Terrorism as a Challenge
for Promotion of Human Security in Africa

A case study of Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province[1]

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Abstract:

The increasingly transnational and multifaceted nature of terrorism calls for a strong multilateral response. States have the primary responsibility for protecting their populations from the threats posed by terrorism. At the same time, given the often cross-regional nature of the terrorist threat, mechanisms for effective cooperation are needed at the global and regional levels. To this end, the international, continental and regional organisations have an important role to play. Human security is relevant in understanding terrorism and counterterrorism approaches. Using Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province as a case study, this paper seeks to address how and why terrorism creates challenges in promoting human security in the province. The purpose of the paper is to assess the extent to which terrorism has a real and direct impact on human security, with devastating consequences for the government and citizens. The paper argues that terrorism creates terror, a feeling of insecurity, and the idea that leaders can no longer protect those they lead. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilize governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development. The key issues to be appraised include discussion of the causes of conflict in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, terrorism as a major threat to human security in Cabo Delgado province, the international and regional interventions in the province and government intervention.

Introduction

Terrorism has become part of our daily lives. There are daily reports about assassination, political kidnapping, hijacking or bombing incidents around the world. The increasing number of incidents of terrorism in the past decade meant terrorism has become one of the rising concerns to governments around the world and of increasing interest to scholars. The terrorism term has no precise or widely accepted definition. One of the reasons for this, especially in Africa as quoted from Darrell Trent in 1974, is that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014). The problem of defining terrorism is characterized by the fact that the word terrorism has become a trend often applied to different acts of violence which are not strictly defined as terrorism. Some government label as terrorism all acts of violence committed by their political opponents, while anti-government extremists frequently claim to be government terror victims. Thus, the definition of terrorism depends on one's point of view (Becker, 2006).

Terrorism can be understood to refer to acts of violence targeting civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims (Ganor, 1999). The international community is yet to adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism. The existing United Nations (UN) declarations, resolutions and universal sectoral treaties related to specific terrorism aspects have defined certain acts and elements of the concept. At its fifty-first session, the General Assembly through its resolution 49/60 approved the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and stated that terrorism includes acts intended to provoke state of terror in general public, a group of persons for political purposes and that such acts are unjustifiable even if political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious reasons are given to justify the act (United Nations,1994). Ten years later in 2004, the Security Council in its resolution 1566 referred criminal acts including against civilians, committed with the aim to cause death or serious bodily harm, taking hostages with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons, population intimidation, compelling government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (United Nations, 2004).

Later in 2004, the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change emphasized this definition by identifying several key elements that must be included in the definition of terrorism. Such as recognition in the UN preamble that state use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments and constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity. Reiteration that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Convention and protocol. Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism and a declaration that they are a crime under the international law. Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 of 2004 (United Nations, 2004).

In Africa, terrorism is not defined, and the closest definition comes from the 35th Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government which adopted the Organisation of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention) in July 1999 (OAU, 1999). This definition elucidates what a terrorist act is in Article 1 of the OAU Convention. The Convention further encompasses the nature of Africa in Article 3(1) which gives exemptions of terrorist acts as struggles waged in the pursuit of liberation, self-determination including colonialism, occupation aggression and domination by foreign forces. This exemption is fundamental in Africa as it protects freedom fighters from being labelled as terrorists (OAU, 1999). States can however circumvent this by refusing to ratify the Convention (OAU, 1999). Therefore, the United Nations definitions are clearly outlined but the coverage of the Algiers Convention is more detailed and has more protection especially about human security.

Terrorism aims at the very destruction of human rights, human security, democracy and the rule of law. It attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments such as respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules governing armed conflict and the protection of civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict (Nelles, 2003).Terrorist acts can destabilize governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, threaten social and economic development, and may especially negatively affect certain groups (OHCHR, 2008). Furthermore, terrorism threatens dignity and human security everywhere, endangers or takes innocent lives, creates an environment that destroys people's freedom from fear, jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and aims at the destruction of human security (OHCHR, 2008).

Terrorism has an adverse effect on the establishment of rule of law, undermines pluralistic civil society, aims at the destruction of the democratic bases of society, and destabilizes legitimately constituted governments. It also threatens the territorial integrity and security of states, constitutes a grave violation of the purpose and principles of the UN, is a threat to international peace and security, and must be suppressed as an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security (OHCHR, 2008). The direct destructive impact of terrorism on human security has been recognized at the highest level of the UN, notably by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the former Commission on Human Rights and the new Human Rights Council (OHCHR, 2008).

Background and causes of conflict in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province

Cabo Delgado is a province in north-eastern Mozambique bordering the neighbouring country of Tanzania. The province is an ethnic stronghold of the Makonde tribe, with the leading minority ethnic groups of Makua and Mwani. The capital city of the province is Pemba, with Montepuez and Mocimboa da Praia as the other two big towns. Although Mozambique is a majority Christian country, two northern provinces have an Islamic majority. The province of

Niassa has 61 percent and Cabo Delgado has 54 percent Islamic majority. The coastal administrative posts are also predominantly Muslim (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2017).

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is an ongoing conflict in the province shaped by religion and fought between Islamic militants with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in the region and the Mozambican security forces (Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, 2020). The main militant group is Ansar al Sunna (supporters of the tradition), which is also known by its original name Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo ((ASWJ) translated adepts of the prophetic tradition), locals call them Al-Shabaab even though they are a separate organization from the Somali Al-Shabaab (Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, 2020). The Islamic State (ISIS) has claimed ties with the Al-Shabaab in Mozambique. The militant group was originally a religious movement when it was formed in 2008 by followers of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a Kenyan Muslim cleric with the aim of advocating for the formation of an Islamic State in Kenya in a peaceful manner. Sheikh Rogo assisted in the bombing of the Embassy of the United States of America in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and was later sanctioned by the USA and the UN for providing support to Al-Shabaab (Obaji Jr, 2021). Following the death of Sheikh Rogo in 2012, many of his followers settled in Tanzania, before moving to Mozambique's northern district of Cabo Delgado around 2015, where they encouraged mosques in Mocimboa da Praia to adopt Sheikh Rogo's interpretation of Islam (Obaji Jr, 2021). However, given this information, the majority of the Al-Shabaab group members in the province of Cabo Delgado are mostly Mozambicans from Mocimboa da Praia, Palma and Macomia districts, with some foreign nationals from Tanzania and Somalia (Obaji Jr, 2021).

The militant group argues that the Islamic practice in Mozambique has been corrupted and no longer follows Muhammad's teachings (Morier-Genoud, 2019). Based on this argument the group's members entered traditional mosques with weapons to threaten worshippers to follow their own radical beliefs. The movement is anti-Christian, anti-Animist, anti-Western. Based on the argument that attending schools and going to hospitals is secular and anti-Islamic, they tried to prevent people from going to such institutions (Morier-Genoud, 2019). The group became increasingly violent overtime by calling for the implementation of Sharia law in the country, refused to recognize the Mozambican government and formed hidden camps in Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia and Montepuez Districts. The militant group received training in the hidden camps, recruited other Islamist militants in East Africa and some journeyed abroad to receive direct training by other militant groups. The group funds itself through heroin, contraband and ivory trade (Hussein Mohammed, 2018). Although religion plays a fundamental role in the conflict, the most important factors behind the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado province are widespread social, economic and political challenges in Mozambique (Hussein Mohammed, 2018).

The social and economic factors behind the terrorist attacks are the exclusion, marginalization, and poverty of the local communities, who see no potential gains from the gas megaproject (Hussein Mohammed, 2018). Other factors fuelling the insurgency include youth unemployment, increasing inequalities, widespread corruption in the officialdom and

political exclusion. Young people who join the group are promised that the movement will act as an antidote to corruption and elitist rule. Many members of the group belong to the native Mwani and Makwa ethnic groups in the province. The two ethnic groups have expressed their sympathy to the movement because their province lacks infrastructure and has the largest rate of state underrepresentation (Hussein Mohammed, 2018).

Although the militant group has been operating and committing terrorist attacks in the province for a long time, it was the events on the 5th of October 2017 that caught the attention of government and the international community (Saide et al, 2019). On this day the militant group staged their first attack in the province where they raided police barracks in Mocimboa da Praia district, ambushed vehicles, beheaded civilians and expanded their territorial reach by attacking new towns. The militant group captured the Cabo Delgado province, the fishing harbour of Mocimboa da Praia town and the connected roads of N380 and N381. The capture of the connected roads allowed them to secure a steady revenue stream through illicit trade in minerals and taxation prevalent in the province. Mocimboa da Praia town has been a key transit point for narcotics over a period of forty years, mostly from Afghanistan and Pakistan (Saide et al, 2019).

Since the capture of Mocímboa da Praia, the militant group has expanded their controlled territory to large stretches along the main N380 and N381 highways connecting Mocímboa da Praia to the provincial capital Pemba in the south of the province. Other towns such as Macomia, Muidumbe and in late March 2021, Palma have fallen under the control of the insurgents. Most of these towns have been attacked several times since 2017. As of June, the militant attacks and security force operations in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province had claimed nearly 3,000 lives, while displacing hundreds of thousands of people (ICG, 2021).

In response to the attacks, the government deployed military force to the province, to stop the militants from advancing towards the provincial capital Pemba and destroying some of their camps, however, they were unable to neutralise them. The group resurfaced and in March 2021, with the help of ISIS, they attacked Palma, the operational hub of a multi-billion-dollar French gas project of Total Energies. The group targeted shops, banks and military barracks (Renon, 2021). The fighting in Palma left more than 2500 people dead, 700 000 displaced and hundreds of both locals and foreigners were rescued from the area after the attack (Renon, 2021).

Terrorism as a major threat to human security in Mozambique

Since October 2017, Al-Shabaab has been staging attacks in the northern Cabo Delgado province, chasing away central government as well as the local population. The terrorist attacks have led to major human security issues in the province. Between April 2020 and April 2021, the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) more than quadrupled, from 172,000 to over 732,000 (OCHA, 2021). Around 45% of all IDPs were children, and over 90% of the

displaced lived with host families. Since 2020, increased violations against civilians, including killings, beheadings, and kidnappings, have been reported in Cabo Delgado. Furthermore, between January–June 2021, more than 9,600 people who sought refuge in Tanzania had to return to Mozambique through the Negomano border point in Mueda district. There is an urgent need for food, shelter, health, and protection. An estimated 1.3 million people in the three provinces of Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado (around 12% of the total regional population) need humanitarian assistance and protection (OCHA, 2021).

Following the March attacks in Palma, in 2021, nearly 104,635 people were displaced from Palma district; 77% lived within host communities, and 23% resided in one of the 29 displacement sites across Cabo Delgado (in Ancuabe, Chiure, Metuge, Montepuez, Mueda, Nangade, and Pemba districts) (OCHA, 2021). The humanitarian evacuations by air were suspended in April, from Palma. As a result of the suspension, the armed group targeted civilians who tried to flee to other areas by road or sea. Those who remained in Palma district urgently needed humanitarian assistance. IDPs need access to food, shelter, and health services. There was also a need for psychological support for displaced individuals, separated families, and unaccompanied minors. Continued and increasing levels of conflict and displacement have resulted in protection needs. Overcrowding in shelters and a lack of livelihood opportunities increased the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. Women and girls are at particular risk of kidnapping, rape, forced marriage, and forced prostitution (OCHA, 2021).

While the conflict has been going on since 2017, it has received very little political attention from regional governments or international organisations, except those interested in Mozambique's gas reserves or private military contracts (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021). Much less attention has been given to the growing number of displaced people and the critical humanitarian crisis facing the province (Whittall, 2021). The human security issues in Cabo Delgado have been neglected. The attention from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and the Mozambican government's international backers has been fixed almost exclusively on fighting terrorism. When a country is experiencing acts of terrorism, there are always fears that the proposed government solutions to tackle the terrorist attacks may overlook the urgent need to save lives and alleviate the suffering of communities affected by scores of conflicts (Whittall, 2021). Hundreds of thousands of people have fled violence and insecurity and they have ended up living in overcrowded camps or being hosted by local communities with already limited resources.

People have experienced significant trauma such as decapitation and kidnapping of family members as well as missing family members. Terrorist attacks lead to a situation whereby many people walk for days to find safety after hiding in the bushes, often without food and water. Others remain in locations where humanitarian organisations cannot reach them because of the ongoing insecurity. These acts therefore, instill fear, insecurity and lack of access to the basic needs for survival such as food, water, shelter and urgent healthcare services (Whittall, 2021).

Thus, in many cases acts of terrorism such as those from Syria to Iraq and Afghanistan lead to counter-terrorism operations generating additional human security issues while limiting humanitarian response. When government publicly labels a group as a terrorist group, they push the group underground. This makes dialogue opportunities with the group difficult and complex and this has a significant impact on human security and humanitarian access to the affected areas captured by the militant group. To uphold human security and impartially provide humanitarian assistance to affected areas, humanitarian workers are compelled to negotiate with any group that controls a territory (Whittall, 2021).

Government response

The Mozambican government failed to adequately respond to and address the scale of the terrorist attacks. The government opted for a security response to the unrest in Cabo Delgado rather than addressing the root causes of the insurgency such as poverty, marginalization, expropriation, and lack of jobs. Furthermore the government intervention failed to address the fact that the province is one of the poorest in the country, with a predominantly Muslim population that feels neglected by the largely Christian ruling elite in Maputo, the country's capital located in the south (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021). The region is home to major gas reserves (worth more than 50 billion USD), which foreign energy companies have been actively extracting without any of the profits benefiting local populations (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021).

Against the broader socio-economic background to the crisis, the governmental response to Al-Shabaab's rise has first and foremost been one of force. Following the attacks in 2017, it sent in a special rapid reaction unit of the national police, the *Unidade Intervenção Rapida* (UIR, or rapid intervention unit), supported by the national military (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021). However, in part because Maputo had been put under foreign pressure to prioritise economic development over defence spending after its long civil war (1977-1992), these forces were insufficiently equipped and trained, and suffered from low morale. According to local reports, this led to security services refusing to defend towns such as Mocímboa da Praia, which was eventually captured by Al-Shabaab (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021).

The government's response has not only suffered from a lack of resources. Several human rights groups have accused government forces of arbitrary arrest waves and detentions, torture and extrajudicial executions of both Al-Shabaab members and civilians suspected of collaborating with the group (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021). The national police supported by the national military lacked operational preparation and coordination, which exacerbated tensions because the government downplayed the severity of the situation and argued that the attacks were part of a foreign conspiracy to keep the country poor. Thus, refusing to acknowledge the existing local grievances that fuelled the anti-governmental sentiments among many people in Cabo Delgado (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021). The

government has also repressed, detained and expelled Mozambican and foreign journalists who tried to report on the attacks. The government prevented journalists from reporting about the attacks fearing that foreign industrial partners and investors would withdraw from the country. However, the French energy company Total responded to the attacks by suspending its operations in northern Mozambique due to "force majeure" in April 2021 (Demuynck and Weijenberg, 2021).

Aware of its limited capacity to counter Al-Shabaab, the government searched for ways to support its security forces. However, the government has been strikingly hesitant to accept or request foreign military support. This hesitancy by the government was met with bewilderment by countries who were ready to help, especially the neighbouring South Africa (Cilliers et al., 2021). In early 2021, the Mozambican government accepted the deployment of small Portuguese and US military missions even though for a long time it had remained reluctant towards conducting larger and more operational missions in the country.

The main reluctancy by the government to request for help from other countries was over concerns of national sovereignty. The reluctancy was further based on the wariness by the ruling socialist Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (translated Liberation Front of Mozambique) (FRELIMO) party of relying on other states for fear of imperialism. The government also generally distrusts several of its neighbours, accusing Tanzania of sponsoring Al-Shabaab and experiencing increasing strain in the traditionally warm relationship with Zimbabwe due to a border conflict. Nevertheless, critics also pointed to the fact that Cabo Delgado has long been a crucial hub for illicit trafficking of heroin between Asia and Africa as another reason and motivation for Mozambican government's reluctancy to request for international assistance (Cilliers et al., 2021). This trade is believed to be highly beneficial to several people close to the president, thus it was believed a military intervention will subject the government to external security (Cilliers et al., 2021).

International Intervention

Several countries, including the United States, France, and Portugal offered support to the Mozambican government to fight the insurgency. Portugal and Mozambique signed a new military cooperation accord in May 2021 to help confront a growing jihadist threat by beefing up training, notably of special forces (News24, 2021). Both the United States and France tried to intervene in Cabo Delgado by becoming involved in patrolling the coast of Cabo Delgado (Hanlon, 2020). The USA is supporting the Mozambican government's counter-narcotics efforts by helping them disrupt some of the transnational organized crime at sea through more effective patrolling (Hanlon, 2020). The French intervention in Mozambique entailed a military maritime cooperation agreement in the context of possible support in the fight against insurgents in Cabo Delgado. The French Armed Forces of the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean (FAZSOI) have been promoting military cooperation, by conducting training with the Mozambican authorities on state action at sea (Hanlon, 2020).

The European Union (EU) adopted a decision setting up an EU military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). The aim of the mission is to train and support the Mozambican armed forces in protecting the civilian population and restoring safety and security in Cabo Delgado province (Council of the EU, 2021). The mandate of the mission is planned to last for two years. During this period, the strategic objective of the mission will be to support the capacity building of the units of the Mozambican armed forces that will be part of a future Quick Reaction Force. The mission also provides military training including operational preparation, specialised training on counter-terrorism, and training and education on the protection of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law (Council of the EU, 2021).

The Mozambican government also welcomed the Russian intervention by signing an agreement on mineral resources, energy, defence, and security. Russian energy giant Rosneft signed an agreement at the same time with Mozambique's state-owned energy company to help develop gas fields (Peters, 2020).

The regional intervention

The SADC heads of state approved the mandate of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force mission to the Republic of Mozambique during their extraordinary summit of SADC heads of state and government (Moffat, 2021). The deployment of the Standby Force is in support of Mozambican efforts to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. The decision endorsing the recommendation of a technical team deployed in Mozambique was taken following the summit held in Maputo in April 2021. SADC members at the summit agreed on the deployment of a 3000 strong joint military force comprising land, air and naval capabilities. The deployment of the Standby Force falls under the framework of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact and is in line with the United Nation's "responsibility to protect principle" to prevent human catastrophe (Moffat, 2021).

The SADC mission in Mozambique was formally launched on 9 August 2021. The Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is comprised of troops from Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, and includes troops from Angola, Rwanda and Tanzania (ISS, 2021). The troops were deployed to the conflict-ridden province of Cabo Delgado to help fight against violent extremism. The decision to deploy troops to Cabo Delgado prevented the risk of non-African solutions in the Southern African region where lucrative natural resources prompted fears of the "Iraqification" (militarization and foreign agenda) of Mozambique (ISS, 2021).

This development was welcomed by many local and international observers that had advocated for a Southern African state to mobilize and help Mozambican forces to restore security and ensure civilian protection against attacks in Cabo Delgado (Moffat, 2021). The intervention by SADC has been perceived as the best chance of getting a response that is

comprehensive and serves the region. The arguments made in favour of the regional intervention are fear of the attacks spilling over into Mozambique's neighbouring states and the need for a coordinated response including tough cross-border intelligence to manage jihadist infiltration (Moffat, 2021). Moreover, it is in the regional powers' interest to find a durable solution to prevent attacks from escalating further.

The legal basis for the African Union's intervention in Cabo Delgado

The human security agenda of the AU for the promotion of peace and security is enshrined in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (CA) of the AU. The human security ideas have also been integrated into AU binding agreements, declarations, decisions and policies. The CA empowers the AU to intervene in the affairs of member states with the purpose of preventing war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (AU, 2001). The AU created the African Standby Force (ASF) to fulfil the mandate of promoting human security through military intervention (AU, 2001). The AU conditions for a human security intervention in the internal affairs of a country is based on the criteria to protect human security (AU, 2003). The AU does not necessarily require the consent of a state to intervene in its internal affairs when the population is at risk. The decision to intervene under AU is based on a two-third majority vote of the Assembly (AU, 2003).

Clearly the AU has a duty to intervene in African conflicts where there are severe

situations of crimes against humanity. However, the AU's Constitutive Act fails to state how soon they should respond in any conflict situation where there are severe crimes against humanity. Even if there is a will to respond early enough it is still questionable whether the AU has the capacity to address crisis on the continent. Additionally, there are other concerns as to how severe a situation should get before there is any form of

intervention from international organizations.

Based on the outline and discussion of the AU CA, there is a need for the AU to address the root causes of human security issues in Africa. Regarding the AU intervention in Cabo Delgado, the organisation has failed to intervene through its AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) division to help or cooperate with SAMIM (ISS, 2021). The AU's PSC has to date failed to hold discussions about the situation in Mozambique. The issue was tabled to be discussed in May 2021; however, it was later withdrawn by the Mozambican government arguing that this was a SADC matter. The AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and other officials have asked African countries outside the Sahel to help combat terrorism, but there has been little response to this call.

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis is an example for voluntary contributions to fight threats across regional boundaries. However, the initiative has failed because of states' resistance to foreign intervention, albeit from other African countries (ISS,

2021). Therefore, continental discussions and coordination around conflict intervention is urgently needed. The AU is the only continental body that can convene and mediate such discussions. The AU can use its vast continental experience and insight to persuade states to draw up workable plans to overcome long term violent extremism threats.

Way forward: How Mozambique can address the terrorism challenges to promote human security in Cabo Delgado province

Considering the discussions above, it is quite clear that the root causes of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado are complex. The causes which were outlined amongst others include a long-standing sense among residents of being mistreated by the central government, and socio-economic factors such as unemployment and inequalities amongst the youth. The grievances about youth unemployment were further intensified by the exclusion of residents in the large-scale development of natural resources, including the major natural gas investment by the French Total Energies company. The company has been accused of in-sourcing labour, instead of hiring residents for the gas project. Therefore, to ensure that youth does not resort to joining the militant groups and committing acts of terrorism the government must address these grievances.

The Mozambican government with the support of continental, regional and international organisations is required to intervene in Cabo Delgado province to address the issues fuelling the insurgency. The interventions can also be directed towards preventing future recruitment of the aggrieved youth. The military intervention by the government and other organisations must prioritize the promotion of human security. In stabilising the province Mozambique must employ a people, rather than security-centric strategy to address the humanitarian, political, security, economic, social and religious aspects of the insurgency. For this approach to be achieved there is a need for a centralised government body to entrench an inter-agency approach and deliver a unified national response.

The government must contain the attacks by driving the militant group out of the areas they occupy such as the strategic port of Mocimboa da Praia. To achieve this the government must develop a detailed intelligence strategy. The government through the help of regional, continental, and international organisations must develop a 24-hour intelligence, policing and operations centre in Cabo Delgado, that is informed by a land, sea and air surveillance system. An intelligence sharing between SADC members and other countries with naval presence in Mozambique will ensure a constant supply of information on local developments, such as information sharing about new people entering villages and towns and external threats. To successfully tackle the insurgency and ensure the militant group does not regroup in the future, the government must station the police and military in Cabo Delgado that can move by road, air and sea throughout the country and the Tanzanian border. The deployed security forces must also patrol and secure the coastline.

Furthermore, regarding the promotion of human security in Cabo Delgado SADC and the AU must consider appointing special envoys to step up efforts to ensure the protection of

civilians, end the abuses by armed groups and government security forces, and hold all those responsible for abuses in the Cabo Delgado crisis to account. SADC must also urgently convene a special summit on the crisis to map out ways to support Mozambique to restore security and protect civilians. The AU Peace and Security Council should urgently place the issue of Cabo Delgado on its agenda. The council has the authority to coordinate efforts between regional mechanisms and the AU to promote peace, security, and stability. This will help demonstrate to the civilians that the Mozambican authorities, SADC, and the African Union prioritize their security and protection of their rights.

Conclusion

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado has been ongoing since 2017 and has contributed massively to the challenges of human security in the province. The insurgency to date has resulted in the displacement of people, torture and death of ordinary civilians. The formula for peace in Cabo Delgado and elsewhere in Mozambique requires greater local autonomy for all Mozambicans to feel that their interests are represented. The government must implement decentralization and more participatory, transparent and accountable governance, combined with effective security operations to defuse the insurgency in Cabo Delgado and ensure Mozambicans benefit from the natural resources, including the gas project.

In conclusion, the promotion of human security is important in dealing with issues of insurgency on the African continent. For the AU and SADC to either prevent insurgency, to end it, and to tackle its aftermath, it needs to understand and operate based on the premise that at their root Cabo Delgado's security problems are related to resources. They are thus political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in nature. As such, Cabo Delgado's insurgency require responses that deal with the province's challenges not only through military force but also by tackling issues of human security both as they result from the insurgency (such as forced displacements) and as they cause problems (such as the lack of resources or political exclusion).

Lessons learnt from past peacekeeping experiences and opportunities presented by non-state actors can be turned into strategies upon which the AU can create a common agenda for peace and (human) security. This requires collaboration and the recognition that states, and governments hold the key to the success of any developmental or security-related programme because they (states and governments) ultimately control all national resources for social upliftment and are responsible for deciding how and for what purposes to use these resources.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on contributor

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