini, F. (2020). The State of Emergency and Exception in Algeria, Morocco and
Tunisia: The 'License to Kill' the Rule of Law? *Journal of Asian and African
Studies*, *56*(6), 1286-1303. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909620962530

Tamburini, F. (2021). Who Controls the Past Controls the Future: How Algeria
Manipulated History and Legitimated Power Using its Constitutional Charters
and Legislation. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *57*(2), 226-246. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096211013416

Tlemçani, R. (2008). *Algeria Under Bouteflika:Civil Strife and National Reconciliation*.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

United States Department of State. (2023). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Algeria*. Retrieved July 15, 2024 from https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-
country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/algeria/

Volpi, F. (2013). Algeria versus the Arab Spring. *Journal of Democracy*, *24*(3), 104-115.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2013.0040

Werenfels, I. (2014). Beyond authoritarian upgrading: the re-emergence of Sufi orders
in Maghrebi politics. *The Journal of North African Studies*, *19*(3), 275-295. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2013.858036

Zerdoumi, A. J. (2014). Algerian Army Kills Militant Leader Linked to Beheading of French Hostage. *New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/world/africa/algerian-army-kills-militant-leader-linked-to-beheading-of-french-hostage.html

Zoubir, Y. H. (2002). Algeria and U.S. interests: containing radical Islamism and promoting democracy. *Middle East Policy*, *20*(1), 77-78.

Zoubir , Y. H., & Aghrout , A. (2012). Algeria's Path to Reform: Authentic Change? *Middle East Policy*, *19*(2), 66.83.