

Linking Theory to Practice

The Potency of the “New Wars” Thesis in Better Understanding Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Supporting Peace Operations and Reshaping Post-conflict Resolution – A Liberian Case Study¹²

Richárd Schneider³

Abstract:

Before the 1990s, the practice of post-conflict management mainly focused on military and law-enforcement priorities. Since then, a development-oriented approach has evolved by making a greater sense of the better addressing of the root causes and characteristics of conflicts, as well as the needs and motivations of actors and individuals. In the same vein, critical approaches to the traditionally „minimalist” approach suggested a relatively new, community-based practice that may help to better understand the complex political, psychological and economic situation in local terms to enhance the efficiency of reintegration of former combatants and make them socially and politically represented after conflicts end.

At the same time, according to Mary Kaldor’s theory, we have witnessed meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts which pose vital challenges to the Westphalian international system as they reshape the concept of sovereignty and question the state monopoly on violence. Proponents of the “new war” thesis argue that such qualitative changes in wars also necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches. In Kaldor’s view, as a consequence of the rapid globalisation during the 1990s and the never-ending erosion of state sovereignty a fundamentally new theoretical framework is needed in the course of peace operations which is entirely different from the former so-called „liberal peace”. Thus, the new characteristics of wars pointed out by Kaldor may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be planned and implemented in post-conflict settlements.

In this analysis the question is how the failure of traditional disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and the prospective new generation of them reflect to „new wars” theories, particularly to Kaldor’s thesis, so what connections they may have, if any. The author makes this search through a Liberian case study. The focal points of the analysis include: actors (1); motivations and goals (2); brutality and the victimisation of the civilians (3); and economic and financial characteristics (4).

Keywords:

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2022.2.2.63>

² This paper is a shortened, translated and revised version of the author’s Masters thesis at CUB. See the original thesis: Schneider, 2021.

³ International Expert and Criminalist, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary;
ORCID: 0000-0002-1906-3410; akinyetuntope@gmail.com

DDR; demobilisation; disarmament; Kaldor; Liberia; „new wars”; peacebuilding; reintegration.

Introduction

As a fundamental element of peacebuilding efforts and peace operations in general⁴ (Kilroy, 2008; Verkoren et al., 2010), DDR programmes, focusing on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, have gone through an evolution since the 1990s (Seethaler, 2016).⁵ At the same time, according to some scholars, the number of classical interstate wars has decreased while wars waged by non-state actors have become more typical (Kaldor, 2012) as a consequence of the significant increase in the number of armed non-state actors. So-called „new wars” protagonists argue that some meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts pose vital challenges to the modern state system developed in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. In this regard, according to Kaldor, such changes also necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches (Kaldor, 2019, p.24).

Before the 1990s, in an era determined by the superpowers’ antagonism, the practice of peacebuilding operations mainly focused on a kind of „minimalist” (Muggah, 2009) or „first generation” (Kenkel, 2013) approach that saw post-conflict recovery through a military and law-enforcement lens, when the aim was usually just to overthrow or support certain reigning elites (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005). However, critical approaches to the traditional⁶ approach suggested a relatively new, community-based practice that may help to better understand the complex political, psychological and economic situation in local terms to enhance the efficiency of reintegration of former combatants and make them socially and politically represented after conflicts end.

After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially since the beginning of the new millennium, when both the globalisation of world politics and technological revolution intensified, the humanitarian crises of the 1990s oriented academic research in Germany, Great Britain and the United States (Mello, 2010) to describe the seemingly new character of war after the bipolar international system and to examine whether such a novelty necessitates the revision of former military and war-related strategies. As a consequence, a new „maximalist” approach has evolved (Muggah, 2009; United Nations Department on

⁴ In 2000, the so called Brahimi Report prepared by a special committee of the United Nations differentiated three categories of peace operations: those for prevention and peacemaking; for peacekeeping; and for peacemaking (United Nations General Assembly, 2000).

⁵ With regard to that kind of evolution, there are different methods in the literature that are willing to make clear distinction between the generations of peace operations and DDR programmes, e.g.: Kenkel, 2013; Lamb, 2008. According to Muggah and Baaré (2009 cited Söderstrom, 2013), a kind of American-British-Western-European-led „first generation” analytical style, operating with qualitative methods and case-specific focus, was typical until the mid-2000s. He argues that at that time, economic indicators and the positioning of DDR programmes in peace missions were at the focal points of any analysis while former combatants were seemed to be rational individuals led by self-interest and economic benefits (*homo oeconomicus*). Then Muggah (2010, p.11) mentions statistical, empirical and comparative evaluations and analyses as „second generation” practices that made bi- and multilateral international development organisations’ and think tanks’ committed to and interested in complex peacebuilding programmes with all their cultural and local characteristics.

⁶ „Traditional” refers to that kind of „minimalist’ approach – focusing more on military and law-enforcement aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction and less on the reintegration of ex-combatants – just to make them differentiated from „second generation” or community-based practices.

Peacekeeping Operations – UN DPO, 2010) – with a greater emphasis e.g. on development aspects – in order to better address and understand the root causes and characteristics of conflicts. Within the frame of such „second generation” peace operations (Kenkel, 2013), DDR programmes became typical and tried to accomplish their mandate even if armed struggles in all their hybrid forms (Munive and Stepputat, 2015) have not ceased yet.

At the same time, having an extensive literature, „new wars” theories argue that qualitative changes in wars after the end of the bipolar world showed that both a better understanding of the root causes and motivations of armed conflicts and belligerents, and a strengthened commitment to the reintegration of ex-combatants are needed to find long-term resolutions for conflicts. Such ‘new wars’ theories have the axiom that there are wars which can be differentiated from earlier wars. In the same vein, according to Mary Kaldor (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014), we have witnessed meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts and such changes pose vital challenges to the Westphalian international system as they reshape the concept of sovereignty and question the state monopoly on violence. Theorists of the so-called „new wars” argue that those qualitative changes in wars also necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches. In this sense, the new characteristics of wars pointed out by Kaldor may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be planned and implemented in post-conflict settlements (Kaldor, 2019; Kilroy, 2008; Verkoren et al., 2010). In her view, a fundamentally new theoretical framework is needed in the course of peace operations which is entirely different from the former, traditional, so called „liberal peace”, as a consequence of the rapid globalisation during the 1990s and the never-ending erosion of state sovereignty.

Kaldor’s „new wars” argument, which is mostly based on qualitative rather than quantitative data (Kaldor, 2013), is widely criticised, questioning the *raison d’être* of any differentiation between wars. Regardless the validity of any differentiation and criticism there is a consensus in the literature that „new wars” theories can add useful insights into how „contemporary” wars are being waged. Therefore, they may contribute to better address how peacebuilding efforts could be more effectively planned and implemented (Kaldor, 2019).

If we accept the idea that wars have new characteristics and they can be fundamentally distinguished from their earlier forms, the emerging question concerns the role, the nature and the novelty of post-conflict peace operations and peacebuilding programmes in managing post-conflict reconstruction, so whether they can take on the challenges „new wars” pose. In this regard, according to the aforementioned thoughts, critical views to traditional practices propose a relatively new, community-based approach by making a greater sense of local, cultural components and reintegration programmes during peace operations. Regarding such a conceptual change, the next question is whether programmes focusing more on local communities and the recommendations made by the critical literature on traditional DDR programmes in general could grasp the real causes and motivations of conflicts and overcome the menacing challenges of „new wars”.



In this paper the author is willing to find out how the so-called failure of traditional programmes in finding long-standing resolution for conflicts and the prospective new generation of DDR reflect to and intertwine with the discourse developed by „new wars” proponents, particularly Mary Kaldor, so what connections they may have, if any. The author makes this search through a case study, namely the Liberian wars⁷ (1989-1993; 1997-2003) and the second DDR programme (2003-2009). The focal points of the analysis include: the actors (1); their motivations and goals (2); the brutality and the victimisation of civilians (3); and the economic and financial characteristics (4).

General Overview of DDR

Beyond the international framework of arms control regulations, ad hoc arms embargoes, general or conditional amnesty promises and comprehensive reforms of the security sector, since the 1990s DDR programmes⁸ focusing on the disarmament of belligerents and armed groups as well as the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants have become an essential and unique part of peace operations and post-conflict resolution in general (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005). The first DDR programme – authorised by the United Nations Security Council and designed by its relevant organs – took place in Namibia between 1989 and 1990, and since then the majority of DDR programmes in conflict-torn regions were also carried out with the support of that organisation (Chounet-Cambas, 2018) that demonstrate the UN’s prominent role in implementing such peacebuilding missions.⁹

In 2006, based on the authorisation of the Swedish government, a DDR-related Report was issued by the Stockholm Initiative (Ministry for Foreign Affairs – MFA, 2006). Besides addressing the complexity of peace missions and referring to the ever-growing role of the communities in building capacities for long-term stability, it outlined the connection between DDR and security sector reform (SSR) on the one hand, and that between DDR and transitional justice on the other (Muggah, 2010). While the Initiative was originally intended to revise former DDR programmes, the document was rather to strengthen former practices committed

⁷ The conceptual method to clarify the differentiation between wars, armed conflicts, civil wars etc. corresponds to that used by Correlates of War Project that Kaldor (2013) mentioned in her work and that other scholars also referred to. According to that, within the frame of a state-based conflict, which is „a contested incompatibility over government and/or territory, where at least one party is a state, and the use of armed force results in at least 25 battle related deaths within a calendar year” (Palik et al., 2020, p.5), war is a „state-based conflict that reaches at least 1,000 battle-related death in a specific calendar year” (2020, p.8). In the same vein, a non-state conflict refers to „the use of armed force between organised groups, none of which is the government of a state, resulting at least 25 annual battle-related deaths” (2020, p.5). In this paper the author concentrates on the qualitative changes of conflicts so for understanding purposes the author is not willing to use such strict methodological criteria, thus definitions are interchangeable throughout this analysis. According to Kaldor (2009) conceptual clarifications are problematic as contemporary wars combine the oppression of civil society with political discrepancies, criminal activities for economic benefits and human rights violations. She defines war as „an active violence that is framed in political terms” (2014) or „a violent enterprise[...], an act of violence involving two or more organised groups framed in political terms” (Kaldor, 2013, p.3;13). Having the aforementioned conceptual notes, in this paper the author uses the word „war” for the Liberian armed conflicts during the 1990s.

⁸ In this paper, DDR programmes refer to the ones implemented by external support. In this regard, Appendix 1 demonstrates wars and related DDR programmes between 1979 and 2006.

⁹ For example, Doyle and Sambanis (2000 cited Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010) found positive effects UN peacekeeping forces’ presence in post-conflict situations have on the duration of peace.

for military and political issues (Lamb, 2008). According to Söderstrom (2013), the authors of the Report perceived the political integration of former combatants – which was a part of their broader integration – as a natural and automatic concomitant and consequence of their general economic and social integration, so they did not even take care of ex-combatants' political representation.

Besides the mobilisation of the European Union for the support to DDR (2006), due to the efforts made by the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG) the so-called Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) concretising the preconditions and requirements of DDRs for effective implementation has also been created (UN IAWG, 2006). Among others, the purpose of this inter-institutional organisation was to reflect to the challenges posed by the incoherence of former DDR practices in the field of organisational mechanisms (Lamb, 2008). In the same vein, the document sought to assist the UN's work on demobilisation and reintegration while forming new strategies and politics (United Nations General Assembly – UN GA, 2006). Pointed out in its mandate, IAWG provided a comprehensive set of policies for DDR practitioners (Muggah, 2009), proposed new approaches regarding human resource and financial management, heralded the development of economic and social reintegration of former combatants, while it also called for a better understanding of the needs (Kilroy, 2010) of minorities, women, children, the poor and the people with disabilities as groups identified as particularly vulnerable to armed conflicts.¹⁰

After the two-year long consultation in the IDDRS the UN admitted both the complexity and the importance of the political aspects of DDR programmes, and laid down five fundamental principles regarding UN-led DDR programmes, according to which programmes have to be: people-centred(1); flexible, accountable and transparent(2); nationally owned(3); integrated(4); and well-planned(5) (Lamb, 2008). The original aim of DDR¹¹ has been finally clarified: to create the capacities and security guarantees for long-term peace on the one hand, and strengthen as well as promote social cohesion, societal development and peaceful coexistence by integrating former combatants into the society on the other. In this vein, as a fundamental element of post-conflict resolution and peace operations in general (Kilroy, 2008; UN GA, 2006; Verkoren et al., 2010) DDR – having a kind of voluntary nature – strives for the prevention of war recurrence by collecting, registering, storing, transporting and disposing weapons; demobilising combatants and taking them out of former hierarchical chains of command; integrating them into civilian life; strengthening social cohesion; and promoting social trust and reconciliation (United Nations Development Programme – UNDP, 2012).

¹⁰ In this regard, e.g. Muggah (2009) emphasised how important the arrangement of children's status is and how special their needs are they may have during and after conflicts.

¹¹ Even though we have examples and practices from Asia and Latin-America, the majority of DDR programmes have been developed and implemented in Africa (Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 2010).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned development in the conceptual field of DDR, it seems like former programmes' practical effectivity is still being uncertain as they generally disregarded the complexity of post-conflict settlements and – by underestimating reintegration phases – they overemphasised the political and security-related issues. Based upon such doubts, critical voices questioned the *raison d'être* of DDR programmes as effective means for building peace, and called for a new approach.

Critical Literature on DDR

On the one hand, critical approaches to DDR pointed out the conceptual deficiencies connected to the earlier peace operations' theoretical framework and listed the challenges the so-called concept of „liberal peace“ posed to programme coordinators and developers as they were fundamentally characterised with and based solely on western concepts such as democracy, free market economy and human rights (Cunliffe, 2012; Danesh and Danesh, 2002; Danesh, 2006; Goodhand and Walton, 2009; Krause and Jütersonke, 2005; Loode, 2011; Paris, 2002; Richmond, 2006; Söderstrom, 2013; Verkoren et al., 2010). On the other hand, the literature that is criticising DDR programmes for their practical deficiencies (Bowd and [Özerdem](#), 2013; Colletta and Muggah, 2009; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008; McQuinn, 2016; Muggah, 2005; Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 2010; Munive and Stepputat, 2015; Özerdem, 2012; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Seethaler, 2016; Sprenkels, 2014; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011) called for a revision and emphasised: the wrongly executed evaluation methods based on the number of weapons collected from ex-combatants and also on criminal- and economic-related indicators; the severe consequences of neglecting and underestimating reintegration processes as prerequisites of long-term peace and stability; and the lack of a holistic approach integrating cultural, social, religious and psychological components due to short-term economic and political priorities (e.g.: Colletta, 2012; Kilroy, 2008). Muggah (2005) criticises former DDR practices for: sacrificing reintegration programmes for short-term purposes; developing improperly considered strategies with financial shortfalls; having unfounded assumptions about the positive effects that collecting weapons might have on security. However, he also emphasises the basic necessity for disposing and destroying arms and munitions as a must to prevent their recirculation and stop illegal arms trafficking. In the same vein, he calls for the better understanding of the belligerents' motivations and goals, while he called on to harmonise short-, mid- and long-term interests.

A typical critique of DDR programmes is that they used to disregard context-specific features of different armed conflicts while they neither spared the time to comprehend their organisational characteristics nor their national and international interferences. They instead tended to follow a one-size-fits-all-approach, which is problematic, because context specifications matter not only in regional terms, but within the same country (Arnould, 2021). By prioritising only financial and economic components (Bowd and Özerdem, 2013) may lead

to the deceiving perception that DDR programmes' participants are members of a homogeneous group in which they are treated as individuals always react rationally for financial incentives (Muggah, 2009; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011), thus DDR perceived to be only a technical asset that is aiming to guarantee only material goods and adapt to the interests of donors and those of the economic and political elites (Muggah, 2010; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011). But, what is quite obvious now is that programmes focusing too much on such economic aspects and neglecting complex political, security-related, social and psychological issues – just like the potential of former hierarchical ties (Bøås and Bjørkhaug, 2010; Colletta, 2012; McQuinn, 2016; Munive és Stepputat, 2015; Söderberg Kovacs, 2007; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011) or the importance of personal reconciliation (Arnould, 2021) – generally entails further escalation of social conflicts and a radicalisation of the conflicting parties (Kraus et al., 2005).

In summary, the critical literature on DDR programmes proposed a new approach and called for developing new strategies that are able to address the root causes of different conflicts and the motivations of the armed actors. Herein the literature suggests to develop a community-based framework that now highlights the importance of the communities in building capacities for long-term peace. Critics emphasise the need for mapping the complex psychological state of former combatants and to support their reintegration and political representation in post-conflict settlements. In addition, they proposed reforms for measuring the efficiency of DDR programmes (Bowd and Özerdem, 2013; Colletta and Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 2009; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Seethaler, 2016; Söderstrom, 2013). The emergency of the so-called second generation or community-based views was an inevitable response for the increased awareness of strengthening and reforming DDR practice.

Community-based DDR Programmes

In 2005, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan admitted (UN GA, 2005, p.31) the institutional defect that seemingly hindered the implementation of any efficient peace mission. He suggested a reform by reshaping the institutional framework that have been traditionally specialised for the resolution of interstate conflicts, in order to empower UN organs to react to the challenges of the 21st century appropriately (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005). This reform, on the one hand, also refers to the revision of the traditional concept of peace operations i.e. „focusing on rights rather than on needs”¹² (Arnould, 2021, p.7), and, on the other, to the so called „liberal peace” that used to disregard the importance of domestic political processes and substate actors in creating the capacities for peace (Goodhand and Walton, 2009) and the importance of context-specific analysis (MacGinty, 2011 cited Sabaratnam, 2013). Having such processes revised, this reform then implied to turn away from

¹² Arnould (2021) in her work discusses how decentralised transitional justice – as a part of a broader post-conflict peacebuilding process – could be carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

state-centric approaches while the role of local communities and organisations have become overvalued and the conception of sovereignty has been redefined.

In 2006, the UN General Assembly stressed the importance of an „integrated approach” that is to reflect to the ever-changing menaces and challenges in the new century (UN GA, 2006). According to the Assembly, DDR programmes’ goals concerning the reintegration phase would be successful only if the difference between the target groups were detected by programme developers and if they were willing to concentrate on the recognition of the specified and different needs of men, women, children, mentally and/or physically disabled people who were associated with armed groups.¹³ So, in addition to highlighting the role the local communities might have in post-conflict situations, so called „integrated missions” were born to reveal the *casus belli* of different armed conflicts in political, economic and social terms and they now include humanitarian purposes like mapping and satisfying the special needs of different, sometimes highly vulnerable layers of society (UN GA, 2006). This, however, also necessitates to support women and children associated with armed groups to participate in DDR programmes and to let the civil society be incorporated into planning and decision-making processes (Lamb, 2008; UN DPO, 2010). It is not a coincidence that according to the United Nations’ Practice Note on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants DDR, programmes are “means” used for supporting communities throughout the reintegration phase (UNDP, 2012, p.37).

In 2010, the UN admitted the legitimacy of the criticism regarding the insufficiency of DDR programmes and the necessity to revise them (UN DPO, 2010). According to the document, the strategical priorities of second generation programmes¹⁴ are not new in comparison with former practices. However, it made a clear distinction based on the programmes’ target groups. While armed combatants were in the centre during first generation programmes, the new approach was to deal with the broader community. In this sense, such a new conceptual framework necessarily revealed the need for a community-led approach reiterated by the critics of former, state-centred practices.

Even if community-based approaches put a greater emphasis on the reintegration phase compared to the disarmament and demobilisation processes (Verkoren et al., 2010), their practical efficacy is still uncertain. Notwithstanding the fact that locally focused strategies may exclude certain groups from the participation (UNDP, 2012, p.55), just like happened during the Liberian DDR (McMullin, 2020), they can amplify and strengthen the practice of traditional DDR programmes (Muggah, 2010; Verkoren et al., 2010) and then „the point of departure has

¹³ As McMullin states: „Whilst the IDDRS refer more generally to ‘specialized needs’ of disabled ex-combatants, in practice DDR provision [in Liberia] has not consulted with disabled ex-combatants about specialized needs[...]”. He argues that disabled ex-combatants were „screened, separated, and removed from able-bodied colleagues and go through a separate process” that reinforced stigma. Moreover he claims that any „segregated forms of assistance[...]violate the core principles of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD), which are non-discrimination, inclusion, participation, and accessibility” (2020:16).

¹⁴ Which is namely: supporting peace processes and building capacities for secure conflict resolution and reconciliation while managing political struggles.

to be the impact that violence and human rights violations have had on victims and communities and the needs that ensue from this” (Arnould, 2021, p.7).

A General Overview of Mary Kaldor’s Theory and the ‘New Wars’ Debate

After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union when the globalisation of world politics and technological revolution intensified, the humanitarian crises¹⁵ of the 1990s oriented academic research in Germany, Great Britain and the United States (Mello, 2010) to describe the new character of war after the bipolar international system and whether such a novelty necessitates the revision of former military and war-related strategies and conceptual frames. However, since then, it is still much less clear what such a revision or reform actually means.

The so-called „new wars” theories include different disciplines like political theory, history, international studies, political economy, military strategy (Mello, 2010), but what they all have in common is the axiom that there are wars which can be differentiated from the earlier ones on the grounds of specified characteristics.¹⁶

Kaldor argues (2019) that the new form of wars may be, or even should be differentiated from their earlier forms which used to be waged in an era when wars went hand in hand with the dependency on modern industry, mass production, mass media and fossil fuels. As one of the most prominent proponents (Shaw, 2000) and the first founder of „new wars” theories, Mary Kaldor gave a comprehensive and widespread, but highly criticised thesis of „new wars” that gives the researchers the opportunity to use that as a conceptual framework for their analysis. This paper is not to verify or reject any conclusions the theorists of „new wars” have drawn, but to clarify the arguments Kaldor used and the criticism she received where that was needed. This general overview of Kaldor’s theory and the „new wars” debate helps to draw valid and reliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of DDR strategies in Liberia.

According to Mary Kaldor’s (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2019) theory, „new wars”¹⁷ have become typical during the 1990s and they can be contrasted with „old wars” in terms of actors, goals, methods, effects on civilian population and their economic characteristics. In her view, as a consequence of the rapid globalisation during the 1990s and the incessant erosion of state sovereignty, a fundamentally new theoretical framework is needed in the course of peace operations which is entirely different from the former so-called „liberal peace” (Shaw, 2000) inappropriate to explain the social, political and economic characteristics

¹⁵ For example the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War in 1991, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 or the Yugoslav Wars throughout the decade were typical cases of humanitarian catastrophes, but civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are also among them, just to mention a few.

¹⁶ In this regard, according to Newman (2004) such a differentiation can be based on the root causes of war(1); the nature and number of belligerents(2); their goals and motivations(3); the spatial characteristics of wars(4); the means by which wars are being waged(5); and the effects that violence has on the civilian population(6).

¹⁷ Newman (2004) gives some examples which mostly meet the requirements of the so called „new wars”. Among them he mentions: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Somalia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Liberia, Congo (supposedly the Democratic Republic of Congo – the author’s note), Angola.



of wars. She also argues that due to the intensification of globalisation and the erosion of the Westphalian modern state, the qualitative changes in wars showed that both a better understanding of the root causes and motivations of armed conflicts and belligerents and a strengthened commitment to the reintegration of ex-combatants are needed to find long-term resolutions for conflicts. Kaldor's theory gives a critique of classical peace operations on the one hand, and the „liberal peace“ as a conceptual basis of such practices on the other that actually visions representative democracy and free market economy as a required end of peace processes. In this sense, her thoughts may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be planned and implemented in post-conflict settlements (Kilroy, 2008; Verkoren et al., 2010).

Whereas the globalisation intensifies economic interdependence and multilateralism that led to the erosion of state power caused by supra-national phenomena like international organisations and international law, in some cases subnational entities tend to question state sovereignty through both legal and illegal activities (Kaldor, 2013; Newman, 2004). According to Kaldor, „old wars“ refer to the conflicts that were to strengthen state authority and power by waging wars. This method was typical from the late 18th to the mid-20th century (Kaldor, 2013). Such wars were characterised by clear frontlines (Mello, 2010) and direct fights between uniformed state armies through which the state monopoly on violence was established, and private armed activities were forced to stop (Kaldor, 2005).

In addition, in the age of „old wars“ states guaranteed the wherewithal for their war-related activities by: restrictive financial measures (e.g. tax increases); the centralisation of the national economy; taking out loans, made possible by the state-sponsored financial and banking system. In „new wars“ theories „old wars“ were interpreted as ideological or geopolitical ones, where the former means the completion of a certain programme aiming to spread, establish or preserve an ideology, while the latter refers to conquering or defending geographically advantageous territories.¹⁸ In certain terms, these ideological and geopolitical considerations legitimated and justified wars and state armies that also meant a reciprocal acceptance and recognition between the belligerents (Mello, 2010). Such wars generally ended with peace negotiations or the victory of any of the conflicting parties which was actually the basis on which classical peace operations have been built (Kaldor, 2013).

The so called „new wars“ are just the opposite. In this regard, the impacts of an ever-intensifying globalisation have reshaped the concept of state sovereignty, questioned the state monopoly on violence and eroded public services. According to Newman (2004), as a consequence of the national economies' collapse in weak and fragile states, illegal trade and criminal activities have enabled armed groups to evolve and wars waged for natural resources became common.

Kaldor (2013) listed four typical characteristics the differentiation between „new“ and „old“ wars might be based on. A short, but concise review of these characteristics is necessary

¹⁸ However, one does not exclude the other (the author's note).

at this point, as in the next chapter, the analysis of the Liberian wars and experiences will rest on them. Firstly, according to Kaldor, in addition to the states, the number of armed non-state actors have increased significantly. In this regard, private security providers, private armies comprised of mercenaries and child soldiers, armed militias connected to political parties, organised crime groups, insurgent and separatist movements have become typical. These actors do not treat other belligerents as legitimate enemies, thus a kind of illegitimate reciprocity becomes a decisive feature of „new wars” (Mello, 2010). In this sense, the significance of horizontal structures in wars have increased at the expense of verticals (Briscoe, 2015; Kaldor, 2009). Decentralisation and localisation also contributed to the growing efficacy of controlling and monitoring both the civilian population and the conquered territories in a certain region dominated by an armed group, because of independent illegal financial resources and recruiting mechanisms (Briscoe, 2015). At the same time, as „horisontalisation”, decentralisation and localisation – similarly to those of between political and economic or privately and publicly financed armies – the distinction between criminals and combatants just like between state and non-state actors has started to blur (Kaldor, 2013).

Secondly, she argues (2013) that former geopolitical and ideological aspects of armed conflicts have been replaced primarily by identity politics relating to ethnic, religious and tribal clashes. She highlights that through the contagious spread of violence, intimidation and hatred – that are also desired consequences of „new wars” themselves –, instead of parental identities, tribal and community-related or ethnic identity forms were being strengthened as a consequence of the life-threatening dangers. In the long run, Kaldor interprets identities instrumentally (Mello, 2010) that are actually the real consequences, means and also goals of wars rather than their triggers or the root causes (Shaw, 2000). Such identities were often induced to gain as much power as possible to have the capacity to represent the groups’ interests and increase its influence (Kaldor 2009). Similarly to Lind and Thiele (2015) who described a new generation of warfare in their handbook, reaching such purposes in „new wars” is possible through having the support of the society, community or group and breaking down the enemies’ martial spirit rather than conquering new territories or destroying the enemies’ arm stocks (Echevarria, 2005; Malantowicz, 2013).

Thirdly, even though Kaldor (2013) – just like Clausewitz (1976) who defined them as crucial elements – mentions direct battles as the peaks of „old wars”, she stresses that in the context of the „new wars” the use of intentional violence against civilian population has become a determinant characteristic, so in the light of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement only indirect battles are conceivable. In this regard, Shaw (2000) mentions the extermination of a potential threatening group of people differentiated on the basis of preliminarily defined features as a novum that characterises contemporary wars.

Fourthly, in contrast to former wars that were financed through taxes, Kaldor (2013) argues that „new wars” are mainly based on international humanitarian aid channels, looting, smuggling and raiding, which all contribute to the emergence of a kind of global war economy. Despite the fact that those financial channels are decentralised and usually criminal in their

nature, they are well-embedded into the global world economy in many respects. Among them are the organised crime groups' transborder activity; diaspora-networks; international and national organisations; and the presence of global news agencies (Kaldor, 2013). According to Shaw (2000), the mixing of wars before 1950 with the capitalist mode of production during the bipolarity of Cold War and the nuclear arms race induced shifts in the relations between war, economy and society. Kaldor's concept which interprets „new wars“ economic conditions within the realm of globalisation seems to be the consequence of such shifts Shaw described. He argues that the ever-intensifying interdependence and external exposure – that are both main concomitants of globalisation – fundamentally question the concept of total war. Having such an argument on behalf of the inconceivability of total wars, Kaldor's theory makes sense in this respect as she argues (2013) that with their specific financial resources and network, actors in „new wars“ strive to wage and conserve low-intensity conflicts.

Old wars	New wars
Fought between states that are generally supported by the majority of the societies and waged for ideological, geopolitical purposes. The conflict strengthens the state's sovereignty and legitimacy.	Fought within states, waged by numerous state and non-state actors/groups along religious and ethnic-based identity politics without any social support. The conflict causes the erosion of the state's sovereignty and legitimacy.
The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is clear.	Combatants are not easily recognisable. The distinction between criminals and combatants blurs.
Civilians are not direct targets of the violence, the majority of civilian deaths interpreted as unintentional, collateral damage.	The main victims are civilians.
The territory and the borders of a state are controlled by direct military engagement. Direct military clashes between the national armies are typical.	The territory is controlled by different armed groups through abusing, intimidating and controlling the population (displacement, rape, ethnic cleansing are means of wars).
There are clear frontlines.	Frontlines are unclear.
War financing befalls through tax increases, by setting up the central bank system and having foreign loans that all have state-building effects.	Legal and illegal international trade, organised criminal activity, looting, hostage taking, humanitarian aid and diaspora relations are among the main sources of financing wars that all contribute to the erosion of state structures and public services.

Table 1. Some of the main characteristics of the „new“ and „old“ wars. Edited by the author based on the original table from Rigterink, 2013, p.5.

Even though Kaldor's „new wars“ theory has been followed by an intense academic debate that is exemplified by the extensive critical literature the field has, it is not the aim of this paper to review that discourse. However, it is worth mentioning that the critical approaches are primarily to indicate that Kaldor's differentiation between wars is inaccurate. The critical literature on „new wars“ argues that in certain circumstances the theory fails to stand up for empirical scrutiny and the characteristics of „contemporary“ wars identified by Kaldor are

actually not new, the identity politics she described cannot be separated from ideological ones, therefore Kaldor's conclusions are unfounded and rash (Chojnacki, 2006). Besides – similarly to the critics on Lind and Thiele's (2015) four generation warfare theory (Echevarria, 2005; Jackson, 2007) – critical views emphasise that „new wars” theories in general neglect historical rigidity, consequently their differentiation between wars is highly arbitrary (Berdal, 2003; Kalyvas, 2001; Mello, 2010; Newman, 2004). Furthermore, some critics also question the allegation that the number of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) and civilian casualties have been growing since 1990 (Briscoe, 2015; Smith, 2018), and that since the end of the Cold War armed conflicts have been waged only between ANSAs, for economic benefits, in a more lethal manner.

In sum, both historical comparative analyses and empirical, qualitative case studies have criticised Kaldor and the „new wars” theories in many respects (Berdal, 2003; Kalyvas, 2001; Mello, 2010; Newman, 2004). But regardless the validity of any differentiation and criticism there is a consensus in the literature that we have witnessed some qualitative changes regarding armed conflicts and that „new wars” theories can add useful insights into how „contemporary” wars are being waged. Therefore, they may contribute to better understand how peacebuilding efforts can be more effectively designed and implemented (Kaldor, 2019).

Case Study – Liberia

Due to the length limits of this paper, there is no possibility of examining if armed conflicts after 1990 fall within the domain of „new wars” and if the qualitative changes defined by Kaldor are applicable to them. Nor does this paper aim to evaluate DDR programmes implemented in post-conflict situations. The specific purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how Kaldor's theory intertwines with and reflects to some of the defects traditional DDR programmes have had. Furthermore, to point out how useful community-based solutions are in conflict-torn societies and how they might reflect to the „new” challenges contemporary wars pose.

Even if the hostilities and wars in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia and Somalia – just to mention a few – may seem to be evident^{19,20} as case studies when discussing „new wars”, this paper uses the Liberian wars (1989²¹-1997 and 1999-2003), their historical antecedents and the second DDR programme (2003-2009) to present some of the challenges of the

¹⁹ Among the conflicts listed, Kriege (2008) examined for example the relevance of the „new wars” theories in the context of Sierra Leone, while Malantowicz (2010) did the same with respect to Rwanda, Darfur and Syria.

²⁰ Due to the vast and unprecedented use of violence against civilian population (for more information: <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboad>), Syrian War is a good example of contemporary „new wars” (Malantowicz, 2013), therefore that could also be a proper case study as one of the most lethal present-day conflict. But, due to the fact that the Syrian War is not ended at the time of this writing, any presumption connected to a future DDR programme may proved to be rash and irresponsible. What seems to be a guidance for future reintegration programmes is the analysis about peacebuilding and DDR programmes in the Syrian context conducted by Chounet-Cambas (2018). In this regard, we should be aware of those hasty reintegration practices that could generate new lines of fractures when the war has not ended yet (Haid, 2018a; Haid, 2018b; Khaddour, 2018; Osseiran, 2018).

²¹ For example Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010:46) perceived 1992 as the start of the First Liberian War.



traditional DDR practice and reintegration programmes, and to demonstrate how „new war” theories and community-based approaches connect to them.

The choice fell on Liberia firstly because that is one of the classic example of „new wars” due to the economic conditions, the illegal trade-related financial channels, the actors who played a vital role in the war and the conflict’s regional and international nature that all characterised the country throughout the two wars and their aftermath (Bøås, 2005). Secondly, because the Liberian experience is the epitome of the problems and the shortfalls of the traditional DDR framework. The choice is fundamentally justified as the Liberian DDR started from the outdated assumption that ex-combatants are always rational individuals striving for profit maximisation, therefore the satisfaction of their economic needs automatically leads to the reduction of violence intensity (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012). This logic may seem to be quite oversimplifying in the Liberian case as some authors (i.e. Shittu et al., 2017, p.60), using Galtung’s concept of negative peace, refer to the country as one infected by structural violence that accordingly necessitate complex conflict resolution also emphasising its political and psycho-social aspects. Thus a detailed inquiry of the Liberian case is also needed to dispel the obscurity and any doubts about the complex situation the DDR programme tasked to deal with. That is out of question that generalisation is not allowed throughout this analysis as the connections revealed and conclusions drawn here can only serve as guidelines for similar future analyses.

Historical Context and a Short Overview of the Liberian Wars

After Monrovia – the capital city of the West African country of Liberia – was founded in 1922, the descendants of former African slaves who were resettled from the American continent to their birth of origin founded the country and proclaimed its independence (Paragi, 2005). The origins of the hostility and the wars during the 1990s can be found at that time due to unsolved religious and ethnic heterogeneity all over the country. Lacking experience, the most evident and familiar public administration model that emerged for the Americo-Liberian elite who possessed disproportionate power was the legacy of British-American slavery (Bøås, 2005)²² which determined Liberia’s modern statehood until 1980. The True Whig Party (TWP), founded formally in 1870 and governing for the next 110 years, played a vital and decisive role in creating a system based on plantations, feudal structures, the export of natural resources, forced labour and the oppression of different indigenous ethnic groups and tribes (Shittu et al, 2017) on the one hand, and a devoted commitment to a united African continent on the other (Paragi, 2005).

After World War II, William Tubman’s (1944-1971) and William Tolbert’s (1971-1980) presidency prioritised their personal aggrandisement through clientelism and patrimonialism instead of supporting the stability in the country. In 1980, an ethnic Krahn, Samuel Doe staged

²² It is not a coincidence that the Liberian constitution was based on the American constitutional model and its political principles (Bøås, 2005).

a *coup d'état* that resulted in the execution of the president and other TWP leaders. As a *de facto* head of state, Doe ruled from 1980 to 1997 which ended the 150 year-long domination of the Americo-Liberian elite. Even though his ruling did not bring significant political progress in the country (Ebo, 2005 cited Neumann, 2011), due to the proclamation of democracy and the approval of a new constitution, Doe's popularity grew quickly (Shittu et al., 2017) among economically and politically marginalised tribes and clans who had been serving traditionally the elite (Bøås, 2005).

As the head of a rebel group, the Americo-Liberian Charles Taylor supported by the Gio and Mano tribes staged a raid on December 24, 1989 against Doe's regime backed by the Krahn and the mainly settled Mandingos, which marked the beginning of the First Liberian War (1989-1996). The number of insurgent groups increased quickly. At first, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) strived for managing the conflict and resolve societal and political tensions. Negotiations started in Gambia with Nigerian mediation which led to the creation of a monitoring, peacekeeping unit (ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia, ECOMOG). The Groups' competence included – in accordance with the principle of neutrality and the general rule of the use of force only in case of immediate threat and self-defence – reconciliation processes between the parties, the maintenance of ceasefire agreement and the separation of armed troops. Taylor questioned ECOMOG's legitimacy since the beginning and the belligerents breached ceasefire agreements from time to time (Paragi, 2005). During 1995 and 1996, Abuja Accord and a supplemental peace agreement to the Accord led to the presidential election by which Taylor was formally elected president and ended the First Liberian War.

Taylor's role in the Sierra Leone civil war – especially through training fighters and financially supporting oppositional militias – and his involvement in illegal diamond trade entailed Liberia's sliding into isolation (Bøås, 2005) that was heightened by internal conflicts induced by the depression of international aid and the tensions revenant fighters generated in the communities.

In this situation, the former pro-Doe rebel group ULIMO (United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy) split in two different squads which messed the political landscape. Taylor had to deal with the Mandingo LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) incursion from Guinea and the Krahn and Côte d'Ivoire-backed MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) simultaneously. After the wars the majority of DDR beneficiaries were affiliated with these groups.

Intensifying hostilities led to the Second Liberian War (1999-2003). However, opposition forces invaded significant territories quickly, final victory was out of their reach. In order to prevent further escalation of the conflict, ECOWAS deployed a renewed peacekeeping mission (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia, ECOMIL). For the sake of peremptory conflict resolution, special efforts were made by the civil sector, the ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations, the



United States and the European Union.²³ That is logical as Liberia was among the poorest countries in the world with an unemployment rate at 85%, where 76%²⁴ of the population was living on 1 dollar or less a day at that time (Jaye, 2009).

Two months after signing a ceasefire agreement on June 17, 2003, Accra Peace Agreement ended the war. Peacebuilding processes could start along with the authorisation for a UN mission and the deployment of peacekeepers. However, it was still uncertain how reconciliation and long-term peace will be reached after 14 years of war when masses of people were raped, sexually abused, mutilated and the overwhelming involvement of child soldiers were typical.²⁵

DDR in Liberia

Two DDR programmes were implemented in Liberia, primarily designed in the wake of security Council Resolution 1325 (McMullin, 2020). The first took place after the 1993 Cotonou Agreement (UN SC, 1993) that outlined the details regarding the ceasefire agreement, the transitional public administration, the amnesty laws and the military aspects of DDR, just to mention a few. This programme dealing with logistical, financial and personnel challenges was executed between 1994²⁶ and 1997 (Jaye, 2009).

After the Second Liberian War, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the United Nations could directly deploy peacekeeping forces to the country to promote the transitional government, prepare multiparty elections scheduled for 2005 (Bøås, 2005), support the rebuilding of the country and the reintegration of ex-combatants (Lively, 2012). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in 2003 the Security Council Resolution 1509 (UN SC, 2003) established a peace mission (United Nations Mission in Liberia – UNMIL) – originally for a period of 12 months²⁷ – to start to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate thousands of combatants. “CPA gave UNMIL (and the Transitional Government) extra-constitutional powers, suspending the constitution during the interim period[...].” (McMullin, 2020, p.27), which made UN decisions legally justified throughout the programme (McMullin, 2020).²⁸

With its mandate, UNMIL was to embody the full complexity of peacebuilding with a focus on shaping basic local and national-level administrative, judicial, executive and legislative mechanisms; reorganising law enforcement agencies; monitoring the ceasefire; maintaining

²³ The desire for final resolution was quite evident and visible, albeit Bøås (2005) stressed how France, the United States and the United Kingdom – intentionally or not – contributed to the reinforcement of anti-Taylor armed groups through financing Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, among which the former supported the LURD, the latter the MODEL.

²⁴ 76,2% in 2001 (Jaye, 2009).

²⁵ For a detailed inquiry regarding the involvement of children in armed struggles in Liberia and their reintegration prospects, see: Shittu et al., 2017.

²⁶ Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010:46) regard 1996 as the beginning of the first DDR programme.

²⁷ The mission officially accomplished its mandate on March 30, 2018. For more information: <https://unmil.unmissions.org/> (Accessed: 21 April 2021).

²⁸ This is why the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) could be easily disbanded in its entirety as a result of the incoming Johnson Sirleaf administration that did not trust such forces' loyalty (McMullin, 2020).

peace and stability; and promoting and protecting human rights (UN SC, 2003). In its resolution, the Security Council urged the international community to ensure the necessary resources for execution, and called upon all conflicting parties – primarily the groups of LURD and MODEL – to cooperate in the implementation.

Similar to the DDR programme that had just ended in Sierra Leone (1998-2004), both the monitoring of programme compliance and the operative guidance were performed by the United Nations and a competent national committee. While financial resources for disarmament were granted by the UN, rehabilitation and reintegration costs were guaranteed through donations and a trust fund (Human Rights Watch – HRW, 2005) that was overseen by the UNDP. Among the main donors were the European Commission, the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and a former British ministerial department (Department for International Development) (Jaye, 2009).²⁹

From this point this paper will concentrate on the second DDR programme (2003-2009) and examines the connections between „new wars” theories and DDR practices in that context, because the first programme’s results regarding reintegration have practically lost relevance and significance in the light of the second war.

With regard to the number of participants,³⁰ the complex nature of vocational trainings, the improvement in ex-combatants’ economic and safety conditions some argue that some kind of success could be perceived in Liberia (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012³¹; Pugel, 2006 cited Jaye, 2009; Jaye, 2009). Ex-combatants usually mentioned the UN mission without which they would not have chosen to accept disarmament (Jennings, 2007). Neumann and Schia (2012) also confirmed the community-based approach in Liberia that was essential in conflict resolution and effective peacebuilding.

At the same time, the challenges the programme coordinators faced and the defects revealed later on may justify a more prudent evaluation as DDR efficacy in Liberia is still questioned by critics, especially with respect to the reintegration results (Ackermann, 2009; Jennings, 2007; McMullin, 2020, Shittu et al., 2017). This paper is not aiming to take a stand on DDR efficacy in Liberia, but strive to describe the connections between DDR practice, the role communities may have and the characteristics of „new wars” through detailing some dysfunctionalities.

The Second DDR Programme (2003-2004) – Disarmament and Demobilisation

After the second Liberian War (1997-2003), the DDR was divided into two phases. The first engaged with disarmament, disengagement and demobilisation, the second with rehabilitation and reintegration aspects. While the latter put a greater emphasis on vocational trainings, education and social reintegration, the former – along with traditional guidelines – meant the rapid collection of weapons and used the highly desired notion of decreasing the

²⁹ In September, 2020 the Department has been replaced by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

³⁰ A total of 102,193 people (Paes, 2005), including 22,33 women, 8,500 boys and 2,400 girls (McMullin, 2020).

³¹ In an interview made by the authors themselves, they cited the viewpoint of one of the political advisers to the UNDP from 2006, who pled for the programme’s success.



odds of war recurrence through buying up weapons rapidly. As a consequence of such a great demand for guns and bullets, the illicit arms traffic has given the green light to rebound. In this situation what happened in Liberia is that foreign intervention contributed to the uncontrolled recirculation of weapons and created an undesired market where arms became the objects of trade rewarded by the programme itself (Jennings, 2007).

During the first phase, which officially ended in November, 2004 (Jennings, 2007), people just had to surrender their arms to be eligible for the programme and for all its cash benefits. Dysfunctionalities become evident if we note that the majority of the UN staff in Liberia were unfamiliar with the local context as they were redeployed from Sierra Leone where DDR processes had just ended (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012; Jaye, 2009). Due to the low entry criteria, the tempting financial benefits and the uncertain and inappropriately managed datasets based on information provided by armed militias' leaders, the number of participants rose rapidly,³² while both the benefits per person and the time for demobilisation decreased. In the light of such unforeseen tendencies, and due to the original case overload, it was to be feared that no money would be left for rehabilitation and reintegration.

The discontent among the people was heightened³³ further by the fact that policy-makers intended to complete pro-government militias' disbursement at first (Jennings, 2007) while certain groups (i.e. the so called *540 group*) were being excluded from formal programming (McMullin, 2020), and that former commanders, sometimes bribed by other war lords to re-recruit combatants (Shittu et al., 2017), were charged with the identification of former combatants who used to serve under their leadership (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012). The latter became the essence of a post-war state of dependence and clientelism through which former commanders have given the authority to select between the applicants and prioritise their family members on the one hand, and to gain additional benefits by claiming money in return for applicants' participation on the other (McMullin, 2020).³⁴ Henceforth, commanders were not only seen as high-ranking officials in the hierarchy of an armed group, but also as guarantors of economic benefits and survival³⁵ that resulted in the maintenance and renewal of former clientelistic, patrimonial societal structures based primarily on loyalty (Jennings, 2007; Munive and Jakobsen, 2012; Jaye, 2009). Similarly to Jennings (2007), Munive and Stepputat (2012, pp. 361, 369-370) argue that the aforementioned tendencies led to the blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians, creating „bureaucratic combatants” who were civilians simply impersonating armed fighters in order to have DDR benefits.

The second phase, demobilisation was tasked with the disengagement of combatants from former hierarchical structures through having courses relating to civics, democracy, HIV, AIDS,

³² According to an interview with a UNDP official, Munive and Jakobsen (2012:367) mention that for lack of any prior survey, the calculations regarding the total number of participants based on rough estimates, the experiences from Sierra Leone and the First Liberian War, thus the numbers were finally exceeded the original plans almost three times.

³³ Which e.g. resulted in the death of 9 participants (Jennings, 2007).

³⁴ McMullin also warns „not to focus exclusively on formal commanders' malfeasance”, but also on internal UN corruption (2020:10).

³⁵ That is quite important as the majority of the combatants were under the age of 30, just seeking for life purposes and the means of livelihood, which made them highly malleable and exposed to such structures of dependence (Bøås and Bjørkhaug, 2010; McMullin, 2020; Shittu et al., 2017).

public health and family planning in detached camps. Due to the growing number of participants and the decreasing budget, the original time frame decreased by 75%, while the per capita financial benefit has been cut by a third (HRW, 2005). After completing demobilisation, the participants were given a transitional safety net allowance (TSA) by which they started a six-month long, paid training programme chosen by the applicants themselves (HRW, 2005). Via their warrant of identity they could choose from four categories agricultural programme; civil sector; vocational trainings;³⁶ and formal education (Lively, 2012).

By and large, along with the critics of traditional DDR programmes, planning mistakes in Liberia and the lack of local, context-specific knowledge resulted in instability and discontent in many respects. The process could only be regarded successful if evaluation were based on participation only. But taking the numbers collected pro rata to the number of the participants – that is one weapon for four people –, then such a success is highly questionable (HRW, 2005; Jennings, 2007; McMullin, 2020; Shittuet al., 2017). Taking everything into consideration, Liberian disarmament and demobilisation – even in the light of the inadequacy of the reintegration phase – seemed to be quite effective (Jaye, 2009).

The reintegration of combatants in Liberia

After the Second Liberian War, the reintegration of former combatants exceeded the officially scheduled deadline by two years and ended on July, 2009 (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012), with a ceremony presided over by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (McMullin, 2020). Lively (2012) argues that – Liberian – reintegration programmes should be distinguished from disarmament and demobilisation processes and perceived as a part of a broader development policy. In this vein, vocational and educational programmes defined during the demobilisation of combatants should rather be interpreted within the framework of their reintegration as a progress of picking up new skills aiming to prepare them to take care of themselves, therefore increase the odds of their reintegration into their communities of origin that is actually the ultimate purpose of DDR programmes. This approach fits in the spirit of reintegration programmes which see the prerequisite of lasting peace and the essence of the strategy against military recruitment in eliminating economic incentives of taking up arms, develop self-awareness and offer alternatives for self-care through education, vocational trainings, job creation and sustainable income generation. However, approaches rest exclusively on economic considerations make both societal and personal reconciliation impossible if ethnic and identity-based struggles are not given a special attention and victims' needs are not "addressed alongside those of combatants" (Arnould, 2021, p.6).

Along with the growing number of participants and decreasing amount of transitional allowances, the reintegration process faced severe budget shortfalls. For example, the assistance for one person has been halved (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012). Liberia illustrates how budget cuts in a post-conflict situation and time gaps between programme phases risk

³⁶ E.g.: carpentry, weaving, car mechanic, masonry.



the fragile peace and stability and how it leaves room to war recurrence.³⁷ It is quite evident how apocryphal the programme propagating the importance of financial and security stability became in the eyes of the participants when the basic amenities to survive, the means and guarantees for basic subsistence were not available. In such a situation, ex-combatants found themselves highly exposed to former hierarchical dependence which – without effective checks and balances – contributed to the reproduction of former clientistic ties (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012).

In the Liberian context, Jaye (2009) refers to different surveys that draw contradictory conclusions regarding DDR efficacy, among which the outcomes of the reintegration phase are highly diverse. What is seemingly authoritative in this regard is the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2007 (UN SC, 2007). Based on a comprehensive evaluation, this document stated: four years after the war ended, without real job security and guarantees, the preponderance of ex-combatants generally opt for illegal income generation due to the inability of the programme to offer sustainable alternatives to the participants (UN SC, 2007, p.7).

A survey conducted by Hill et al. (2008) in Lofa Province, a northwest county of Liberia contiguous to Guinea and Sierra Leone, searched for the main causes of war recurrence. According to their findings, the lack of jobs, trainings, earnings, so poverty and economic deprivation are among the most common triggers for taking up arms. In addition, the lack of acceptance by the family or the community may further hinder reintegration and reconciliation (Hill et al., 2008), meanwhile ethnic and tribal conflicts in the country are still unsolved, they are thus also potential risk factors of renewed violence to the very day. According to the authors, 97% of the respondents viewed that their living conditions have been improved after the war.³⁸ 13% of them would take up arms again for survival, particularly in hope of some economic benefits. Moreover, some of them put in view their mobilisation in case of the protraction and cancellation of DDR benefits. These all confirm the necessity of economic incentives in order to avoid war recurrence and support DDR efficacy.³⁹ However, after earlier practices, the Liberian reintegration efforts dealt rather with vocational trainings than job creation, even though the negligence of the latter might increase the odds of war recurrence as detailed above and argued by McMullin who refers to biannual Hot-Spot assessments identifying “the lack of livelihood opportunities as the biggest challenge to stability in the areas under review” (2020, p.4).

On the basis of a nationwide, UNDP-supported survey that reached 540 ex-combatants and conducted by Pugel (2007), Lively (2012) examined and measured what impacts the DDR might have on certain economic indicators like employment rate and income generation. He found that DDR in Liberia did not have significant impact on the personal incomes of those

³⁷ In January, 2005 four thousands students who had gained admission to secondary schools supported financially by the programme were dismissed due to the budget shortfalls (HRW, 2005).

³⁸ On the contrary

³⁹ This is much more relevant and outstanding among those who had jobs and regular income before the war, because being unemployed and financial insecurity in Liberia goes hand in hand with the loss of prestige. So, among them, unfulfilled promises could result in more serious and drastic consequences.

completing the programme. He thus argues that DDR trainings seemed to have low efficacy, especially in a country with a high unemployment rate.

Ex-combatants' perceptions of their reintegration and community acceptance are but two yet quite important of many indicators of reintegration programmes. According to the literature, traditional DDRs, just like in Liberia, disregarded real reintegration challenges the combatants generally face when returning to their community and family or the methods to support them in such struggles were insufficient. According to Hill et al. (2008), 27% of the respondents struggled with problems during their homecoming, meanwhile 40% of them felt that the community they returned to deems them negatively. This is highly problematic in Liberia, where traditional peace concepts used to focus less on vulnerable groups like women,⁴⁰ meanwhile female ex-combatants are actually more likely to take up arms again (Hill et al., 2008), which in all makes the reintegration of women fragile.

The Liberian DDR (2003-2009) in the Context of „New Wars“

Bøås (2005) argues that „new wars“ theories may help to better understand the diverse dimensions of conflicts, just like the Liberian case.⁴¹ Even though the critical literature usually considers „new wars“ theories as reductionist conceptual fields of inquiry that tend to overvalue and overemphasise some characteristics of contemporary conflicts, in reality, they used to focus on and still strive for indicating the complexity of wars.

This section tries to put the Liberian events into the context of „new wars“ in which the focus is not on the uncertain novelty of some conflict features, but rather on their presence and relevance in describing reality. The analysis concludes that the two Liberian Wars mostly comply with the conditions described by Kaldor. This has just been proved in this section through the four key conflict features: the actors (1); the goals and motivations (2); the scale of brutality and the victimisation of civilians (3); and the economic and financial characteristics of the war (4).

Irrespective of any novelty contemporary conflicts can be characterised with, „new wars“ theories may add useful guidelines to better understand armed conflicts and to develop effective peacebuilding strategies as well. Thus, in the following sections, this paper aspires to perceive the Liberian context in the conceptual framework of „new wars“ and indicate how such a theory can grasp some of the crucial aspects of armed conflicts and how they can be used for clarifying some problems and challenges the Liberian DDR faced.

a) Actors and blurring lines

With its eroding state capacities, collapsing modern statehood and the number of non-state actors in conflicts, Liberia is the epitome of „new wars“. The mode of warfare during the

⁴⁰ For a detailed review of the lasting negative impacts of the exclusion of women, girls (and disabled combatants) from programming see: McMullin, 2020.

⁴¹ Among such dimensions the author probably means the economic motivations, the illegal trade relations as means of war financing, and regional and global connectivity (the author's note).

1990s with numerous rebelling armed groups (e.g. MODEL, LURD, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia or the Independent National Patriotic Front), the involvement of masses of child soldiers (Shittu et al., 2017) and private security services in the armed struggles to gain power in the country also testify this. Conflicting parties striving for power usually did not accept and recognise each other as legitimate enemies, moreover they questioned the legitimacy of any international peace mission, like Taylor did with the ECOMOG forces.

In addition to the growing number of conflicting parties and their changing roles, Kaldor (2013) also mentions the blurring lines between combatants and civilians as a typical feature of „new wars“. In this regard, whereas DDR programmes rightly aim to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life through mellowing former hierarchical military structures, in Liberia the programme really missed to grasp the essence of demobilisation and conserved the differentiation by making a greater sense of some localised conflicts on the one hand, while on the other, let former structures remain and clientistic dependence flourish during which civilians personate combatants for financial benefits through which the lines between combatants and civilians thus started to blur (Bøås, 2005; Colletta, 2012). Founded their argumentation on field research outcomes, Bøås and Bjørkhaug (2010) stresses that Liberian DDR was counterproductive as stigmatisation and some lines of fracture between the combatants and civilians derived from – abrupt and poor – DDR planning.

A survey conducted by the authors in Monrovia and Voinjama concluded that there were no difference between young fighters and other layers of the society regarding the standards of living, the employment rate or the income generation, thus stigmatisation of ex-combatants originated from the UN peace mission which presumed that all those who used to be associated with armed groups and participated in the fights were necessarily threats to the security and stability. This, however, was not the case in Liberia. Colletta (2012), among others, pointed out how – if differentiation is inevitable – durable fraction lines can be preserved and maintained for organisational purposes and how war-related competences can be used for guaranteeing security in rural areas. So, whilst conflicting organisations and war structures were being dissolved formally and ostensibly, they were actually transformed and fixed in an other way (Bøås and Bjørkhaug, 2010). After all, the DDR unfortunately conserved such dependence and hierarchical structures without taking institutional advantages of them for peacebuilding purposes.

According to Kaldor (2019), „new wars“ are fragmented and decentralised, thus local and regional levels are the quintessence of dealing with post-conflict challenges. This also demands substate-level actors and communities to be involved in and incorporated into peacebuilding processes. In Liberia, the decentralisation of the UN mission UNMIL has been carried out through so called Civil Affairs (CA) committees founded on the principle of respecting the local cultural context to practically support state capacities at local levels, rebuild social trust and promote reconciliation through mediation, while representing, implementing and monitoring mission activities at community levels (Neumann and Schia, 2012).

Some tends to raise attention to the success of the Liberian programme, even though the Liberian DDR - sometimes with exaggerated „liberal peace” concepts – was prone to be perceived as a partner of state institutions rather than locally engaged substate actors or communities. By and large, leaving behind state-centric approaches was not reached. Continued attention by the international community primarily to the capital of the country and to a nationwide state-building standpoint (Neumann and Schia, 2012)⁴² blocked any new approach to evolve.

b) Goals and motivations

Regarding the goals, according to Kaldor’s theory, in „new wars” people are mobilised around identities that gets further consolidated during the wars, primarily in pursuit of economic benefits. In Liberia, economic exploitation was an integral part of Liberia’s historical development since the emerging of its modern statehood which has accelerated afterwards and become more decisive through illicit diamond trade and rivalry about caoutchouc production⁴³ whose starting point at that time also can be found in profit-oriented, market-driven exploitation.

Jaye (2009) argues that ethnic and tribal origins – that are determinants of post-bipolar „new wars” as claimed by Kaldor – are but two of many triggers. Even though the scale of war motives are diverse, it is important to mention that prior to the war, discrepancies and conflicts were themselves mainly along ethnic and tribal fractures. Consequently, the inequality and the diversity of the fields of antagonism do not question ethnicity as a main fracture and organising principle along which the wars were waged, just indicate how numerous manifestations the ethnicity could have in a war-torn country. Moreover, while pre-war ethnic lines were not entirely impermeable, after the long decades of crystallisation of such ethnic categories wars themselves fixed them definitively (Bøås, 2005, p.77) underpinning Kaldor’s (2013) argumentation who stated that ethnicities are the real products, means and in some sense goals of „new wars”. “Products” primarily in terms of Besenyő’s (2019, p.295-296) concepts of spontaneous and semi-spontaneous securitisation “where the referent object of securitization is not the nation state...but the more traditionally defined community and its individual members, plus religiously or ethnically defined groups that are under the protection of the regionally dominant identity community”, „guided by traditional concepts of (ethno-) national survival”. Even though, economic, social and political conflicts should be perceived along ethnic and tribal fractures in Liberia, it does not mean that ethnic clashes should have inevitably resulted in war, just that ethnicity played a critical role in the forming of fractures that should have been taken into account during post-conflict peacebuilding. In this field, the conservation of ethnic-based group structures through the Liberian DDR programme did not resolve but intensified such identity struggles, while

⁴² According to Neumann and Schia, (2012), social mistrust towards state institutions remained after the war, when Civil Affairs failed to manage conflicts. This lasted until 2009 when so called Peace Committees focusing on the local historical and cultural context and representing all layers of the Liberian society were created on a voluntary basis to better address and resolve conflicts.

⁴³ For more details see: Neumann and Schia, 2012:37-38.



hierarchical social ties with their clientistic and nepotistic dependence have also been intensified through DDR-guaranteed economic benefits that were to be the primal triggers of war (Jennings, 2007; Munive and Jakobsen, 2012; Jaye, 2009).

It is quite clear when Pernice (2013) – like Bøås and Bjørkhaug (2010) – argues that contrary to economic incentives, the roots of mobilisation and inclination for violence can be found in the searching of individuals for security guarantees against state authorities which finally led to an extensive joining to militias.⁴⁴ However, when the author contests the applicability of „new wars” theories in the context of Liberia and rejects to perceive the Liberian wars as „new wars” based on such a sequence of ideas along with the underestimation of their novelty and brutality seems to be unfounded. On the one hand, the lack of security guarantees in Liberia derives from the erosion and destabilisation of the state which resulted in ethnic and tribal group cohesion that exactly what „new wars” theories strive to stress. On the other hand, conflict did not escalate and accelerate because of individuals living in fear and searching for security, but primarily due to those high-ranking officials who aspire for economic benefits through the exploitation of people exposed to fear and deprivation. In addition, when Pernice stresses the role that international humanitarian aids have in war economy and refers to the low intensity and prolonged nature of conflicts, he in fact justifies the relevance of Kaldor’s „new war” theory (2013, p.10).

Economic incentives as personal motivations and ethnic/tribal fractures as products, means and goals of armed conflicts are determinants of „new wars”, and were typical of the Liberian events. Peacebuilding should incorporate „new wars” theories – which were capable of identifying the main features and guiding principles of the war in Liberia – into the designing and planning of DDR programmes in order to fix structural defects and contribute to the reconciliation by better addressing the war motives and fractures.

c) Brutality and the victimisation of civilians

According to Kaldor’s thesis, instead of direct battles between state armies, the prevalence of the use of force against civilians and indirect clashes between the conflicting parties became common. For example, Shaw (2000) mentions ethnic cleansing and genocide as concomitants of „new wars”. Serious human rights violations, widespread sexual violence and rape, the killings of masses of civilians and the exploitation of women and children are suggestive examples of brutality which have been confirmed and proven in the Liberian wartime and reached unprecedented heights compared with other conflicts in the African continent (Bøås, 2005; Shittu et al, 2017; Jaye, 2009). Forced displacement – that is also typical of „new wars” – was qualified as widely accepted practice in Liberia too. Monrovia, the capital of the country, for example, while having the predominant amount of development assistance (McMullin, 2020), hosted masses of internally displaced people (IDP) for years (Jennings, 2007).

⁴⁴ Some argues that the struggling for survival (Bøås és Bjørkhaug, 2010) and human rights abuses (Shittu et al., 2017) have not ceased when the war ended.

In connection with sexual violence as one heinous manifestation of brutality in Liberia, Amnesty International (2004, p.3-4) highlighted that between 1989 and 2003, 60-70% of the population was sexually abused and became victims of some forms of sexual violence. Notwithstanding the difficulties regarding measuring and quantifying brutality, based on the reports and statements, Liberia is certainly one of the most deadly and cruel example of „new wars”.

Concerning the aforementioned brief insight into the involvement of the population in the war clarifies why social reconciliation, investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of mass human rights violations and the rebuilding of national justice should (or should have) given the priority in post-conflict resolution which rarely happened in Liberia (Neumann, 2011).

d) Economic features

As Bøås (2005, p. 82) details, the worsening conflict environment in Liberia created its own logic of war economy which – like Kaldor described – was able to refinance and sustain the state of war even if illicit trade activities were halted due to international efforts. Instead of supporting DDR and reintegration, the strategy to giving financial benefits in return for weapons created a segregated market economy used primarily by ex-combatants that deepened the gap between fighters and civilians (Jennings, 2007). Similar to Kaldor’s (2019) argumentation, Pernice (2013) acknowledges the role that international humanitarian aid generally has in sustaining and prolonging wars. In this regard, in Liberia, such an economy based on predation, looting and rivalry for resources to gain power and control over a territory is mentioned in the literature (HRW, 2005; Jaye, 2009).

The starting point of the Liberian DDR rested on the assumption that preventing further radicalisation and recruitment, as well as the resolution of conflicts in the country are available through removing economic incentives of taking up arms. This is well within the reach of a DDR programme if instant disbursements to satisfy ex-combatants’ basic needs and long-term stipends through employment are both guaranteed. This is exactly what the Liberian DDR missed to fulfil in some cases by focusing on the participants as rationally profit-maximising individuals⁴⁵ without guaranteeing the necessary means to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate them, conserving new financial and institutionalised dependence (Munive and Kajobsen, 2012) using former hierarchical structures for participation⁴⁶ or by disregarding other crucial aspects of conflict-resolution – used also by Kaldor to specify „new wars” – like identity, ethnicity, personal reconciliation and the fundamental roles the local communities can have in resolving conflicts. Moreover, some argues that reintegration and vocational programmes – as mentioned above – were not necessarily followed by the improvement of living standards

⁴⁵ This refers to the notorious theory of ‘greed and grievance’ developed by Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004; and: Collier et al., 2006) who interpreted conflict motivations in the context of economic benefits.

⁴⁶ After the peace processes of 1997 and 2003, the new political and economic power structures were created along with the intention to preserve former commanders’ status and influence which made accountability highly problematic (Jaye, 2009).



and earnings (Lively, 2012; UN SC, 2007).⁴⁷ So, taking the assumption that economic benefits lead to a more effective demobilisation, the outcomes of the Liberian DDR programme seem really contradictory.

Jennings (2007) clearly stresses that poverty and unemployment were extensive after the Second Liberian War, and two of the greatest challenges of development and state-building were to exceed that kind of war economy based on looting and to overcome ethnic polarisation so typical of Liberia. With respect to the former, in the author's opinion, reintegration programmes were incapable to satisfy ex-combatants' needs in terms of earnings and jobs. Some of the respondents of the survey conducted by the author mentioned two indispensable aspects which might be the core elements of long-term reintegration and dissolution of such kind of war economy. The first was the basic demand to better address the real needs of ex-combatants. The second was the responsibility the programme had to keep its promises (2007, p.207).

Conclusion

Theorists of the so-called "new wars" argue that we have witnessed meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts and such changes in wars necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches (Kaldor, 2019, p.24). The field already has extensive critical literature on "liberal peace", DDR programmes and traditional peace operations, which may serve as a good starting point. In this regard, second generation programmes focusing much more on communities and their role in post-conflict settlements try to define and describe how such a shift should look like to better resolve contemporary conflicts.

According to Mary Kaldor's (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2019) theory, „new wars“ have become typical during the 1990s and they can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of actors, goals, methods, the effects of war on civil population and their economic characteristics. She argues that qualitative changes in wars showed that both a better understanding of the root causes and motivations of armed conflicts and belligerents and a strengthened commitment to the reintegration of ex-combatants are needed to find long-term resolutions for conflicts. In this sense, the new characteristics of wars pointed out by Kaldor may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be designed and implemented in post-conflict settlements.

After a detailed review of the relevant literature, the Liberian wars seem to fit the trends of „new wars“ described primarily by Kaldor. Regardless whether there is any novelty in the evolution of armed conflicts, the Liberian case is roughly consistent with the complex description she detailed (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2019). After a general review of DDR

⁴⁷ With special regard to disabled ex-combatants McMullin argues that DDR/SSR and their aftermath ended up providing less social safety net support to them than existed under the Charles Taylor regime (2020:17).

programmes and Kaldor's „new wars“ theory, and a brief summary of the Liberian conflicts and experiences, such a correspondence has been testified in this paper on the grounds of war actors, their goals and motivations, the economic conditions, the scale of brutality and the involvement of civilians in war struggles. What has also been confirmed is that „new wars“ theories reflected to many of the problems and shortfalls the second Liberian DDR programme – and traditional DDR programmes in general – are characterised with, and revealed some ways to better resolve them. In fact, due to Kaldor's work, some of the typical characteristics of contemporary wars have given prominence whereof the critical literature on traditional DDR programmes actually strive to raise the attention. In this vein, Kaldor's thesis may have relevance in better addressing and understanding the conflicts and make programme designing and planning more efficient through calling the international community's attention to the economic, political and social complexity of security in a post-conflict situation (Malantowicz, 2013).

Systematic underestimation and ignorance of the local context and obsessive application of the sometimes highly outdated concept of „liberal peace“ resulted in counterproductive solutions in Liberia. According to field research by Neumann (2011) conducted in rural Liberia, the set-up of a formal, western-styled justice system in the country eventuated in parallel institutions which thus led to the decreasing sense of justice among the people and to the decline of local customary law as traditional channels were often replaced by western inventions (2011, p.66). The author – like second generation community-based DDR programmes – thus proposed a localised approach focusing more on the local cultural context. Besides, she showed how UN-supported, in that case incautious decentralisation of the elections of 2011 along with the principles of democratisation, rule of law, freedom of religion and guaranteeing of human rights – originated from the „liberal peace“ concept – reached contrary effects.

Taking all the facts detailed in this paper into consideration, community initiatives, localised programmes, context-specific analysis, peacebuilding strategies reflecting to cultural specifications and the strengthening of the local and regional levels are indispensable for effective conflict resolution and reconciliation in Liberia. This is what Kaldor (2019) also admits and proposes to consider. After all, while Neumann and Schia (2012) hold a brief for the effective community-based approach in Liberia,⁴⁸ Jennings (2007) argues that the Liberian DDR's impact on the local-level and its development potential were insufficient. One thing is for sure: communities and local-level projects' role for long-standing reconciliation and peace are vital (Jennings, 2007; Kaldor, 2019). This is evident as severely damaged countries sometimes face unprecedented challenges and social hatred that basically corrode social cohesion. Thus the prerequisite of a successful reintegration and having decades-long legacy

⁴⁸ In addition to the authors, who consider the channel of Civil Affairs committees as an integral part of such a community-based approach, McMullin (2020), for example, also refers to labour-intensive road rehabilitation projects as platforms where *“both ex-combatants and non-combatant community members working together in teams, demonstrated high utility to peacekeeping efforts at a relatively little cost”* (2020:37), while some examples of local civil activities and localised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) might be also perceived to be useful means on the ground for reconciliation (Jaye, 2009).



of mass human rights violations left behind is the rebuilding and the supporting of communities, while addressing and resolving local challenges and threats. Especially in Liberia, where the state always used to be highly centralised (McMullin, 2020), the quality of infrastructure low and the communication between the urban and rural areas weak.

Acknowledgement

The completion of this study could not have been possible without the support of my professors at the Corvinus University of Budapest. The author would like to express his special appreciation to Dr. Péter Marton for his thought-provoking suggestions.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Richárd Schneider is an international relations expert, a criminalist and a doctoral student at the Africa Research Institute of the Doctoral School of Safety and Security Sciences of the University of Óbuda in Hungary. His research interests include African armed conflicts, the United Nations' peace operations and his doctoral inquiry also concerns the use of artificial intelligence for armed conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Bibliography

- Ackerman, R. (2009) 'Rebuilding Liberia, One Brick at a Time', *World Policy Journal*, 26(2), pp. 83-92.
- Amnesty International (2004) 'Liberia. No Impunity for Rape: A Crime Against Humanity and a War Crime', *Amnesty International*, Index Number: AFR 34/017/2004. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr34/017/2004/en/> (Accessed: 19 April 2021).
- Arnould, V. (2021) 'Reflections on a Decentralized Approach to Transitional Justice in the DR Congo', *Africa Policy Brief*, No. 33. Available at <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/reflections-on-a-decentralised-approach-to-transitional-justice-in-the-dr-congo/> (Accessed: 25 January 2022).
- Berdal, M. (2003) 'How "New" Are "New Wars"? Global Economic Change and the Study of Civil War', *Global Governance*, 9(4), pp. 477-502.
- Besenyő, J. (2019) 'Barry Buzan's Securization Theory and the Case of Iraqi Kurdish Military Action Against ISIS in 2014', *Journal of Security and Sustainability*, 8(3), pp. 295-306.
- Bøås, M. (2005) 'The Liberian Civil War: New War/Old War?', *Global Society*, 19(1), pp. 73-88.
- Bøås, M. and Bjørkhaug, I. (2010) 'DDR in Liberia: Youth Remarginalisation or Reintegration?', *MICROCON Research Working Paper*, 28, Brighton: MICROCON.
- Bowd, R. and Özerdem, A. (2013) 'How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-Combatants', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 7(4), pp. 453-475.

- Briscoe, I. (2015) 'Conflict, Security and Emerging Threats' In: van de Goor, L., van der Lijn, J., Rood, J. and Dinnissen, R. (eds.) *Peacekeeping Operations in a Changing World*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Strategic Monitor Project, pp. 8-15. Available at <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Peacekeeping%20Operations%20in%20a%20Changing%20World.pdf> (Accessed: 17 April 2021).
- Chojnacki, S. (2006) 'Anything New or More of the Same? Wars and Military Interventions in the International System, 1946-2003', *Global Society*, 20(1), pp. 25-46.
- Chounet-Cambas, L. (2018) *Disarmament in Syria*. The National Agenda for the Future of Syria (NAFS) Programme, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Available at <https://nafsprogramme.info/sites/default/files/2019-07/Disarmement%20in%20Syria.pdf> (Accessed: 12 April 2021).
- von Clausewitz, C. (1976) *On War*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
- Colletta, N. J. (2012) 'Interim Stabilisation in Fragile Security Situations', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 1(1), pp. 45-51.
- Colletta, N. J. and Muggah, R. (2009) 'Context Matters: Interim Stabilisation and Second Generation Approaches to Security Promotion', *Journal of Conflict, Security & Development*, 9(4), pp. 425-453.
- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Rohner, D. (2006) 'Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War', *CSAE Working Paper Series/2006-10*. Centre for the Study of African Economies. University of Oxford.
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004) 'Greed and Grievance in Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4), pp. 563-595.
- Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1998) 'On Economic Causes of Civil War', *Oxford Economic Papers*, 50(4), pp. 563-573.
- Council of the European Union (2006) 'Draft EU Concept for Support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)', "I/A" ITEM NOTE, Brussels, December 6. Available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/16387_/16387_en.pdf (Accessed: 12 April 2021).
- Cunliffe, P. (2012) 'Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons Between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today', *International Peacekeeping*, 19(4), pp. 426-442.
- Danesh, H. B. (2006) 'Towards an Integrative Theory of Peace Education', *Journal of Peace Education* 3(1), pp. 55-78.
- Danesh, H. B. and Danesh, Roshan (2002) 'Has Conflict Resolution Grown Up? Toward a Developmental Model of Decision Making and Conflict Resolution', *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, 7(1). Available at https://www3.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijsps/vol7_1/Danesh.html (Accessed: 12 April 2021).
- Doyle, M. W. and Sambanis, N. (2000) 'International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', *The American Political Science Review*, 94(4), pp. 779-801.
- Ebo, A. (2005) 'The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia', *Occasional Paper No. 9 of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)*. Available at https://issat.dcaf.ch/fre/download/19728/233769/op09_security_sector_reform_liberia.pdf (Accessed: 25 March 2021).
- Echevarria, A. J. (2005) *Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths*. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Available at <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/22592> (Accessed: 1 February 2021).
- Glassmyer, K. and Sambanis, N. (2008) 'Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination', *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(3), pp. 365-384.



- Goodhand, J. and Walton, O. (2009) 'The Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding? International Engagement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process', *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 3(3), pp. 303-323.
- Haid, H. (2018a) 'Joining the Enemy: How the Syrian Regime Reintegrates Former Rebel Fighters', *Chatham House*, July. Available at <https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/joining-the-enemy-how-the-syrian-regime-reintegrates-former-rebel-fighters> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).
- Haid, H. (2018b) 'Reintegrating Syrian Militias: Mechanisms, Actors, and Shortfalls', *Carnegie Middle East Center*, December 12, 2018. Available at <https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/12/12/reintegrating-syrian-militias-mechanisms-actors-and-shortfalls-pub-77932> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).
- Hill, R., Taylor, G. and Temin, J. (2008) 'Would You Fight Again? Understanding Liberian Ex-Combatant Reintegration', *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, Washington. Available at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr211.pdf> (Accessed: 17 April 2021).
- Human Rights Watch (2005) 'Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors', *HRW*, April 13, 2005. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/04/13/youth-poverty-and-blood/lethal-legacy-west-africas-regional-warriors> (Accessed: 16 April 2021).
- Jaye, T. (2009) 'Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Liberia', *International Center for Transitional Justice*. Available at <https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-DDR-Liberia-CaseStudy-2009-English.pdf> (Accessed: 19 April 2021).
- Jennings, K. M. (2007) 'The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-combatants in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 14(2), pp. 204-218.
- Kaldor, M. (2013) 'In Defense of New Wars', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 2(1), part 4, pp. 1-16.
- Kaldor, M. (2012) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. 3rd Edition. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Kaldor, M. (2009) 'New wars – Counter-insurgency or Human Security', *The Broker*, May 28. Available at <https://www.thebrokeronline.eu/new-wars-d12/> (Accessed: 1 April 2021).
- Kaldor, M. (2014) 'No Wars? New Wars? Peacemaking in New Contexts', OxPeace conference lecture. The podcast is available at <http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/oxpeace-2014-no-wars-new-wars-peacemaking-new-contexts> (Accessed: 6 April 2021).
- Kaldor, M. (2005) 'Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror', *International Politics*, 42, pp. 491-498. (Public lecture on February 2. London School of Economics, Cold War Studies Centre).
- Kaldor, M. (2019) 'Peacemaking in an Era of New Wars' In de Waal, Thomas (ed.) *Think Peace: Essays for an Age of Disorder*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Think_Peace_final.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2020).
- Kalyvas, S. N. (2001) '„New“ and „Old“ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?', *World Politics*, 54(1), pp. 99-118.
- Kenkel, K. M. (2013) 'Five Generations of Peace Operations: From the „Thin Blue Line“ to „Painting a Country Blue“', *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 56(1), pp. 122-143.
- Khaddour, K. (2018) 'Syria's Troublesome Militias', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/77635> (Accessed: 11 April 2021).
- Kilroy, W. (2010) *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: The Co-evolution of concepts, practices, and understanding*. Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies. Program on States and Security. New York. Available at https://www.academia.edu/3750155/Disarmament_Demobilization_and_Reintegration_The_co_evolution_of_concepts_practices_and_understanding (Accessed: 20 January 2021).

- Kilroy, W. (2008) 'Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) As a Participatory Process: Involving Communities and Beneficiaries in Post-conflict Disarmament Programmes', In: European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) *Second Graduate Conference: 25-27 August 2008*. Universitat Autònoma Barcelona. Available at https://www.academia.edu/3750154/Disarmament_Demobilisation_and_Reintegration_DDR_as_a_participatory_process_involving_communities_and_beneficiaries_in_post_conflict_disarmament_programmes (Accessed: 20 January 2021).
- Krause, K. and Jütersonke, O. (2005) 'Peace, Security and Development', *Security Dialogue*, 36(4), pp. 447-462.
- Kriege, G. (2008) *Perspectives on 'New Wars' in Africa: The Case of Sierra Leone*. MPhil Thesis. University of Stellenbosch. Available at <https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/2601> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).
- Lamb, G. (2008) *Current Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme Design and Implementation*, *Thematic Working Paper (Contribution to the Project: DDR and Human Security: Post-Conflict Security-Building and the Interests of the Poor)*. Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security. University of Bradford. Available at <https://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk/handle/10454/7297?show=full> (Accessed: 21 January 2021).
- Lively, I. (2012) 'Measuring Intermediate Outcomes of Liberia's DDR Program', *IES Working Paper*, No. 2, Charles University in Prague, Institute of Economic Studies (IES), Prague. Available at <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/83399/1/684815257.pdf> (Accessed: 21 January 2021).
- Lind, W. S. and Thiele, G. A. (2015) *4th Generation Warfare*. Castalia House: Kouvola. ISBN: 978-952-7065-75-4.
- Loode, S. (2011) 'Peacebuilding in Complex Social Systems', *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, 4(18), pp. 68-82.
- Malantowicz, A. (2013) 'Civil War in Syria and the 'New Wars' Debate', *Amsterdam Law Forum*, 5(3), pp. 52-60.
- Malantowicz, A. (2010) 'Do 'New Wars' Theories Contribute to Our Understanding of the African Conflicts? Cases of Rwanda and Darfur', *Africana Bulletin*, Nr. 58, pp. 159-172.
- MacGinty, R. (2011) *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McMullin, J. R. (2020) *The Legacy of DDR in Liberia: Policy Briefing Report Prepared for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section*. DPO/OROLSI. United Nations Department of Peace Operations. Available at https://www.academia.edu/57365976/The_Legacy_of_DDR_in_Liberia (Accessed: 13 March 2022).
- McQuinn, B. (2016) 'DDR and the Internal Organisation of Non-State Armed Groups', *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 5(1), pp. 1-24.
- Mello, P. A. (2010) 'In Search of New Wars: The Debate About a Transformation of War', *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(2), pp. 297-309.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2006) 'Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration. Final Report', Available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ED1EF744FE93A788C1257428003110CB-gvtSweden_feb2006.pdf (Accessed: 16 April 2021).
- Muggah, R. and Baaré, A. (2009) 'Negotiating Reintegration in Uganda: Dealing with Combatants During Peace Processes', In Muggah, R. (ed) *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*. Routledge, pp. 226-247.



- Muggah, R. (2010) 'Innovations in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Policy and Research. Reflections on the Last Decade', Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI Working Paper 774. Available at <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/119784/WP-774-Muggah.pdf> (Accessed: 19 February 2021).
- Muggah, R. (2009) 'Introduction: The Emperor's Clothes?', In Muggah, R. (ed) *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 1-29.
- Muggah, R. (2005) 'No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts', *The Round Table*, 94(379), pp. 239-252.
- Munive, J. and Jakobsen, S. F. (2012) 'Revisiting DDR in Liberia: Exploring the Power, Agency and Interests of Local and International Actors in the 'Making' and 'Unmaking' of Combatants', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 12(4), pp. 359-385.
- Munive, J. and Stepputat, F. (2015) 'Rethinking Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programs', *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 4(1): part 48, pp. 1-13.
- Neumann, H. and Schia, N. N. (2012) *Contextualizing Peacebuilding Activities to Local Circumstances*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Report, Security in Practice 6 (NUPI Report). Available at <https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/276450/NUPI%2BReport-SIP-6-12-Schia-Neumann.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y> (Accessed: 27 February 2021).
- Neumann, H. (2011) 'Taking a Micro-social Perspective of Impact of Peacebuilding Interventions on Rural Citizens', *Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development*, Issue 18, pp. 47-67.
- Newman, E. (2004) 'The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed', *Security Dialogue*, 35(2), pp. 173-189.
- Osseiran, H. (2018) 'In Syria, Rebel Integration Promotes Conflict Not Peace', *The New Humanitarian*. Available at <https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/peacebuilding/community/2018/08/10/in-syria-rebel-integration-promotes-conflict-not-peace> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).
- Özerdem, A. (2012) 'A re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant reintegration: 'social reintegration' approach', *Conflict, Security & Development*, 12(1), pp. 51-73.
- Paes, W. (2005) 'The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Liberia', *International Peacekeeping*, 12(2), pp. 253-261.
- Palik, J., Rustad, S. A. and Methi, F. (2020) *Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2019*. Peace Research Institute Oslo. Available at <https://www.prio.org/publications/12442> (Accessed: 18 April 2021).
- Paragi, B. (2005) 'A libériai és Sierra Leone-i (polgár-)háborúk háttere és összefüggései', *Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade*, (4)1-2, pp. 89-105.
- Paris, R. (2002) 'International Peacebuilding and the "Mission Civilisatrice"', *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), pp. 637-656.
- Pernice, D. (2013) *Should the Liberian Civil War(s) Be Considered Example of „New War“?*. University of Kent: Brussels. Available at https://www.academia.edu/8097826/Should_the_Liberian_Civil_War_s_be_considered_example_of_new_war (Accessed: 20 April 2021).
- Pugel, J. (2006) *Key Findings from the Nation-Wide Survey of Ex-Combatants in Liberia: Reintegration and Reconciliation*. Monrovia: UNDP/JIU/ANPPCAN.
- Pugel, J. (2007) *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia*. United Nations Development Programme and the African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) report.

- Schneider, R. (2021) *A fegyveres konfliktusokban résztvevő volt harcosok leszerelésével, demobilizációjával és reintegrációjával foglalkozó DDR programok kritikai vizsgálata az „új háborúkra” vonatkozó elméletek kontextusában*. Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of International, Political and Regional Studies, Department of International Relations.
- Richmond, O. P. (2006) 'The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'', *The Journal of Conflict & Security and Development* 6(3), pp. 291-314.
- Rigterink, A. (2013) *New Wars in Number: An Empirical Test of the 'New War' Thesis*. London School of Economics, Security in Transition SiT/DP/03/13. Available at <http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Rigterink.-New-Wars-in-Numbers.pdf> (Accessed: 18 April 2021).
- Sabaratnam, M. (2013) 'Avatars of Eurocentrism in the Critique of the Liberal Peace', *Security Dialogue*, 44(3), pp. 259-278.
- Schulhofer-Wohl, J. and Sambanis, N. (2010) *Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programs. An Assessment*. [research report] Folke Bernadotte Academy Publication. Available at https://fba.se/contentassets/7da0c74e1d22462db487955f2e373567/ddr_programs_-_an-assessment.pdf (Accessed: 21 January 2021).
- Seethaler, F. (2016) *Assessing the Impact of DDR Programmes: Possibilities and Challenges*. United Nations University. Policy Brief – March 2016. ISBN 978-92-808-9029-7. Available at https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:5546/Assessing_Impact_of_DDR_Programmes_160322.pdf (Accessed: 21 January 2021).
- Shaw, M. (2000) 'Review Essays. The Contemporary Mode of Warfare? Mary Kaldor's Theory of New Wars', *Review of International Political Economy*, 7(1), pp. 171-180.
- Shittu, R., Olori, B. and Tanko, A. (2017) 'Child Soldiering and its Implications for National Security in Liberia', *AUDC*, 11(2), pp. 53-78.
- Smith, B. (2018) 'Two Dogmas of the New War Thesis', *International Journal of Military History and Historiography*, 38, pp. 92-120.
- Söderberg Kovacs, M. (2007) *From Rebellion to Politics: The Transformation of Rebel Groups to Political Parties in Civil War Peace Processes*. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University: Uppsala.
- Söderström, J. (2013) 'The concept of Political Reintegration in the current peace research', Uppsala University, Department of Government Working Paper, 2013:5. Available at https://www.statsvet.uu.se/digitalAssets/443/c_443604-l_3-k_wp2013_5.pdf (Accessed: 20 February 2021).
- Sprengels, R. (2014) *Reintegration or reconversion? Probing the nature of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes in fragile settings*. IS Academy Human Security in Fragile States. Research Brief #11. Available at https://www.wur.nl/upload_mm/0/e/a/373d8434-82eb-4604-9b14-3559d3b74fc9_RESEARCH%20BRIEF%20%2311%20DDR%20reintegration%20or%20reconversion.pdf (Accessed: 21 February 2021).
- Stankovic, T. and Torjesen, S. (2011) *Fresh Insights on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: A Survey for Practitioners*. Centre for Peace Studies. Tromsø University. 3rd edition. Available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/39068-doc-58_nupi_fresh_insights_on_ddr_1.pdf (Accessed: 19 February 2021).
- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2010) *Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping*. Office of Rule and Security



Institutions, January 18. Available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2gddr_eng_with_cover_0.pdf (Accessed: 25 February 2021).

United Nations Development Programme (2012) *Practice Note on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants*, Jan 21. Available at https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/gender_and_cpr/practice_note_ondisarmamentdemobilizationandreintegrationofex-co.html (Accessed: 20 February 2021).

United Nations General Assembly (2005) *A/59/2005*, March 21. Available at <https://undocs.org/A/59/2005> (Accessed: 23 February 2021).

United Nations General Assembly (2006) *A/60/705*, March 2. Available at <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/60/705> (Accessed: 20 February 2021).

United Nations General Assembly (2000) *A/55/305-S/2000/809*, August 21. Available at <http://undocs.org/A/55/305> (Accessed: 23 February 2021).

United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (2006) *Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards*. Available at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/589201> (Accessed: 20 February 2021).

United Nations Security Council Resolution (2003) *No. 1509*. September 19. Available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1509> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).

United Nations Security Council (1993) *S/26272*. August 9. Available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/LR_930725_CotonouAgreement.pdf (Accessed: 19 April 2021).

United Nations Security Council (2007) *Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. UN Doc. *S/2007/479*. Available at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/605175> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).

Verkoren, W., Willems, R., Kleingeld, J. and Rouw, H. (2010) 'From DDR to Security Promotion: Connecting National Programs to Community Initiatives', *International Journal of Peace Research*, 15(2), pp. 1-32.

Websites

Disaggregated Data Collection, Analysis & Crisis Mapping Platform, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. Available at <https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard> (Accessed: 20 April 2021).

United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) official website. Available at <https://unmil.unmissions.org/> (Accessed: 21 April 2021).

Appendix

1. Civil Wars and Externally-Assisted DDR Programmes, 1979-2006. Note: Wars are coded as of December 31, 2006. DDR is coded through December 31, 2009. Source: Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p.44,46. (shortened, without footnotes)

	Country	Conflict	War Years	DDR Years
1.	Afghanistan	United Front v. Taliban	1996-2001	2003-Ongoing
2.	Afghanistan	Taliban	2001-Ongoing	2003-Ongoing
3.	Angola	UNITA	1975-1991	1991-1992
4.	Angola	UNITA	1992-1994	1995-1998
5.	Angola	UNITA	1997-2002	2002-2008
6.	Bosnia	Rep. Srpska/Croats	1992-1995	1996-Ongoing
7.	Burundi	Hutu groups	1991-Ongoing	2004-Ongoing
8.	Cambodia	Khmer Rouge; FUNCINPEC; etc.	1975-1991	1992
9.	Central African Republic	Factional fighting	1996-1997	1997-2000; 2004-2007
10.	Chad	FARF; FROLINAT	1980-1994	1992-1997
11.	Chad	FARF; FROLINAT	1994-1997	1992-1997; 1999-2000
12.	Colombia	FARC; ELN, drug cartels, etc.	1978-Ongoing	2002-Ongoing
13.	Congo-Brazzaville	Cobras v. Ninjas	1998-1999	2000-2009
14.	Congo-Zaire	RCD; etc.	1998-Ongoing	2004-Ongoing
15.	Côte d'Ivoire	Forces Nouvelles	2002-2005	2006-Ongoing
16.	Croatia	Krajina; Medak; Western Slavonia	1992-1995	1996-1997
17.	Djibouti	FRUD	1991-1994	1994-1996
18.	El Salvador	FMLN; RAES	1979-1992	1992-1997
19.	Ethiopia	Eritrean war of independence	1974-1991	1993-1997
20.	Ethiopia	Ideological; Tigrean	1978-1991	1991-1995
21.	Guatemala	Communists, Indigenous	1978-1994	1997-1998
22.	Guinea-Bissau	Vieira v. Mane mutiny	1998-1999	1999-2006
23.	Haiti	Cedras v. Aristide	1991-1995	1994-1996
24.	Indonesia	East Timor	1975-1999	2000-2004
25.	Indonesia	Aceh	1999-2005	2005-Ongoing
26.	Iraq	US/Coalition occupation; civil war	2003-Ongoing	2003-Ongoing
27.	Lebanon	Aoun; militias; PLO, Israel	1975-1991	1991
28.	Liberia	NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; LPC; LDF	1992-1997	1996-1997
29.	Liberia	anti-Taylor forces	1999-2003	2003-2009
30.	Mali	Tuaregs; Maurs	1990-1995	1995-1997
31.	Mozambique	RENAMO; FRELIMO	1976-1992	1993-1997
32.	Namibia	SWAPO; SWANU; SWATF	1973-1989	1989-1990
33.	Nepal	CPN-M/UPF (Maoists)	1996-Ongoing	2007-Ongoing
34.	Nicaragua	Contras & Miskitos	1981-1990	1990-1992
35.	Papua New Guinea	BRA (Bougainville)	1988-1998	2001-2005
36.	Philippines	MNLF; MILF	1971-2006	1997-Ongoing
37.	Rwanda	RPF; genocide	1994-1994	1997-Ongoing
38.	Senegal	MFDC (Casamance)	1989-1999	1992
39.	Sierra Leone	post-Koroma coup violence	1997-2001	1998-2004
40.	Somalia	post-Barre war	1991-Ongoing	1993-Ongoing
41.	South Africa	ANC; PAC; Azapo	1976-1994	1995-1997
42.	Sudan	SPLM; SPLA; NDA; Anya-Anyas II	1983-2002	2006-Ongoing
43.	Sudan	Darfur	2003-Ongoing	2009-Ongoing
44.	Tajikistan	Popular Democratic Army; UTO	1992-1997	1997-2003
45.	Uganda	NRA; etc.	1981-1987	1992-1995
46.	Uganda	LRA; West Nile; ADF; etc.	1995-Ongoing	2005-Ongoing
47.	Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1998-1999	1999-2004
48.	Zimbabwe	ZANU; ZAPU	1972-1979	1980-1985
49.	Zimbabwe	Ndebele	1983-1987	1980-1985