

Introduction to *Nigeria: Balkanization Ahead?*¹

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Nigeria is a composite postcolonial state with more than 250 ethnic groups. Three of them, Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo constitute a relative plurality, as those are the largest communities in the federal state. These three major ethnic groups (sometimes called micro-nations, nationalities, or tribes) are sometimes together referred to as Nigeria's power „tripod.” Despite this, since 1966 there has not been an Igbo president or military head of state in the 200 million strong country, tilting the tripod towards one of its sides, namely the Hausa/Fulani-Yoruba nexus (especially since federal victory in the Biafra War in 1970). Nigeria is globally consequential. It is Africa's largest oil producer, and Africa's largest economy (since 2018 when it overtook South Africa). It is a cultural powerhouse, whose music, films, modern visual art, and novels reverberate way beyond the country's borders, and where financial services, as well as certain forms of religion, are top global exports, overtaken only by oil. That said, Nigeria in 2021 was second to Afghanistan only in terms of the number of terrorist attacks committed. North and South, Muslims and Christians, Yoruba and Igbo are vying for the same scarce resources in the country. Or are they? Is it really ethnocentrism and inter-religious hostility that together define the fate of Africa's giant, or are there other factors that play a role as well?

West Africa's giant Nigeria, is obviously struggling today to resolve its internal contradictions and security challenges. The federal government has expressed its interest in inviting direct US military presence via relocating AFRICOM headquarters to Nigeria's soil, then when confronted with US human rights concerns over its own behaviour, in a sharp U-turn, decided to approach Russia instead, for military hardware, just to sort out its differences with the United States and the West soon in another volte-face (this saga took two years to unfold, in 2020-2022) (Okafor 2022).

Igbo and Yoruba circles in the Christian majority South of the country are busy discussing secession – and have set up illegal security organizations without federal sanction (Amotekun, Eastern Security Network) in an effort to halt what they see as Northern encroachment but also, possibly, as vehicles of independence or at the very least, regional autonomy. Even Northern Nigerian politicians and traditional rulers have started talking about the need for restructuring and zoning. One of the editors (and authors) of our special edition, Michael

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Nwakpa, argues that the introduction of Sharia twenty years ago, as well as Boko Haram and its splinter groups today, are expressions of the Northern will to Northern secession.

What are the driving forces behind the colossal failure of the Nigerian state? Why is 22 out of 36 states today, sites of Army deployment (as opposed to stationing), and why are army, police, and even the Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and Islamist radicalism, routinely accused of gross human rights violations, possibly including the wiping out of entire villages and settlements (so much so that Yakubu, Aideloje and Taiwo call the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force in our collection, „a war crime“)? What causes lie behind the hollowing out of Nigerian democracy, originally modelled in 1979 on the US system, and one that draws on unparalleled hydrocarbon and human resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, including a professional managerial elite with close ties and an important diaspora within both the US and the UK? How does France affect the regional balance of power, from a Nigerian point of view (as Kaze and Mbapudah ask in this collection), or how does Cameroon? How does Russia, the PRC, India, Saudi Arabia, Israel, South Africa, and others affect the security context for Nigeria? How do institutional problems affect the state of democracy in the country? How does class affect democracy, and how does Nigerian capitalism benefit, or else impede, Nigeria’s chances for integrated development? How does the country’s political economy, new and traditional religious groups, its traditional authorities affect our analysis? What are the chances that Nigeria will be the African continent’s sick man in the coming decade? Is Nigeria balkanizing/morselizing (as former US Ambassador to Abuja John Campbell surmises in: Campbell 2010)? What are the survival chances of an independent Biafra, Yorubaland, or a Northern conglomerate, as separate, sovereign nations? Are we witnessing the start of a low intensity civil war already today in the country?

The provenance of the ethnic groups in question, the ones that rule Nigeria and the ones that are marginalized as well, is subject to fierce debate of course. Not only do theoreticians of Nationalism Studies form ‘primordialist’ and constructivist groups, where an Ernest Gellner and an Eric Hobsbawm, a Benedict Anderson would supply the ‘constructivist’ thesis and Azar Gat the modern, 21st century revisionist anti-thesis (the latter talks about the ancient roots and historico/biological reality of tribes and nations) – but within the Nigerian historiographical context, there are also two distinct schools: one constructivist and one primordialist, when it comes to the origin of the different ethnics of Nigeria (Gellner 2007, Hobsbawm 2012, Gat 2012).

The progressivist, leftist Zaria School of History, especially Yusufu Bala Usman, posited that these ethnic groups themselves in their modern form are products of colonial modernization, urbanization, migration and economic change (today, the Literary critic Biodun Jeyifo is the strongest proponent of this school of thought, denying entirely, the historical reality of „the tripod“), whereas writers Chinua Achebe, and even Wole Soyinka, along with many historians who focus on the historical achievements of their own respective ethnic identity communities and regions, take ethnicity as an ancient, given, pre-colonial reality of an undeniable kind (Usman 1979, Jeyifo 2016). For the progressives, ethnicity and religion are ‘masks’ that

political entrepreneurs and contractors put on, to mislead the public into following and sacrificing for them. For the traditionalists on the other hand, it is not ethnicity but class that is an artificial construct in an African context.

The collection of essays that as guest editors, Michael Nwankpa and Adam Mayer present here, are mostly closer to the primordialist end of the spectrum (albeit there are exceptions, Biko Agozino and Michael Nwankpa for example). As an editorial team, we did not prejudicate on this matter, as we also tried to avoid basing editorial decisions on the submissions' authors stance on whether federal Nigeria is 'worthy of' survival as an integer territorial unit in the long run. The existence of Nigeria is of course legally and politically undeniable, and we left moral judgements pro or contra, to our authors.

A definite *pièce de résistance* in our collection is also is our very first essay, by Virginia Tech Professor of Sociology Biko Agozino, a global name in intersectional, decolonial criminology, and an all-round Nigerian American Marxist person of letters. His tone in this short work is anything but mild, however. The title of his essay is „Genocidist Discourse and Intellectuals in Africa.” In his erudite piece, he implicates mainstream and even radical (i.e. Marxist) Nigerian intellectuals in what he views as the intellectual and moral cover-up of Igbo genocide in the Biafra War (1967-1970). He calls these incriminated intellectuals (notably including Professor Toyin Falola of the University of Texas at Austin, and Professor Biodun Jeyifo of Harvard University, both global luminaries in their respective fields) „genocidist intellectuals” for what Agozino sees as them denying the genocide of Biafran women, children, elderly, men, and even soldiers, who died of hunger over the civil war years due to the federal blockade of the territory. Agozino offers African epistemological systems to replace neocolonial ones, as well as the overcoming of sexism specifically in the Nigerian Left, as preconditions to admitting federal Nigerian responsibility for deaths that numbered in between one and two million. Obviously this is a controversial article – it will be a platitude even to state this.

Calling what happened in Biafra 'genocide' cuts to the heart of Nigerian politics of memory, indeed the very heart of the federal Nigerian project, positing that the federation itself survived due only to purposeful genocide. It is interesting to furnish the reader here with a North American parallel for clarity. When Howard Zinn not only called Columbus a *génocidaire* in his great *People's History of the United States*, but called US policy on Native Americans also 'genocide,' he kickstarted a debate that had not stopped ever since, prompting debates on high school textbooks and university curricula in the country: a major point of US *Kulturkampf* still. What Agozino does here is that he attacks the core suppositions of the Nigerian democratic/military „ethnic rotation” based presidential system, points to Igbo exclusion from it, and finds the explanation to this phenomenon in the denial (or else we may say: formulation) by major Nigerian intellectuals that posits Biafra as a civil war, and its casualties as terrible, but which stops short of a claim of conscious and deliberate ethnic cleansing or genocide by federal forces.



At Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies, we think that academic freedom, and freedom of expression in academia, are core values, indeed that they are inherently valuable. JCEEAS does not endorse, condone, or else, on the contrary, condemn on an intellectual plane either, Agozino's views expressed in this collection's essay written by him, on the Biafra War. We think that this article will serve the discourse in a major way though, and that by publishing it we serve Nigeria scholars and Nigerianist discourse worldwide. With Indigenous People of Biafra leader Mazi Nnamdi Kanu in prison and under trial currently in mid-2022 (after having been caught by British secret agents at a Kenyan airport, then extradited to Nigeria a year back), this for the second time (as MNK had spent 2015-2017 in their custody already), with his Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) freely instituting curfews in the South-East, and with weekly clashes between Igbo vigilantes and pastoralists from the North, to still claim that debates around Biafra's 'politics of memory' are over forever, is wishful thinking.

Agozino however, is likely in a minority among Nigerian Leftists with his views on the matter. Pro-Biafran Marxist intellectuals had of course existed, Ikenna Nzomiro chief among them, but today, any position that (rightly or wrongly) seems to indicate unhappiness with federal Nigeria including Igboland, has the capacity to invite controversy even among Nigerian trade unionists and Leftists. Not only that, but as it happens, the memory of Biafra, Biafra itself, is a cause célèbre of the international hard right. Former Nazi mercenaries flew airplanes for Biafra. Salazar's Portugal backed Biafra, along with metropolitan France, uber-conservative Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire, and the Vatican. So did and do South African Afrikaner icons, such as Security Studies czar Al J. Venter (a veteran of the Biafra War), gun enthusiasts and war buffs of various persuasions, monarchists, Francoists and Trumpists. There is an angle to Biafra, of 'Christians being persecuted by Muslims', grossly simplified and rather irrelevant (as rural Northern Nigeria had barely been Islamized at the time of the Biafra War, and even in Igboland, traditional African religions had near-equal sway to Christianity at the time.) Nonetheless, when Biko Agozino calls Biafra 'genocide', his position is ipso facto complicated by Al J. Venter calling it genocide as well (Venter 2018). Almost regardless of the historical and forensic facts of the matter, this is what complicates and makes it so difficult, for radicals and progressives everywhere, to question the prevailing mainstream narrative on Biafra, even if Biafra, apart from being the international alt-right's cause célèbre was also the historical starting point of Médecins Sans Frontières and a number of other, high profile international NGOs who did, still do, and always have been doing, great work all over the world and who naturally, win people's hearts for what they do everywhere.

These entanglements started with Biafra's original, highly unusual Cold War constellation. It was a conflict that saw the UK and the USSR both supporting the selfsame side, the federals. The UK did so because of its traditional special relationship with the Hausa/Fulani elite, and in order to side with the winner. The USSR did, just six years after Lumumba's death and well into the Katanga conflict, to forestall the morselization of African countries that the Soviets viewed as a neocolonialist Western plot to undermine national liberation movements and

progressive causes worldwide. Along with the occasional Western mercenary, (then) pro-Soviet Egypt sent Ilyushin planes to fight and bomb Biafra on behalf of Nigerian Military Head of State Gowon. Agozino's position is thus not something that comes without a price for a Nigerian Leftist. Even Chinua Achebe did not emerge unscathed from some of the controversies that surrounded his works that dealt with Biafra in concreto. On the other hand, even Jeyifo might perhaps agree with Agozino on the matter of 'Igbo presidency,' or rather the lack of it even as a pious wish in the Nigerian context. Jeyifo puts the point thus: „Again as every politically active and morally conscientious Nigerian adult knows, the ultimate canard – spoken or whispered – about the workings of this post-civil war dispensation is the presumed specter of an Igbo-speaking executive president of the country. Without mincing words, this canard is one of the most hideous expressions of the principle of a rotational presidency.” (Jeyifo 2016: 32). And here we are in 2022, seeing two primaries producing a Yoruba godfather, and a Fulani ex-vice-President to Obasanjo, the hyper-neoliberal Atiku Abubakar, facing each other on the two sides of the arena, predictably but sadly, again with no Igbo contender standing. Jeyifo of course, has his own recommendations, all geared towards overcoming ethnicism as such, and divisions as such. Rotational presidency after all, produced the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. A rotational/confessionalist system produced the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1989. Nigeria's rotational system displays some features of both Yugoslavia and Lebanon, with rampant terrorism already added into the mix (in what we call „peacetime”). Whether Agozino's eloquent attempt here to call a spade a spade, is actually oil to the fire, or on the contrary, it is 'telling truth to power' and a starting point towards long term reconciliation, is left entirely for the reader to decide.

The second essay in our collection, „The Politics and Dynamics of Secession in Nigeria,” is a Security Studies essay that aptly uses historical methods to its great advantage. For its author Michael Nwankpa, „The religious, linguistic, socio-cultural and political fault lines among Nigeria's plural society have created tension and conflict throughout its existence as a political unit,” but he does not explicate the British either, pointing to historical and external factors. His article critically examines the politics involved in secession in Nigeria as well as the dynamic nature of selected secessionist movements.” Importantly, Nwankpa first brings conceptual clarity to secession. He discusses how there is no such thing as automatic right to secession, implied in people's right to self-determination. In detail, he discusses the Igbo Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), armed vigilante groups O'Odua People's Congress (OPC) in the Yoruba South-West, Bakassi Boys in the South-East, Manbilla in the Middle Belt, Hishbah Police in the North, Amotekun in Yorubaland (2019), the Yoruba Global Alliance that demands secession, Ogoni causes of the 1990s, the Ijaw Youth Council (1998), 2003-2009 in the Delta: the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), the famous Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), as well as today's Niger Delta Avengers. Discussed are also today's Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (2017), the Arewa Youth Development Forum, the Arewa Students Forum, the Kaduna Declaration (for Northern



secession), the 2000-2003 adoption of Sharia criminal code (as a form of secession), as well as Boko Haram (similarly a secessionist organization despite its formal statements to the contrary, according to Nwankpa). The Igbo Youth Movement (IYM), and the Eastern Consultative Assembly (ECA), organizations that supported Nnamdi Kanu in 2017 and beyond, are also described and analyzed in detail in Awankpa's excellent combination of theoretical and conceptual clarity, and forensic, historical detail.

The collection's third essay, written by UNILAG and University of Benin contributors MJ Yakubu, KF Aideloje, and BS Taiwo, is again more controversial in its logic and conclusions, but its authors back those up with admirable elegance. „An Analysis of Crimes Committed by the Multinational Joint Task Force in North-East Nigeria” is similar to Bill Hansen's admirable articles on police brutality in the selfsame North-East (Hansen 2020). The Lake Chad Basin Commission's MNJTF, in its chase against Boko Haram, has committed torture, extra-judicial executions, and gender-based violence from 2012 to 2019, through its Counter-Insurgency operations. The article does not hide the MNJTF's achievements (chief among them was actually ousting Boko Haram from the Sambisa Forest), but the authors conclude that the Task Force had committed crimes, including what legally count as war crimes whilst achieving these results. In terms of the crimes themselves, (somewhat controversially again), biological theory as well as Cultural Transmission Theory are employed, and the problems bedeviling the participant nations' relations with each other are also discussed (Nigeria has had a complicated relationship with Cameroon, as well as Chad). The essay proposes ways to curb this kind of criminality.

AM Kovács's „Here there be Dragons: Evolution, Potentials and Mitigation Opportunities of Cybercrime in Nigeria: A Review, Analysis and Evaluation,” relates to our special issue's overarching theme by the connections between financing and operating terrorist, insurgent and vigilante activity through means of cybercrime. Nigeria today, as we learn from the author, has 33.6% of internet penetration. The country is one of the global cradles of cybercrime activities, with US\$649M annually lost through these nefarious machinations. Nigeria passed a cybercrime act in 2015. As many as five Nigerian universities offer cybercrime-specific course though, offering hope. The activity affects the banking sector, and thus Nigeria loses 0.08% of its GDP to cybercrime annually – a bewilderingly serious problem. The author provides a typology and also furnishes the reader with recommendations as to how best to tackle this menace.

Cameroonian authors TNS Kaze and MN Mbapndah (University of Yaoundé) enrich this collection by their excellent essay „Is Nigeria Ripe for a Break-up? The Mitigating Importance of Cameroon and France in the Survival of Nigeria's Territorial Integrity.” Cameroon's English-speaking region, „Ambazonia,” is adjacent to Nigeria's Igboland: they share a border. Their agendas of disintegration are similar. The role of ECOWAS, as a place where Nigeria-France contests for West African leadership are usually played out, is also given ample attention in this exciting take.

T Ososona's „Toxic Elite Consensus and Leadership Gaps as the Main Driver of Nigeria's Crisis of Nationhood,” provides a new explanatory framework for what John Campbell calls 'the oga system' (Campbell 2010), the oligarchical system that actually runs Nigeria. Ososona does not have what we would ordinarily call class analysis in mind, but a sociology of the elite and an analysis of what this elite does that contributes to, enables, or even actively underwrites, the security challenges of the country. The data used here come from the World Bank and the Ibrahim Index, ie. mainstream sources. But even thus, the author enlightens us with observations as crucial as „public office being a legitimate and primary source of wealth, accumulation and redistribution,” the elite being in „continuous circulation” even in the case of pastors who inherit their 'apostolic' offices to their sons and form dynasties (!), the leadership context, and what the elite consensus means on the ground: „extraction, exclusion, rent seeking, and conspicuous consumption,” while in Northern Nigeria, absolute poverty levels are above 70%.

Gombe State University's own UI Yau discusses „Boko Haram Insurgency and Environmental Degradation in the North-East Region of Nigeria, 2009-2021.” Yau links migration, loss of biodiversity through conflict, destruction of ecosystems, to rapid desertification (0.6 km / year), excessive deforestation (0.4% reduction/ year), severe erosion, seasonal flash floods, and garbage accumulation in urban areas. He presents reintegration/deradicalization efforts especially in Gombe State, where „repentant” Boko Haram fighters routinely become armed robbers and bandits. Yau digs deep with a treatise on the Islamic textual foundations of protecting nature, especially trees, a welcome feature.

Our Founder János Besenyő, and our Editor Marianna Kármán delight us readers with an exposition and analysis of Nigeria's migration situation, including how it affects Hungary, Nigerians living abroad (the diaspora), a breakdown of the different types of internal and external migration, Nigerians living in Hungary, as well as Covid-19's effects on these phenomena. The Nigerian diaspora in Hungary is yet to reach the glamour of its United States counterpart where Nigerian Americans are literally the most educated immigrant group overall in the nation (!) (Fosco 2018), and where entire segments of immigrants end up constituting upper middle class and elite professional strata (such as medical doctors, lawyers, academics), to the extent that a certain level of alienation had developed between US Blacks and elite Nigerian immigrants, partly fueled by different historical and class trajectories in certain parts of the United States among those two different groups. In Hungary, Nigerian immigration was fueled primarily by university student intakes up to the country's transition in 1990, so there is an elite current especially in those cohorts. With Hungary's political freedom came different patterns of mobility, and the profiles of Nigerian immigrants into Hungary are now more multifaceted, as we learn from this great contribution. Besenyő's former contributions to Boko Haram scholarship are also noteworthy here (Besenyő and Mayer, 2015).



DO Iweze's „The Role of Religious Leaders in Fostering Inter-Faith Dialogue amid Boko Haram Insurgency in Kano, Northern Nigeria” is an article that despite the title, gives a great account of developments in Kano, Jos as well as the titular Kaduna, focusing on reconciliation and interfaith dialogue, and religious peacebuilding methods. Religion had not always been seen as a viable tool or context for conflict resolution, indeed it was mostly seen as the prime cause of conflicts until the late 1980s and even the 1990s. This changed with the proliferation, and good works, of religious NGOs, as well as the higher profile of some religious decision makers in high places in the early 2000s (such as IMF head James D. Wolfensohn) who promoted concepts around religious peacebuilding with funds globally. Nigeria was a pioneer of such initiatives with the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council, the Interfaith Mediation Centre (IMC) in Kaduna, (by Pastor James Wuye and Imam Muhammad Ashafa, both former victims of atrocities). This article makes use of oral interviews, focus group discussion, and ethnographic research in establishing its primary data.

The volume's Review section is also rich in reflection. A. Cann reviews Michael Nwankpa's, Abdulbasit Kasiim's, and David Cook's *The Boko Haram Reader*. Ambassador György Suha reviews Adam Mayer's *Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria*. G Sinkó reviews *African Intelligence Services: Early Postcolonial and Contemporary Challenges*, by Ryan Schaffer. Guest Editor Michael Nwankpa then reviews *Islamic State in Africa: The Emergence, Evolution and Future of the Next Jihadist Battlefield*, by Jason Warner, Ryan O'Farrell, Héni Nsailia, and Ryan Cummings.

Our entire selection anticipates and encourages, indeed welcomes debate and follow-ups by academics as well as professionals and activists, through subsequent editions of *Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies*!

To compound this special edition's conscious provocations, I conclude this Introduction by revoking one of the most complex, most principled takes on Nigerian secession by a trade unionist of global renown, Baba Aye, who considers Nnamdi Kanu a 419-er (a fraud) and considers the current wave of secession, writing in 2019, a „farce.” He puts the matter thus: „Many on the socialist left have put forward the formulation of support for the right of self-determination in an unqualified manner. (...) Generalized support for the right of self-determination to all nationalities, including dominant nationalities, would amount to a continued right of one or more dominant nationalities over the oppressed nationalities. We saw how this played out during the Civil War. The minority nationalities of the Niger Delta remained in chains during the short-lived Republic of Biafra. Meanwhile, IPOB for example, still maintains the map of old Biafra, which includes these nationalities, for the country it seeks to reestablish. Similarly, all the maps drawn by O'odua separatist agitators include the old Mid-Western Region, which comprises several minority nationalities like Edo-speaking peoples, and the diverse peoples of the Delta State. Some of these maps go as far as including the Ijaws. (...) (...) An uncritical approach to applying the principle of support for the right to self-determination would be like cutting off one's nose to spite their face. With the reality of the Nigerian situation, it would be very much like peeling an onion. (...) We support the right

of oppressed nationalities to self-determination. But we must tell the people the truth about the consequences of realizing that right. And supporting this democratic right, which of necessity for us includes the right of secession, must not be construed to support secession. As Voltaire is reported to once have said, „I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend you to the death your right to say it.” (...) Does this mean that we stand by Nigeria’s so-called „indivisibility and indissolubility” or with those who insist that Nigeria’s unity is „not negotiable”? To this, again, we say no. That is absolute nonsense! (...) the poor of all nationalities are equally impoverished. In fact, poverty is much greater in the so-called oppressor North. (...) Who bore the brunt of the Civil War? It was the poor masses. As rank-and-file soldiers, they were killed on the battlefields. When the federal government used starvation as a dastardly weapon, those who died from hunger in Biafra were the children of the poor masses. The high and mighty and their families were hale and hearty” (Aye 2021).

And indeed, Biafran ideologue Ikenna Nzimiro had described the Civil War as a class conflict between different elite groups (on this see Mayer 2016), already in the 1980s, pointing in a very similar direction. Aye may exaggerate the amenities that Biafran elite enjoyed during the war (in the last two years elite strata also lost life, limb, houses, their bookshelves, and even clothes on their backs, as did Mokuwugo Okoye who was caught by the front multiple times), but the disagreement over man made hunger as a weapon seems only to lie in nomenclature between Agozino and Aye (who in other ways disagree deeply and fundamentally).

With these insights, aspects and caveats, we invite reactions to this special issue’s collection of research essays and reviews from Nigerian federalists and from regional secessionists, from Christians and from Muslims, from secular academics to people who pin their hopes on the redeeming qualities of religious NGOs. Your debate articles, reactions, and reflections will be given space on the pages of JCEEAS as long as they bring added value to the discourse on these topics. It is lucky for our journal to be edited in Hungary, where neither the global mainstream, nor local schools of thought (Hungarian, Nigerian or otherwise) can stop academics from expressing their thoughts freely – and this provides a window of opportunity for authors who put forth opinions that are not ‘smooth’. Our efforts are focused on fighting epistemic racism against African as well as Eastern European scholars in today’s global but still brutally hierarchical and classist academia.

Guest editors Michael Nwankpa and I would like to extend our thanks also to the Editorial team at JCEEAS, especially of course the Founder Dr habil. János Besenyő, but also Editor Marianna Kármán, who did not blink an eye when she spotted that a submitted text’s every single citation referred to non-existent (entirely made up) sources (!), or when the Journal received threats regarding a particular publication from another zealous author. Editors Dávid Vogel, Gábor Sinkó, and the Journal’s native English copy-editors are also due our gratitude for helping to put the material in shape. Similarly, we thank JCEEAS’ anonymous reviewers who (as is the practice in neoliberal academia) toiled without remuneration of course on their excellent, excellent feedback on the pieces! They also represent a range of geographical



regions in Nigeria scholarship, from South Africa through Nigeria and West Africa, again through Egypt, to Hungary and Romania and South-East Europe in general, stretching to the UK and the US. The fact that this is the Journal's very second special issue, points to a recognition of Nigeria's importance at JCEEAS and at its home, the Africa Research Center at the University of Óbuda in Budapest, Hungary. Importantly, we also thank our authors who put up with our demands with patience, and often characteristic humor. The School at the University of Óbuda in Budapest offers full scholarships through the Hungarian state's generous Stipendium Hungaricum program to Nigerian and other African doctoral students! We welcome applications from qualified young scholars who want to join our vibrant community of open inquiry and search for truth on matters vital for Africa.

Notes on Contributor

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