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Dear Readers,
Dear Fellow Scholars,

Let me take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to all loyal readers of the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies (JCEEAS). First of all, I would like to thank those who have been with us since the inception of the Journal. Besides, I wished to welcome our new readers: thank you for your trust in advance; we will do our best to serve it. Since the first issue of JCEEAS has been published, as a member of the Editorial Board, I had the chance to get to know and interact with a lot of great and knowledgeable researchers and academics from a wide variety of fields. As the Journal is righteously gaining local, regional as well as international attention, it is rather challenging to select the best and most up-to-date papers about intriguing topics related to the African continent. It was no different this time either; however, I believe that we once again managed to include several topics in the Journal that will prove to be interesting for our readers.

The authors of the first study, Eunice Akullo and Yona Wanjala, revisit the discourse on NPOs, money laundering and terrorism financing, presenting an overview of the state of civic space specifically and the operational environment of NPOs in East Africa as impacted by the AML/CTF regulatory frameworks. Following that, Péter Gergő Juhász and Csaba Szeremley examine the wide range of deradicalisation and reintegration practices that try to rehabilitate war-affected people through mainly agricultural activities in eastern DRC. Then using field data from research conducted by Eunice Akullo, the chapter titled 'Responsibility for Uganda's Children Born in Captivity' provides a discourse analysis of the common discourses that emerged from the research participants in the study. Tibor Pintér seeks to answer the question whether the global problems caused by the war have an impact on the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) or the counterinsurgency against them, and the changing position of the Russians in East Africa.

In the next paper, Richard Andoh concludes that in order to safeguard the nation's security and socioeconomic stability, the rising trend of bullion van robbery attacks in Ghana requires immediate attention from both the government and the private sector. Zsolt Szabó then focuses on the security policy effects of the Algerian-Moroccan-Spanish debate on gas on Europe in the light of the Russian-Ukrainian War by thoroughly analysing the energy and security situation in the region and what solutions there are for the parties to ensure their interests in this complex political, economic and security competition. The author of the next study, Robert Maina Ndung'u, writes about the challenges and opportunities in the management of inter-communal conflicts in Kenya's Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) regions. The topic of the last research article is Israel's relations with emerging African states in the light of some newly-discovered Hungarian state security documents from the first half of the Kádár Era. Archival sources suggest that the treatment of Israel as an enemy occurred in this region before the 1967 break-up.

Following the studies, there are three reviews; two of which deal with entirely different parts of the African continent, namely the north ("Wartime North Africa" by Bálint Somkuti) and the south ("Beyond Judgments and Emotions" by László Pálfi). The third review is about the interaction between African countries and one of the key global players in the continent, Russia ("Russia in Africa" by Nikolay Medushevsky).

We truly hope that our readers will have a pleasant experience familiarising themselves with the topics included in this issue.

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Non-Profit Making Organisations (NPOs) and the Dilemma of Combating Transnational Crimes in a Digitalized Era: Emerging Perspectives of NPO Actors from Selected African Countries¹

Eunice Akullo² and Yona Wanjala³

Abstract:

The paper is premised on the argument that States may find themselves in a dilemma, as they seek to counter transnational crimes, more so and subjects of this paper, illicit money transfers/money laundering and terrorism financing, and doing so with great caution not to restrict the Not-for-Profit Organisations (NPOs) operations. anecdotal evidence suggests that NPOs are caught up as the unintended 'victims' of FATF Recommendation-8-based-regulatory and policy frameworks- particularly of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing. The paper argues that the Sector's contribution to this important debate is essential for ensuring that they comply with the intended need to protect against terrorism and money laundering while also working in an environment that doesn't jeopardize their contribution to development. Drawing from some of the findings of a recent study undertaken by the Defenders Protection Initiative (DPI) focusing on 5 African countries, the paper revisits the discourse on NPOs and money laundering and terrorism financing presenting an overview of the state of civic space specifically, the operational environment of NPOs in East Africa as impacted upon by the AML/CTF regulatory frameworks. Tapping in the synthesized views of industrial experts (NPO Sector experts) on this matter consulted during the study, the paper unmask the evolving dilemma of balancing the enforcement of the regulatory framework curbing transnational crimes on one hand and restraining State securitization of the NPO sector since it's prone to exploitation. The paper makes recommendations as emerged from the study aimed purposely at balancing the friction between the regulation of NPOs as against the need to fight terrorism financing and money laundering.

Keywords:

African, anti money laundering, FATF, terrorism financing, transnational crimes

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Introduction

A report on Transnational Organized Crime and the Impact on the Private Sector: The Hidden Battalions (2017) indicates that findings from a survey indicate that private organizations get caught up in transnational crimes as either facilitators or targets; that the impact of those crimes on the private sector was increasing rather than reducing; and countries of the south were the most affected (Cartwright, 2017). While recognizing the charitable organisation's contribution to, they are also important actors, just like states in tackling terrorist abuse. In fact, NPOS are described as partners in ensuring integrity of financial systems. However, they encourage transparency and accountability so as to ensure that they are not used by terrorists for their activities.

Concern over, and the need to govern (regulate) transnational crimes has since the 1990s expanded beyond the focus on anti-money laundering (AML) at both state level and the international relations, to include the need to prevent and respond to terrorism and terrorism financing. Such governance has led to actions that do not only affect states, but non-state actors. In the process of achieving this normative goal, some literature suggests that non-state actors such as Not for Profit Organizations (NPOs) have been caught up as indirect victims. Given the limited discourse around the voice and agency of these non-state actors, the findings from a research conducted by Defenders Protection Initiative (DPI) were analyzed to provide insight into essential issues that are vital for the academic analysis of such regulation – from the perspective of NPOs.

FATF (2015) defines NPOS as ‘*A legal person or arrangement or organisation that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of “good works”*’ (Financial Action Task Force, 2015). It also clarifies that recommendation 8 applies to only those NPOs that pose the greatest risk of terrorist financing abuse. Recommendation 8 relates to the need to combat the abuse of NPOs in the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing. FATF Recommendation 8 requires that the laws and regulations that govern non-profit organisations be reviewed so that these organisations cannot be abused for the financing of terrorism. The FATF has established best practices, aimed at preventing misuse of NPOs for the financing of terrorism while, at the same time, respecting legitimate actions of NPOs. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) standard.

The study from which this paper was derived, used the comparative method to seek answers to (i) what are the Implications of addressing strategic deficiencies concerning the NPO sector? and (ii) what NPOs can do to support the process? Additionally, the study does precisely explore Financial Intelligence Unit sectoral outreach plans, NPO relations with Financial Intelligence Units, and Not for Profit Organization's willingness to comply and partner for solutions with other regulators. The specific areas of concern where; (a) To assess the level of NPO awareness about the

FATF, within jurisdictions under increased monitoring in Africa; (b) To assess the levels of NPO awareness about jurisdictions under increased monitoring and its implications on a given country; (c) Examine the legal and administrative implications of increased monitoring of the NPO sector; (d) To understand the level of engagement with the NPOs during the FATF agreed timeframe for addressing the strategic deficiencies within your jurisdiction; (e) To identify any opportunity of working in partnership without interrupting activities of legitimate NPOs; and (f) *To seek advice from the NPOs on how regulators can improve on the process of AML/CFT.*

Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing

Anti-money laundering (AML) is described as a vice whose intensity spread with at the expansion of globalization (Alldridge, 2008). Concern over the phenomenon preceded the existing global regulation (Durner and Cotter, 2019; Jojarth, 2013). The AML concern of the 1980s was the illegal money transfer from drugs through the prohibition (criminalization) and regulation (prevention/deterrence). Just like the phenomenon, the response to it – particularly legislations- has also witnessed at expansion over the years from the more developed countries, through to the developing ones. These crimes are also conceptualized as “serious crimes for economic gain” (Levi and Reuter, 2006) and include; remittance of cash outside a country, purchasing of businesses through which such cash can be remitted, and transfer pricing using underground banks. Furthermore, those involved in these activities (such as drug trafficker, tax evaders, corrupt officials and terrorist) aim at creating a false availability of funds from an illegal origin and dented purpose (Jojarth, 2013).

Terrorism financing refers to organizations that fund terrorism target operations expenditures and funding of organization structures and networks (Norton and Chadderton, 2016). According to him, the more the available funds (generated alongside criminally entrepreneurial methods, such as bank robbery, kidnapping for ransom, drugs and other smuggling ventures), the more the threat a terrorist group can pose to a possible target (Freeman and Ruehsen, 2013). Funds are often available through sponsorship, donations and the misuse of charities and NPOs. They argue that the countering of terrorism requires that concern be placed not only on the sources of terrorism financing, which often is the case, but on the methods used to obtain those funds. The sustainability of funding by such groups may be “secure financing network” (Baradaran et al., 2014). Moreover, he argues that the funding for terrorist activities is far more expensive compared to what is required to counter such funding. They also note that some of the sources of such funding are charities and trusts.

According to Duner and Cotter (2019), the TF and AML responses to these transnational vices is partly because information related to the two often emerges from actors in both the government (public) and non-government (private) sectors (institutions). The importance of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in detecting,



detering and tracking these vices possible situates the private sector, because of the link between them and the public institutions within this field of governing the two vices, at an unfortunate position (described as a burden) of not only understanding the criminals, but also their intentions – with their mandate in countering terrorism financing. According to Levi and Reuter (2006), part of the work of FIUs is to submit suspicious activity reports. Governance efforts to curb AML at the international level include; the 1988 passing of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the subsequent establishment of FATF in 1989 (Alldridge, 2008, Levi and Reuter, 2006). The anti-money laundering legislation targeted profits that arise from drug trafficking in the 1970s and was later one expanded to the regulation of banks in the 1980s and 1990s (Alldridge, 2008).

The focusing event of 9/11 led to the expansion of the AML agenda to include concerns over terrorism financing. He cites the response of the USA (Executive Order 13224) “ordering the freezing of assets and blocking of transactions by individuals and entities associated with or supporting al-Qaida and its affiliates, including Osama bin Laden, and other listed terrorist group.” (Duner and Cotter, 2019, p. 2). He, however, explicitly notes that terrorism financing concerns in the USA predated the 9/11 attack. Thus, this focusing event was important for shaping the agenda on countering of terrorism not only in the USA, but internationally. He described the UNSCR 1373 (September 2001), which provided for the creation of a system that could immediately freeze assets of those who perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate terrorism, thereby reflecting “a near-universal expansion of the U.S. approach under Executive Order 13224 and marked a shift in international law as the United Nations mandated the adoption of domestic laws.” (Duner and Cotter, 2019, p. 3)

The authors argue for the need to conceptually understand the twining of AML and TF, was one of the ways in which an analysis of how what influenced the expansion of actors being targeted by such legislation came about. Furthermore, they argue that those involved in money laundering are more aware of the nature of criminality of their activities, and yet with the case of terrorism financing, it may be possible that a person sending money to another (persons or institution), may not be aware of their involvement in terrorist activities. Moreover, the establishment of terrorism financing requires further investigation by those involved in counter-terrorism such as the military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies – who form part of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The FIUs deal with both criminal matters (money laundering) and intelligence (terrorism). Furthermore, CFT aims at prevention (of terrorists attacks and operations), detection (frontline compliance – such as “know your customer.” “customer due diligence,” “recording keeping requirements”) to provide information for investigation. The third aim is to freeze – as backed up by the UNSC Counter Terrorism Committee – to include actions like economic sanctions. These actions extend to organizations in addition to sanctions against states.

This paper focuses on money laundering and terrorism financing as a type of transnational crime, and argues that while NPOs have been identified as risk entities to being used to facilitate the commission of these crimes hence attracting state regulation to counter this risk, they also risk being un-necessarily regulated with an “iron hand”. We adopt the terrorism financing’s conceptualization provided by the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) is adopted – see Article 2 of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs), are herein considered ‘a legal entity or organization that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of “good works.”’ – See Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Glossary. These organisations or entities may be local or international.

Theorizing Transitional Crime

The 20th and 21st Centuries witnessed the ‘globalization of liberalization’ characterized by ‘new and intensified forms of economic competition.’ (-ibid-). It is this that the scholars have decried- as ‘abrupt marketization and economic liberalization’ which has come with unwanted opportunities for ‘the transnationalization of crime’ manifesting in numerous ways including illicit trade across international borders. Transnational crimes like money laundering and terrorism financing, have in turn created grave challenges for States at the domestic level at various fronts including more critically posing a challenge to the security of the State and of course threatening economic growth and development (Paulette et al., 2012). The international political economy being one of the sub-disciplines of International Relations covers political and economic interests of the state, market, and society as actors (Balaam et al., 2014).

Kleemans (2014) uses models and theoretical perspectives from an inter-disciplinary perspective, to explain transnational/organized crimes from economic; sociology and criminology; politics and identity; law; organization studies and business. While there occurs consensus about the unacceptability of these crimes, much of historical studies has considered the crimes from the perspective of physical movement of illicit goods. The study of transnational organized crime from the analytical perspective of globalization, is a more recent phenomenon. Stoica (2016) – adopts an international relations background, the impact of historical, economic, socio-political and technological perspectives on these crimes are recognized. For him, most theories agree on the nature, intention, means and outcomes of organized crimes. He, however, argues that it is important to focus on the impact of these crimes on the interests of national and international authorities. Realists consider these crimes as an attack on state sovereignty and in response, states take all necessary measures to ensure that they deter and penalize those involved in such crimes – using strong measures. Liberals on the other hand, consider these criminals as deviants who can be assisted to change from their



criminal character. Hence, penalties would include the need to sensitize criminals on the negative impacts of their activities – giving them a choice to either give up their activities or bear the consequences of their behavior. These are the two dominant theories of international relations.

Our study joins Stoica's kind of thinking and push his debate using the neo-liberal perspective. Neoliberalism argues for the need for institutional regulation of issues. Hence, when FATF was adopted by states, it represents consensus towards the need for ensuring institutional regulation of terrorism and illegal financial transfer. Contrary to neoliberal theory debates around regulation (the need for the limited government) – its necessity and extent- the discourse on the place of NPOs in practice (the regulation) of transnational crimes is not about whether or not regulation should take place. But rather, it is concerned with how the regulation is done– with many arguing against and of the possibility of its being used as a framework for shrinking civic space for these actors in society.

Koehane (2012) explains that liberals justify the need for institutions as avenues for ensuring checks against possible abuse of power and is indeed essential to the analysis of a topic such as this. On the other hand, Doyle (2012) focuses on the link between institutional regulation and freedoms and offers a more appropriate framework for understanding concerns espoused in reports from NPO practitioners. Indeed, Koehane succinctly argues that 'internationally, institutional liberals believe that power should be used in the interests of liberal values but with caution and restraint. Institutions serve a crucial social purpose because they are essential for sustained cooperation that enhances the interests of most, if not of all, people.' Hence, for Koehane, the 1950s-1980s agenda of liberal institutionalism sought cooperation in the security, trade, and monetary sectors, albeit with minimal legalization. There was a preference for adopting rules, principles, and norms – agreed upon by well-defined sets of actors. In the 1990s, strict legalism (the belief in the law as a promoter of moral and political progress) and moralism became a characteristic of institutional liberalism–enabling the adaptation of soft laws to protect various categories of persons. At the same time, moralism seeks to guide the actions of political actors by offering moral principles that actors ought to conform to.

Responses to Transitional Crimes and their Effect on NPOs

Globally both States and non-state actors have adopted various interventions to regulate the use of these advancements to address the abuse of ICT for the conduct of such transnational crimes, more specifically money laundering and terrorism financing. The most prominent innovation is the Special Recommendation VIII on the abuse of NPOs for Terrorism Financing purposes adopted in 2001, by the Financial Action Task Force (on Money Laundering) (FATF), also known by its French name, Groupe d'action

financière (GAFI). It is important to emphasise that The FATF is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989, under the leadership of the G7 to develop policies to combat money laundering (ML), Financing of Terrorism (TF), and Proliferation Financing (PF) through collaborative actions by states and non-state actors. The FATF is an intergovernmental body formed in 1989 with the aim of combating AML (Durner and Cotter, 2018). Its recommendations combined together are supposed to work towards preventing, detecting, and policing these transnational crimes-terrorism financing and money laundering using NPOs. According to Durner and Cotter (2018), although FATF is not legally binding, normatively, compliance of states to recommendations that it makes is a very important antecedent to their access to the global financial system – and subsequently the attendant negative impact that being on the wrong side of the expectations from foreign countries, investors, and financial institutions from engaging with the listed jurisdiction, resulting in reduced investment and hindering economic development (-bid-).

Hence, since the adoption of this recommendation, countries world over seek compliance to the requirements thereunder lest they are categorized as ineffective and blacklisted. This quest by States to align themselves with the FATF recommendation has in some instances led many to a clashing relation with the NPOs. Recommendation 8 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, R.8) focuses on protecting the integrity and reputation of non-profit organizations against the risk of terrorism financing risk. Through actions such as acting as conduits of terrorist activities in various ways, including being a pathway for financing of illicit activities. While the role of NPOs in development is uncontested they are also prone to abuse by those engaged in transnational criminal activities (Financial Action Task Force, 2015).

Indeed, the NPO sector has been exploited by terrorist organizations to provide financial and logistical support or otherwise support terrorist recruitments or terrorist operations. A counter discourse to the above, is a claim that although prone to abuse, some NPOs become vulnerable to extreme/unfair regulation by the state – during the localization of FATF in its domestic environment. Those involved in the sphere of governance generally-rule of law and human rights that critique and challenge abuse of State power are more vulnerable. This is so despite the FATF caution that overzealous regulation should not hinder the essential operations of NPOs (-ibid-). Hence the need for transparency and ensuring confidence of the sector in the state FATF localization process, as well as confidence on the part of donors that work with the NPO sector.

Anecdotal evidence in Uganda, for example, suggests that some NPOs have been closed and their leaders arrested and detained on the grounds of being suspected conduits for terrorism financing, illicit money transfer and possible engagement in money laundering further throwing the sector into panic. Whereas the importance of countering money laundering and terrorist financing related transitional crimes cannot be over-emphasized, emerging research indicates that paradoxically, the argument given for regulating NGOs involved in the humanitarian, human rights, conflict prevention,



and peacebuilding sectors is that while the sector can be penetrated for the two vices, majority of the NGOs involved on the contrary work towards curbing these very vices (Defenders Protection Initiative, 2021). This state of affairs raises one critical question; how can the balance to counter transnational crimes such as Money laundering and the need to maintain a safe and conducive operating environment for NPOs be achieved? An attempt at answering this question is made in the latter part of the article drawing from the study undertaken by DPI.

Balancing Transnational Crime Regulatory Frameworks and Their Effect on NPOs: Emerging Reflections from the Field

In 2021, DPI surveyed five countries (Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) included in the then FATF list of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their frameworks to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation, also externally known as “grey list.” Countries on the FATF grey list also referred to as Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are expected to “willfully” work with the respective FATF Regional Style Body (FSRB), in addressing the strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes. This also means that the country has made a political commitment to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring by respective FSRB. This may take a strategic discourse of “introducing specific criminal laws, law enforcement powers, surveillance and data retention systems, financial services industry regulations and international police co-operation arrangements in line with FATF guidance” (Hayes, 2012).

The study sought the views of some selected industrial experts well informed about matters related to AML/TF, on among other aspects, the emerging challenges prevalent in the regulatory framework for combating transitional crimes of money laundering and terrorism financing as against NPOs. Researching sensitive topics or closed communities can be a big challenge. It is often easier for a researcher who has access to these communities or is part of them. Being part of the community provided the authors with access to the respondents consulted in the study.

Using a guided set of questions, information was sought from experts, including those working with country Financial Intelligence Units and some NGOs involved in working groups around the subject. Relevant questions were put together into a fact-finding investigation – distributed to FIUs in each of the five countries on the grey list. Of these, only three countries were responsive to the research. A separate set of questions were sent to selected NGOs in each of the five countries. Additionally, the methodology involved reading some of the existing literature to conceptualize the challenge that the authors had observed as a part of the NPO sector. The information

gathered was analyzed thematically, and helpful narratives were obtained for reporting, part of it presented below.

Non-Participatory Approaches to the Localization of the International Norms Regulating Transnational Crimes

The localization process of FATF has adopted a top-down approach, often overlooking the contributions of the essential stakeholders in the process for purposes of legitimacy and mutual ownership of the end product-legislation. NPOs experience from Uganda, for example, revealed that the legislative processes for enacting the current anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism laws, were “blind” to the involvement and participation of the NPOs. Rather, what is desired is a mechanism that seeks to ensure that agency of those at the bottom (targets of the norms) are incorporated at different stages of localization. This provides a forum for the exercise of their agency and the inclusion of their interests in the norms aimed at protecting the interests of all.

Hence there is need for governments and NPOs to partner in the localization of the FATF – for purposes of agency and also better collaboration in addressing the crimes in need to prevention/deterrence. The Ghanaian experience is indicative of this. The government’s localization process involved the constitution of a committee by the Ministry of gender and other non-governmental actors. In consortium, they drafted an NPO Policy and Bill. By the time of the research in July 2020, the country was conducting a nationwide consultation on the bill before it could be passed. The parties concerned were convinced that “*passage of the NPO Bill will further strengthen the legal and institutional framework for the NPO sector.*” The committee was actively involved in the sensitization of NPOs on the need to adopt norms for society’s benefit. This led to better working partnership between the Financial Intelligence Center-FIC of Ghana and NPOs, towards having a safer civic space. One respondent emphasized this finding noting that ‘*as a result of series of sensitizations, engagements, and interactions, the contributor to shrinking of the sector*’ ideology has largely and significantly changed to ‘*a partner to a safer civil space.*’ However, it was noted, that there is a need for regulation to guide this relationship for the benefit of all.

Respondents further noted that a country with an increased number of NPOs without a well-coordinated policy and regulatory framework will allow unprofessional practices and abuse of the sector by terrorist organisations: (i) posing as legitimate entities; (ii) exploiting legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; or (iii) concealing or obscuring the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes, but diverted for terrorist purposes. Government and NPO players need to see each other as partners and collaborate in addressing the socio-economic challenges facing their countries. The same view on partnership was shared by Uganda’s respondent from the Financial Intelligence



Authority (FIA), who emphasized the need for a policy to guide the partnership to realize the goals sought by the norms. If what happens in practice is as the case in Ghana indicates, a participatory approach would ensure that the legislation adopted is in the interest of all who draft them, other than being used by the state to the disadvantage of the NPOs.

A specific recommendation for Uganda related to the need to complete the NPO risk assessment for terrorism financing. The evaluation would guide the outreach process to those NPOs that are highly at risk. The FIA conducts outreach activities with NPOs when necessary and is perceived differently among the various members of the NPO sector. While some find the relationship beneficial, others consider the FIA/FIU an agent for suppressing their activities.

Awareness of FATF Norms in the NPO Sector

Findings further reveal that information gaps partly shape the variations in NPO perceptions concerning the FATF requirements and even the awareness that the country was on a grey list. This was the case in Uganda, where a strong view exists that the mandate of FATF and rationale of R8 are tools used to control/monitor countries on the African continent. The intrusion into the premises of Action Aid Uganda (2019) was cited by some respondents. Such targeting may be disguised as ensuring that such NGOs are not receiving funding for TF and ML. Hence, this may explain why some are resentful of anything linked to the AML/TF norms and subsequently affect the nature of norm diffusion for the practical realization of the goals sought.

Using the argument on policy diffusion, (Sharman, 2008) argues that while by 1986 money laundering was not a crime in the world, as of 2008, about one hundred and seventy states had recognized its criminality. Hence, the author seeks to answer the question as to why despite differences in states, this policy issues had attracted support and attract it so fast? He used the frames or learning (drawing lessons from elsewhere), mimicry, coercion options – as reasons leading to the diffusion. The use of blacklists is analyzed as a coercive measure which ought to create a particular response by states within their broader transnational networks:

The first mechanism, coercion as blacklisting, was a deliberate and calculated use of power by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to impose AML policies that enlisted instrumental compliance by states. The second mechanism, mimicry, saw governments adopt AML policy in line with changings social expectations among transnational networks of regulators that defined these laws as something all progressive, modern states should have (Sharma, 2008, p. 636).

However, in Zimbabwe, the respondents in the NPO sector seemed more aware of the nature and mandate of FATF. This is partly attributed to the efforts by the state agencies to disseminate this information among members of the NPO sector. One of the responses argued that being on the gray list shall help Zimbabwe improve transparency and accountability. The members of the NPO sector are expected to share more information about their activities and be transparent about their sources of funding. However, in practice, the financial industry is suspected of conducting corrupt activities while monitoring the NPOs.

Despite the more significant level of awareness compared to Uganda, there are still concerns by some NPOs that the State could use the FATF mandate to shrink the civic space, especially the human rights NGOs. Furthermore, the respondents expressed concern that whereas these concerns may exist, it is essential to have a broad understanding that the FATF regulations do not only monitor the activities of NPOs but also sectors such as banking and finance. Hence, considering the intention of the norms and legislations beyond their possible shortcomings (albeit of utmost concern to those affected) is paramount to enabling all actors to fight these transnational crimes.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is need to address concerns regarding the shrinking of civic space often link to the use of State instruments to enforce the need to counter money laundering and terrorism financing. While the NPOs do not dispute the high risk involved in the AML/TF networks and operations, and neither do most of them dispute the necessity of having legal and normative frameworks to curb these vices, what emerges from the study reveals the need to prevent the used of these norms to the disadvantage of the NPO sector. Both governments and NPOs need to be involved in processes that ensure compliance with the relevant legislations against transnational crimes of this nature.

A broad approach to enforcement, which involves collaboration between financial intelligence agencies and the NPO sector, seems to be an appropriate strategy for dealing with the tension between the two industries. If this is done at various stages of norm localization—including; advocacy, consulting for policy development, and involvement in policy implementation, this may offer a better pathway to addressing these transnational criminal activities. Otherwise, as all those participating in the study revealed, these crimes do exist and need to be managed/prevented.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.



Notes on Contributor

Eunice Akullo (PhD) is a lecturer in the department of political science and public administration (Makerere University – Uganda). Her teaching experience in various universities has expanded her interest and knowledge into other fields of international relations such as: conflict, peace & security, gender, social justice, trans-nationalism, regionalism, diplomacy, and political theory. She has researched and published on conflict-related issues affected especially women and children. Her PhD These was on the integration of children born in captivity to Lord’s Resistance Army Formerly abducted females. She obtained her doctorate from the university of Southampton (United Kingdom).

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Work of a Local NGO VETO, in Contrast with the International Organisations in the Eastern Congo¹

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Abstract:

The history of the Democratic Republic of Congo has been one of long, unpeaceful turmoil. Even before the establishment of the state, there has been continuous fighting for decades, displacing and killing millions of inhabitants across this land in Central Africa. Evidence suggests that none of the peacekeeping efforts could make valuable, long-lasting contributions while generations after generations grew up in a hostile environment. In this paper, based on empirical data gathered through research by local organisations (VETO, VACNET), we examine the wide range of deradicalisation and reintegration practices that try to rehabilitate war-affected people through mainly agricultural activities. We are also assessing the effectiveness of these activities and outline the need for further research. Finally, this paper demonstrates that local organisations may have the best means and chances to deradicalise and reintegrate people successfully.

Keywords:

Africa, deradicalisation, DR Congo, VANCET, VETO

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1. Introduction

1.1. Brief Introduction of the Democratic Republic of Congo

The history of the DRC offers to its examination a picture full of contrasts which, on the one hand, show a country with incredible potential and, on the other hand, a country paradoxically poor and apparently without hope of exit. The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country in Central Africa, bordering nine others, which extends according to the convention of Berlin of 1885, on a surface of 2.345.000 km², of which some neighbouring countries have the ambition to seize a part or, at least, to establish their companies and their populations there, without expenses nor questioning the administrative order of the power of Kinshasa, DRC's capital.

1.2. History of Wars in DRC and Its Predecessors

The populations of the Congo used to live in their forests and steppes, feeding themselves with natural products until the day when “adventurers” in the pay of Western countries came, supposedly, to discover them.

With its virginity now broken, the Congo became the scene of looting and exactions of all kinds, supported and tempered in the background by a subtle horde of kindly messengers of the Good News or of Islam, who also lived off the resources of the Metropolis to spy, steal and lull people to sleep, postponing their greatest well-being until later and after death, far from work and, above all, far from any rights; what happens is only the product of their generosity, of prayer and therefore, of divine grace. Portuguese explorer Diego Cao was the first European who made his way into Congo from the western direction through the Atlantic Ocean. The Portuguese started trading with slaves from around the early XVI. century. The Arabs also arrived slowly from the other end of the Congo a century later. They killed some people and took many to go and sell them through the port of Zanzibar, leaving the others prey to internal migrations (Banshchikova and Ivanchenko 2019) (Renault, 1988). The Belgians also came. They killed people and took away megatons of mineral wealth and all the cultural symbols of the people, leaving the country prey to politicking and looting by multinational companies, also with juicy financial reporting obligations to the “former” rulers. Hence the wars, the destruction and the exactions that follow. Hence also the mobilisation and the voluntary or forced enrolment of many young people in forces and groups armed with weapons of war or, more subtly, with the unshakeable will to fight one day with their enemies or to die, this time with full knowledge of the facts. At this point, where all existential calculation is stretched into conjecture and where the death of the other or of themselves becomes commonplace in the absence of a just solution to the evil suffered, the doors are wide open to what others call, with feigned innocence, “terrorism”, “jihadism” or “radicalisation.” The demand for truth and justice is brought to justice before the executioners. The snake bites its own tail and finds itself



condemning the very thing it was preaching by example. As long as the consensus established in Berlin between the colonizing nations in 1885 was valid, there was no war in the Congo, except from 1914 to 1918 and from 1940 to 1945, during the two world wars, when Congolese, turned into cannon fodder, went to defend the interests of “the Metropolis”, at the cost of their unknown blood, on foot as far as Eritrea, Egypt and even Italy. After the II. World War Congolese people started to fight for their independence, which resulted in the successful forming of the independent Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, the task of building a nation in peace in this vast land with so many different cultures and so many different interests failed (Weiss, 2000; Besenyő et al. 2010).

There have been political and military insurgencies, military operations from independence to the mercenary revolts (Collins and Watson, 2014), followed by the First Congo war in 1996-97. Next was almost instantly the Second Congo War between 1998-2003 (Cooper, 2013). Even the last 20-plus years of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a region that has been embroiled in successions of war, civil conflict and severe poverty for over two decades (Marijen and Schouten, 2019). The United Nation’s Mission in the Congo (MONUC) is currently the world’s largest peacekeeping mission, but it is increasingly facing criticism for its failure not only to end the conflict in the eastern parts of the country but also to offer even some minimal form of civilian protection (Bøås, 2010).

2. Humanitarian Projects in Congo

In view of the social and economic impacts of the multi-faceted wars that have been depicted and experienced in the DRC, the first logical step, if we really want to put an end to them, would be to conduct a program of reconstruction and development, or even national excellence, in line with the dynamics, intensity and extension of these wars, which are, in essence, "a program of destruction and underdevelopment, or even national annihilation.

However, not all the parties involved in these conflicts have the same spontaneity to repair what they have contributed to destroying since the mandates and resources of each actor are not the same, and since the pain of the people cannot wait for the conclusion of the last meeting of the “scholars,” emergency interventions have appeared on the ground to at least alleviate the weight of the gratuitous and unnecessary suffering of the survivors:

- in the field of physical security of the populations (MONUC, United Nations Mission in Congo),
- in the area of food security (WFP, World Food Program and FHI, Food for the Hungry International),

-in the area of transitional housing for refugees and internally displaced persons (UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs)

-in the field of Health (MSF, Doctors without Borders, ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent),


-in the field of Child Protection (Orphans, unaccompanied children, children associated with armed forces and groups, children living on the street or in any other particularly difficult situation: SAVE the Children, War Child Netherlands, CARE, International Rescue Committee, IRC, amongst many other international NGOs

-in the field of mine clearance and care for the disabled: HANDICAP International

-in the field of in-depth contacts with communities, we have saluted the sacrifices of the Churches and local NGOs such as the PANZI Foundation for the reparation of women victims of sexual violence, the ESPD network, Childhood in Particularly Difficult Circumstances in which VETO asbl, our project, is located.


For years, if not decades, the international community has been involved in various attempts at state-building in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, the positive effects of these attempts are not easily observed on the ground. In Eastern Congo the humanitarian situation is terrible and the political situation a mess. The conventional top-down approach to state-building that seeks to rebuild so-called 'failed states' from the capital areas towards the hinterland is therefore still in need of reconsiderations and revisions (Bøås, 2010).

We refrain from rushing into a judgment of individual intentions for which we have no objective basis. However, in view of the results achieved by the various parties, each in their own field, we would like to briefly draw the following conclusions as a basis for our further reflection:




As Riedel states in his article when large human disasters strike, such as the thousands of massacres and mass rapes occurring in the eastern DRC, international aid organizations provide short-term help (e.g. Doctors Without Borders). But there is no follow-up, and individuals and communities are left to manage on their own. Many thousands of survivors have no access to medical care, and many of them die (Riedel, 2014).

◆ **The development projects at community level by civil society activists.**



◆ **The policy and infrastructure development projects by the Government.**



3. Our VETO Project, Brief History of the NGO and Introduction to Its Work, Main Projects

VETO stands for Vivres, Etudes, Travail, Opportunités de Développement Solidaire, in English it means Food, Studies, Work, Opportunities for Solidary Development.

VETO is understood here first and foremost as a noun indicating its revolt against the suffering inflicted on people for free and its decision to raise its “veto power” against so much injustice, with its brains and bones alone, if no one is found to join them. VETO is then understood as a set of “Food and Study Projects for Orphans,” this last word being taken in the literal sense of children deprived of one or both parents as a result of the war and in the figurative sense to designate all this population now without a father or geographical, political, economic or even family reference point after the hurricane of the war.

Their problems, as we have seen and demonstrated above, are numerous, but VETO’s choice is based on two that it considers more essential, namely food to stay alive and education, in order to find sustainable ways to be economically and socially self-sufficient, without prejudice or emphasis to any other consideration deemed useful to the implementation of its vision of wounded communities that rise up in solidarity through agriculture in order to respond sustainably to the problems of each one of them in a short period of time.

VETO’s projects are all articulated around three guiding principles, the best interest of the child in the definition of good programmatic orientations, the participation of the beneficiaries in the identification of the priorities as well as in the realisation of the approved programs and the non-discrimination of the objects of the program as well as of its beneficiaries, although there must be considered a certain priority between the two.

Thus, over the years, since 1995, VETO have developed and conducted, alone or in partnership with third party organizations, a series of projects that revolved around the protection and development of children as well as the city, through studies and agriculture, of which the following is a brief presentation of the most relevant, according to their order of arrival:



No	Project title	Location	Partner organisations	Result	Current status
1	Shelter and transitional care for unaccompanied children	MURHESA / South KIVU-DRC	CICR, Centre Agricole de Murhesa	103 reunited with their parents	Refugee camp dismantled in 1996
2	School reintegration and support to orphans and vulnerable children	Bukavu	Jesuit College, Marists Technical School and Lycee Wuma Girls School	96 scholarships provided	Program moved to Nyangezi due to safety issues in 1996
3	Construction of the Kanakuze Reception Center	CIBIMBI/NYANGEZI	CARITAS	Guest house with 20 rooms, 5 conference rooms, 5 offices and a large breeding section	Waiting for completion and more intense use
4	Educational and professional reintegration of orphans	Grouping of NYANGEZI and BUKAVU	PLANETRISE	1783 in school	Project ended due to unfulfilled promise of free education.
5	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers	KINDU/ MANIEMA Province	CARE Ngo MONUC SAVE the Children, ICRC	611 in pig breeding and 42 in masonry and building techniques	The project was continued in new forms with funding from CARE to local NGOs
6	Repatriation and reintegration of ENA from Tanzania and Congo	BUJUMBURA / BURUNDI	IRC, UNHCR, UNICEF	401 reunified and installed in agriculture and 62 returned to the army.	Project continues with local NGOs in Muyinga, Ruhigi and Makamba with funding from UNHCR
7	Resettlement of relocated ex-miners' households.	BURHINYI & LUHWINJA / SOUTH KIVU	PLANETRISE	146 households with 566 minors are established on private plots with some gardening and pig raising skills	Project completed in 2014
8	Women's Inter-regional exchange of agricultural projects	Congo- Rwanda- Burundi	PLANETRISE	Daily 6,000 women cross the border and make a good salary by this initiative.	There are depots of Burundian and Rwandan products in Congo and vice versa,
9	Agro veterinary synergy for the protection of children and the environment	ECUADOR / DRC	PLANETRISE	Acquisition of 12 hectares for corn cultivation. Monthly delivery of 12 tons to Kinshasa and construction of a literacy center and upgrading	The project is ongoing and will continue until we provide a boat to transport the products.
10	Masters and PHD program in DRC	Institut Supérieur Pédagogique of Bukavu and Institut Facultaire de Développement in Kinshasa	Óbuda University, PLANETRISE	Study phase and setting up of basic tools	In the process of being set up.

Veto started its first project in April 1994. It aimed to provide shelter and transitional care for street children, as due to the ongoing genocide in Rwanda left thousands of unaccompanied minors on the streets of Bukavu. The starting funding was USD1,800 provided by VETO. The initial target was 147 children. At the end of the project in 1996 altogether 103 children were reunited with their families. Besides providing home to these kids the project involved them in agricultural education and hands on training. It meant the cultivation process of maize, sorghum and soy plus breeding of chicken and pigs. In the project, locally partnered with the International Committee of the Red Cross, whose expert, Athoon Scoofs, worked along with the Agricultural Centre of Murhesa (Murhesa is an area around Bukavu) expert Abel Kahamba. VETO was mainly represented by director Dieudonne Cirhigiri. The main tasks were divided among the participants as the following: shelter and medical care International Committee of the Red Cross, food Agricultural Centre of Murhesa and social security, family tracing and reunification overseen by VETO. The main problems encountered during the project were the language limitation and the hypersensitivity of the youngest children. VETO focused on recruiting Rwandan assistants, especially women to tackle these issues.

From May 1995 till August 1997 VETO operated another project to help easing the effects of war. It started a school reintegration and support program for orphans and vulnerable children. The initial budget was USD 4,500 given by VETO members. This was needed because of the growing number of orphaned children in school who could not provide for themselves. The project started with 19 children from the Jesuit College, then it was extended to the Marists Technical School with 36 pupils and to the Lycee Wima Girls School where 41 children were taken care of. In total 96 scholarships were fully paid, and 89 diplomas were acquired by the participants. VETO in this project also put emphasis on agricultural activities and involved the participants in cultivation and breeding training. VETO also provided food store for maize, sorghum, soy and different meat products. The main experts were Bayoya Nkabalire Christophe and Dieudonne Cirhigiri (VETO) plus all the academic directors in the selected schools, namely Wanduma Thierry (Jesuit College), Katchuka Francois Xavier (Lycee Wima) and Claude Lunanga (Technical School). While the schools provided the academic tuition, VETO ensured the full scholarships and lodging. Unfortunately, in October 1996 the food store got looted by the invading AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) troops and the program became unsafe and unsustainable therefore it was moved to Nyangezi.

VETO's third main project started in late 1995. It was a construction of the Kanakuze Reception Center in Nyangezi. USD 60,000 was provided by VETO. The ongoing uncertainty and security issues forced VETO to start constructing a secure and privately-owned accommodation infrastructure for unaccompanied children in the long run, with full access to food production facilities. From 1996 to 1999 the construction had to stop due to war and up to now it is still waiting for full completion of the guest



house, conference rooms and offices. Over the time it has provided temporary shelter for 98 children whom were reunited with their parents (except 9 who escaped). In its cultivation area the growing of cassava, beans, maize amongst many other vegetables are ongoing. There are also pigs and poultry and brick manufacturing facilities.

From September 1999 till July 2006 the Educational and professional reintegration of orphans and children project were running by VETO. It was needed because in the aftermath of the wars in Nyangezi so much of the households could not afford even the low school fees (USD 1 was requested per child per month). This project also became very successful as 1783 children were kept in school over the years, and 611 were fully trained in pig keeping and breeding. Additionally, 42 pupils were taught masonry and building techniques. Dieudonne Chirigiri was the main coordinator and was helped by Marama Felicien admin secretary and Péter Gergő Juhász as a technical advisor. The projects main contributors were besides VETO the Planetrise NGO, WFP, Save the Children UK, War Child Netherlands, Abha Light Foundation and Steve Rwangara as chief agronomist. Planetrise provided USD 2,300. WFP gave 22 tons of food and Save the Children UK provided ongoing staff and capacity building. The main problem of the project was that far more children were in need than what the centre's capacity could bear. The project ended in 2006 due to financial constraints.

In December 2003 VETO was involved in a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers project because the war dynamics has pushed thousands of children out of their homes, some to remote countries and provinces in the armed forces and groups, some others in slavery (sexual or labour).

Reintegration assistance is necessary not only to meet the social and economic needs of ex-child soldiers, but it also helps maintain peace by ending the cycle of war crimes (Brownell, G. 2020).

Reintegration of former child soldiers is a multidimensional process. Research shows that regaining social acceptance and becoming socially included in society is indeed a challenging and complicated process for former child soldiers (Tonheim, M. 2014). There was presented evidence of social exclusion, stigmatisation and non-acceptance of former girl soldiers in eastern Congo of which VETO was aware of and wanted to eliminate by working closely with reunited families.

World Bank provided \$3,800,000 for the project, which was operated jointly by CARE International NGO, MONUC (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Save the Children International NGO and the International Committee of the Red Cross. VETO provided help in family tracing of the children and Dieudonne Chirigiri as a project manager. The project stopped on the 25th of May in 2005 and partly was continued by CARE and local NGOs.

From June 2005 till July 2007, VETO was involved in the repatriation and reintegration of refugees in DRC. The project was funded by the International Rescue

Committee (IRC) with USD656,000, the UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency) with USD 1,060,000, UNICEF (UN Childrens' Fund) with USD843,000 and the World Bank with USD 4,600,000. During the wars entire families fled Congo in all directions. VETO's expertise was called upon to guide their repatriation and community reintegration. 4601 reunited, reintegrated in formal or non-formal schools or installed in agriculture value chains. There were schools' rehabilitation in Muyinga (2), Ruyigi (1), Makamba (1), Rutana (2) and Nyanyalacs (1), plus social agrobusiness in Kirundo and Makabma. Returning families spread randomly thought the territory needing help because their average income was too low to survive. A community network of repatriation has been trained, funded and established in the community to ensure the follow up of the returning families, especially the children. The project continued with local NGOs funded by the UNHCR.

In May 2009 the resettlement of relocated ex-miners' households project started. After the 2006 elections hundreds of "mining investors" poured in the DRC. Many of them vested with non-social sensitive official contracts and readily pushing hundreds of households out of their lands thus increasing the number of refugees, hunger, banditry and new recruitments in all the armed groups. During the project 146 households including 566 minors were taken care of by house constructions on private lands. The main activities were house constructions, home gardening and breeding promotion along with large scale maize and potato cultivations. Adults were on the basis of a one-year salary while the youngest were put in school. The main problems occurred during the first months before harvest. The heads of the households were connected to the WFP food distribution program and to the UNHCR non-food item distributions. VETO itself made wooden barracks where families could shelter temporarily. Families could survive with their one-year salary and the progressive and combined yields of their small garden and farms provided for a better life onwards. The project was completed in 2014.

VETO started a project in January 2011 which is ongoing up to date. This is a Women's International Exchange of Agricultural Projects. VETO fundraised with the help of its main partner Planetrise NGO USD 10.000 as a start-up budget. This project was born because of the obvious failure of the politics and the military to bring peace despite their huge financial means and their fluid vocabulary during their multiple reconciliation meeting in South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Switzerland amongst many. The project has far exceeded expectations with at least 6,000 women crossing the borders in all directions per day to trade with their peers. The ten first operations took three months and amounted to USD 12,600 each but today full trucks of about 60 tons of maize are crossing twice the border per day. An eloquent OVI (Objectively verifiable indicator) is the sky rocketing number of new buildings in Bukavu, Goma, Gisenyi, Cyangugu and Uvira. The main task was to organize them into one representative committee in charge of the transport and the clearance of their goods and collecting some fees for the needed administration.



Another ongoing project of VETO with Planetrise NGO was started in July 2019. It is called the Agro veterinary synergy for the protection of children. Millions of children do not get nor good nor enough food for their growth in Kinshasa. In the same time, the farmers in Equator can't sell their products to take care of their children. The unique thing that runs smoothly is the trees' cutting from the forest for export timber and charcoal for cooking. VETO initiated this project to help. Acquisition of 12 hectares for corn cultivation and monthly delivery of 12 tons to Kinshasa and construction of a literacy center for out of school children are the main achievements besides those also purchasing of maize, peanuts and dried fish from vulnerable women at good price and sales of the same to vulnerable women in Kinshasa to avail a balance that goes to the operation of our first educational centre. The main obstacles were low capital, high interim storage and transportation costs. Patience and tight calculation have brought our purchasing power from two to twelve in two years despite the covid emergency and the low waters on the Congo River during the dry season. The project is ongoing and will continue until we provide a boat to transport the products.

VETO and Planetrise NGO has just recently started a new project of MA/MSc and PhD programs provided by the Óbuda University to students in the DRC. The aim is to have 60 Master students and 5 PhD students every year. This project is still very much in the process but the first Master students have started their courses in September, 2021.

4. The Current Situation of Our Subject

At this stage of VETO, right in the face of a situation of conflict that has become endemic in the country, and considering the generosity and seriousness demonstrated by our commitments as well as those of many other actors, both national and international, we remember that the most important problem that needs to be solved is the access to and effective use of knowledge.


“My people are dying because of lack of knowledge,” exclaimed Ghana's eminent Africanist Kwame Nkrumah in 1958. VETO also, at this point must recognise, after 12 years of collaboration with PLANETRISE of Hungary, that their goodwill and even their only sympathies are not enough to shake all these bruised communities towards the positive change that we would like to oppose to the logic of wars and murders advocated by the numerous artisans of misfortune that people have decried enough.

Veto, therefore, declares once again that the major problem and solution for this country lies in the level of capacity of national education to provide independent agents and entrepreneurs capable of responding first to the daily imperative of restoration, then to the long-term perspective of developing the framework conditions for autonomous development of the populations towards peace.

Hence, VETO's orientation with the Óbuda University towards the implementation of an immense agricultural program centred on the production of biological electric energy, chickens and fish to finance the high studies of MA/MSc and PhD of generations of young technicians who will bring to their respective villages the virtues and the assets of their courses in our academies and in our workshops.

VETO, PLANETRISE and Óbuda University thus overflow their territorial limits to be reborn each year in the professional fields of the young laureates fed at their tables. Our tables will be the partner universities that will provide us with the finalists who have been ironed out, the partner universities that will provide the courses that are not available at Óbuda University and the civil society organisations that will adhere to our vision to accentuate it or the commercial companies with which we will make contact and contract to deploy their business in partnership with us so that the students find and are concretely open to the subject of their concern.

- ◆ **The VETO systemic project by both the beneficiary populations, the government, the funding organization and the knowledge providers institutes.**



5. Methodology

First of all, VETO is an independent organization of the civil society. Their lives, therefore, bring them into close contact with the joys and vicissitudes of citizens' daily lives. There is, therefore, a mass of data to which VETO have access simply by being there, present and witnessing the twists and turns of national history.



But, in addition to this major advantage, VETO obey four research principles for the conception and confirmation of a project idea: analysis of the context, listening to people's lives and opinions in that context, learning from other contexts and other similar or radically contrary opinions in the literature, and deduction based on the observation of behaviour. VETO's respective organizations have been in it for almost 28 years. They know because they see it that, without a radical change of mentalities, no positive future is to be envisaged durably for the generations to come. Corruption and misappropriation are today the elephant on the lawn in the highest spheres of the State (and within the populations themselves...).

The scholarly illiteracy of the semi-literate does more damage today than the crass ignorance of the first steps described above. In the face of this deprivation, half science and science without conscience are the same tragedy. Some people get tired of it and flee. This is called emigration, travel for study or business, but one, like the other, does not end in the Congo. Others refuse to close their eyes to what surrounds them with drink and debauches and blindly launch themselves into a counter-attack of which they do not hold enough life weapons to counter the lethal arguments used against them effectively. They want to study more and better in order to undertake salvific and equitable solutions. This is the group that interests us in this project. The last ones are disciples of the law of Talion. An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. They have been perpetuating, for almost 30 years, the same mechanism of mutual exclusion and destruction against which they claim to be rebelling, reinvigorating, in flesh and blood, the impulse of negation of others and radicalisation of oneself that we are called to thwart, in our capacity as social organizations of proximity. Six drivers of disengagement are listed below 1. Disillusionment and disappointment with the tactics, leadership, or other aspects of the movement; 2. The realisation that the costs of continued actions are too great; 3. The establishment or re-establishment of relationships with individuals or networks outside of the jihadi circle; 4. Familial pressure; 5. Changing personal and professional priorities; 6. Humane treatment by authorities (Hwang, 2017).

6. Discussion

For years, if not decades, the international community has been involved in various attempts at state-building in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, the positive effects of these attempts are not easily observed on the ground. In Eastern Congo, the humanitarian situation is terrible, and the political situation is a mess. The conventional top-down approach to state-building that seeks to rebuild so-called 'failed states' from the capital areas towards the hinterland is therefore still in need of reconsiderations and revisions (Bøås, 2010).

The grimacing and sometimes macabre but unreturnable images of past history return because they never left, despite the din of the media, and become the question: How to slow down the momentum of a logic that has become so insane in order to

save what can still be saved from this blind cyclone of vengeance without law or limits? What program and what approach lead to the benefits of so many men too easily held for nothing who have nothing more to lose, from the moment when their existence and their silent patience are judged too much on the planet, taken away in the same movement those of the others, especially those of the real or supposed torturers. What does it matter if innocence is only a deplorable abstraction? It is important to disengage and deradicalise people (Horgan, 2009).

The more empowered and financially independent ex-child soldier and ex-child slave girls become, the less problems and stigmatisation they will face (Tonheim, 2012) and their reintegration and deradicalisation becomes more successful.

With their educational, psychological and physical development disrupted, ex-child soldiers are left without human and social capital to rebuild their lives. With few or no opportunities to improve their socio-economic status, this population remains one of the most vulnerable in post-war nations. According to Human Rights Watch (2008), there is a direct link between ex-combatants' poverty level and the continuing cycle of war crimes among former combatants affiliated with government and military groups (Brownell, 2020).

Someone can be both disengaged and deradicalised—that is, they have ceased to be involved in violent extremism and no longer support the ideas or ideology behind the group or its actions. Alternatively, someone might be disengaged yet not deradicalised. That is, they have ceased to be involved without necessarily refuting their ideological or emotional commitment to a movement or cause (Horgan, 2021).

The UN's Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) also strongly stress the social aspects of child reintegration. This includes but is not limited to family reunification, mobilising and enabling the child's existing care system, medical screening and health care, schooling and/or vocational training, psychosocial support, and social and community-based reintegration (UN, 2006).

7. Conclusion

Our research question was whether the work of local NGOs such as VETO is effective in de-radicalizing and reintegrating war-affected people in Eastern Congo, given this delirious context of intertwining and re-creating contradictions at every turn in history.

After this incomplete overview of the fields of diversions and unresolved controversies, our answer is formal and final: Yes.

Yes, it is possible for and by local NGOs to find and implement viable and sustainable solutions to the problems that challenge international NGOs and governments in their communities, but not by themselves.



Yes, it is possible for NGOs like VETO to organically transform, i.e. de-radicalize the behaviours, attitudes and practices of individuals as well as populations electrified by killings and injustices into positive stances and actions, but not automatically or by virtue of purely artificial DDR process oblivious to the obligatory passage to truth, justice and reconciliation

Yes, finally, it is possible for local NGOs such as VETO to reverse the war into an entrepreneurial and collaborative deal in their local, national or even transnational communities with the conscious and deliberate contribution of all stakeholders and all losing parties.

7.1. Who Are the Stakeholders?

They are, in the first place, the governments and multinationals that pull the strings behind the theatre of newspapers and political speeches. According to Riedel, questionable behaviours of Western humanitarian aid industries have corrosive effects. Many knowledgeable people have told me that nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) appear more interested in justifying their projects back home than in taking responsibility for the outcome of their projects on the ground (Riedel, 2014).

In the background are the warlords and armed robbers (of the Bible or the Koran, of the code of law, of the authorised baton, of the stethoscope, of the chalk, of the red pen or simply, of the word expressly distorted to lie) steal and kill properly.

As Adam Hochschild so poignantly demonstrates in the Foreword to this special issue, the Congo has been at the hands of the international community since King Leopold drew its borders with little consideration for its people. The result is a political situation so complex that even the international media, when they do report on the situation in the Eastern DRC, reject real understanding and instead focus on elements of it as the *raison d'être* of the conflict (Collins and Watson, 2014).

7.2. What Are the Losing Parties Here?

It is in the foreground those from one to 101 years old who take the shots, the blows of hunger, those of exclusion or exile, in place of the sponsors, without having known or even expected it in any way, abruptly and without any state of mind or distinction of sex or religion whatsoever. In short, the whole population of the innocent and the surprised.

In the second plan, it is those who rise to react to the aggression, push back the enemy, and claim lost rights. In loyalist jargon, they are called “rebels,” “negative forces,” or “civil society organizations,” distinct from “political societies,” which are too

often clandestine in terms of their ideological positioning, their means of action and their performance indicators.

The question that automatically emerges is, how can these civil societies, all of them eminently minority, reactive and against the current, inflect the tendencies and lead, in the long run, to a more peaceful general context, even where the tendency and the actions are subtly motivated by theft, exclusion, torture or murder?

It is first of all because of their flat existence as independent non-governmental organisations, their resistance to predatory and divisive madness, and their resilience in the face of and in the midst of tragedy. Local actors are left out of discussions surrounding the mechanics of creating peace, whilst international actors remain unaware of local priorities as they attempt this creation (Collins and Watson, 2014).

In fact, at the same time when, in their drunkenness of power, some governments and their multinationals hold the will and aspirations of the people as little or nothing, the NGOs proclaim themselves loudly in favour of all man and all mankind.

It is then because of the international legal texts, admitted at least officially by the torturers and by the tortured for the protection of the life of all, in spite of and against any armed conflict or not.

Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Additional Protocols on refugees, the disabled and the vulnerable all proclaim, in convergent terms, the right to life and development for everyone and therefore openly ratify the work of NGOs which apply themselves to the realisation of these objectives, without discrimination or exclusion of the target publics.

Finally, it is because of the proximity, the immersion of NGOs in the wounded communities, seeing and hearing all the perverse effects of conflicts and, above all, suffering with the communities, the avatars inherent in the multiple war adventures: suspicion, persecution and sometimes destruction. With forces pulling youths into a more rewarding and pro-social alternative given the right combination of push and pull factors, individuals may be persuaded to give up their involvement in the form of organised crime (Gjelsvik and Bjørge, 2012).

It must also be said that the proximity of NGOs to donors, governments and, above all, their extensive capacity to understand the underlying causes of conflicts as well as the dynamics of their expansion or consolidation.

It is in this last capacity that they are the lever without which no community recovery will ever be possible, in favour of some program initiated from abroad without being strange itself or, above all, sustainable, in favour of micro-projects limited in time and to a few beneficiaries, as if the war chose.



By conducting systemic, holistic and catalytic programs, the local NGOs, which are there and remain there for life, offer themselves as the perennial platform for coordinating and strengthening the positive wills that exist but struggle to impose themselves because they lack the popular participation and the ferment of the academy that the NGOs have in abundance.

The gateway to this systemic programming is agriculture. Not because it is the answer to all the problems but because there is no life without food. And therefore, no truth or reconciliation.

Indeed, it is when life regains its shape and taste those words are released, and responsibilities for this or that misdeed are pointed out. It is in the field of work that absences or unusual presences are officially noticed, and reasons as well as answers to their failures are found. The cases of unaccompanied children and/or internally displaced persons stand out against the local panorama. The cases of women victims of rape or of the disabled also strike the judgment and provoke either revolt or reconciliation.

Both take time. As much if not more time than the hostilities themselves. To work agriculture has the advantage of this quality, as opposed to armistice treaties or agreements between politicians in Sun City, Nairobi or anywhere else but the DRC.

7.3. In Short

Where international aid agencies and government cannot reach, NGOs can.

The creative patience they cannot see, communities have. The experience of VETO's WIRE-GL project between the Great Lakes countries has even shown, by organizing cross-border exchanges between Rwandans, Congolese and Burundians, that the little people don't mind and happily work and trade together across borders while politicians pull their hair out and use them as cannon fodder, arguing inter-ethnic rivalries and arming one against the other to diminish the populations and take over their natural resources. A key factor in the transformation from violence to peace is the role played by personal relationships: change often hinges on a relationship with a mentor or friend who supports and affirms peaceful behaviour (Horgan, 2009).

And the expertise of the universities, which is so lacking to all, is more easily accessible to NGOs that have objective and participatory criteria for the selection of projects than to governments that choose their actors from political parties and act according to the budgets of donors who rarely move for reasons known to the local populations. Deradicalisation programs represent a creative approach to addressing violent extremism. Their existence signals a commitment to rehabilitation and reintegration. They are one element of not just counterterrorism but also rebuilding communities often torn apart by violent extremism. But they can only be effective if properly resourced, informed by evidence, rigorously evaluated, and rooted in the


affected communities. Research from the scientific community can greatly contribute to the long-term sustainability of deradicalisation programs (Horgan, 2021).

Hence, a current step of VETO towards universities for operational programs of MA/MSc and PhD in partnership with the Óbuda University and VETO's conclusion below.

These programs integrate the reception and participation in situ of students and professors from overseas with local populations and students from the terroir. Together, they confront and seek answers to real-life problems, enriching each other with their respective perspectives and know-how far beyond the air-conditioned confines of ministries or UN agencies.

The science is then branching into specific cases and the nomenclatures are gaining, as a result, in localisations and in lively enumerations with a human face. Not to mention that the modern farmer's profession has lost its isolation to embrace telecommunication, product processing, marketing, efficient and transparent income management and, ultimately, the exponential multiplication of related jobs and the extension of the project to the whole country. This is succinctly shown in the diagram below and is not included in any of the DDR programs that people are hearing about, without transitional justice or work.

◆ **The VETO systemic project by both the beneficiary populations, the government, the funding organization and the knowledge providers institutes.**





Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Csaba Szeremley graduated from the Pannon University in 2002 with a degree in economics, majoring in tourism. He spent eighteen months of his internship in the United States at Brookdale Living Inc. In 2009 he obtained an MA in Educational Planning, Economics and International Development from the Institute of Education, University College London. Prior to moving to Malawi in 2012, he worked for Humana People to People UK, a development aid organisation, as general manager. In Malawi, he set up his own audiovisual production company and worked for several prominent NGOs and companies, in addition to running the Hungarian Trade and Cultural Centre. In 2016, he returned to Hungary, but as an entrepreneur, he is still connected to Malawi: he has participated in 10 medical missions as a coordinator and as a member of the Planetrise Association for Culture and Environmental Protection, he coordinates development projects.

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Responsibility for Uganda's Children Born in Captivity: From Failure to Prevent to the Need to Rebuild¹

Eunice Akullo²

Abstract:

The responsibility to protect doctrine attributes the first responsibility for protecting vulnerable persons to the government in which they live. It is only in circumstances where a country is unwilling and unable to offer such protection that external intervention is permitted. The response to persons formerly associated with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) (those abducted and those born in captivity) indicates action by both the government of Uganda and external actors (especially international NGOs). Following the reinsertion and start of a new life of the affected persons among communities in Uganda, concern has emerged in some literature, regarding their well-being- specifically their reintegration and integration challenges. Hence, concerns for such long-term integration and reintegration cause questions of responsibility to re-emerge. Using field data from a research conducted by Akullo (2019), this chapter provides a discourse analysis of the common discourses that emerged from the research participants in the study. The analysis of these discourses, reaffirm the view on responsibility to protect and also highlights the importance of culture in re-enforcing the primary role of the state in guaranteeing protection. There is also hope that the political discourse can be reinforced by outcomes of litigation processes linked to the trials of top-LRA commanders at The Hague and in Uganda. The paper is therefore important for understanding of how to govern this group of war-affected children.

Keywords:

Children born in captivity, children born of war, Discourse analysis, Lord's Resistance Army, Uganda

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1. Introduction

1.1. Brief Introduction of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Uganda has recently (August 2023) received another group of people formerly associated with the Lords' Resistance Army – who were living in Central African Republic. The various categories of those returning were members of former armed groups, their wives (some of them married out of consent) and children fathered in captivity (Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo). While their return reflects a positive gesture in the public domain and discourse of the state's response to these persons formerly associated with armed forces/groups, there remain concerns over the un-addressed issues of those who returned earlier (up to 2006) – at the time when the peace talks between the LRA leaders and the government of Uganda stalled. Some of the debates between then and now, have been questions related to the plight of females forced into marriage and their children born of war – also dubbed as children born in captivity. One of the questions that has not clearly been addressed in the existing literature, regards the responsibility for the plight of this category of children born of war.

Discussions on the responsibility for children born of war, among whom are Uganda's children born in captivity, is not a new debate. In 2010, Mochmann and Lee (2010) sought answers to the question regarding who is responsible for (protecting) children born of war. Concern for these children (in terms of who holds the primary responsibility for their protection) were also raised by Carpenter (2010) and Seto (2013). The two argue that the global agenda for the protection of war-affected children excluded children born of war. The localization or diffusion of global norms on protection of these children - such as the Paris Principles and Guidelines (2007) focus on child soldiers - and this situates their children born in captivity (a category of children born of war), at the margins of interventions and advocacy. In practice, Uganda adopted reintegration policies, programmes and projects in collaboration with non-government actors and the community as part of the localization of global norms aimed at protecting children in the context of war.

Archarya (2007) explains how norms become adopted into a national context when they resonate with the domestic or traditional norms into which they are proposed. When adopted, they are then implemented in ways that are acceptable in that community. Hence, in the case of Uganda, the implementation of Paris Principles, including aspects of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, depict acceptance and adoption of the norms. Akullo (2019) provides details of how reintegration and integration are mostly framed as domains championed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Both local and international NGOs, working closely with relevant government departments at district level (in Oyam, Gulu and Kitgum) assisted persons returning from captivity (former child soldiers and their children) to reintegrate into the community. The interventions assisted various returning persons (commonly



referred to as Formerly Abducted Persons to resettle and start a new life) and seem to have neglected (the children born in captivity), albeit, not deliberately.

In Uganda, state intervention took place in coordination with other non-state actors. Both local and international NGOs played an important role in enabling reinsertion and follow-up (albeit minimally). The everyday interaction between the persons formerly associated with the LRA and communities among whom they reside became characterized by experiences of stigma and discrimination. Some of the major actors that have been helpful in mitigating these experiences, are local NGOs and Cultural leaders. These are critical in sensitization of communities to enable better living among those involved. In some instances, they also provide other social kinds of support aiding reconciliation processes, counselling, and mediating in disputes. The significance of these two categories of actors, illuminate the importance of the social and cultural discourses on responsibility - a possible reflection of efforts at grassroots level which rely on networks with other partners engaged in humanitarian and development work. The contribution of these actor then bring to the fore the importance of the third pillar of responsibility to protect – which is responsibility to rebuild- as a critical foundation for enabling reintegration and integration in the short term. The problem arises in the long-run where there is no clear and deliberate transfer of responsibility from the third pillar, back to the first – which is responsibility to prevent (in this case, ensure the adequate protection of the human rights of this category of persons).

Responsibility to protect (R2P) is a doctrine that emerged from international law and normative debates on the regulation of intervention of another state or group of states in the domestic affairs of a territory of a sovereign state. In 2005, at the UN World Summit, the principles of R2P were adopted at the global level. The concept is explained by Roland (1988) and Woocher (2012) as a right or claim, due to all citizens and the duty of the state as the primary actor expected to ensure protection. These claims are valid when any insecurity occurs – in this case war- the first duty to protect and ensure adequate response is the state. Other actors (state and non-state) only intervene in scenarios where the state is either unable or unwilling to provide such protection. In this paper, I argue that the ideas inherent in the intensions enshrined in the three pillars of the R2P doctrine can be helpful for understanding the plight of children born in captivity.

The three pillars of the R2P doctrine are (I) the responsibility (duty) to prevent- framed in the words of the UN as follows: “*Every state has the responsibility to protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.*” In the case of children who were abducted from communities in Uganda by the LRA, the failure to protect them from abduction may be interpreted as a failure to prevent the occurrence of child abduction in the context of war - a category of war crimes. The office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict presented a report in 2013, listing six (06) categories of crimes that are dubbed “*grave violations against children during armed*

conflicts". Violation one, spells out the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts. It is this that covers the abduction of children among communities of North, East and West-Nile sub-regions of Uganda by the LRA.

The second, is the responsibility to react- framed as follows in the UN document - "the wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility". Lastly, pillar three represents the responsibility to rebuild - presented as "if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter". In the case of the LRA war in Uganda, by 2004, there was growing advocacy by civil society aimed at pushing the government of Uganda to allow intervention into the war by other states such as the USA and members of the EU (2015). Notable advocacy included efforts such as those of *Kacoke Madit* comprised of Acholi in the diaspora, a parliamentary motion passed by Hon. Nobert Mao (8th Parliament).

Additionally, the agenda pushed for the cultural and religious leaders in northern Uganda was made stronger following the visit by the United Nations under secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs remarks on the conflict. According to Jan Egeland, OCHA reported his description as "*the world's worst form of terrorism*" (Reliefweb, 2006) and the Guardian "*Northern Uganda to me remains the biggest neglected humanitarian emergency in the world...For me, the situation is a moral outrage, but I'm heartened that the security council devoted so much time to northern Uganda*" which was followed by comments by the British PM's (Sir Emyr Jones Parry) describing the war as "*one of the great crises out there which is not recognised enough*" and the need for countries outside the AU to join in the cause through donations and other support to address the conflict (The Guardian, 2004). It is important to emphasize the importance of how the agenda on intervention was framed. Global concern over terrorism after 9/11 was significant in garnering international support. Moreover, expression of commitment at the level of the UN and Britain (for example) was pivotal in enabling intervention through international NGOs providing humanitarian assistance in coordination with the office of the Prime Minister in Uganda.

The Juba Peace Talks enabled many persons formerly associated with the LRA to return to Uganda after the cessation of hostilities. The reintegration of persons formerly associated with the LRA and their children (who were integrating) coincided with other programs of post-conflict recovery that were being coordinated by the office of the PM on behalf of the government of Uganda and UN OCHA on behalf of international actors providing humanitarian assistance. It is important to note that most of the arguments in rebuilding states after war are dominated by sociolect-economic and political reconstruction that targets broader society. Debates on the need to target individuals (their victim-hood and needs related to the same) are more recent within claims and interventions for post-conflict reconstruction. Akullo (2019) adopts the



responsibility to protect argument to explain responsibility for these children at national level.

The government of Uganda's failure to protect against abductions is often posited as one of the reasons for which it failed in its mandate of responsibility to protect towards children affected by the LRA war - especially the child soldiers and the children they later got in captivity (arising out of the initially failure to prevent the abduction of child soldiers). In response to such failure of the state to protect against abductions, reparations have been suggested as the ideal form of responsibility of the state towards these children (based on the responsibility to repair) (Goodhart, 2007; McClain Opiyo, 2015; Lühe and Mugeru, 2014; Rimmer, 2006). Reparations are broadly understood as remedies to any harm suffered by victims of war (Brooks, 1999a). children born of war, are considered secondary victims when violations against their mothers are analysed (Clark, 2014).

Furthermore, Sakin (2014) argues that in the case of the LRA war, this responsibility includes the duty to provide reparations to victims by government. According to the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2006), state responsibility includes the provision of reparations to both direct and indirect victims - Article 3(d). Previous reparations to mothers and their children faced with similar situations (Vietnam, India and Pakistan), indicates possibility of the remedies to address the plight of those concerned (Hwang, 2013; Lee, 2017; McKelvey and Webb, 1995; Das, 2007). This view on state responsibility to protect and repair, can also be linked to the political and legal discourse on social contract.

2. Methodology

The Foucauldian type of discourse analysis, also dubbed 'Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA)' is part of critical discourse analysis. It pays attention to the relationship between discourses and institutions and moves beyond the examination of language, which is the focus of discourse analysis in linguistics. For instance, Willig (Willig, 2013, p. 10) asserts that the Foucauldian Discourse Analysis moves beyond the analysis of spoken and written words, and considers the ways in which such words legitimate and reinforce social and institutional structures - in turn validating them. Hence, for him, a FDA uses materials such as transcripts of speech, written documents and symbolic systems that are necessary to answer a research question determines the criteria for selection of materials included in analysis. These materials may be obtained from experts, ordinary people or publications.

Foucault stresses the need for both critical and genealogical analysis (Foucault, 1981). Despite his suggestion of both critical and genealogy in analysis, there appears to

be a lack of a single approach to conducting FDA. Different scholars used various approaches in conducting and presenting work grounded in FDA. Scholars have adopted elements of either genealogy or critical approaches as suggested by Foucault, with Foucault's writings and examining other works written as interpretations of Foucault's work as well as work based on analytic perspective drawn from Foucault's thinking on post-structuralism. For instance, Willig (2013) adopts a critical perspective only from a psychological perspective. A FDA by Graham (2005) involves the critical perspective of discourse as 'discursive analytic' – a focus on how statements shape the truth by making objects nameable, manifest and describable.

Another use of FDA occurs in the work of (Miller and Rose, 1990). They use a critical approach to FDA by conceptualizing governmentality as a *mentality of government*; one in which actors, not necessarily the state in a modern or advanced liberal states from the nineteenth century and beyond. They interpret governmentality as a way of analysing/conceptualising problems that various authorities can respond to, through calculated supervision, administration and the maximization of resources. They borrow the notion of "action at a distance" from Latour (1987) to explain state's reliance on experts as key resources in the conduct of modern and liberal democratic governments. Although this perspective was advanced in the context of advanced liberal democratic states, elements of such thinking about governmentality can apply to other contexts, such as developing countries. This is because of the advancement of liberal governance ideas through globalization and the conditionality placed upon these countries by institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. According to Stocker (1998), the adoption of liberal democratic values through such conditions set by international institutions such as the World Bank, reflect a kind of Governance related to developing countries. One of the key features of this form of governance is the interdependence of public, private and voluntary sectors in these societies.

However, despite the involvement of various institutions in governance, not all of them will have the same amount of power or influence in fields of intervention. Miller and Rose (1990) contend that "the notion of government highlights the diversity of powers and knowledge entailed in rendering fields practicable and amenable to intervention" (Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 3). Yet for governmentality to be effective there is need for the actors to know the details of the phenomenon being responded to. Such knowledge for example requires more than speculation through the collection and availability of statistics to guide intervention. This argument based on this perspective, may extend to the challenge in handling children born of captivity for whom there were challenges obtaining actual statistical estimates of their numbers. The most recent estimate is set at about eight thousand by the International Center for Transitional Justice (Feb, 2017). The documentation of estimates was taken as a step towards pushing for reparations with the successful outcome of the trials of Dominic Ongwen at The Hague.



Using the conceptualization of “governmentality”, this article argues that the predominant role played by NGOs in enabling reintegration and integration, albeit, in partnership with government, exemplifies the importance of the third pillar on responsibility to protect. This partnership between government and NGOs highlights the importance of the political discourse on responsibility for the protection of persons formerly associated with the LRA, among whom are children born in captivity. The second other discourse emerging from analysis of the data, is that on culture. The cultural discourse is important for understanding responsibility – at community level – with respect to enabling sustainable integration of children born in captivity and the reintegration of former child soldiers. The research findings from the field work conducted confirm the importance of culture (institutions, norms and leaders) as it exists in other literature, though not framed as cultural discourse. This article supports this line of argument and extends it by advancing a claim that the limitations of cultural discourse and NGO predominance in integration and reintegration, may suggest a need for more long-term planning when the responsibility for protection is shifting away from NGOs (usually after a transition from emergency to development) and the long-term development phase in which integration and reintegration occurs. Using elements of what it means to “govern at a distance,” the political and cultural discourses are discussed in the next sections.

3. The Political Discourse on Responsibility for Children Born in Captivity

The claim on failure to protect the formerly abducted persons from LRA abduction (when interpreted as inability to fulfil the first pillar of R2P) serves as the basis for apportioning responsibility to ensure that these and children born in captivity can experience sustainable reintegration and integration respectively (Akullo, 2019). In one of the focus group discussions, one participant raised the following concern:

Most of our children who went in captivity, were abducted when they were children, although they come back when they are thirty! Forty! Years. But they were abducted, when they were children. Now, the one question which I feel, [disruption], the one question which I feel, I am not sure if it has been answered! Is that, now if we come back, you want us to give accountability for what we did, how accountable should the government be at the time when we were abducted? What did the government do to protect us at the time when we were abducted? I am not very sure if this has been answered. (Seed in focus group discussion)

Similar sentiments were presented by some formerly abducted persons who have returned, been assisted through rehabilitation and were by the time of research, part of institutions that were assisting other people returning from captivity to go through reintegration and integration processes. Given the claim of “failure to protect against

abduction,” communities consulted advanced a counter claim of the need to ensure remedy for the crimes committed by the LRA, including the injustices that those abducted and their children born in captivity faced as a result of the failure to protect, in the first instance. This remedy is argued for in light of reparations.

Reparations claims can be understood by drawing from their historical claims at the end of World War I has been used within the political discourse to manage human rights violations. After the cold war, reparation became part of transitional justice discourse. Within transitional justice and feminist discourses, reparation became part of the remedies for sexual violence committed against women, a background against which claims for reparations for children born in captivity was made, albeit as proxies of the occurrence of such violations upon victims. Using the concept of reparation as “a strategy or tactic of managing the relationship between men (human beings) and misfortune” semblances can be realized in Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality, as involving management, as one of the functions or conducts of government. Hence, if we consider war as a misfortune that leads to human rights violations, reparation become an appropriate management strategy performed by government as a remedy to victims of war.

Consensus exists regarding the important role that government played in enabling reintegration and integration of persons formerly associated with the LRA. However, given the nature of governing these processes, the partnership between government and NGOs appears to have led to the conceptualization of these processes as an “NGO Affair” (Akullo, 2019). Some community members however argue that any support to these war-affected persons in a post-return experience, should be included under broader post-conflict reconstruction projects. They argue that, this would enable better reintegration and integration, by reducing the vulnerability of all war-affected persons, and also avoiding a scenario where assistance to persons formerly associated with the LRA and misconceived by those who were victimized by the LRA. Furthermore, a suggestion was made that the management of government programs at district and sub-county levels need to ensure that bureaucratic processes aid, rather than complicate the acquisition of support to vulnerable persons.

A community development officer explained how through small groups, micro loans or grants are given to vulnerable people as start-up capital, something that children born in captivity through their mothers, can benefit from.

NUSAF started with NUSAF 1. NUSAF 2 ended and now we are beginning NUSAF 3. Yeah, but in all those programmes they are mainly targeting especially the war affected areas and the beneficiaries, actually when you look at the category that they are supposed to target, you find all those categories including children. Like now NUSAF 2, beneficiaries form groups. But they say selection of the groups or beneficiaries must look at those categories. There must be female-headed households, there must be formerly abducted children, there must be

child mothers, there must be the former abductees, those ones they must be in the group so that they can benefit. So, it was trying to help them recover. I mean, to assist in their resettlement (Community Development Officer, Lango sub-region).

Furthermore, while community members recognize the contribution of NGOs towards the rehabilitation and reintegration process involving persons returning from captivity, but argue that, nature of NGO operations – characterized by short stay and some limited catchment areas, affects the sustainability of interventions to the targeted children.

There are interventions by Non-Governmental Organizations fine, like Save the Children, but they come for a short duration- three, four months and they go away. Another one comes. UNICEF comes, takes you in, one year, they go away. Leaving these children in the same problem they were trying to deal with. So there is a big challenge because of interventions, untimely interventions (Seed in a Focus group discussion, Lango sub-region)

Such perspectives may suggest that more government intervention would create room for such continuity and sustainability. The discourse on integration being an NGO affair may serve as an appropriate explanation for the state of “short and unsustainable integration” and a way of placing responsibility upon the state to ensure a shift towards “deep and sustainable integration” because of expected duties under the ‘social contract.’ By adapting a conceptualization of *governmentality*, a concept developed by Foucault and analytically interpreted as a type of ‘governing at a distance’ (Miller and Rose, 1990), the participation of state and non-state actors as responsible actors for integration can be justified.

4. Cultural Discourse on Responsibility for Children Born in Captivity

The responsibility for integration of children born in captivity according to the cultural discourse rests on the non-recognized identity of children born in captivity according to customary norms. In one of the interviews with a community leader in northern Uganda. The following remarks were made:

You need to know that children who were born in captivity, the culture does not accept them. The culture does not accept them because they are seen as a taboo or misfortune because according to our culture nobody is allowed to play sex in the bush. The fact that these girls played sex in the bush, they were forced actually. They were forced to do that and they had children born in captivity, even that kind of relationship is not accepted...you know rape was not part of our culture. So if a girl is raped or a girl plays sex in the bush that becomes an issue. So when the formerly abducted children came back with their children the

parents have a lot of problems. What to do? So the parents accepted their own daughters minus the children born in captivity. (A religious leader and part of the Acholi Religious Peace Initiative- an advocacy group that has been instrumental in conflict resolution and peace building in Uganda)

Anecdotal evidence on their culturally-grounded non-recognition is provided by a study on Acholi (Porter, 2013) and Lango (Apio, 2013). Beneficiaries of reintegration and integration processes start a new phase of life among communities that were victimized by the LRA activities, with the aid of NGOs as explained under the political discourse. Part of the reinsertion and insertion processes require them to undergo cleansing rituals. The importance of culture in these long term processes are introduced to the beneficiary and community of reinsertion/insertion, roles of cultural leaders and norms also clearly explained and enabled.

It is important to emphasize that the cultural institutions are legally given semi-autonomous powers in Uganda. This makes cultural institutions and leaders important actors in the reintegration and integration processes. In fact, their importance can be traced to demands for an end to the LRA war, through to their participation in processes leading to and including the Juba peace talks- an important event that enabled the return to many persons formerly associated with the LRA to Uganda. While cultural institutions and leaders are important gatekeepers in the governance of these war-affected persons, a minority view was expressed by some of the research participants, regarding the interpretation and application of culture. Some participants argue that culture is not static and hence leaders should be flexible while dealing with various persons who may prefer to opt for alternative religious practices other than the African traditional ones - in this case, Acholi and Lango rituals. This perspective notwithstanding, the cultural discourse helps us appreciate the role of the first pillar on responsibility to protect and is indicative of the claim on discourses as vital for the validation of social and institutional structures.

Willig (2013) argues that discourses can become dominant to the extent that they become 'common sense.' The cultural discourse may make it unthinkable or not permissible to think about a cultural change that would embrace these children. The only assistance that culture proffers is through cultural cleansing ceremonies, which allow the unification of these children with their mothers' kindred. Beyond that, the everyday life of children born in captivity, characterized by stigma and discrimination, is pushed to the State. Literature on Multi-culturalism explains how in some cases, when contentious cultural issues need to be addressed, state intervention into the cultural norms and practices of tribal or racial communities may be restrained by the semi-autonomous status of these groups (Taylor, 1994; Tempelman, 1999). This perspective is grounded in the 'social contract' perspective of the state. By this perspective, responsibility becomes a function or duty of the State.



5. Conclusion

This article has presented two major discourses on responsibility to protect children born in captivity, using analytical outcomes of data from a piece of research on Uganda. Despite the important role of intervention by NGOs (implementing the responsibility to rebuild), the situation of these children's integration demands that the state takes on its mandate and offer protection. The article is important for emphasizing the need for adequate transition from the actors in the third pillar, to the first pillar in ensuring adequate protection. Lastly, the discourses discussed indicate protection as a form of governmentality, one that validates social and institutional structures, in the management of the integration of this category of war-affected children.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Eunice Akullo (PhD) is a lecturer in the department of political science and public administration (Makerere University – Uganda). She has researched and published on conflict-related issues affected especially women and children. Her PhD thesis was on the integration of children born in captivity to Lord's Resistance Army Formerly abducted females. She obtained her doctorate from the university of Southampton (United Kingdom).

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The ISCAP in the Shadow of the Russian-Ukrainian War¹

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Abstract:

The outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 has focused the world's attention on Eastern Europe. But we should not overlook the impact it had on global economy, with inflation and rising material prices. If we focus on Africa, and East Africa in particular, we cannot overlook the security risks posed by jihadism, which runs parallel to the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine. The Islamic State's affiliates are dominant not only in the West but also in the East of Africa. In 2019, it incorporated two of its local affiliates into the then-established ISCAP (Islamic State Central Africa Province). Prior to that, the two organisations were significantly different, given the local context, the date of their formation and their trajectories. In order to analyse the prospects of ISCAP for the period 2022-2023, it is necessary to have a historical background of the organisation and to develop a framework that can categorise the development path of jihadist organisations. The objectives of the study include whether the global problems caused by the war have an impact on the life of ISCAP or the counterinsurgency against them, and the changing position of the Russians in East Africa.

Keywords:

ADF, ASWJ, DRC, ISCAP, jihadism

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Introduction

In late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, a conflict that is still ongoing at the time of writing. It is essentially a regional conflict, yet it has a global impact. From Africa's point of view, two important elements of these impacts are highlighted. The first is the fact that the two warring parties are among the world's largest exporters of cereals and in 2020 African states imported 44% of their wheat from Africa. This is compounded by the fact that most sub-Saharan African countries do not have sufficient reserves to make these fragile economies resilient to such sudden crises (Marsai and Tóth, 2022, pp. 4-7).

The other is the price explosion that we have seen internationally, which started with the rise in energy and grain prices. This has caused severe inflation, affecting all aspects of life and making it more expensive to achieve a general standard of living (Abu Hatab, 2022, pp. 41-42). This illustrates the vulnerability of African states to a crisis that could influence global economic trends. This may generate a security crisis that might benefit the violent organisations, as states can respond to an emerging global economic crisis by reallocating resources, thus preventing a potential food crisis.

Within violent organisations, jihadist organisations may find it an ideal arena to increase their influence if the instability they cause is able to spread to a larger and larger area, which can manifest itself in disrupting calm local agricultural production or triggering a wave of refugees.

Methodology

In this paper, I will focus on the following three questions:

-Is the ISCAP a single organisation or merely an artificial entity?

-Is ISCAP's members' developmental trajectory a short-term indicator of their future career path?

-Does the war outlined in the introduction or the global problems it has caused have an impact on the counterinsurgency against ISCAP?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to have a common description of the organisations involved in ISCAP in a single framework. To do this, I have drawn on the classification system found in the book *Horn, Sahel, and Rift: Fault-lines of the*



African Jihad by Stig Jarle Hansen, in which he empirically constructs a framework based on ten East African jihadist organisations. However, for a more accurate description, an analysis pattern is needed, for which the *SWOT* analysis is helpful. Mostly used in business and marketing, it can also contribute to other disciplines, in this case security policy, as a kind of risk analysis.

This combined framework is described in the next chapter. The history of the parts of ISCAP is indispensable, but the distinction between the stages is based on the categories established in the *SWOT* analysis. The unity of ISCAP will be discussed, followed by the conclusions answering the question posed. Throughout the paper, I will draw on secondary sources, i.e. studies, reports and the latest news.

Typology of Territorial Presence with SWOT Analysis

The concept of Stig Jarle Hansen's description of the categories in a *SWOT* analysis makes the categories easier to understand, highlighting their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. In the table below, each category has been assigned two characteristics, which are either the most important and/or the most comprehensive terms, in an attempt to provide a consistent presentation of the characteristics of the organisations.

As Stig Jarle Hansen points out, these organisations are constantly moving along a development trajectory whose future is difficult to determine, since this trajectory can be affected by an internal structural crisis, a major battlefield victory or, conversely, a major defeat. For this reason, it is possible that a jihadist organisation may have been in more than one category at some stage of its development during its lifetime.

In the 'Strengths' category, the characteristics that make the organisation the most dangerous from a security point of view, that are difficult to eliminate or inhibit and that are the key to the organisation's success are included. 'Weaknesses' include those characteristics that are the Achilles heel that the organisation lives with and tries to adapt to. Basically, the weaknesses show the operational limits of these organisations and the obstacles that prevent them from developing at a higher pace.

The 'Opportunities' show the factors that can make the organisation even greater, which if they can realise, can take them to a higher level, which at that moment in time shows them the most profitable option. And 'Threats' shows the characteristics that could cause a drastic decline in the group if they occur, which in the most extreme case could bring them to the edge of extinction. This is an important category for counterinsurgency organisations, as the occurrence of these events can really destabilise jihadist organisations in this category.

Categories	Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats
Clandestine network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The mystery of the structure - Assassinations are the main weapon, The group consists of secret cellular units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A well-functioning state structure is the enemy - Lack of a large training base; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Money flows through secret networks - Integrating new members into the group's closed system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Occurrence of ideological fragmentation - High risk of desertion
Accepted presence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supported by the state - Significant training capacity and open flow of information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Subordination to the interests of the state - Limited powers due to a strong state apparatus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Significant source of income - Can be openly strengthened in its own field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defying the interests of the state - Organisation's overreach is seen as a threat by the state
Semi-territorial presence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Effective use of guerrilla strategy - Hit and run tactics are the most powerful weapon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rural population can influence the functioning of the organisation - Defence against comprehensive operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Making rural areas spheres of influence - Exploitation of rural areas and the illegal economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Blocking foreign money traps - Drastic decline in local support
Territorial control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Own territory - Exploiting the state within a state system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State within the state structure involves significant expenditure - Fixed location makes the organisation vulnerable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training young foreigners and spreading the ideology - Building good relations with local people and gaining their support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The group is forced into a conventional war to defend its territory - Suffering loss of prestige

Table 1: Typology of territorial presence with SWOT analysis - self-edited table (Hansen, 2019a, pp. 18-34)

Circumstances of the Creation of ISCAP




Table 2: Jihadist organizations in Africa between 2017-2020 (Zenn, 2020)

Until 2019, while the Islamic State was in a position of territorial presence, its own territories were the focus. From 2017 onwards, the organisation's territories began to shrink drastically, until 2019, when the last base was lost. This was the moment when the organisation started to become a global jihadist umbrella organisation and focused on its transnational links (BBC, 2019). Although there were those who predicted the end of ISIS, it merely reorganised internally and adapted to the semi-territorial category. From a global perspective, one of the most important steps in this

process has been the reorganisation and consolidation of existing provinces, granting status where appropriate to areas that had not previously been granted it (East Asia). Through this reorganisation, it has halved the number of its provinces, organising these entities into larger units (Candland et al., 2021, pp. 8-9).

However, there are strict conditions and requirements for being accepted by the Islamic State as a single entity. First and foremost, the leader of the organisation intending to join must swear an oath of allegiance to the caliph of ISIS and this must be accepted by the caliph. In addition, the applicant organisation must apply the ISIS dogma, which includes its ideology and jurisprudence, and its methodology, which is the coordination of political and military strategy. In the case of the dogma, it is important to highlight its relationship with the takfir, which is the issue of proscription or Muslim apostasy, which justifies massacres against civilians, including Muslims. And, in addition, maintaining relations between the two sides is an important requirement, meaning that the closest and quickest possible exchange of information is increasingly important in the age of social media, where ISIS places great emphasis on propaganda videos (Candland et al., 2021, pp. 7-8).

Of the two ISCAP organisations, only the ADF's pledge of allegiance can be dated precisely. In 2017, a low-quality video was made declaring allegiance to the Islamic

State, but the caliph's response was not forthcoming (Hansen, 2019b). The first reference to the adoption of the loyalty oath is the first evidence of the former caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's reference to the creation of a Central African province in a 2018 video (Callimachi, 2019). ISIS headquarters recognised the new province as ISCAP in April 2019. Interestingly, the ADF was then part of the province, the ASWJ was only recognised in June 2019 (Lister, 2020, p. 39). This alone shows that there are two independent jihadist movements that have come under the umbrella of ISIS. To understand and prove this, the next two chapters will first briefly discuss the history of the ADF and then the ASWJ.

ADF (Allied Democratic Forces)




Table 3: Approximate areas of ADF activity between 2021-2022 (Arieff, 2022)

Until its creation in 1995, the ADF(-NALU) was the result of the fusion by external power of groups based on ethnic and religious fragmentation. The National Army for the Liberation of Uganda - NALU

is a radical movement of oppressed ethnic groups living along the Congo-Uganda border that sought to improve their deteriorating condition in the 1980s. After Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, the Ugandan government structurally oppressed and marginalised the people living there, increasingly excluding them from Ugandan politics (Scorgie, 2011, p. 8). The NALU wanted first and foremost local autonomy, initially through propaganda and later through increasingly violent means. The reason for this is that the NALU, taking advantage of its links with the Congolese border region, enjoyed the support of the DRC leader Mobutu, whose aim was to overthrow the Ugandan regime. Museveni was forced into action and tried to stop the NALU. The culmination was in 1992, when the NALU launched an attack in western Uganda, but was defeated by the Ugandan army and moved into neighbouring DRC, taking advantage of its cross-border connections to integrate into local society (Titeca and Vlassenroot, 2012, pp. 157-158).

At the same time, President Museveni faced a depoliticised Muslim divide, exacerbated by the emergence of the Tabliq movement, whose leaders were Saudi schooled Ugandan clerics who favoured a more puritan form of Islam, challenging traditional Ugandan Muslim scholars. In 1991, some members of the movement stormed



the Kampala mosque, killing several police officers. At the lead of this attack was a young radical thinker, Jamil Mukulu, who was arrested and imprisoned with his companions until their release in 1994. Mukulu then founded the Movement of Ugandan Combatants for Freedom – UMFF with Sudanese support, but its existence proved short-lived as the Ugandan army moved into their camp in 1995, forcing them out of Uganda and into the eastern borderlands of the DRC (Congo Research Group, 2018, p. 5). The remnants of the UMFF reorganised in the DRC under the name ADF, which in June 1995 formed an alliance with another exiled movement, the NALU (Titeca, 2016, p. 1192).

Since 1995, the ADF(-NALU) has undergone a rollercoaster development. Initially, the NALU component was dominant through local contacts and ties in the Congolese border region. The development trajectory has been steep, mainly thanks to support from Sudan and the DRC. Sudan provided military training, while the DRC gave it growing space, arming them by entrusting the organisation with security tasks. As they were partners of the Congolese government, they began an open recruitment campaign, which was effective (Hansen, 2019a, pp. 131-132). At that time, the organisation was in a status of accepted presence. It is estimated that in 1996 the ADF(-NALU) numbered between 4,000 and 5,000 fighters, becoming strong enough to carry out cross-border attacks. This was clearly a high point in the organisation's history. In 1996, it began to carry out attacks in Uganda. In 1998, it raided a school for forced recruitment and in 1999, it besieged a Ugandan prison. In 1999, eight attacks were carried out in Kampala. By the late 1990s, the ADF(-NALU) support base had dried up: Mobutu was overthrown and replaced by Kabila, who pursued a Uganda-friendly policy, while Sudanese support also gradually declined and then disappeared. The turning point came with the launch of Operation Mountain Sweep in November 1999, when Ugandan forces crossed into the Congolese border region to eliminate the ADF(-NALU). It was so effective that the organisation was on the verge of disappearing, but it survived, with only a few hundred fighters in the early 2000s. The NALU component slowly disappeared within the ADF(-NALU), as many took up the offer of amnesty made by Museveni. Around 2007-2008, the ADF clearly became the overwhelming dominant force within the organisation, and this is where the ADF-NALU effectively ceased to exist (International Crisis Group, 2012, pp. 4-6). By this time the ADF was clearly in a semi-territorial presence and continues to hold this status to this day.

From this point onwards, the ADF was on an upward trajectory, its internal structure was strengthened, as by then the leader was undoubtedly Jamil Mukulu. They began to enter into economic symbiosis with local communities in the eastern region of the DRC, generating income. The internal structure became ideologically based on the Islamic religion and the organisation learned to adapt easily to the local mountain terrain and to the threats of attacks by the Congolese army. By 2014, although the organisation had not reached the numbers of the mid-1990s, it still had a few hundred fighters (Hansen, 2019a, pp. 136-138). The most successful offensive by the Congolese

army, in partnership with United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – MONUSCO, was Operation Sukola I, launched in 2014, when almost all ADF bases were captured, forcing ADF elements to flee and disperse. Jamil Mukulu fled and was arrested in Tanzania, then extradited to Uganda. Although the ADF did not reach the low point of the early 2000s, it suffered heavy losses and its internal structure was damaged. The new leader was Musa Baluku, under whose leadership the organisation became radicalised and violent attacks against civilians increased (United Nations Security Council, 2016, pp. 14-16).

Baluku made the ADF increasingly radical, which was coupled with a shift towards ISIS. This was not only an ideological decision on Baluku's part, but also a strategic one, hoping that the close association with the Islamic State would pay off both financially and in terms of combat assets. The organisation partially lifted its veil of secrecy and started producing videos on social media from 2016, where it preferred to call itself Madina a Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen – MTM, imitating major jihadist organisations. The ADF tried to use this for global Muslim recruitment, as it was no longer just Ugandan, but equally former Congolese. It was this kind of radical Muslim view that led to ISIS eventually taking it under its own umbrella in 2019, with ISIS undertakes more and more attacks as ISCAP activities (Candland, 2021, pp. 17-23).

The Congolese army has been trying to put continuous pressure on the ADF for the past decade or more, one of the two most important offensives being Operation Sokola I, launched in October 2019, during which the Congolese army captured several ADF camps, but their occupation was still not long-lived, which the ADF took advantage of and returned. The jihadists' response was an even more devastating attack on civilians to increase the bad blood between the Congolese army and the local population. Basically, the structure within the ADF has not changed, as it did after Operation Sukola I in 2014 (United Nations Security Council, 2020, pp. 10-12). The second is the most recent Operation Shujaa, which is interesting because it is a coalition offensive, launched jointly by the Congolese and Ugandan forces at the end of 2021, when around 4,000 Ugandan troops were deployed. This was a kind of manhunt for violent organisations, including the ADF. The full details of the operation are not yet known, so the extent of the successes achieved can only be estimated, but it is clear that the ADF command structure has remained unchanged and organised (Katusiime, 2022). Indeed, the operations appear to have made the ADF structure even more sporadic, spreading from Beni province to neighbouring Ituri province (United Nations Security Council, 2023, p. 4). But even more worrying is the April 2023 attack on a school in western Uganda by the ADF. Nearly 40 students were killed, but it was the first time since 1998 that the ADF had been able to attack a school in Uganda and at its peak. This is clearly a means of pressure and retaliation for Uganda attacking ADF positions with the DRC (Atuhaire and Gregory, 2023).

ASWJ (Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah)




Table 4: ASWJ area of influence 2020-2021

The organisation is much younger than the ADF, yet the ethnic and religious fault lines along which it was formed can be traced back to the Portuguese colonial period. Cabo Delgado is the northeastern province of Mozambique, whose coastline is the epicentre of the emergence of the jihadist movement. The Frelimo movement of the Makonde ethnic group, which has been the ruling party since independence in 1975, played the leading role in the war of independence from 1964 to 1974. During the colonial period, the coastal Mwani ethnic group supported the Portuguese

colonialists in return for political concessions. After independence, the situation was reversed and the Makonde political and economic elite began to gain strength and the Mwani ethnic group began to be marginalised. This conflict was exacerbated by the civil war, in which Frelimo won against Renamo, which had a northern base. From then on, Cabo Delgado began to become increasingly impoverished as a result of the conscious actions of the Makonde political elite.

Basically, both ethnic groups are dominated by Islam in a country where Christianity is the state religion, but increasingly difficult living conditions have led Mwani Muslim youth to turn to religious radicalism as a way out of their increasingly difficult living conditions. In the last decade, this trend has been exacerbated by the discovery of mineral resources, including deep-sea natural gas in the coastal parishes and rubies in the southern part of Cabo Delgado. Although the locals could have benefited greatly from these discoveries, the Makonde political and economic elite have marginalised or driven the locals from their homes and granted concessions to foreign companies to extract the minerals, making it impossible for local small-scale miners to operate. These processes, combined with poor infrastructure and local administration, made Cabo Delgado an increasingly forgotten province until the mid-2010s (Mapfumo, 2020, pp. 102-105).

In recent decades, the Mozambican government has granted visas and foreign residency permits to Muslim missionary organisations in exchange for sending students from northern Mozambique on study trips abroad to countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Somalia and Saudi Arabia, and on their return they have increasingly begun to question the religious practices and interpretations of the local Islamic communities in Mozambique. This can be traced back to the 2010s, when a group of Muslims entered mosques in Mocímboa da Praia with guns and shoes, showing that local Islamic practice was unacceptable to them and opposing the intertwining and coexistence of the state and Islamic institutions (Bekoe et al., 2020, pp. 4-5). By this time, a sect had clearly emerged, which sought to gather those with the same radical views, but a wave of arrests followed for their anti-state views, but from 2015 onwards they condemned the state with increasingly strong rhetoric, demanding governance based on Islamic law. After 2016, they withdrew from society because of their rejection of social order, living according to their own political order, which is when the Islamist sect became an armed jihadist movement (Lister, 2020, pp. 36-37). The mysterious nature of the group means that it is not known for sure who is leading the group, it is more likely to be a senior command staff including Abdul Faizal, Abdul Remane, Abdul Raim, Nuno Remane, Ibn Omar and Salimo Kijepel (Campbell, 2021). At the time, the organisation may have been in a state of a clandestine network, a structure that determined its later structure, about which very little is known.

The jihadist insurgency began on 5 October 2017, when 30 fighters stormed a police station in Mocímboa da Praia. The fighting lasted for more than a day, mainly for loot. This was later followed by continuous armed attacks in the area. By 2019, ASWJ attacks had become increasingly sophisticated, with the ability to launch simultaneous attacks and carry out ambush-style assassinations, by which time footage of successful raids had been fed into the ISIS propaganda machine. The government sought to respond to the escalation by deploying private military companies, such as the Wagner Group, but they withdrew after a few weeks in the autumn of 2019. In 2020, the ASWJ became increasingly organised, forming geographically distinct groups, and thus gained a larger sphere of influence in Cabo Delgado, attacking larger and larger towns. In the second half of 2020, they carried out a multi-stage raid on the town of Mocímboa da Praia, occupying the town for a few days, and in the autumn of 2020, crossing into Tanzania, they stormed security installations, looting military equipment, the latter also highlighted by ISIS in its media. The group was then at the height of its power, as it was able to besiege the centres of Cabo Delgado. The high point was on 24 March 2021, when it overran the city of Palma, looting weapons depots and damaging government buildings, forcing thousands to flee. Although by April 2021, government forces had retaken some key positions, the event marked a turning point internationally (International Crisis Group, 2021, pp. 10-16). At that time, the organisation had around 2000 fighters (Doctor, 2022, p. 12). As of 2017, the ASWJ is clearly categorised as a semi-territorial presence.



As the city of Palma is the gateway to the discovered deep-sea natural gas fields, Total has suspended its multi-billion euro extraction project, declaring vis maior because safety conditions do not allow the project to continue. As a result, Rwanda sent troops to the region in July 2021, and a month later had already recaptured the main rebel-held towns (McKenzie and Balkiz, 2022). This was joined a few weeks later by Southern African Development Community – SADC units, bringing the total number of troops in the region to around 3,000, handing a military defeat to the ASWJ. But this did not spell the end of the organisation, as its members dispersed and merged with civilians, waiting for another opportunity (International Crisis Group, 2022, pp. 2-3). By this time, the organisation's fighters numbered roughly between 200 and 400 (Doctor, 2022, p. 12). By 2023, the ASWJ was split into more agile units and primarily targeted economic targets. Through guerrilla warfare and hit and run tactics, it expanded its sphere of influence outside Cabo Delgado. It carried out attacks in the neighbouring provinces of Nampula and Niassa, as well as in southern Tanzania (Columbo, 2023, pp. 2-3). Currently, ASWJ has an interesting status as it combines the characteristics of a clandestine network and a semi-territorial presence, which is one of the reasons for its relatively rapid spread.

To What Extent Can ISCAP Be Considered a Single Entity?

From a geographical point of view, not at all, since the spheres of influence of the two organisations are far apart, with the ADF located on the eastern border of the DRC and the ASWJ in the north of Mozambique. That notwithstanding, it cannot be said that there is no link between the two parties, with some reports of Mozambican fighters appearing at ADF training camps. But no jointly coordinated operations have taken place up to the time of writing (Zenn, 2020).

On the other hand, the two organisations are on different development paths and face similar problems. On the one hand, the ADF is perhaps now the most organised and dangerous since 2014, as illustrated by the fact that they have again carried out attacks on Ugandan schools, as outlined earlier. Since its peak in 2021, the ASWJ has been in a period of transformation and rebuilding, trying to maintain its sphere of influence and even expand through a cellular bottom-up structure, the latter being exemplified by the expansion of its food supply into neighbouring areas. It is true that both organisations are beginning to spread into neighbouring provinces, but they are at different stages of strength. With the creation of ISCAP, coalition forces have been increasing in the regions, the ADF has Ugandan forces alongside the Congolese army, MONUSCO and Rwandan soldiers have also been deployed in the region, and I would add that this coalition is also focusing on fighting other violent organisations (ACLED, 2023). In the case of the ASWJ, in addition to the Mozambican forces, Rwandan and SADC troops are present, with significant international support (Nhamirre, 2023).

The question arises as to how far ISCAP can be considered a unified province from the point of view of the Islamic State. What is evidence of unified remote control is that the Islamic State of Somalia – ISS can act as a kind of communication transmission and distribution centre, a kind of coordination centre (International Crisis Group, 2021, pp. 23-24). Although there is no conclusive evidence of how closely the ISIS leadership is linked to the leadership of ISCAP organisations, it is clear that it may be a looser link. Regardless, in recent years the ADF has displayed characteristics of the Islamic State, such as the use of suicide bombings and the production of beheading videos (Kibasomba Man-Byemba, 2022, p. 85). Perhaps the main reason for this is that both the ADF and the ASWJ are essentially the end product of conflicts along local ethnic and religious fault lines, and although they have transcended national borders and are still considered a local security risk rather than a regional one, they are far from the global level, which would be very useful for ISIS propaganda. It seems that from an ISIS perspective, the ASWJ could be more valuable and have greater propaganda power, as in March 2022, ISIS designated the northern part of Mozambique as a new, separate province (Columbo, 2023, p. 4). I emphasize that there has been no further announcement or official mention of this, but it highlights that for ISIS, the ASWJ's activities may be more central, taking precedence over the ADF.

Conclusion

Among the direct actors in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the former should be highlighted. Although Russia is a major international player in African politics due to its outstanding debts and its Soviet past, it is increasingly marginalised from the East African region, and within it from the countries of the region under review or has not had significant political influence in the past. Its last bastion was Mozambique, where there are still very good relations between the Russian and Mozambican political elites, but since 2019 the Russian side has not been able to give this relationship any tangible substance or success. Both economically and always militarily, it has been squeezed out of the region in 2019, of which I can give two examples: the Anadarko company drilled test wells in the early 2010s, which discovered deep-sea gas fields, and then became the main investor until 2019, when Total Energies bought out the Russian company's stake (Flanders Investment and Trade, 2021, p. 3). Also in that year, the Wagner Group was hired for the first time by the Mozambican government to manage the ASWJ, but due to the losses suffered and alleged bad relations with the Mozambican forces, it was withdrawn after a few weeks. The most recent attempt was the second Russia-Africa summit, held in St Petersburg on 27-28 July 2023, to which 49 African countries sent delegations, only 17 of which were represented at head of state level (Vines and Amare, 2023). Of the countries relevant to the paper, the participation of Heads of State from Uganda, Mozambique and Rwanda is the most significant (Teslova, 2023). Yet the declining participation and the African countries' opposition to Moscow's aggression is



an obvious response to the state of Russian-African relations (Vines and Amare, 2023). This move can be seen as a failure to improve Russian relations with East Africa.

The biggest problem for East African countries could be the impact of rising energy and grain prices on the world market and inflation. The response of the state will be limited, as with the general increase in prices and inflation, the budget will be strained, they will be even more dependent on external aid, assistance and units, if we look at the process from a security perspective. On the other hand, this external aid could flow in at an increasing rate, as Africa's raw material resources will make it increasingly important as Western powers try to find alternatives to Russian supply. The emergence of a growing number of foreign investors on the Cabo Delgado coast is a good example, with Tesla trying to replace its Chinese supply with Mozambican graphite (Investogist, 2022). If we start from the relationship that a state wants to secure its foreign investment, it cannot ignore the growing jihadist expansion and send units directly or indirectly into the region (Nhamirre, 2023). For the time being, this trend is continuing, with no signs of a reduction in the intervention forces or financial constraints. In other words, securing sources of raw materials remains the main preference of the intervention forces. This may, of course, change in the future as the war drags on and a possible world economic recession sets in. If this situation persists in the longer term, the global economic recession will have an impact on counterinsurgency, but in the short term it is not yet a major obstacle.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Tibor Pintér graduated from the University of Szeged with a Bachelor's and Master's degree in international studies. Since 2020 he is a PhD student at the University of Szeged Doctoral School of Law. His research topic is the relationship between ungoverned territories and jihadism through examples from East Africa. For this reason, his focus is on al-Shabaab in Somalia, the ADF in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the ASWJ in the Cabo Delgado region of Mozambique.

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Terrorism Threats and Rising Bullion Van Robbery Attacks in Ghana¹

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Abstract:

Bullion van robbery attacks have emerged as a significant security threat in Ghana in recent years. They pose grave consequences for national security and social, political, and economic stability. This paper provides an overview of Ghana's rising bullion van robbery attacks. In the paper, realism theory is used to portray the rate of bullion van robberies and their daringness. The subsequent analysis illuminates the factors contributing to the rise of these attacks, including the current economic downturn, socioeconomic problems, and corruption complicity. It explores the potential involvement of organised crime syndicates. The paper recommends a multifaceted approach involving enhanced collaboration between security agencies. It also involves stringent regulation and oversight of cash transportation, technological innovations in security systems, and improved training for law enforcement personnel. Additionally, it emphasises the importance of public awareness campaigns and citizen engagement to foster a collective response to combat bullion van robberies. The paper concludes that the rising trend of bullion van robbery attacks in Ghana requires immediate attention from both the government and the private sector. A comprehensive strategy encompassing preventative measures, swift response mechanisms, and robust law enforcement efforts is imperative to mitigate the risks posed by these attacks. This will safeguard the nation's security and socioeconomic stability.

Keywords:

Armed robbery, corruption, Ghana, terrorism, violence

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Introduction

Ghana, which is well known for its shining democracy in the subregion and hospitality people, in the past few years, is grappling with a surge in bullion van robbery attacks that pose a significant threat to public safety and the nation's security. It is important to emphasise that there have already been signals, and warnings of threats of terrorism, violence, and extremism on Ghana's border (Jeannin, 2022), which put the country in perpetual fear. The bullion van robbery attack is a daring and well-orchestrated robbery by unknown assailants targeting cash-in-transit vehicles transporting large sums of money for banks, businesses, financial institutions, and individual private goods (Punch, 2022; Djanie, 2023). The activities of these complicities have led to the injuries and killing of both civilians—drivers and security personnel who are normally on the bullion van for a security escort. These brazen and audacious acts of criminality threaten innocent citizens' lives and challenge the confidence in financial institutions and law enforcement agencies. The recent incident in June 2023, has called for the attention of the security personnel to put stringent measures that would ameliorate the phenomenon. Following these relapses, a security expert advised the country's Police Service and the Central Bank to disband the practice where the police personnel is made escort bullion vans. Again, the Executive Director in charge of the Africa Centre for Security and Counter Terrorism has urged the State to closely examine the operation of motorbike riders in light of their use in bullion van attacks. It is important to emphasise that a spectacular of all these tragic incidences have successfully been carried out by armed criminals that use motorbikes, widely recognized in Ghanaian parlance as "Okada." At the same time, their operation is prohibited by law. It can be recalled that in 2012 laws were passed to prohibit the usage of motorbikes for carrying passengers (Ghanaweb, 2021; Arhinful, 2021). The provisions in Regulation 128(1-4) of the Road and Traffic Regulation clearly state, "The Licensing Authority shall not register a motorcycle to carry a fare-paying passenger." Despite, the prohibition of the use of okada in the country, they continue to operate albeit illegally (Oteng-Ababio and Agyemang, 2016). Many believe that the country's political system has called for this trend (Lartey, 2020; Frimpong, et al., 2021). This is because the illegal Okada business has received unqualified backing from the political elite, the ruling government, opposition parties, and some interest groups. The notion is that the ruling government cannot compel them by prohibiting its activities for political expediencies. This claim can evidently be supported with some facts. Before the run-up campaign for the 2020 general elections, the two dominant parties were split on the issue of motorbike activities. While the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and its leader in their campaign vowed the idea of introducing a policy where motorbikes drivers would be given taxis on "work and payment conditions," the National Democratic Congress (NDC) leadership vowed to regulate and legalise motorbikes activities in Ghana (Frimpong, et al., 2021; Duodu, 2023). Therefore, the rising phenomenon could also be attributed to how political parties behave towards a crime.

According to Braimah and Mbowura (2014), political parties in both developed and underdeveloped countries play a significant role in fighting crimes. However, the situation in Ghana is deteriorating as combating crimes has always been politicised. As a result of the increased phenomenon, a government official has reiterated that the robbery attacks on bullion vans in Ghana could send the wrong signals about the country's security. He further contends that the attacks could scare investors away from the country and urged the Police to ensure this situation is nipped from budding (Nartey, 2023). This article explores the escalating phenomenon of bullion van robberies in Ghana, highlights the conceptual factors underpinning their occurrence, and emphasises the urgent security measures to safeguard citizens, businesses, and the economy. The paper also addresses the emerging threats of terrorism in Ghana. This paper is the first novelty of its kind. It draws attention to the core of the security issues in a country. And this should be the prime concern that needs to be addressed especially in African countries where the volatility is domineering. The security of a country is vital for safeguarding its citizens, upholding sovereignty, promoting economic stability, fostering social cohesion, providing defense capabilities, protecting critical infrastructure, and enhancing international relations. These factors contribute to a nation's overall well-being, prosperity, and stability. Therefore, this paper will inform the broader perspective of the general public including civil society organisations, policymakers, and the government, and address the situation as it could lead to something unbearable in the future. As the first country to have been democratically consolidated (Huntington, 1991) in the subregion, it could serve as a reference to other countries experiencing the phenomenon.

Theoretical Underpinning

This study is supported by realism theory. The bullion van robbery attack in Ghana can be attributed, analysed, and elucidated through realism theory. This is a paradigm in international relations focusing on power dynamics and state-centric behaviour. While realism theory is most commonly associated with international relations, its essential ideas can be expanded to explain domestic situations involving criminal activity and security concerns. The pursuit of power, self-interest, and the idea that states are motivated by a desire to maximise their security and existence is central to realism theory (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2014). As a result, in applying this theory to the bullion van attack robbery in Ghana, several key factors that align themselves with realist principles can be identified. The first factor is power and security. Realism theory posits that states prioritise security and seek power to protect their interests (Kay, 2004; Zhang, 2022). Correspondingly, criminal actors involved in the bullion van attack robbery aimed to wield power and gain control over resources, in this instance, the money being transported in the van. By successfully committing robbery, the criminals



sought to enhance their economic well-being and security while undermining the state's and banking system's security.

Another factor is self-interest and rationality. Realism theory assumes that states and individuals act based on their own self-interest and engage in rational decision-making processes (Bachleitner, 2023; Väyrynen, 2023). Therefore, it can be argued that the unknown assailants involved in the bullion van robbery were motivated by financial gain and sought to maximise their advantages. Their actions were motivated by a reasonable assessment of potential gains versus dangers. This included the target's apparent susceptibility and the potential returns of a successful attack. Another factor that points to the fact or that could be used to understand the phenomenon is anarchy and lack of central authority (Deudney, 2000). The realist theory contends that anarchy exists in the international system. This means there is no overriding authority to establish order and govern state action. In the context of the bullion van robbery, the absence of a strong central authority or effective security measures could have contributed to the van's vulnerability. It is possible to argue that the lack of adequate law enforcement or surveillance systems has enabled criminals to exploit the security vacuum, committing crimes without immediate consequences.

The final point worth mentioning is a dilemma. Realism theory also highlights the security dilemma, which occurs when one actor's efforts to enhance security culminate in increased insecurity for others. In the bullion van attack robbery, the criminals' pursuit of their own security and economic gain created a security dilemma for the state and the banking system. The successful robbery highlighted weaknesses in security protocols and raised concerns about the safety of transporting valuable assets. This led to a reassessment and potential strengthening of security measures. While realism theory provides valuable perspectives on the bullion van attack heist in Ghana, it is crucial to highlight that this explanation is only one of the numerous viable interpretations. Other theories, such as liberalism or constructivism, may also provide alternative explanations by focusing on different factors, such as social norms, economic inequalities, or institutions.

Methods and Materials

The objective of this paper seeks to address the rising phenomenon of bullion van robbery attacks in Ghana. In this paper, a content analysis qualitative was used to achieve the researcher's objectives. Content analysis belongs to the qualitative and quantitative paradigms of social science research. Content analysis is a qualitative observational research method used systematically to evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of recorded communications (Kobel and Burnett, 1991). According to Neuendorf (2017), content analysis allows the researcher to interpret a phenomenon through words, themes, photos, symbols, and concepts. It allows for unobtrusive or

discreet communication evaluation. This unobtrusive approach is significant or unique in a situation where direct methods of inquiry might yield responses (Kobel and Burnett, 1991). Content analysis data is derived from secondary sources of data. Secondary data sources were surfed online via search engines and websites. Journals were selected based on their credibility while avoiding predated ones. The Ghana News media such as Ghanaweb, Daily Stateman, Myjoyonline, etc were chosen because of their credibility in their reportage. They are highly patronized by the public. They are independent news media and apolitical.

Background: Escalating Phenomenon

In this section I provide a comprehensive, concise, and all-encompassing overview of some unusual criminal activities in the country and in some recent years, resulting in the deaths of some security officers and cash in some cases. A relatively large number of bullion van robberies began in 2016 (Daily Guide Network, 2016). However, according to Quaye (2023), starting from 2021, in the middle of the year, police records show that four bullion van robbery attacks have been carried out across the country. This is the seventh time the police are attacked in bullion van robberies. The report indicates that in three incidents, the bandits absconded with cash on board. In two of the cases, the security personnel escorting the van were killed. On January 18, a gang of 10 highway robbers ambushed a bullion van travelling on the Adansi Fomena³ and stole over GH¢500,000 (about \$43,922) USD. And in this incident, while the driver managed to get away from the shooting the security personnel accompanying the van were killed, and his rifle was stolen (Boateng, 2021; Ghanaweb, 2021). Similarly, on March 1, a robbery incident involving a bullion van was marshalled at Spintex Road at Baatsona⁴ by four armed men. Again, the driver and one bank official escaped while the security officer was brutally assaulted and disarmed. Consequently, the armed men robbed the bullion van and absconded with money and a service rifle (Antwi, 2021).

Moreover, in June only within three days, two bullion van attacks occurred. The first incident happened⁵ on June 14. As a result of the sporadic gunshots, the security officer escorted the van, and a woman⁶ was killed while the driver suffered serious injuries. Then again, the robbers absconded with the money (Adom Online, 2021). Secondly, on June 17, passengers aboard the bullion van were attacked⁷ (Ghanaweb, 2021). Consequently, the unknown assailants engaged the police in a gun battle after police reinforcement was deployed at the robbery scene, and the heists fled. The police officers escaped gunshots, and the bullion van carrying an amount of GH¢550,000 was

³ In the Ashanti Region

⁴ A suburb of Accra

⁵ Adedenkpo, a suburb of James Town in Accra.

⁶ A street hawker

⁷ This robbery incident occurred on the Winneba-Accra highway.

rescued. Together with the police officers and the driver was escorted back to Accra Police Team. Another attempted criminal bullion van attack took place in Accra's North Kaneshie Industrial Area and was repelled by police. The incident was thwarted when neighbouring police officers intervened. The armed robbers fired indiscriminately and fled the scene. Even though the operation was not successful, three people police officers were injured in varying degrees and sent to Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital for treatment (Graphic Online, 2022). Four gang-armed robbers who attacked a bullion van are the last incident that occurred⁸ recently and traumatised (Bosiako, 2023) residents living at Ablekuma⁹. Even though the driver escaped without any injuries, the police officer died on the spot after several gunshots (Sackitey, 2023).



Source: *Ghanaweb*, 2021

The above photo shows a bullion van captured by a CCTV camera at James Town. The armed robbers were sitting on the motorbikes around the bullion van.



Source: *Republic Press*, 2023

The above photo indicates evidence of a bullion van attack robbery published by Republic Press on the 22nd of June 2023.



Source: Bosiako, 2023

The photo above shows the bullion van at the fuel filling station in Ablekuma with an unknown armed gang man heading towards the side of the driver.

⁸ June 22, 2023

⁹ A suburb of Accra



Source: Kojo Emmanuel 2023, Pulse.com.gh

Photo of the recent bullion van robbers at Ablekuma captured by CCTV camera. In front of the bullion van are two motorbikes.

In case of reply the number and date of this letter should be quoted

My Ref: PAD/PRESS/VOL.4/1/16

Your Ref:



**PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE
POLICE HEADQUARTERS
POST OFFICE BOX 116
ACCRA**

7TH MARCH, 2022

PRESS RELEASE

POLICE MAKE BREAKTHROUGH IN BULLION VAN ROBBERIES

1. The Ghana Police Service, after several months of painstaking intelligence-led operations at the highest level, has made a major breakthrough in the investigations into multiple Bullion Van Robberies recorded in the Greater Accra area. These are:
 - Kingsway, in February 2021.
 - Baatsona (Spintex), in March 2021
 - Jamestown (Adedemkpo), in June 2021
 - Attempted robbery at North Kaneshie (Industrial Area) in February 2022.
2. Preliminary investigations have established the involvement of two policemen among a number of other suspects. The investigations are continuing and we expect to soon bring all culpable people to face justice.
3. The public will be given further details as soon as it is possible to do so without compromising the ongoing investigation.
4. We wish to assure the general public that the Ghana Police Service will continue to work hard to rid our country of criminal activities that disrupt the peace and stability of the nation. We, therefore, call on all to support us in this endeavour.



**SUPT. ALEXANDER KWAKU OBENG
DIRECTOR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS**



The above photo shows a letter that was released and published on the 7th of March 2022 for the public indicating the Ghana Police Service's efforts in making investigations regarding the attacks on four bullion vans robberies within some suburbs of Accra. This shows how serious the phenomenon is deeply rooted in Ghana.

Emerging Terrorism Threat in Ghana

Terrorism has evolved as a global threat, crossing geographical boundaries and harming states worldwide (Oganyan, 2015; Gunaratna, 2018; Clarke, 2020; Ramakrishna, 2021). While some locations have seen increased terrorist activity, it is critical not to overlook new concerns in previously deemed safe areas. In recent years, West African countries have been increasingly concerned about terrorism of which Ghana cannot be left out (Obi, 2006; Nkwi, 2015; Zimmerer, 2019). Ghana has long been known as a stable democracy that maintains internal peace and security. The growth of terrorist activity in adjacent countries such as Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, has raised concerns about the potential spillover effects. Ghana shares porous borders with several countries, making it prone to extremist infiltration and ideology propagation. For instance, Ghana recently deployed a thousand special troops to the country's northern part, close to Burkina Faso's border, after militants shot immigration agents around a town close to the border and killed one. The attack has raised concerns that Islamist terrorists in Burkina Faso are fomenting trouble in order to spread throughout the region (Mensah, 2023).

Notwithstanding, several reasons contribute to Ghana's increased fear of terrorism. The presence of economic and social inequality is the first. Despite tremendous economic growth, Ghana has difficulties decreasing poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Such circumstances foster radicalisation, since disaffected people may be vulnerable to radical ideas promising a better way of life. For example, there has been internal conflict in Ghana's Northern part which has affected the economy. There is growing unemployment in the region which could lure youth into Islamist militants. Also, the global jihadist movements' influence cannot be overstated. These organisations, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, use regional conflicts and grievances to attract members and build local branches. Their recruitment efforts largely target marginalised communities, taking advantage of their vulnerabilities while providing a sense of connection and purpose. As already stated, the internal conflict in Ghana, the dearth of poverty, and unemployment in the country might seriously entice youth to join these groups. Moreover, an important aspect is the inadequate border security infrastructure. The sub-region, Ghana-inclusive, has a security infrastructure deficit (Braithwaite and Mbowura, 2014; Akanji, 2019). In Ghana, for example, the long and porous borders make it difficult to monitor and manage the flow of people and products. This allows terrorists to enter the country unnoticed. Improving border

security and increasing intelligence sharing among neighbours are critical measures toward mitigating the threat.

Conceptual Explanations of Bullion Van Attacks in Ghana

In this section, I show how bullion van robbery attacks have become widespread in the Ghanaian political landscape in recent times. The first factor I want to elaborate on is socioeconomic conditions. Criminological research indicates that some social traits are linked with a greater likelihood of people's involvement in criminal activity. Kitchen (2006) elaborated in his studies that most offenders, particularly young males, are disadvantaged in society and tend to make a livelihood. His research conducted in Canada found that socioeconomic conditions have been found to be strongly correlated with crime, particularly the most severe offences including assault, robbery, and killing. Data collected on offenders shows that these assailants are unemployed or employed in low-paying, unskilled jobs. Socioeconomic factors play a significant role in engineering an environment conducive to criminal activities.

According to Lofstrom (2016) in global south countries, high levels of poverty, unemployment, and income inequality contribute to desperation among some individuals. Consequently, this drives them toward crime. Alemika (2022) contends that most crimes vary across countries; and in developing countries, crimes are determined by socioeconomic and political structures. The anomie explanation of criminal behaviour and crime rates in African states stems from a lack of socioeconomic opportunities. Disparities in wealth distribution fuel public dissatisfaction, leading to a fertile breeding ground for criminal enterprises (Tilley, Tseloni, and Farrell 2011). In light of this, I argue that a contributory factor to the criminal activities in the country can be attributed to poverty, unemployment, and the inequality that exists between ordinary citizens and politicians. Also linked with socioeconomic conditions are economic difficulties that can be attributed to the robbery phenomenon. Economic desperation such as the escalation of essential commodities prices and extreme poverty imposes a sense of desperation among citizens who find it difficult to make ends meet (Perez, 2022). Essentially, when there is a dearth of resources necessary for the survival of the people, or when they lack anything above survival they tend to engage in all forms of illegality. Until recently, Ghana was hailed as Africa's most promising country by the IMF and World Bank. This put Ghana ahead of many African countries as the fastest-growing economy in the world (Fröhlich, 2019).

The aftermath of the global pandemic and the subsequent Russian-Ukrainian war exposed the country's fundamental economic fragility. Within a short time, prices for goods and services have increased astronomically. This has culminated in hyperinflation and a devalued currency affecting both macro and micro levels of the political economy (Mensah, 2022). It can therefore be argued that the current rising Bullion van robbery



attacks in Ghana are attributed to economic desperation. Due to poverty, unemployment, and limited economic opportunities, these criminals often resort to such criminal acts. Therefore, these individuals see engaging in illegal activities such as robbing bullion vans as a quick and worthwhile way of living a life of affluence. However, they see this being done through illegal means. Economic factors, coupled with social inequality and limited access to resources, can contribute to such attacks in Ghana.

Moreover, organised crime could explain the phenomenon of bullion van robbery attacks in Ghana. Organised crime is a business, and criminal activity systematically organised and delivered by highly centralised enterprise groups most commonly for-profit motivations (Burrell, 2022). In developing countries, organised crime rampantly threatens security and well-being. This suggests that organised and well-structured criminal organisations orchestrate organised crime perpetuated by bullion van robberies in Ghana. These groups operate with meticulous planning, coordination, and specialised skills, often involving experienced criminals with experts in armed robberies. They may have insider information about valuable asset movement, including cash. They may exploit vulnerabilities in the banks or transportation security systems. The motivation behind these attacks is primarily financial gain, as stolen money can fund other criminal activities or enrich an organization. Despite Ghana ranking 8th (Global Crime Index, 2023) for overall resilience in Africa, and having sufficient effective capacity in combating organised crime, it cannot be ruled out of the problem of organised crime. According to Gov.UK (2022), most visits to Ghana are peaceful. However, criminal behaviour occurs, ranging from minor crimes (See Table 1 for the crime index scored or recorded in Ghana) to petty crimes. In 2021, there was an upsurge in robbery, burglary, and violent assault including the use of weapons (Gov.UK, 2022).

Lastly, corruption and collaboration contributed significantly to the bullion van attack in Ghana. The bullion van robbery attacks in Ghana may involve corruption and complicity within the security and law enforcement agencies. It can be argued that some individuals within these organizations may collude with the robbers, providing them with critical information, access to firearms, or even actively participating in the heists. In the recent attacks, some police personnel have been indicted as prime suspects in the crime involving the bullion van attacks (Bansah, 2023; Emmanuel, 2023). These highlight systemic issues related to corruption, lack of integrity, and weak institutional frameworks that allow criminal elements to exploit vulnerabilities to their advantage. The motivation behind such complicity could range from personal financial gain to coercion or fear of reprisals. It is well-known that corruption is so rife in Ghana that every sector of the political economy is deeply involved (Andoh, 2022; Asomah, 2023). Significantly, in this case, political corruption such as bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and abuse of power is widespread (Asomah, 2020). Ghana currently loses over \$3 billion (USD) through corruption activities (Akosa, et al., 2018; Ljubas, 2019; Richard, 2021). Unsurprisingly, Transparency International's corruption ranking consistently places Ghana on the perceived list of the most corrupt countries. Governments have

implemented anti-corruption measures in the past, such as creating anti-corruption institutions and enacting laws, but enforcement and accountability remain a challenge. This ineffectiveness in fighting corruption and other malpractices tends to derail Ghana's democratic success over the years (Andoh, 2022).

Table 1: Indicate Crime Index from 2014-2023

Year	Crime Index/Points
2014	46.38
2015	49.92
2016	49.01
2017	46.99
2018	45
2019	51.95
2020	48.97
2021	48.52
2022	46.81
2023	44.5

Source: Statista 2023

The above figure indicates the crime index in Ghana from 2014-2023. From the table, in 2023, the crime index recorded was 44.5 points. This means that at the time the crime was moderate compared to 2019 when the crime rate was approximately 52 points which is very high, and in 2018 the crime rate recorded was 45 points lower.

Public Perception

The general public view of bullion van robberies in Ghana differs based on the persons and groups involved. However, some common elements emerge from the societal debate surrounding these instances that are elaborated. The first public perception of bullion van robbery attacks is fear and concern (Ghanaweb, 2023). Ghana's general populace has expressed worry and alarm over the bullion van heist. These instances include armed assailants targeting cash-carrying vehicles, resulting in violence, injuries, and, in some cases, fatalities. This has created a sense of uneasiness and concern among

residents, particularly those who work in the financial industry or rely on cash-safe transit (MyInfogh, 2023; Ghanaweb, 2023).

Secondly, there is public criticism of security measures. The public continues to criticise security procedures during bullion van transportation. Some people believe that security staff should be properly equipped, trained, and given appropriate resources to protect themselves and deliver valuable bullion transport. To deter similar attacks, there have been calls for tougher rules, better coordination among security agencies, and the deployment of more complex security systems. Another public reaction to the bullion attacks is concern about insider involvement. Suspicions and concerns have been raised concerning probable insider involvement in bullion van robberies (Bosiako, 2023). The public has expressed concern about how offenders appear to know the routes, times, and details of these operations. Some argue that collaboration or leaks of critical information from the financial and security industries have raised the probability of successful attacks (Djanie, 2023; Bosiako, 2023).

Further, there is an increasing public outrage and demand for justice. The Bullion van robbery attacks on the banks' security personnel and staff have generated public outcry or fury over the daring and audacity of the perpetrators involved in the attacks. There is a growing concern among citizens who ask the police and security agencies to apprehend and prosecute the perpetrators as soon as possible. The public expects the government and security agencies to take decisive action to address this issue. This will protect both individuals and the financial sector. Finally, citizens demand the government respond and be held accountable. The public expects the government to take responsibility and ensure the safety and security of its residents. Increased investment in security infrastructure, such as surveillance cameras, alarm systems, and armoured vehicles, is necessary. Some residents have also expressed dissatisfaction with what they consider a lack of transparency and responsibility in dealing with these attacks. They have called for better communication and updates from the appropriate authorities.



Source: Gomda, 2023

This photo shows some residents at the robbery scene after the incident in Ablekuma.

Policy Recommendations

Bullion van robberies are becoming increasingly common in Ghana, posing significant dangers to public safety and currency transportation systems. These occurrences illustrate the importance of comprehensive policy measures to reduce risks, strengthen law enforcement capacities, and protect persons, financial institutions, and precious cargo. This paper investigates the policy consequences of bullion van robberies in Ghana and considers viable counter-strategies. The first measure is strengthening the country's law enforcement system. Enforcing the law is crucial to building a better society. Gray (1997) contends that enforcing the law system in a developing country helps control and regulate people's behaviour. It is, therefore, crucial that the capacity of law enforcement agencies responsible for combating organized crime and robbery attacks be enhanced. This can be achieved when police forces invest more in training, equipment, and technology for security personnel in police forces. Specialised units must be developed to respond to and investigate such situations. This will ensure proper coordination and intelligence sharing among various security organisations. Secondly, enhancing collaboration between security agencies and financial institutions can reduce ongoing robberies. In their study of crime combat in developing economies, Braimah and Mbowura (2014) suggest that the military has been repeatedly invited to combat armed robbery. This is due to collaborative efforts between security and those involved positively impacting crimes. For this to work effectively, security agencies and banking institutions must work together to prevent and respond to bullion van robberies. Regular communication channels and information-sharing systems should be developed to exchange intelligence, identify potential threats, and take preventative actions. Joint training programmes can also be implemented to raise security consciousness among bank staff, cash-in-transit personnel, and law enforcement authorities.

Another policy recommendation is cashless transactions. In this era of global digitisation, countries should be learning how to do new things that would make it easier for people to do simple transactions (Malini and Menon, 2017; Murugan, 2021; Kasri, et al. 2022; Datta, 2023). Thus, digital transaction of cash has been stressed by many scholars for reducing crime rates and protecting customer assets (Druhova, 2021; Starodubtseva, et al. 2021). Accordingly, a vital policy aspect is to encourage cashless transactions. Promoting digital payment systems that lower cash dependency will make bullion van robberies less appealing. And to encourage businesses and individuals to use electronic payments, the government can create incentives such as tax reductions or subsidies. To encourage wider adoption, educating the public on digital transaction benefits and security is critical. Moreover, physical security measures should be improved. Policy interventions should focus on improving the physical security measures surrounding bullion van operations. Armoured vehicles must be fortified or outfitted with sophisticated security features, such as GPS tracking, tamper-proof compartments, and panic buttons, which can considerably improve cash transportation safety. Furthermore, thorough adherence to standard operating protocols, such as route



surveillance planning, security escorts, and Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) employees training, is critical to minimising vulnerabilities.

Also, public awareness and community engagement are essential to curtail bullion van robberies. It is critical to raise public awareness and engage communities to prevent bullion van robberies. To do this, the government should start broad campaigns to educate residents about the dangers of these attacks. It should also establish rules for personal protection when conducting cash transactions. Engaging local communities, neighbourhood watches organisations, and community leaders can help build a feeling of communal responsibility. This will motivate residents to report suspicious activity and assist law authorities. Finally, implementing legislative reforms and deterring sentencing is critical. No nation has developed without an effective law enforcement system. Crime prevention is of paramount interest to law enforcement agencies in Europe and America. For example, in Europe, traffic police forces can detect and deter criminals because of an effective law enforcement system (Roland and Verdier, 2003; Cestra, et al., 2023). Ghana has so many laws and regulations, but they fail to crack the whip. It is essential that policy changes are required to reinforce the legal framework governing bullion van robberies. The law-making body should examine existing legislation to ensure that it is effective, broad, adequate, and proportional to the gravity of such offences. Harsh punishments such as significant prison sentences and asset forfeiture should be applied to dissuade potential criminals. Specialised courts or tribunals can be established to speed up prosecution proceedings and ensure justice is served quickly.

Conclusion

The objective of this article sought to explore the rising phenomenon of bullion van robbery attacks in Ghana. The paper uses realism theory to explain how bullion van robberies have taken root in Ghana. It also explores the threat of terrorism and the factors that contribute to robbery attacks in Ghana. The paper maintains that the recent bullion van attacks in Ghana have raised many questions about the safety and security of cash delivery by bullion vans. It contends that these criminal activities by armed gangs have resulted in precious lives lost. This has impaired the public's trust in the country's law enforcement authorities and banking sectors. Accordingly, the bullion van robberies are a sharp reminder of the necessity for proper safety precautions to secure money in transit. Furthermore, the paper recommends the Ghanaian government, security services, and financial institutions collaborate to develop rigorous, and robust protocols. This is to minimise the danger associated with such operations. It emphasises the importance of enhancing the training and equipment of security professionals involved in cash-in-transit activities. This involves supplying them with proper weaponry, protective gear, and specialised tactical response and situational awareness training. Investing in advanced surveillance technologies, such as GPS tracking devices and CCTV systems, can also help track and deter potential assaults. In addition, the paper maintains

that addressing the root causes of these attacks is critical. It contends that socioeconomic variables, such as excessive unemployment and poverty, are frequently the underlying causes that motivate people to engage in criminal activity. Comprehensive social programmes aimed at reducing poverty, generating job opportunities, and offering skill training can address these underlying concerns. Public awareness and collaboration are also essential components in the fight against bullion van attacks. Encouraging citizens to report suspicious activity and providing a forum for anonymous reports can greatly benefit intelligence gathering and incident prevention. Furthermore, building a solid collaboration among police, private security organisations, and the general public can permit a proactive approach to improving security and ensuring cash-in-transit activities. Finally, the paper concludes that dealing with bullion van attacks requires a multifaceted approach that includes adequate security measures, socioeconomic solutions, public participation, and collaboration between government and financial organisations. Ghana may seek to create a safer and more secure environment for cash transportation by following these techniques. This will protect the lives of those involved and the country's financial system integrity.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that no financial or conflict of interest was reported in the manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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The Security Policy Effects of the Algerian-Moroccan-Spanish Debate on Gas on Europe in the Light of the Russian-Ukrainian War¹

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Abstract:

The following research aims at analysing the energy and security challenges that faces the current MENA region in accordance with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It tries to give a comprehensive look upon the situation that defines today's political and economic world. At the beginning, it starts with the assessment of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its consequences on Europe and the Maghreb. In the next part, it focuses on the various issues that complicate the situation in North Africa regarding energy and security factors. Then the article goes on to describe the gas pipelines that connects the two areas (Europe and North Africa) and it clarifies the threats that hinder the cooperation between them. With a short introduction of the role of Tunisia in this debate, the research finally tries to explore the possibilities in renewable energy resources regarding the substitution of Russian energy supplies on the European market. In the conclusion, the article wanted to give a short and brief, but thorough analysis about the energy and security situation in the region and what solutions are there for the parties to ensure their interests in this complex political, economic and security competition.

Keywords:

Energy, Gas, North Africa, Russian-Ukrainian conflict, security policy

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Introduction

The Algerian-Moroccan-Spanish gas debate is a very important geopolitical issue in the MENA-region which has also effects in and is effected by the European countries and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict or war. The theme is very complex, and to understand it correctly, one has to take into consideration as much aspects of the problems as it is possible, since it takes a lot of research to understand at least the basics of the connections between the intertwining causes. There are mainly three part of this scene which complement each other: the Algerian-Moroccan debate on Western Sahara and other issues, the geopolitical realities of the European Union and the Russian-Ukrainian war. 24 February 2022 was a fatal and important starting-point of the clashes in the East, and basically the consequence of the sanctions Europe had imposed on Russia was that Russia weaponized its gas resources to blackmail the continent. This way, Europe had no chance but to look for other sources of petrol and natural gas, so the MENA region came as one of the most favourable areas, which could replace the decreasing Russian gas supplies. However, this area is not easy to comprehend, since it has its own problems and rivalries between countries which are supported by traditional Cold War superpowers who retained their status until the present. Also, there is the problem of colonization as a burden of several former countries, who took part in the division of the continent in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. The region that concerns us for the time being in connection with the subject is the North African area, especially Morocco and Algeria. While the abovementioned events took place in Europe and the East, the North African region was in turmoil. Since the 1960s, rivalry was present between the two large Arab countries, and it hasn't withered since. Especially at the turn of 2020, there have been a lot of controversial issues, which affected diplomatic relations and gas resource supplies between the countries. This way, the MENA-region and Europe, as well as the Russian-Ukrainian war have created an unprecedented scale of intertwined and complex conflicts, which has serious ramifications not only for regional, but also for world politics. In my article, I would like to explore in depth these realities.

The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict and the MENA Region

One of the main triggers of the events was the war, which began on 24 February 2022. Already in 2020, there were real difficulties economically all around the globe due to the spread of the COVID-19 disease and its later effects. The increasing want for petrol however blossomed in 2021, when there was an energy hunger. The problem was that one tragic event led to another, and with the beginning of the Russian invasion a series of problems arose concerning energy issues.

First of all, the Russians used energy prices as a weapon and blackmailed the Europeans with the withholding of gas reserves and the rising of the gas prices on the market. All this in due time took the Europeans to cooperate against Russia, and they



imposed heavy sanctions on the eastern country regarding their economy. Russia's answer was again the raising of gas prices, so Europe could do sooner or later nothing more than to turn to other regions to diversify their resources (Hafner, 2022).

Since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict brought about these problems for Europe, it had to turn geopolitically to other parts of the world in search of petrol and natural gas resources. The first sign of this was that all the major European leaders, like Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron and Mario Draghi went to Algiers to find a common solution for the issues that had been bothering the continent (Fasanotti, 2022). The countries of North Africa understood the seriousness of these events soon, and they wanted to appear as a reliable partner to support the new interest of the Europeans, however, they had had from before serious alignments with other great powers, like Algeria with Russia, who is its main weapon supporter. Because the Russians are important business partners of Algeria (since the Cold War), they have to thread carefully between the two sides – given that Russia and the West are in confrontation now –, so their diplomacy is very cautious nowadays.

The diplomatic carefulness of the countries can be well-percieved in the vote which was cast at the UN General Assembly on the condemnation of the Russian-Ukrainian war on 2 March 2022, where Algeria abstained from voting and Morocco didn't participate in the process (Belkaid, 2022). This way, it can be assessed that the Maghrebian diplomacy was very cautious and gentle regarding its relations with both sides, since it saw the business opportunity in the relation with Europe, but it didn't want to anger the superpowers which were connected to it from before. Especially Algeria was in a difficult position, because it has a strong and long-lasting relationship with Russia, but in the new situation it doesn't want to waste its opportunities with the European countries. The maneuvering of Algeria has to be delicate, since its partners in the East don't appreciate their turn to the European states, however, Algerian diplomacy is ready to modify its relations in order to handle the situation. From the beginning of the war the country thus decided that it takes an equal distance from the West and the East as well (Cafiero, 2022).

While Algeria decidedly supports Russia, and has good diplomatic relations with the Eastern power, it has to be aware that with doing business with its northern partners (the Europeans) there will be conflict, and this way it has to thread cautiously. So in spite that it held joint military excursions with the Russians, it opened an embassy in Kyiv, thus the Western countries see that it is not all-supportive of the Russian aggression. However, Algeria is still the third greatest importer of Russian weapons and thus has to show fidelity to them as well. This is a hard balancing maneuver which makes it difficult for Algerian diplomacy to deal with the recent issues regarding the gas debate and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict (Glez, 2023). Moroccans have to deal with the diplomatic pressure as well, and since there was a scandal in the European Parliament that Moroccans have bribed some European representatives, the country felt that it

owed the West with some support, so it was one of the first African countries to support Ukraine with tanks militarily (Holleis, 2023).

Altogether it can be concluded, that the Eastern dependency of the European countries could be reduced and it could turn well to the West and the Maghreb countries so Algeria and the US will be a very reliable supplier of petrol and gas resources for the abovementioned countries. Thus the Western and North African powers could easily be the new source of energy for the European countries. Russia this way could lose its previous preeminent position as energy provider for the region (Hafner, 2022).

The Moroccan-Algerian Debate at the Base of the Conflict

To understand better the situation, it is necessary to go to the roots of the conflict, which lies in the relation between Algeria and Morocco. The two countries have a long-standing rivalry against each other, which goes way back in time. It can be said that in the North African region basically the two countries fight for the leading position of the area, and there are a lot of problems that poison the relationship between them. One of these issues is the Western Sahara question, which emerged in the '70s, around the time Morocco annexed a large part of the country. There is also difference in which superpowers were they supported by in the Cold War era and after: Algeria is more aligned to Russia and Morocco to France and the US.

There is a competition as well between the two countries regarding the energy debate: although Algeria has the most petrol and gas resources, Morocco is also dominant in the region, and this is why they fight for the leading position. Both of the countries had (and still have) internal problems, Morocco had to fight the political turmoil and turn to liberalization of its trade, while Algeria had a recent upheaval: in 2019 the Hirak movement emerged and there were protests all over the country, so it also had to fight its demons. In the meantime, both countries wanted to gain an advantage, thus they concentrated to modify their foreign policy in order to fight for more dominance in the region. There is also the issue of Western Sahara, in which both countries want to get the upper hand, and they were willing to sacrifice a lot for winning the debate. In 1963, the rivalry between the two countries went so far as there was an open confrontation which was named the Sand War. However, it only lasted some months so the conflict didn't escalate (Fakir, 2023). The Western Sahara debate is so important that the UN sent a peacekeeping mission in 1991 to the area called MINURSO to handle the delicate balance between the sides. The mission is still on the ground, and according to some sources, its results cannot yet determine what fate the country will have, or which side would gain the upper hand, but the international community definitely want a solution to the problem (Besenyő, 2020).

Regarding to certain opinions, the security threats that this region (Western Sahara) poses also challenges the European community in its relations with the MENA



region and unless there is a definite solution to the problem, it will hinder the political balance in the area (Besenyő, 2009). There were also other debated issues between Algeria and Morocco, for example the Trump administration's decision to support Morocco's claim for Western Sahara in exchange for the rationalization of the relations between Morocco and Israel. The border debates also renewed between the Polisario and Morocco; hence, Algeria was also in the picture when a conflict broke out. Algeria and Morocco had a standoff as well when some Algerian truck drivers were killed and Algeria suspected Morocco to carry out the attack, but it wasn't proved. Thus there were a lot of debated issues between the two countries (Dworkin, 2022). From this it can be concluded that the fight between the two countries for the dominant position of the region led straight to the gas debate that occurred after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which created possibility for the European countries to look for other energy supporting regions.

There was another problem: since Morocco rationalized its relations with Israel, and in exchange, the US recognized its rights to Western Sahara, the Algerian politics became very angry, and there have been diplomatic problems, for the Algerians threatened and then closed the Gaz-Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline, which transmitted gas to Morocco (france24.com, 2021). Instead, the Algerians will export gas to Spain via an underwater pipeline called Medgaz, which doesn't reach Morocco but runs straight to Spain from Algeria (africanews.com, 2021). In 2022, there was another issue, which deteriorated relations between Spain and Algeria: Spain sided with Morocco on the issue of Western Sahara, causing tensions with the Algerians, who regard this case very important. Algeria thus suspended a friendship agreement with the Spanish, who changed their view about the fate of the Saharan territory (aljazeera.com, 2022). From all this, it can be assessed that Algeria, who provided the majority of Western European and North African gas supplies became in a difficult position, since diplomatically it lost some leverage. However, Morocco and Spain also depends on Algeria's gas resources, thus the North African country may be in advantage regarding the regional dominance. Nevertheless, Morocco also boasts a very successful diplomatic machinery which functioned very well during the last years and gained political advantage for the country.

The other side of the conflict includes the European countries and the US. As it has been mentioned before, the United States reversed its former position on Western Sahara regarding Morocco, because it formalized its relations with Israel. As a compensation, the Trump administration acknowledged Morocco's right to Western Sahara, and Algeria was quick to demonstrate against this. Spain also went to support Morocco's claim over the territory, while France remained positive on the Moroccan side of opinion. However, for example, Italy made a serious contribution to Algerian politics and diplomacy when in 2022 they signed a petrol contract with Algerian president Abdelmajid Tebboune (Al-Fawiris, 2022). Thus it can be concluded that the

European countries and the US were very active in strengthening their petrol resources via the North African region.

Short Introduction of the Gas Pipelines Concerning the Region

There are a lot of gas pipelines that connect Africa (more precisely the North African region) with Europe. Besides the LNG transport that is going on in the Mediterranean, these pipelines constitute the main arteries in the blood circulation of the gas trade between the areas. There are basically four important routes that characterize the trade in the region. The first one is the Gaz-Maghreb-Europe (GME) line, which would flow from Algeria via Morocco to Spain, but it was closed – as was mentioned before – due to debates between Algeria and Morocco. This pipeline is one of the most vital sources for the two countries to acquire natural gas so it really hurt Morocco and Spain regarding their gas revenues. Spain is also very concerned of its possible lack of resources that could hit the country in the winter hard (africanews.com, 2021).

However, there is another gas pipeline that supports the European country with gas resources, but it is an underwater tunnel called Medgaz, which runs from Algeria straight to Spain through the Mediterranean Sea. This pipeline could thus correct the lack of resources the country has to endure because of the debate between the two North African states, but still doesn't count as a full support for Spain. Nevertheless, Spain created an opportunity for Morocco with giving access to the closed pipeline from the other side and thus supporting the country with gas supplies. This of course angered Algeria, and it further alienated the countries from each other. There is a third source of gas resources that is flowing between the two continents, which connects Algeria with Italy, and is called Transmed. This pipeline goes from Algeria through Tunisia to Italy, and – as it has been mentioned before – with the renewal of the contract, Algeria transports even more gas to the country in the future. Finally, there is an ongoing debate between Algeria and Morocco to reach the Nigerian sources of gas: the two countries are competing that who will acquire the huge amount of resource from the Sahel region. There are plans to build it to Morocco, but it would run through lots of countries, including Benin, Togo and Ghana, while the Algerian pipeline – which was already named Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline – would go through Niger from Nigeria across the Sahara. There is now a great debate between the two regional powers who will get the upper hand in this competition (Shawamreh, 2023).

The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline has stirred up debates as well between Morocco and Algeria. Both countries are at pains to exert their influence over the region by taking part in the new Nigerian gas project. Morocco would like to create the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, which would go through at least 13 countries in West Africa, but it would solve its gas difficulties and would give a huge leverage to Rabat against Algiers. The Moroccan idea is to connect the Nigerian gas pipeline with the already existing GME



Maghreb-Europe tubes, which would then provide gas also to Spain and Portugal, bypassing Algeria and excluding it from the profits. Of course, Algeria wants the original idea of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which would run through Niger, but it has the disadvantages of crossing a desert area that is filled with jihadist groups that hinder the production and the transportation through the pipeline. This also would give an advantage to one of the countries as a relevant supplier of gas to the European continent (theArabweekly.com, 2023).

In conclusion, it can be assumed that the pipelines connecting North Africa with Europe will be of major importance regarding the replacement of the decreasing reliance on the Russian gas supplies which Europe is willing to sanction at this period. Algeria this way can become a regional leading power due to the recent events that took place on the European continent, and the Russian-Ukrainian war and the North African dominance fight has its connections in this relation.

Threats Obstructing the Construction of the Pipelines and the Creation of a North African-European Gas Cooperation

There are many current issues ongoing in the North African area that could become a nuisance for the common interests of the two regions. One of them is political instability which has manifested itself severely during recent times. There are practically inestimable coup d'états that happened just in the last five years, and the most recent of them was the military revolt in Niger. The rebellion not only put a Russian-affiliated government at the head of the country, but it seriously damaged the relations of Niger especially with France, but also with the other European powers. The other problematic issue was that the coup not only cut the ties between Niger and Europe, but it hinders the construction of the pipeline connecting Nigeria with either Morocco or Algeria, thus it prevents the two regions from doing business with each other. Mohamed Bazoum, the previous president supported Europe, while General Abdourahmane Tchiani is pro-Russian and this puts Niger in an anti-Europe position, which cuts the opportunities of the export-import possibilities (Aris, 2023).

Besides the several coups that happened in the area, there are other negative effects that makes difficult the situation on the ground. One factor that adds to these problematic issues is terrorism, which is overly present in North Africa and is a current and present danger for the African communities. Both Algeria and Morocco – albeit to varying degrees – is affected by the chaos that these elements can cause, and the security concern they create is very high. Algeria perhaps is less exposed to the attacks of the radicals, however it also has a lot of ties to the fundamentalist organizations. To just sum up the most important, there are a few cells that are worth mentioning. One of the first Islamist organizations that was established on Algerian soil was called Mouvement

Islamique Armée/ Armed Islamic Movement, which was founded by Mustafa Bouyali who was a committed follower of Egyptian radical theoretician Sayyid Qutb.

The structure of the group was built of smaller cells which cooperated and together formed a larger organization that choose the armed approach and could be called a jihadist movement. Although was not a terrorist organization, the Front Islamique Du Salut (FIS) was a fundamentalist and Islamist party or association that even participated in the Algerian elections. Its leaders were Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj. Belhaj was the more influential of the two and he professed an anti-Western credo. Set aside the political wing of the organisation, there was also a military side of the FIS, which was called Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), which was founded by the radical islamist Abdel Qadir Shabbouti or General Shabbouti. With his leadership, the group started to organize an armed resistance and military maneuvers were planned against the government (Botha, 2008).

Morocco has also had its share of fundamentalist and terrorist activities. To start with, one can enumerate some extremist or fundamentalist groups that existed or still exist in the country. For example, Islail al-Khatib created an organization called Jam'yya al-Ba'th al-Islami (Association of Islamic Resurrection), which had a clear Islamist affiliation and one of its main ideologic role model was the Muslim Brotherhood. Having said that, it can be concluded that the Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (MB) was also present in the country, especially in Casablanca. It can never be overemphasized what effects the organization has on Islamic life wherever it appears. However, due to the strict royal roots of the monarchy the organization couldn't thrive in the Moroccan environment so it had to stay in hiding from the public eye. There was also the Al-Shabiba (Moroccan Youth Association) organization. The leader of the early-created group was Abdel Karim Mouti, and it was a radical organization that was influenced also by Sayyid Qutb and the Egyptian MB movement.

The cell was present in the country for only a short period until its banning in 1975. Nevertheless, Al-Shabiba had smaller parts which diverged from it and thrived on their own. One of this was the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or Rabat group). By its name one can assume the ideologies it followed. There was also the Al-Adl wal Ihasne established by Abdesslam Yassin. It was also a radical fundamentalist organization which caused turmoil in the country. One of the most striking incidents of terrorism in Morocco occurred on 16 May 2003: five simultaneous bombs exploded in Casablanca in which 45 people died. In connection with the bombings, there was an organization which got the attention of the Moroccan security forces: it was the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (Moroccan Islamic Combat Group). Its leader was Abdelkrim Thami Mejjati. The organization also had an armed cell, led by Saad Houssaini who was trained in Afghanistan and returned from there to fight in the name of Islam. There were also several other members of the organization who were arrested for planning or executing attacks in Morocco (Botha, 2008). There is also an opinion that the terrorism in the North African region is due to a serious political upheaval and a deep economic



instability, and these are the main reasons for the appearance of the phenomenon (Besenyő, 2007). Thus it can be concluded that both countries are at risk since terrorist activities and Islamic fundamentalism both exist in these areas, and it can be sad that the security concerns that these threats cause can seriously hinder the possibilities of the construction of a Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline that would give more opportunities to the European Union to diversify its gas resources. Thus the European Union's opportunities can be seriously questioned if these security gaps won't be filled in reasonable time.

There is also the issue of migration, which is very actual at this time. Africa is one of the main continents responsible for the vast amount of migrating people from the third world to Europe in search of a better life. The problem of migration is a serious issue and it greatly influences the everyday life of the European communities living in hardship not only because of the Russian-Ukrainian war but also because of the large number of migrants that live in their countries and refuse to live an European way of life and bring with themselves their original customs and culture. Morocco and Algeria, the two dominant countries in North Africa besides Egypt may be a good example if a closer look is taken of them. It is a traditional fact, that while in the Cold War the Algerians were in friendship with the Soviet Union, which remained after it resolved, the Moroccans were in league with the US and France. This provides facts about their possible future approach or attitude towards the migration question. The issue affects both countries, since they lie in the path of the migration routes that come from the Sahel to Europe, and thus they have responsibility in handling the situation.

They are also the source of migration to the continent, and this way they have a two-sided responsibility in this phenomenon. Firstly, they should restrict more their citizens not to migrate to foreign countries without their consent, secondly, they ought to obstruct more the migration caravans flowing in from the Sahel through them. However, they are in difficult position, since the migration issue is not very easy to be handled in a third world country, where the state security is not so tight as in Europe. Nevertheless, Morocco concentrates maybe more – because of political closeness to the EU – on the restriction of migrants, however, in July 2022, several immigrants attacked the two Spanish enclaves in the country, Ceuta and Melilla, in which 23 people were killed and a serious scandal swept through the news. However, Morocco – since the middle of the 2010s – tries to restrict its migration flows to Europe, thus it tries to cooperate with the European authorities. Algeria on the other hand is another case, because it traditionally has ties with Russia and the East, so it is not so inclined to support Europe's migration policies and demands. Nevertheless, it also tries to cooperate – as much as its political affiliations permit – with Europe and help its migration-related problems. In all, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has provided a food problem in the region, which will definitely hinder the possibilities of a controlled migration to Europe (Ouhemmou, 2023). Thus, migration is also a factor that can seriously obstruct the continuous flow of gas and petrol from Africa to Europe and this way it restricts its aspiration to wean off from Russian gas.

The Role of Tunisia in the Gas Debate and the Regional Security Situation

Tunisia is also an important party of the North African security environment and plays an important part in the debate concerning the gas transition. Tunisia has relatively good relations with Algeria, and since the Arab Spring in 2010/11 it has been truly concerned of the security of the country. Because of the porous borders between the two states, there was always the issue of smugglers and terrorist networks that hindered the development of Tunisia and Algeria as well. There is not only this phenomenon, but also the issue of migration and weapon-smuggling activities that bewilder the relationship of the two countries. Tunisia also takes part in the gas transit between North Africa and Europe through the Transmed gas pipeline, which runs from Algeria through Tunisia to Italy. Thus, the country is also important in the gas debate and in reinforcing Europe's position in contrary to Russia. Tunisia this way is also a relevant factor in the creation of new resources for Europe in connection with gas supplies (Henneberg, 2023).

LNG-Transport as a New Source for Europe's Gas Supply

Africa – especially North Africa – has got not only pipelines constructed for gas transition, but LNG-terminals as well, which are important in the gas-trade too. The LNG-capabilities cannot be emitted from the resources that are present on the northern part of the continent, since they present a significant amount of gas supplies that could be transported for European use. Africa is rich in mineral resources, and gas and petrol are outstanding among them as indeed they take part in the international trade. There are approximately three countries that could be major providers of these materials: Mozambique, Nigeria and Tanzania, notwithstanding Algeria, which already transports a serious amount of gas to Europe. However, the business world is never so simple, as the countries which own the gas resources have also domestic problems: internal demand is also high, they have to think about their people as well before they can turn to export. Nevertheless, Europe is in desperate need of extra petrol and gas supply and this way it is expected that despite of the domestic want, the aforementioned countries will be able to manage to find a way to squeeze out some amount for the export and the European partners as well.

There is also the problem of the renewable energy sources which will be a serious issue on the European markets, as the continent not only wants to get rid of Russian gas deals but also would like to change its energy supplies into renewable sources. This will be a difficult issue, nevertheless the African countries will have to look forward to meeting these standards as the traditional source of gas may not be enough or may be changed in the near future concerning the European states (the issue of renewables will be discussed later in this article, since it pertains to the energy deals between the two continents). However, at this point, besides Algeria, Egypt and Senegal are capable of



providing LNG-supporting ports that are able to transport LNG-gas to Europe. It can also be mentioned, that the LNG-transport is already ongoing, although not in the expected measure yet: Algeria transports to France and Turkey while Nigeria supplies Spain, France and Portugal. Thus it cannot be denied that some of the LNG-transport has started to flow. It is interesting as well that there are designed LNG-ports to be built in the future in Mozambique and Tanzania (Global Energy Monitor, 2022).

The Issue of Renewables in the Energy Transport between Africa and Europe

As it is known, Europe is in transition, and it would like to change its energy resources as much as possible into renewables. Africa of course knows this, and besides the issue of gas pipelines and LNG transition, it is important to say some words about the renewable energy aspirations of the continent to satisfy not only their European counterparts, but themselves as well.

To take into consideration, Morocco is one of the best examples, since it has no traditional energy resources (unless the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline hits in). The country realised this and thinks ahead of the future. The most important renewable energy sources are electricity (windmills), solar panels and green energy. Morocco – being almost the only North Africa country without gas resources – tries to concentrate its industry on these kinds of energy resources. They are expensive, of course, but the country has to think about its future and its export tendencies to grow with Europe. With its vast areas of the Sahara and its 300 sunny days per year it is an ideal country to boost these abovementioned resources, and supply Europe with them. Not only would it be a great deal for the country, but also it could put Morocco ahead of Algeria in their race of who becomes the leader of North Africa. Thus, the issue is far from irrelevant to the country and this way it tries to improve its capabilities in this area (Cobo, 2023).

Algeria is in a different position, since it has a load of traditional energy supplies (gas mainly). It is thus not in need of a fast transition, but if it wants to follow future trends and accustom itself to the European acceptations, it should try as well to diversify its energy resources. Algeria – as it has been said – is traditionally a partner of Russia, but it can be a business associate of Europe as well – nothing is against that. This way, Algeria could overcome its disagreements with European countries and with their help it could improve its renewables capabilities, however, it is rather less enthusiastic in developing this field of expertise compared to Morocco, which is in desperate need of finding new energy sources in lack of petrol and gas supplies. By all means, Algeria could boost its energy supplies even more with concentrating on the improvement of renewable energy elements (Farrand, 2022).

Altogether, it can be said that besides traditional energy resources such as gas and petrol, North African countries should concentrate on developing renewable energy

supplies, since Europe is trying to change its energy factors in some decades, and it is better if Africa is prepared for that since the export between the two regions will continue and the energy transition will not stop between them.

China's Role in the Energy and Security Situation in North Africa

At the end of the article, it is perhaps relevant to say some words about the role of China in this complex and difficult issue of energy and security in North Africa, which has of course effects vica-versa in the European-North African relationship and the Russian-Ukrainian war as well.

Since Morocco was a traditional ally of the West (US and France), whereas Algeria was rather a partner of the Soviet Union/now Russia, there is a natural animosity, which presents itself in several other issues between the two regional superpowers. In the recent years, Algeria had to align itself a little further from Russia due to pressure from its European partners. Perhaps the approach to China is the sign of this phenomenon.

As it was said, in the last years, Algeria opened not only to the European trade markets, but to the Chinese business partner as well, who are always diplomatic and have no expectations diplomatically and concerning human rights as the Europeans do. One of the main reasons besides the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, that turned Algeria towards China is perhaps the increasing support of the United States for Morocco, and its recognition of Israel, and first of all, the recognition of the country's demand for Western Sahara by the US. All these factors – albeit the energy deals with Europe – pushed Algeria further and further politically from the West and America and it went straight into the arms of Russia and China.

China is also recognized by its cunning diplomacy, which concentrates on business deals, money, instead of acting militarily, and avoids the interventions into other cultures. This was attractive for Algeria, who renewed its waning relations with the eastern power, and struck a series of business and energy deals also with the country. China's role in North Africa supporting Algeria could also mean that by the support of the sinoese country, the North African entity could grow to surpass Morocco in their race to regional superstatus. Another issue is that this relation would help is the long-standing aspiration of the North African country to be part of the BRICS countries and become an international factor and thus have a word in world politics as well.

However, this is far from the reality yet, and Algeria has a lot to work if it wants to overtake Morocco's role as regional leading power in North Africa and become a country to be counted with internationally. The intention to become a BRICS-member this way also empowers Algeria to strenghten its relations with the Chinese as well (Zoubir, 2022).



Conclusion

To assess everything that have been said is difficult, because there are so many factors that on the one hand hinder and on the other support the energy relations between North Africa and Europe. It can be concluded that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has generated a situation in which Europe had to turn to the North African continent primarily to attract more sources of firstly traditional sources of gas and petrol and secondly renewable energy resources, which both can help the continent turn to new sources of energy that help them to wean off from the Russian-dependence. This is not an easy issue as before the European continent got most of its energy supplies from the eastern power. Since the war started, however, North Africa came handy and they started to turn to the southern continent as the new business deals show. However, there are several political and security issues that hindered the by the way blossoming relationship between the two sides.

First of all, the traditional Algerian-Moroccan rivalry over Western Sahara and other issues made it more difficult to come to a common understanding with Europe, and it didn't always help the continent in receiving alternative sources of energy supplies. However, there are other factors, that also obstruct the North Africans to struck deals with the Europeans: terrorism is for example thriving in these areas, and the several radical organizations and fundamentalist thinking lessened the possibility of a possible cooperation. Migration is also an issue, which makes it difficult to work together, because it causes political turmoil and regional instability that doesn't help in these deals. The role of superpowers like the USA, Russia and China also makes it difficult to navigate between the waves of political games in the region. Tunisia is also a country that has a say in the debate, so it gets more and more complicated.

The renewable energy resources also count as a new factor, since Europe is in transition and looking for these as well and African countries have to take this into consideration if they want to maintain their commercial relations with Europe in the future. Altogether, it can be said that the issue is a very complex one and all partners should take everything in consideration if they want to move forward in the business deals they want to make with each others. There are a lot of interests that collide in this race for energy and it is a very interesting issue, who will be the winner in this international debate. All party members should take into consideration, that if they want to stand out in their region and internationally, they have to maneuver carefully and cleverly to achieve what they want.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that they have no financial interest in this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Challenges and Opportunities in Management of Intercommunal Conflicts in Kenyan ASAL Region¹

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Abstract:

There are a number of reasons that have shaped the dynamics of intercommunal disputes throughout time in Kenya's ASAL (Arid and Semi-Arid Lands) regions, which provide the historical framework for these conflicts (Mkutu, 2020; Omuse, 2018; Nicholas, 2018). Understanding this historical backdrop offers insights into the complicated intercommunal disputes in ASAL and their underlying causes. With roughly 38% of Kenya's population, the ASALs make up 89% of the nation. More than 90% of the wildlife that sustains the tourism sector and accounts for 12% of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is found in these regions, while 70% of the national livestock herd, with an estimated worth of Ksh. 70 billion, is located in the ASAL regions (ROK, 2022). The challenges and opportunities in the management of inter-communal conflicts in ASAL regions in Kenya have been extensively studied and discussed by researchers, scholars, and practitioners.

Keywords:

ASAL region, cultural and ethnic differences, government institutions intercommunal conflicts, Kenya

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Introduction

There are numbers of reasons that have shaped the dynamics of intercommunal disputes throughout time in Kenya's ASAL (Arid and Semi-Arid Lands) regions, which provide the historical framework for these conflicts (Mkutu, 2020; Nicholas, 2018; Omuse, 2018). Understanding this historical backdrop offers insights into the complicated intercommunal disputes in ASAL and their underlying causes. With roughly 38% of Kenya's population, the ASALs make up 89% of the nation. More than 90% of the wildlife that sustains the tourism sector and accounts for 12% of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is found in these regions, while 70% of the national livestock herd, with an estimated worth of Ksh. 70 billion, is located in the ASAL regions (ROK, 2022). The challenges and opportunities in the management of inter-communal conflicts in ASAL regions in Kenya have been extensively studied and discussed by researchers, scholars, and practitioners. Here below are some important perspectives.

Conflict Perspectives

Low and unpredictable rainfall, restricted access to water resources, and difficult environmental conditions are characteristics of ASALs in Kenya. These regions, which are home to numerous ethnic communities, have long been the source of strife and stress (Mwangi, 2020). They have experienced Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC) for many decades, and even Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) are frequent and often exacerbated by proliferation of small arms (Mkutu, 2005; Mwangi, 2020). Despite the fact, that incalculable human suffering and property destruction are brought by these LICs numerous attempts at mitigation and remedies have been made but with some degree of success. Arguably, institutions for conflict management have struggled or refused over time to come up with lasting fixes (Kamais and Mosol, 2022). In context, issues such as colonialism, pre- and post-independence land dispossession and displacement, predisposing factors associated to pastoralist's livelihoods and ethnic and cultural differences have variously played a role in the intercommunal conflicts in the ASAL. Ethnic and cultural divisions, unequal accessibility to development resources and unfavorable government policies and governance are other persisting issues that have had a significant impact on the dynamics of intercommunal conflicts in the area.

Challenges of Intercommunal Conflicts in the ASAL

It is crucial to remember that the conflicts in the ASAL are interrelated and frequently reinforce one another (ROK, 2014). Examples of ASAL regions in Kenya that commonly experience fighting over resources, ethnic tensions, political isolation, and historical grudges include the counties of West Pokot, Baringo, Tana River, Isiolo, Turkana, Marsabit, and Wajir. Effectively resolving these disputes requires an understanding of the challenges and smart use of the opportunities for long-term conflict resolution.

Addressing a number of underlying challenges is necessary for conflict resolution in the area. Some of these challenges are discussed below.

Limited Access to Resources

Intercommunal conflicts often result from the management and access to resources in Kenya's ASAL. Drought and conflict are mutually reinforcing, especially because allocating resources honestly and equitably among competing parties is difficult (ROK, 2014). Drought, which manifests as a lack of vital resources like water, pasture, and grazing land, is a feature of ASAL regions leads to conflicts between various communities who compete for these resources and especially land (Mosol, 2022; Turton, 2017).

Water is essential for home usage, agriculture, and the needs of various ethnic groupings in the ASAL. Communities compete for access when water sources, such wells or rivers, are few or dry up. Conflicts can turn violent, especially when there are unclear rules or processes for allocating water (Seter, Theisen and Schilling, 2018). On grazing land many pastoralist cultures depend on it for their animals. Conflicts between various ethnic groups arise as a result of the shrinking size of acceptable grazing areas caused by climate change, population growth, and land degradation. Conflicts over the limits of grazing land, encroachment, and overgrazing can result in violent encounters that occasionally end in the loss of life and property (Sax, et al., 2022).

Ownership and access to land resources in the ASAL are other difficult concerns related to resources. Different ethnic communities' historical overlapping claims to the same land parcels is a contributing historical aspect. Land tenure and boundary disputes have resulted from this over time. Lack of clear land titles, population increase, and demand on available land exacerbate the problem and frequently result in escalating tensions and ensuing confrontations (Cheruiyot, 2020; Cyprian, 2020; Okomboli, 2019). Possession of priceless natural resources, such as mineral and oil deposits, is a related issue. Conflicts may result from competition for control and access to these resources among various ethnic groups or outside parties. Intercommunal tensions can be brought on by disagreements regarding resource ownership, revenue sharing, and the environmental effects of extraction activities (Sabadash and Denysenko, 2019; Tim and Gerald, 2017).

Land Dispossession and Displacement

Intercommunal conflicts in the ASAL of Kenya are significantly influenced by land dispossession and displacement. It is connected to historical injustices perpetrated since colonial times and competition for scarce resources. Pastoralism, seasonal movements, and political manipulations are other influences (Muchiri, 2015). The marginalization



and deprivation of particular ethnic populations' ancestral lands may be attributed to colonial land policies, coercive evictions, and discriminatory practices (Domínguez and Luoma, 2020). Intercommunal conflicts are stoked by long-standing resentments that have been generated as groups fight to restore their land rights and correct perceived injustices (Rudabeh and Turner, 2022). Despite this, competition for accessible land has increased as a result of resource constraint being exacerbated by population growth and land degradation (Ho-Won, 2017). Conflicts over access to and ownership of land may subsequently arise as a result of displaced communities trying to settle in regions already inhabited by other ethnic groups.

Pastoralist groups in the ASAL areas engage in a practice in which they shift their herds throughout the year in search of pasture and water. Pastoralists may come into conflict with settled agricultural groups as a result of these movements since the latter may believe the herders are infringing on their property or depleting scarce resources (Little, 2019). Conflicts between communities and violent altercations can result from these tensions. Elsewhere, politicians and other powerful people have been known to stir up intercommunal conflict in an effort to seize power, win over supporters from particular ethnic groups, or draw attention away from more urgent problems. Politically motivated manipulation of land disputes worsens already existing tensions and prolongs the cycle of violence and relocation (Menkhaus, 2015). The ongoing conflicts over land displacement and dispossession as a result put a strain on interethnic relations and trust. It frequently causes social networks to be disrupted, community structures to be broken, and traditional livelihoods to be lost. As communities work to reconstruct their lives and assert their rights, these weakened social ties may provide fertile ground for additional intercommunal disputes. Subsequent Retaliations frequently create a cyclical problem.

Ethnic and Cultural Differences

In the ASAL of Kenya, ethnic and cultural differences have a significant role in predicting intercommunal confrontations. Relevant issues include group cohesion and identity, cultural misconceptions and prejudices, as well as marginalization and discrimination (Mutinda, 2019). The ASAL communities strongly embedded ethnic and cultural identities frequently function as indicators of social cohesiveness and group solidarity. However, ethnic distinctions can cause splits and exacerbate conflicts if they are overemphasized. Communities may prioritize their own interests and see themselves as unique, which can cause conflict and tension with other ethnic groups (Ardag, Cohrs and Selck, 2019; Vogt, 2019).

Furthermore, interethnic miscommunication and misconceptions can result from cultural differences, including language, traditions, and customs. These misunderstandings may be exacerbated by bias, inaccurate information, or a lack of

cross-cultural knowledge. As perceptions of the “other” may be clouded or skewed, these stereotypes can foster mistrust and fuel confrontations (Sax, et al., 2022). Ethnic and cultural differences intersect with socioeconomic disparities and marginalization in the ASAL where some ethnic groups may feel marginalized or discriminated against in terms of access to resources, services, and political representation (Wafula, 2020; Cheeseman, et al., 2013). This sense of exclusion can create a fertile ground for intercommunal conflicts, as communities vie for limited opportunities and resources (Mazrui, 2009).

Unequal Access to Socioeconomic Development

In the Kenyan ASAL, unequal access to socioeconomic development can have a substantial impact on conflict dynamics in a number of ways. Certain communities living in the ASAL territories may feel marginalized as a result of unequal access to essential amenities, infrastructure, education, and healthcare. (Mosol, 2022). Neglect and exclusion from development activities can lead to unhappiness and aggravate resentment (Dmello, 2019). As communities work to resolve their complaints and demand equitable access to resources, this feeling of exclusion can serve as a trigger for conflict.

In addition, economic discrepancies between various communities in the ASAL lands frequently result from unequal access to development resources. This manifests in the form of constrained economic opportunities, a lack of investment, and inadequate access to markets, which has the effect of increasing poverty rates and economic hardship among some populations (Galvin, et al., 2020). Furthermore, due to competition for few resources and employment opportunities, tensions and conflicts may arise between communities. Unhealthy rivalry for scarce resources in the ASAL lands, such as water, grazing land, and fertile soil, is also sparked by unequal access to development resources (Mwangi, 2020). This may result in disputes and conflicts over the distribution and use of natural resources, as well as conflicts between groups competing for these resources. In the ASAL areas, unequal access to development resources can also result in political fragmentation, whereby marginalized people look for political representation and influence to address their issues. As various groups contend with one another for control over resources, influence, and power, this may result in political tensions and conflicts (Achiba, 2019; East African Development Bank, 2019; Mkutu and Mdee, 2020).

Social cohesion can be hampered and intercommunal conflicts exacerbated in the ASAL regions by political fragmentation. With examples from North Ireland and Spain, literature reveals that communities who feel excluded from resources may grow resentful and hostile toward those who have better access to them (Norat, 2022). This



can lead to heightened ethnic or communal tensions, which, if not addressed, can escalate into intercommunal conflicts.

Unfavorable Government Policies and Governance

Intercommunal conflicts in the ASAL of Kenya are influenced by unfavorable government policies and governance in a number of ways, though they are connected to most of the problems mentioned above. Unfavorable government policies may contribute to the marginalization of communities in the ASAL lands, among other possible results (Kateiya, 2022). For example, policies that fail to consider the particular demands and difficulties that these communities experience may result in restricted access to vital services, infrastructure, and development possibilities (Sewell et al., 2019). As marginalized communities demand their rights and equitable treatment, this may lead to a sense of unfairness, irritation, and discontent, resulting in intercommunity confrontations. The distribution of resources like water, grazing land, or economic possibilities may also become unfair and unequal as a result. When communities compete for the few available resources and fight for their fair share, the sense of resource shortage leads to tensions and conflicts (Nyaoro and Golooba-Mutebi, 2015).

Inadequate governance and policies related to land and resource management do often contribute to conflicts. This Weak land tenure systems, unclear land ownership, and lack of effective mechanisms for resolving land disputes can result in ongoing conflicts over land boundaries, encroachment, and resource extraction (Muok, et al., 2021). These conflicts can be intercommunity in nature, involving disputes between different ethnic or communal groups over land and resources. In addition corruption and patronage in governance can exacerbate intercommunity conflicts in the ASAL lands. When government officials engage in corrupt practices, including bribery and favoritism, it reinforces inequalities and injustices in resource distribution (Haider, 2020; Hanti, 2022). This breeds resentment and mistrust among communities and can escalate conflicts as communities vie for access to resources or demand accountability from the government.

In addition, unfavorable government policies and governance can be exploited by political actors for their own interests. Politicians may manipulate intercommunity conflicts to advance their political agendas, mobilize support, or divert attention from governance failures. By fueling ethnic tensions or exploiting communal divisions, these actors exacerbate conflicts and deepen the mistrust between communities (Mitchell, 2023). Furthermore, inadequate conflict resolution mechanisms and weak institutions for addressing grievances contribute to the persistence of intercommunity conflicts. When communities have limited avenues for peacefully resolving disputes, conflicts are more likely to escalate into violence (Price, 2020). The absence of effective conflict

resolution mechanisms perpetuates cycles of violence, deepens divisions, and undermines trust in government institutions.

Opportunities in Management of Intercommunal Conflicts in ASAL

Resource competitiveness, racial tensions, lax governance, and socioeconomic inequities must be addressed if intercommunal conflicts in Kenya's ASAL regions are to be properly managed. The following are actions that the government and authorities can do to resolve disputes in the ASAL and promote peaceful coexistence.

Addressing Limited access to resources

Authorities and governments should improve accountability, build governance institutions, and ensure fair resource distribution in order to better manage resources. In order to reduce scarcity and encourage equal access to these resources, they should employ sustainable land, grasslands, forest, and water management methods. Following that, they should involve communities in deliberative procedures that guarantee their representation and engagement in resource management and dispute resolution.

Addressing Land Dispossession and Displacement

Government and authorities should consistently ensure that there are land reforms and reparations that address historical injustices in order to resolve land dispossession and displacement. They ought to acknowledge that protecting the rights of marginalized groups is crucial. There are mechanisms in place to settle land disputes and promote restitution processes, as well as transparent land allocation, acknowledgement of and adherence to customary land tenure systems. They ought to promote sustainable land management techniques, such as agroforestry, watershed management, and land rehabilitation, which can lessen resource scarcity and competition, as well as conflicts over land and resources. Development of accountability and openness by the Government should be done in order to strengthen and improve the institutions in charge of land. Conflicts relating to land can be avoided and resolved with the use of clear and accessible land registration systems, effective dispute resolution procedures, and fair land resource allocation frameworks. Additionally, the Government and authorities should support alternate means of economic support. In order to lessen communities' reliance on land resources and increase their resistance to uprooting and economic disempowerment, there should be income-generating activities, vocational training, and market access.



Addressing Ethnic and Cultural Differences

The Government and the stakeholders should encourage conversation and mediation initiatives among various ethnic groups to enhance understanding, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence in order to overcome ethnic and cultural disparities in intercommunal conflicts. To prevent cattle rustling and violent disputes, security measures including law enforcement and community policing should be strengthened. Affected communities must be encouraged to engage in discourse, mediation, and activities for reconciliation in order to firmly establish conflict resolution systems. This can help ease tensions and foster trust, and it should be guided by community leaders, traditional authority, and impartial third-party mediators. To promote understanding, to foster understanding and dispel stereotypes, the government should support polite and open communication amongst ethnic communities. Interethnic dialogue platforms, cultural exchanges, and community-based reconciliation programs can help to establish peace and heal divisions. Promoting actions that support social cohesiveness and a shared sense of identity, citizenship, and belonging could also serve as a guidance in this. It can be fueled by common cultural activities, infrastructural development initiatives, and initiatives that promote interethnic cooperation. To combat stereotyping and lessen prejudice, the stakeholders should advocate for education and raise knowledge about cultural diversity, tolerance, and respect for different ethnicities. This can be accomplished through educational programs, neighborhood workshops, and public awareness initiatives.

Addressing Access to Socioeconomic Development

Conflicts in the ASAL can be avoided, resulting in more sustainable and peaceful communities, by addressing unequal access to development resources and encouraging inclusive development methods. Governments and authorities should invest in infrastructure development on issues like water storage facilities, roads, schools, healthcare facilities, irrigation schemes, and market access in order to improve access to essential services and economic opportunities. This will help address unequal accessibility to socioeconomic development and reduce conflict in the ASAL. Additionally, it should support equitable and inclusive development policies that give underrepresented populations' needs first priority, and if appropriate, it should undertake specialized development programs and efforts to meet those needs. All stakeholders should be included in inclusive and participatory decision-making procedures that are used for resource allocation and development planning in this environment.

Addressing the Influence of Unfavorable Government Policies and Governance

The authorities should establish inclusive and equitable policies that emphasize the interests of communities in the ASAL and address their unique issues if they are to address

negative government policies and governance. This can be accomplished by building governance structures that encourage accountability, openness, and responsiveness to community demands. Governments should strengthen systems for including affected communities in resource allocation and policy formation. In order to increase the understanding of the particular dynamics and requirements of the ASAL communities, it should also make investments in the capacity building and training of government officials and administrators. Through effective anti-corruption measures, transparency, and accountability procedures, authorities should fight corruption and promote integrity in government.

Conclusion

The difficulties of resource rivalry, including land, ethnic tensions, unequal access to socioeconomic development, weak governance, and socioeconomic inequities, must be addressed if intercommunal conflicts in Kenya's ASAL regions are to be managed effectively. Sustainable conflict resolution and peacebuilding in these areas can be achieved by taking advantage of opportunities including sustainable resource management, interethnic dialogue, stronger governance and security, equitable socioeconomic development, and entrenching favorable governance institutions.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Israel's Relations with Emerging African States - In the Light of Some Hungarian State Security Documents from the First Half of the Kádár Era¹

Attila Novák²

Abstract:

Israel developed its relations with African countries relatively early. The initial boom in the 1950s was followed by a slowdown in the 1960s and then, in many respects, a standstill after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Israel was seen by many African countries as an anti-colonial power, which gradually changed over time. In 1957, the Jewish state recognized the independence of Ghana, and in 1958 it set up a separate organization, the Agency for International Development Cooperation (MASHAV), to assist the newly independent African states. In 1963, it established a new embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.

Based on newly discovered Hungarian state security documents, this paper will give an insight into how Hungary – as a member of the Soviet-led Eastern European socialist bloc – in the early 1960s and 1970s, viewed its relations with Israel and African countries, and the information and political-ideological patterns on which it based its approach. The state security surveillance (through the Hungarian diplomatic missions) later covered not only Israel, but also the American Jewish organizations which, according to the agencies, had been in contact with African states and organizations at the instigation of Israel. Archival sources with a strongly anti-imperialist tone and bearing the imprint of Soviet state security suggest that the treatment of Israel as an enemy occurred in this region before the 1967 break-up, i.e. the diplomatic freeze did not significantly affect the way the Jewish state's relations with the emerging African nations were viewed.

Keywords:

Africa, anti-Zionism, Israel, State security, Zionism

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Introduction

Hungary and Israel's Africa policy in the 1960s was based on completely different foundations, but they had common features dictated by the emergence of the new African states. The African countries that gained independence around 1960 triggered the interest of the Jewish state and the Eastern bloc, which, for different reasons, wanted to build trade and economic-political relations with the new countries. This also means, of course, that the African region has become a rivalry between different blocs and countries, fighting for influence and sometimes even for the displacement of each other.

So Hungary – within a closed political and economic system – sought to establish good relations with Africa. While the Socialist world preferred the post-colonial states because of their real or perceived anti-Imperialism, Israel's search for alliances because of its isolation made it a partner for the African states. After the Six Day War of 1967, and especially after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel had to reposition itself in Africa, and not only with the so-called Black African countries, but also with the otherwise problematic Republic of South Africa.

In our study, we attempt to reconstruct, with the help of Hungarian state security sources, how the Hungarian state, especially some of its diplomatic and state security actors, viewed Israel's Africa policy, and how Israelis (diplomats and civilians) positioned Africa from Israel's point of view, and what was the framework in which this foreign policy could be inserted. In this regard, I must say that, not being a scholar of Africa, the framework of perspectives was developed through the study of Jewish and Israel-related archival sources in Hungary and Israel. It is also important to note that there is still a lot of research to be done on this subject, a good deal of the relevant material on this topic is still unexplored.

Excursus: Israel's Policy in Africa

In order to better understand the course of events, we need to know the history and the essential features of Israeli policy towards Africa in the period (albeit briefly). The long-awaited opening up of Israeli policy towards Africa was a consequence of the country's reduction of its foreign policy isolation. It had its antecedents, as the leading figures of Zionism were sympathetic to Africans, from Tivadar (Theodor) Herzl to many others, even Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky, the founding father of the right-wing Zionism took a stand against the slavery of Americans of African descent, and David Ben Gurion also had great sympathy for Africans and high hopes for the whole region.

According to Israeli historian Zach Levey, Israel's Africa policy was also motivated by certain illusions, believing (on the Israeli side) that the Jewish state could be a kind of proxy for the West against Nasserism, China and the Soviet bloc's encroachment into Africa. On the other hand, at the same time, Israel was shying away from a traditional imperialist role. This policy was successful for a long time, but at the same time, after

the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, one African country broke off relations with the Jewish state, and after the 1973 Yom Kippur war, 22 countries did so.³ The Arab countries – especially Egypt – were also present in the region, had a huge influence on these countries and wanted to convince Africans that Israel was nothing but an imperialist and colonialist state of European white settlers. These influences prevailed, for example, in January 1961 when Ghana, Guinea and Mali called the Jewish State the African pillar of Imperialism. The AAPSO (Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization), a non-governmental international body, has repeatedly condemned Israel: in April 1960 and at the 4th AAPSO Conference in 1965, Israel was described as a threat to regional and world peace and security. After 1973, oil from the Arab countries reached Africa, and by 1981 it had reached the continent to the tune of USD 1.67 billion. In terms of lending, Israel had its successes: between 1958 and 1966, Israel lent USD 199 million to 10 African countries, but between 1959 and 1967, USD 617 million came from the Soviet Union, while the Eastern Bloc states (outside the Soviet Union) lent USD 277 million. China alone lent more than \$300 million to the Sub-Saharan region.

By contrast, David Ben-Gurion, who was Prime Minister of Israel until June 1963, was convinced that African countries wanted to draw from *halutziyuth*, the ideal and practice of Zionist pioneering, and such conviction, alongside *Realpolitik*, drove his rapprochement, driven by the Israeli political elite.

The first Israeli consulate in Africa was established in Ghana in March 1957. Israel launched aid programs, winning the sympathy of the local elite. Egypt's arrival in Accra, Ghana's capital, only a year later bought Israel time. In 1957 Israel sent Ehud Avriel as its ambassador to Ghana, Liberia and Congo.⁴ Avriel (1917-1980) was no stranger to Hungary, having been Israel's first ambassador to Budapest and Prague. The Israeli diplomat, who had also negotiated with the leading Hungarian Communist politician, Mátyás Rákosi, presented his credentials in the Hungarian capital in February 1949, but after that he was mainly in Prague. He was succeeded in Budapest in July 1950 by Shmuel Elyasiv, and Ehud Avriel continued his long diplomatic career, which found him in Africa in the second half of the 1950s. From February to March 1958, Foreign Minister Golda Meir visited Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal.

Interestingly, the successes of Ghana and others are contradicted by the fact that Ghana was a signatory to the 1961 Casablanca Conference, where Israel was condemned. But such withdrawals did not prevent the Jewish state from establishing diplomatic relations with 14-16 African states in 1960-1961. Later, Israel's attention turned to East Africa, especially Ethiopia. In 1964, Israeli soldiers trained Kenyan officers, and in 1966 Israel established military cooperation with 17 African countries. At the same time, the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia did not want to be left behind,

³ In March 1972, Ugandan President Idi Amin Dada expelled all Israelis from his country.

⁴ Avriel was Ambassador to Ghana, Liberia and Congo until 1960, after which he became Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then held Ambassador positions in other countries.



supplying arms to Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda. In 1967, Israel's successful diplomacy in Africa came to an end: 29 of its 96 diplomatic missions were in Africa.

The big question – and it is regularly raised in Hungarian state security documents – is what and who financed Israel's activities in Africa. Levey points to the fact that Israel could not persuade the West to finance its programs in Africa. The Jewish state was 'peddling' its bastion against the Soviets and China, but the British, for example, saw Israel as a threat to their African interests (especially in Kenya). In 1964, Ehud Avriel proposed ongoing consultations with the British Foreign Office, but this did not materialize. At the same time, there was a strong demand among Israeli policy-makers (also because of the past) that Africans should not be allowed to see Israel as a colonial power, a tool of British diplomacy.

Israeli lobbying was successful once, with the United States giving \$7 million for operations in Africa in 1965, but it was a one-off sum and the Jewish state only received it in 1967. The money was given to the *MASHAV* (International Agency for Development Cooperation), which was set up in 1955 after the Bandung Conference, but which began its real work – concentrating on Africa – in 1958 and can trace its origins back to this time.

State Security and Other Reports from Hungary before 1967

The first reflection of the Hungarian state security on Israel and the African countries, which we know of, comes from a report from May 1960, written by Zoltán Dohány, the secretary at the Hungarian embassy in Tel Aviv, who was also a police captain, and whose pseudonym was István Balogh.⁵ The police officer working at the (so-called) Hungarian Residency in Tel Aviv, i.e. the intelligence department, reported on the meeting of the Socialist International in Haifa, from which Anna Kéthly (1889-1976), a veteran Hungarian Social Democratic politician in exile, had been forced out: (allegedly) the local Hungarian diplomacy managed to get the Israeli side to withdraw its invitation. For the first time in its history, the Socialist International held a congress in a non-European country in Haifa in April 1960, which was a great international success for Israel. In his report, the police officer noted that, “*The sole aim of the congress is to fight Communism and to isolate it, especially in relation to the Asian-African countries.*”⁶ Although the report does not actually deal with Israel's policy on Africa, but with the attitude of the prestigious international socialist world organization towards Africa, the

⁵ Report. 20 May 1960. Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (Hereafter ÁBTL). 3.1.5.0-8-089/1.

The identification of “István Balogh” was carried out by the Hungarian historian István Pál (2018).

⁶ Report. 20 May 1960. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/1.

intelligence officer's irritation at the fact that this subject is being dealt with in Israel is strongly felt.

On January 7, 1962, Hungarian Foreign Minister János Péter (1910-1999) summoned Meir Sachar, Israel's representative in Budapest.⁷ Sachar, a man of Kibbutz Tel Yosef of Israel, was an interesting figure among the Israeli diplomats serving in Budapest⁸. He was a former left-wing *kibbutz* member, also sympathetic to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, who found it difficult to accept the Hungarian socialist foreign policy reality that did not want to approach to Israel. In the discussion on Hungarian-Israeli family reunification and the clarification of the tasks of the Israeli ambassador in Budapest, the ambassador – who meanwhile, was being lectured by the Hungarian minister – demonstrated the 'progressive' nature of Israeli foreign policy, and one example of this was the Israeli position on the condemnation of the South African racism. Naturally, the Hungarian Foreign Minister was not convinced by this line of argument and kept repeating that if one looks at what the Israeli delegation votes on in the UN, one can see that it always takes a stand against 'progressive proposals.' "*And the representation of the Southern African Union and China is now in a position in the UN where even traditional colonial powers cannot maintain their old positions on these issues,*" he said. Although the criticism was more about the different attitude towards the Arab countries and the too close Israeli embassy connection to the Hungarian Jewish community according to the head of the Hungarian diplomacy. It is no coincidence that there was not complete harmony on this issue either, since the two countries represented completely different interests in African countries.

The Hungarian diplomatic mission in Israel, which was constantly monitoring the Hungarian-speaking community in Israel (including mainly the resident intelligence service), came into contact with entrepreneur Alon Moshe sometime in 1962.⁹ Moshe, who had left Hungary in 1935 and moved to what was then Palestine, lived in Israel until 1955, after which he left for Liberia in West Africa, where he worked as a road contractor and owned several hotels. Moshe suggested that as an intermediary (and with his money) he would like to be involved in establishing business relations with Hungary. He claimed to have met Ferenc Münnich (1886-1967), who was the President of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic until September 1961, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík (1891-1978) and Dániel Nagy (1910-1983), Vice-President of the Presidential Council, who were visiting Liberia in the second half of 1961. He tried to "do a service" for the Hungarians, and (allegedly) Endre Sík welcomed and supported his visit to Hungary in early September 1961. Moshe repeatedly claimed to his partner that he could arrange many things 'in Africa' and through his Swiss

⁷ Memo of 26 January 1962, Budapest. ÁBTL O-12/233 Shachar Meir.

⁸ Shown here on a visit to a cooperative in Hungary (this is the only photo that survives). Anonymus (n.d.) digitalized a photo about this occasion.

⁹ Alon Moshe is an Israeli citizen. Summary. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/1. The case of "Abraham" Hungarian emigration to Israel.



capitalist interests. The entrepreneur must have been inaccurate, because we know of a Hungarian government delegation in Liberia in early 1960 and in December 1962. The first time they visited Guinea and Ghana, the second time they visited the Republic of Guinea, the Republic of Mali, the Republic of Dahomey, the Republic of Ghana, Nigeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and the Kingdom of Morocco.¹⁰ As a result of the opening up, Hungarian foreign affairs officials also travelled to Congo, Somalia and the Malagasy Republic (early name of Madagascar) in the following months.

In August 1963, in a report signed by police lieutenant colonel Tibor Vadász (BM III/I Group Headquarters), a so-called “social contact” reported in detail on Israel's relations with African neutral countries.¹¹ According to the informant, Israel built up its relations with these countries under duress, forced to do so by threats from Arab countries. It is alleged that, at the suggestion of a senior Israeli foreign affairs official of ‘Czechoslovak origin,’ the African countries were approached in turn and offered their help for development. Various Israeli delegations and committees travelled to African countries and concluded scholarship contracts and agreements on scientific and technical assistance. An agreement was concluded with Ghana to establish a shipping company. Ghanaian experts in Israel have studied border security, in particular the *kibbutzim* on the borders. “*Like Israel, the border is defended by young people settled in ‘cooperatives’ on the border, who also serve their military service by working in the ‘cooperative’.*”¹² At the same time, the social contact reassured the Hungarian Interior Ministry that Israel's relations with Africa are more insignificant than the outside world thinks, that the Jewish state only spends 7 million dollars a year on this, and that plans for “penetrating” Abyssinia have been developed in vain, but the necessary 3 million dollars have not been secured for this purpose. As the Hungarian police lieutenant colonel put it: the information has not been verified, but it comes from a reliable source.

Although diplomatic relations existed between the two countries before 1967, a 1963 secret document, probably translated from Russian but intended for Hungarian domestic use, was entitled the revealing title “Informative Report on the Subversive Activities of Foreign Zionist Centres,” expressed its views in the most virulent anti-Israel and anti-Zionist terms.¹³ According to the document Israel, which is seeking to undermine the anti-colonial and colonial liberation movements, not only wants to join NATO, not only wants to conclude military agreements with France and Germany and not only wants to join the European common market, but is ‘invading’ Asian and African countries.

¹⁰ Dr. Endre Sík, Minister of Foreign Affairs: The Main Guarantee of Peace and Human Progress: The Strength of a United Socialist Camp. (Népszabadság, 1960, p. 1; Népszabadság, 1962, p. 1).

¹¹ 26 August 1963 Report. Subject: Israel's policy towards African neutral countries. ÁBTL 3.2.5 O-8-301/1 “Herzl Tivadar” – Zionist organisations.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ ÁBTL 3.2.5 O-8-301/1. “Herzl Tivadar” – Zionist organisations.

The socio-political network of Israeli ambassadors (or *chargés d'affaires*) accredited to Budapest was important. David Giladi (grandfather of the Israeli politician Yair Lapid; 1908-2009), who was sent to Budapest after Sachar and served as the last ambassador to Hungary between 1964 and 1967 before diplomatic relations were severed, was a colorful personality and was welcomed by the Jewish society of Budapest (Novák, 2022). In late May 1965, he was received by Deputy Foreign Minister Béla Szilágyi (1908-1995), together with Eliezer Doron, Head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry's Eastern Europe Department.¹⁴ Doron – who became head of the department shortly after Moshe Avidan (Új Kelet, 1964, p. 2) – and who, according to his own account, had come to Hungary in an 'unofficial capacity,' had intended to visit other Eastern European countries on his trip. Doron, who believes that Israel should buy arms (we are talking about buying) from any country that sells them because of the Arab threat, criticized several Eastern European leaders, including East German President Walter Ulbricht, who was visiting Cairo, for his joint statement with Egyptian President Nasser. He said that it was no wonder that Israel would seek the help of Western countries in such circumstances. The Hungarian deputy foreign minister rejected Doron's position on the GDR and the United Arab Republic and criticized the country's 'secret agreement' with Konrad Adenauer. He did not explain this, so perhaps he was referring to the 1952 reparations agreement. Doron, who was not critical of the Eastern European countries, told Szilágyi that the Hungarian side was certainly aware that “*especially the black African countries were receiving large loans, investments, technical and scientific assistance, also from French and American sources.*”¹⁵ He also offered this assistance to Hungary, which Szilágyi rebuffed. In all the high-level meetings, the issue was why Hungary was sending only an envoy to Tel Aviv and why it was forcing Israel not to send an ambassador-level diplomat to Budapest itself. Budapest has usually explained this (unofficially, of course) precisely by its alignment with the nonprogressive in Israel and by the fact that the Jewish state is a colonial and 'imperialist power.'

A completely different type of state security reports was presented by the Hungarian mission in Tel Aviv, which was made mainly with Israelis of Hungarian origin. In the mid-1960s, Sándor Kovács, a cultural attaché who went by the pseudonym Pál Egri, played a prominent role in obtaining information. Kovács met with the Israeli journalist of non-Hungarian origin, Simon Shamett (1904-?) in December 1965.¹⁶ The attaché was a regular information-gatherer whose main interest was in the renewed relations between Israel and West Germany, which were irritating the entire Eastern Bloc. Shamett spoke about several issues, though they were not central ones, and were reported extensively in the Israeli press. He told of the plans of President Zalman Shazar (1889-1974) to visit several African countries in the summer of 1966, but the “Africans” had turned him down. Shamett attributed this to the fact that the Jewish state had not

¹⁴ Report. 29 May 1965. ÁBTL 0-13 612. Personal file of Dávid Giládi.

¹⁵ Report. 29 May 1965. ÁBTL 0-13 612. Personal file of Dávid Giládi.

¹⁶ Report. 22 December 1965 Subject: the case of Simon Shamett. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2
The case of “Abraham” Hungarian emigration to Israel.



shown enough ‘radical behavior’ on the Rhodesian issue, had not broken off diplomatic relations, and called the new Rhodesian regime illegal (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1965). Therefore, African countries are more oriented towards Nasser’s Egypt, which is “radical” on the Rhodesia issue. *“Regardless, African countries still require Israeli economic aid and Israel will need an additional \$100 million by 1966 to complete the investments it has begun. One of the purposes of Finance Minister Sapir’s visit to the United States was to obtain that \$100 million. According to Samett, the trip was successful in this respect because the UJA /United Jewish Appeal/ is raising the amount in addition to annual contributions...”* – declared Shamett.

Shamett gave information about Africa to the embassy’s intelligence officer on another occasion: in April 1966, when they met in a café in Tel Aviv.¹⁷ The main topic was, of course, the development of the Federal Republic of Germany (GDR)-Israeli relations, the breakdown in these relations and the reasons for this. Shamett was present at the Embassy’s reception on 4 April, which the Hungarian mission in each country gave to mark the liberation of the country. The journalist reported that Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (1895-1969) and Foreign Minister Abba Eban (1915-2002) will travel to African countries during the summer. They will be mostly busy in Nigeria and one other country, where they will assess the effectiveness of the use of Israeli aid and decide whether to maintain or increase it. Eshkol is not yet travelling to Ghana, but the large Israeli state construction company Solel Boneh has received new orders for further construction from Ghana. It is worth noting that, although African relations were of some interest to the diplomatic correspondent, they no longer appeared in the report’s summary, but rather Israel’s relations with the socialist countries and the Arab world were emphasized. Shamett continued to be a valuable source of information, meeting the Hungarian diplomat at the Rison Cellar restaurant on 26 May.¹⁸ Shamett also spoke in detail (among other topics) about Eshkol’s trip to Africa, making it abundantly clear that the trip was aimed at strengthening Israeli influence in Ivory Coast, Liberia, Leopoldville in Congo and Kenya. The visit to Uganda is not considered a sure issue, given the ‘complicated’ situation there. According to Shamett, these countries owe Israel a total of \$100 million, but there are also problems with the investments of Solel Boneh, the Mayer brothers¹⁹ and the Federmann company (Israeli companies also operating in Africa). On the African aid structure, he said that 60% of this large sum came from US sources, 20% from other Western countries and only 20% from Israel.²⁰ Although other European issues (Foreign Minister Aba Eban’s planned visit to Warsaw, the Israeli-Syrian border tension and the World Jewish Congress conference in Brussels at the end of the

¹⁷ Report. 12 April 1966. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2.

¹⁸ Report. 27 May 1966. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2.

¹⁹ The Mayer brothers, an Israeli entrepreneur in Africa, started in the late 1950s, their investments were dependent on Israeli policy, with materials and construction workers coming from Israel. The Israeli government often financed not only the sister projects but also the company itself.

²⁰ Sándor Kovács notes that, *“This information is supported by the fact that both Mayer and Federmann are currently in the country mentioned above.”* Ibid.

summer) were again a priority, Israel's African policy was also highlighted in this report. The situation was similarly assessed by two Hungarian officers from the Ministry of the Interior's III/I-5-T subdivision²¹ at the end of June 1966²², who found Israel's African policy "remarkable" and asked for more detailed information "as far as possible."

Perhaps the journalist did not know well, Eshkol, who later visited the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Congo (Leopoldville), Madagascar, Uganda, Kenya and Senegal in May and June (and 6 other African countries have invited him), was not accompanied by Eban. He became Foreign Minister in February and had visited African countries in 1969 and 1971 (among others) (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 1966).

In 1966, the embassy's attention was also directed towards Israeli Hungarians. This is how Dezső Hermann, a lawyer from Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca in today's Romania), who was a member of the Kasztner group and later a successful lawyer in Israel, came into the focus of attention.

But he also met Frigyes Naschitz, a writer and literary translator, who was also the Consul General of Iceland to Israel. In August 1966, a report of the meeting was signed by 'Dunai,' i.e. Police Lieutenant-Colonel Kálmán Csécsi, at which Naschitz spoke at length about Israel's relations with Africa.²³ The Hungarian intelligence officer was interested in how Israel could cover its aid to African, Asian and Latin American countries. Naschitz replied that the United States provides the funds for this and also mentioned that Israel would like to employ some of its surplus labour (including intellectuals) in the developing world. Naschitz summarized the usefulness of aid to developing countries in several points. On the one hand, it increases the potential for Israeli exports and, on the other hand, it gives Israel political leverage in the region. Thirdly, it opens up the possibility of employing 'surplus' Israeli labour at home, as already mentioned. Naschitz also said that Israel has been negotiating with Denmark and Sweden to provide money for aid, which would be done without hiding where the money comes from, but with Israel as the executor of the "investments." The two countries have not accepted this 'offer,' but Israel has (allegedly) already proposed similar cooperation with West Germany, and the role of Britain has even been discussed, since the African countries in question are countries in the 'sterling zone.'²⁴ The summary report, in addition to reiterating what has been said so far, noted that 'developing Israeli aid to developing countries can be seen as a means of strengthening imperialist influence.'²⁵

In September 1966, at one of "Dunai's" meetings with Dezső Hermann, the issue of aid to Africa came up again.²⁶ Hermann confirmed that aid to African countries was

²¹ Police Majors Rezső Huller and Elemér Torsa.

²² Evaluation report. Budapest, 29 June 1966. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2.

²³ 13 August 1966. Tel-Aviv. Report. Meeting with Frigyes Nasitz. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ 13 August 1966. Tel-Aviv. Report. Meeting with Frigyes Nasitz. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2.

²⁶ Report. 24 September 1966. Tel-Aviv. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2.



financed by West Germany and that the Germans were now Israel's biggest supporters, as far as accession to the Common Market was concerned. In this context, the African strand was completely subordinated to Israeli involvement in Western European politics. At the same time, the un. Centre, the evaluators and chiefs of the Tel Aviv Residency in Budapest (III/I-5-T) had already asked "Danube" for clarification on the nature of the relationship between West Germans and Israelis in the context of aid to Africa.²⁷

We have no information on what information the Residency provided to the Centre (the intelligence headquarters) in Budapest on the development of Israel's relations with Africa, because on 12 June 1967 Hungary severed its relations with the Jewish State, the diplomatic missions in both countries closed their doors and the Residency in Tel Aviv was also liquidated.

What Remains: Post-1967 Information

At the same time, some documents survived from the post-1967 period, when Israel and the African countries became of interest to the intelligence services in a completely different context. We have found an information report dated 16 November 1971 on the "joint propaganda activities" of the Israeli embassy and American Jewish organizations among "black African" students.²⁸ The information was given to Kolozsi (who was an embassy intelligence officer and we do not know if it is a real name or a pseudonym) by a person named Larre²⁹, and was not from the embassy's own 'collection,' which was typical of the post-1967 period, with Hungarian intelligence officers working second and third hand.

According to Larre, the objective of the Israeli mission and the Zionist organizations is to "produce" a supply of pro-Israel intellectuals and businessmen in African countries who are "receptive" to Israeli initiatives and whose activities will help to achieve Israeli foreign policy objectives, in line with the "divisive" aspirations of Israeli foreign policy among African countries.³⁰ The foreign informant, who himself was a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and also relied on Palestinian students' testimonies, passed on data on the Israeli mission's "propaganda" and

²⁷ 17 November 1966. Order VIII/16 from "B." 16 November 1966. Order signed by Sergeant Major Rezső Huller and Police Captain Antal Kaltenecker. ÁBTL 3.1.5.0-8-089/2. The case of the Hungarian emigration to Israel "Ábrahám."

²⁸ Information report. Report to "comrade" Palotas (9-4/1971). New York, 16 November 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.5 O-8-301/1. 25 November 1971.

²⁹ We do not know exactly who Mr Larre was, but there was a Rene Larre (1915-1999), who was the chief financial counsellor at the French Embassy to the United States (1961-67), and the French executive director at the International Monetary Fund (1964-67). But he was no longer living in the United States in 1971.

If true, the information comes from an earlier period (Anonymus, n. d.).

³⁰ Information report. Report to "comrade" Palotas (9-4/1971). New York, 16 November 1971. ÁBTL 3.2.5 O-8-301/1. 25 November 1971.

intelligence activities among African students. The informant explained that the Israeli embassy works closely with Zionist and other Jewish organizations in the US to provide university and college scholarships for African students. The Israeli embassy people themselves, in an advisory and coordinating role, make nominative recommendations for students to be invited from each country – always taking into the account the state of bilateral relations with the country in question. Most of the scholars come from Senegal, Chad, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo at the invitation of American Jewish organizations. Larre also told Kolozsi that in the past two years, about 70 African students have been awarded scholarships at Columbia, Yale and New York universities. The funds for the scholarships are raised by the Bnai Brith Foundation, the Jewish Labor Committee and the AJC (American Jewish Committee) from their own resources and private donations. Larre also named the two Israeli diplomats who will liaise with the students on behalf of the scholarship recipients and give educational lectures on the Jewish state. They also organize invitations for African students to visit Jewish families and invite them to events organized by Jewish organizations. They are also regularly invited to give “propaganda lectures” to other foreign scholarship holders, for which they are paid extra.

Summary

Until 1967, the Israeli-African relations were an important dimension, a “field of observation” for the Hungarian state security: Israel, seeking allies and building a political and economic zone of influence, was of interest to Hungarian politics, as it had similar ambitions, albeit with the permission and even support of the Soviets. Although the Kádár regime was recognized by Israel very soon after the 1956 revolution, the new leadership was isolated in foreign policy and wanted to exploit relations with the newly independent African countries. Israel, also isolated in its own region, sought economic and political influence in Africa, which it achieved with great success until 1967, but after the 1973 Yom Kippur War it found more difficult to achieve. At the same time, the political elite of some of the new African states themselves sought and found a model in Israel, which had created a prosperous and successful state from (so to speak) nothing, with fundamentally poor endowments. The nexus-building abilities of the Israelis were directly observed by Hungarian diplomacy and intelligence services for as long as possible. The diplomats and civilians did not admit that Israel's projects in Africa were not financed by Western countries, and almost all of them tried to convince (or even disinform) their Hungarian counterparts to the contrary. Generally speaking, the content and tone of the Hungarian reports were the usual, but the almost obligatory political suspicion and the content and style of the official anti-imperialist Soviet political propaganda were still sometimes interspersed with recognition and appreciation of the successful diplomacy of a small country surrounded by enemies, Israel.



Conflict of Interest

The author declares that no financial or conflict of interest was reported in the manuscript.

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Beyond Judgements and Emotions: Understanding the Koevoet¹²

László Pálfi³

Polish right-wing football fans were waving pictures of Janusz Waluś as a sign of support. His name is not widely-known: the Polish immigrant to South Africa wanted to stop the democratic transformation of South Africa, since he was afraid of the dissemination of communism due to his negative experiences in his original home country. Hence, Waluś assassinated Chris Hani, an influential communist member of the African National Congress (ANC). Waluś was released from jail in 2022.

There was another man, who was also released in 2022 in South Africa. His role is more important and complex when it comes to analysing the history of Southern Africa: Eugene de Kock, who received the nickname “Prime Evil” in the Western mainstream media. He is responsible for the death of many anti-apartheid activists and guerrilla fighters who were engaged themselves with the resistance against the white minority rule and racial segregation. De Kock grew up in an Afrikaner nationalist family, and as he became an adult man, it seemed to be one of the most natural issues to contribute to maintaining the system. Led by these intentions, he served in the South African Defence Force (SADF) in order to fight against the ‘roi gevaar’ (red danger) and ‘swart gevaar’ (black danger), which were the keywords for apartheid, used to describe the black nationalist and socialist movements.

Negotiating de Kock’s activities is a great challenge for experts. Many of them are biased by judgement and emotions; hence, Steve Crump took up a serious task when he wrote his paper about the special counter-insurgency (COIN) force of SWAPOL (South West African Police), the Koevoet (‘crowbar’ in Afrikaans). The outcome is more than remarkable: readers can gain genuine information and knowledge about the history of this controversial topic.

The author reveals his aim to distinguish himself from people without relevant experience, or those who tend to confabulate history: revisionists, academics, and armchair historians. (p. 3.) This study is built up on a solid basis of oral history: veterans of Koevoet talked about their war experiences and contributed by permitting the use of their photos from the Border War (1978-1984). All of these documents, which elevate the credibility, aim to have the readers involved in this part of war history. Diagrams

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceas.2023.3.3.245>

² Steve Crump: *Koevoet: South West African Police Counter-Insurgency Operations During the South African Border War 1978-1984*. Warwick: Helion & Company Limited, 2023 (paperback), Volume 1. ISBN 978-1-915070-56-2, pp. vi+60.

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with descriptions offer help to understand the analysis better, since this study contains numerous elements of military policy analysis.

The structure of the study includes eleven chapters (only eight of them have their own numbers). The chapters are organised in a chronological order, even though each chapter has been written on a different topic. Neither the Introduction, which is a separate chapter, did not get an own number, nor the pages presenting the armoured vehicles, insignia and uniforms. These pages are technically a separate part of the study that share additional pieces of information. The technical terms, along with their abbreviations, were collected in the Glossary, and the shortened forms are used in the main corpus. Readers may gain knowledge about the author in the Preface, in which Crump gives a short summary about his experiences in Africa. The story-telling part begins from the first numbered chapter.

Koevoet served in Namibia; nevertheless, the relevant experience of this unit came from the previous war in Rhodesia, namely the Bush War. One of the “Founding Fathers”, Eugene de Kock fought against the armoured opposition of Ian Smith’s white minority rule regime. This field recommended a great chance to develop martial and investigative skills. When South Africa decided to make South West Africa nominally independent in 1978, the war in Angola had been raging for four years. The anti-apartheid SWAPO’s (South West African People’s Organization) armoured wing, the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army of Namibia) was fighting on the side of the Angolan Marxist MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and its military wing FAPLA (People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola). South Africa, which depicted itself as an anti-communist country, intervened in the decolonization of Angola (Operation Savannah). For this reason, the presence of SADF on the northern fields of today’s Namibia was part of daily life.

The nominally independent South West Africa had its own police force, the SWAPOL, which was able to undertake only police-related tasks. Without considerable support from South Africa, the SWAPOL could not fight against the PLAN supported by the FAPLA, the Cuban forces in Angola, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China. Hence, the Koevoet was established in 1979 to support the apartheid regime, and to fight back the PLAN.

As the quasi predecessor of the Koevoet, the Ovambo Home Guard was less and less competitive with the Namibian insurgents; crossing the Red Line (defence system in the Northern part of South West Africa), they attacked farms owned by white people. De Kock, who moved to South West Africa, upgraded his skills by learning the methods and tactics of the COIN units, which were led by Nel. The South African government also behaved in a supportive way, as Colonel Johannes (Hans) Dreyer, who had a remarkable amount of experience from the South African Police Security Branch, became the leader of the Koevoet.

All the armies were suffering from the lack of a good amount of equipment. The Casspir vehicles and helicopters rapidly became an essential part of the Koevoet. Regarding the weapons, the situation was much different. Besides the original equipment, AK-47 guns and other Eastern Bloc weapons were collected from the rivals. Hence, in this sense the Koevoet shared similarities with the African indigenous insurgent organisations, or any other more important guerrilla army.

The Koevoet was a phenomenon that could not be put into the basket of “tools of the apartheid.” Archival sources from the countries of the Cold War Eastern Bloc share the observation of their diplomats that 30-40 per cent of the Koevoet soldiers were black. These African indigenous men had various motivations. One of these motivations was survival: De Kock experimented in Rhodesia and Zambia with enrolling captured soldiers of the enemy in the SADF. These soldiers played a key role in exploration. The other cause is connected to the population of Namibia: the SWAPO was originally an organisation of the Ovambo tribe, the majoritarian ethnic group (49-53 per cent of the total population between the 1940s and 1980s) could be seen as a prospective oppressor in the future. Crump’s paper contains pictures about the Koevoet’s Ovambo soldiers; in conclusion, there must have been a minority among this tribe which opposed the liberation movement.

The star of Koevoet was rising until the mid-1980s; the Lusaka Accordance, the linkage principle, and the collapse of Dirk Mudge’s government were obvious signs of transition. Therefore, the South African troops were withdrawn from Angola, and the tasks of the Koevoet were also reduced to domestic activities within the borders of South West Africa. On the other hand, anti-terrorist warfare remained its most relevant task. While the pro-South Africa regime was making several efforts to create a more humanistic image (allowing non-whites to watch movies in cinemas, visit restaurants, etc.), the Koevoet did not change their brutal methods and the way the dead bodies of PLAN guerrillas were transported across the country.

Today’s Namibia struggles with two major controversial political issues: 1) The possible redistribution of land owned by white farmers and entrepreneurs; 2) The pension salary and veteran status of former soldiers of the Koevoet. Regarding the second issue, only those soldiers are eligible who served between 1988 and 1990, while the rest of them cannot apply for these benefits. The same is true for veterans of the South West African Territorial Force. Even though the Namibian society is the most peaceful among its post-apartheid counterparts in South Africa and Zimbabwe, tensions are still palpable, the PLAN veterans having distanced themselves from the former in September 2022. As a result of memories of the bloody war, the Namibians remained firm on this issue. Hence, I recommend Steven Crump’s paper to everyone who wishes to understand the war history of apartheid and its frontline states, and especially to those who are passionate about genuine, first hand experiences.



Book Review “Russia in Africa. Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender?” by Samuel Ramani¹²

Nikolay Medushevsky³

The examination of the African countries' role in the system of international relations and its investigation become more relevant than ever before in African studies.

Several explanations are found for this, which, in our opinion, can be linked to the concept of a "compression of the world", rooted in the works of the Anglo-American Scientist R. Robertson. He characterized the process of globalization as "the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole."

This process began long before its scientific explanation and was associated with the development of communications and the communicative space. Consequently, this facilitated the development of different types of technology.

The process of globalization can hardly be claimed as equal and simultaneous to all territories. However, it is quite obvious that at certain points in history, certain states become their engines and spread influence to the periphery by attracting resources, investing, and sharing technology.

In this regard, the African region, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, has long remained on the periphery of the globalization process, and its countries have been predominantly objects of influence rather than full-fledged subjects of international relations.

In the XXI century, a tendency to change is deploying, and there are several reasons for this. First of all, the world economy in its development requires an increase in human capital, therefore, it is gathering new regions that meet the principle of value for money. Many Asian countries by the end of the twentieth century had entered the post-industrial era and the production of goods and services required by the world economy on their territory became more expensive. This led to the need to develop new labor markets, including in African countries.

The second point is related to the development of logistics. The intensity and scale of goods transportation require the creation of new logistics routes. Accordingly, their development cannot bypass the territory of the African continent, and their

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2023.3.3.246>

² Samuel Ramani: *Russia in Africa - Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. ISBN 978-0-19-774459-8, pp. 320.

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creation leads to the development of territories and their increasing participation in the process of globalization. The third point relates to demographic issues. After the decolonization of Africa in 1960, the population of the continent doubled, which led to intensive migration and increased consumer activity.

Under these circumstances, in the 21st century, the African continent has acquired key importance in global development and has become an integral part of it. This status, in turn, has become an object of heightened interest for global powers interested in joining this process and, if possible, moderating it in their interests. Yet, this moderating is no longer ideological, as it was during the Cold War. Nowadays it is related to the integration of individual countries of the continent into geocentric economic systems with centers in Paris, London, Brussels, New York, Beijing, Moscow, or Delhi, as each of these centers seeks to create its own economic space with resources and human capital. This desire creates fierce competition for partnerships with African states, which can now choose their partners and make demands.

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In this regard, the book "Russia in Africa. Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender?" is particularly interesting as it illustrates an understudied dimension of the interaction between African countries and one of the key global players - Russia. Moreover, it should be noted that even Russian contemporary studies have not been conducted, particularly a deep and inclusive analysis, which combines historical background, history of cooperation, analysis of legal documents, analysis of cooperation strategies, and even elements of forecasting the development of interaction.

At the same time, it can be stated the timeliness of the publication of this book from the point of transformation of the world order. In this regard, Russia's current position and strategy should be elaborated.

Imposed under sanctions and diverged with the Western political and economic space, Russia expectedly realized a "turn to the East", which was associated with building closer relations with China. Nevertheless, from the point of the Russian leadership, it would be short-sighted to limit to this area of cooperation. In this sense, successful attempts were made to establish relations with Iran, India, Turkey, the Persian Gulf countries, and many other important regional players. African countries were no



exception in this context and Russia hosted the first Russia-Africa summit in 2019, where almost all countries of the continent were represented and a large number of deals were concluded.

It can be stated that from this moment a new stage of close cooperation between Russia and many African countries has begun and their number is only growing, as demonstrated by the second summit in 2023. The success of cooperation was because the Russian state and large corporations made extremely favorable offers to African leaders in the field of infrastructure development, investment, supply of arms and technology, transfer of production facilities, joint development of the field, etc.

Meanwhile, Russia's position on political issues is crucial. Along with condemning the practices of colonialism and neo-colonialism of Western states, modern Russia, unlike the USSR, does not impose any conditions on African leaders to transform their political regimes, even when they are authoritarian, accepting all their traits. In this respect, Russia prevails over Western states, and especially France and England, which have long acted as metropolises for African territories, and after the end of colonialism, tied young African states to their political and economic systems and blocs, often taking action to support or overthrow certain regimes.

Many contemporary African states have spoken out against such dependence, examples of which include Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, CAR, Gabon, and several other countries. Russia has supported them in this context. This strategy has served to boost the importance of cooperation with Russia from the perspective of many African states leaders and has raised the prestige of Russia in the minds of ordinary Africans.

Another fundamental moment in the development of Russian-African cooperation was related to the expansion of BRICS, including Egypt and Ethiopia. This process was perceived by the African community as extremely affirmative and was seen as ascending to the global economic space, bypassing the global economic institutions that discriminate against African states. Besides, Samuel Ramani rightly points this out, the experience of cooperation of African states and liberation movements with the USSR, debts to which were forgiven by the contemporary Russian government in 2019, is also important for modern bilateral cooperation.

As a result, the author reasonably writes about it at the end of his book; cooperation between Russia and African countries has been developing very intensively and forms a crucial political agenda for the entire world development, both in political and economic aspects.

Book Review of “Wartime North Africa: A Documentary History, 1934–1950” Edited by Aomar Boum and Sarah Abrevaya Stein¹²

Bálint Somkuti³

The reviewed book offers a modern interpretation of the events of World War 2 in North Africa and its aftermath using documents from 1934 until 1950. The above sentence is both a praise and a critique of this unique volume which presents mostly English translations of original North African documents of the era for the first time.

Its modernity is visible almost immediately after the start of reading. Unlike previous centuries’ and decades’ history related books and papers it does not focus on institutions, states or the event itself but on everyday humans. How did these people, local population of North Africa interned, or displaced persons even prisoners lived and survived this inhumane period, in a barely researched area during the tumultuous times of before and after the great cataclysm.

And here we immediately encounter the limits of the given approach. Though the title and the introduction promises a glimpse into the lives of women and men, and children with various religious and ethnic background, yet the material’s significant majority deals with the once 500 000 strong Maghreb Jewry. Naturally it wouldn't be a problem in itself since the half million who used to live in the cities like Algiers, Casablanca and other exotic dwellings are gone by now almost without a trace. Smaller part of them died in one of the least known areas of the Holocaust, “the lucky survivors” were pressurized or to be more precise were forced to leave their ancestors’ land and move to Israel.

The book consists of various documents in chronological order from the era meticulously translated into modern English. The sources have been translated from Arabic, French, Hebrew, Italian, North African Judeo-Arabic, Moroccan Darija, Spanish, Yiddish even Tamazight (Berber), as well as transcribed texts from English.

Official reports of events, other reports, pamphlets, poems, newspaper articles, even parts of diaries show a vivid picture of a bustling, lively and vibrating social and economic life endangered by Hitler's rise and later the start of the Second World War. Touching personal stories like the one about a Paris educated writer and artist selling out his poems in pamphlets about the danger the modern “Haman” means for Jews of the word (p, 24). Later realizing that his writings can cause him serious trouble he bought

¹ DOI: <https://doi.org/10.59569/jceeas.2023.3.3.247>

² Aomar Boum and Sarah Abrevaya Stein: *Wartime North Africa: A Documentary History, 1934–1950*, Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2022. ISBN: 9781503611511, pp. 384.

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them back and recklessly tried to destroy them all, some of them miraculously survived. It is heartbreaking to see the events leading to the destruction of this community through contemporary eyes. The racial laws of the collaborator Vichy-regime (p. 123), and the coming of the little known yet as cruel as anywhere else activities of SD Einsatz-Kommando Tunis SS (p.131-133) orchestrating the final solution in North Africa.

The continuous push to reduce Jewish rights in North Africa, the slow but steady strangulation of the 2000 years old communities and the tragic conclusion of the German occupation does not stop the reviewer wondering what else if anything else could have been done. The presented moving human fates are intertwined with stories about foreigners. A former member of the Spanish republican international brigades originally from Poland interned to Africa by French authorities (p. 317), a prisoner of war, a tirailleur, a Senegalese French soldier later the first president if independent Senegal (p. 63) and others all describe facets of history almost completely unknown.

It was a magnificent trip and at the same time a sorrowful journey that has led the reviewer through this world utterly destroyed by two waves of history. What a different title this book could have offered an interesting insight into the already gone world of the multiethnic North African life under French rule. Negotiating French rule, the clearly racist regulation of the Vichy regime is unexplainably little known in most parts of the world. How crooked that system was is clearly shown in a pamphlet my author uses fabricated primitive Arabic to attack the incompetence and the indecisiveness of the collaborators. Yet waiting for a detailed description of events promised by the title has left a continuous longing in the reviewer especially that the editors themselves have written in the preface that the area was populated by a huge number of different groups In the 16 years discussed in the book.

The reviewer must note that the definitively unknown concept of *négritude* presented by Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first Senegalese president would have had a more detailed presentation than a passing note (p. 39 and 63).

Unfortunately, the modern approach does not stop at the anomalies of the title. It is undeniably a dark side of an already sinister phenomenon, sexual assault in military conflicts that is. Yet it is unquestionably a part of it ever since wars have been started. That kind of surprise towards the fact that women and the girls between 15-50, in worst cases 7-77 are indeed endangered in military operations it's quite a shock. Sexual insults, violence, and rape was, is, and will be accompanying huge amounts of men living in extreme danger for longer period of times. As a side note, it is worth remembering the number of combat incapable American soldiers infected by sexual diseases were always higher than combat losses during the campaign in North Africa.

The other evidence pointing at the lack of the barest minimum of relevant military history knowledge and the overwhelming effect of preconceptions in the text is the highly questionable description of image 11 on page 165. According to it a German soldier offers a local a cigarette under the threat of violence. Be it from courtesy or

negligence the fact that a significant part of Arab locals logically preferred the unknown Germans to the known French colonists is not even mentioned. On the other hand, the alleged “rifle”, which is an MP38 or 40 submachine gun, is clearly unloaded as there is no magazine in the weapon. Not to mention its position which confirms the safe use of firearms. Would the soldier threaten the clearly local man with violence he had pointed the gun towards him. Loaded. It is the fact that the empty gun is pointing backwards that is proving he's benevolent, even more than the fact that he offers a cigarette especially given the probable language difficulties between the two.

To summarize the above a title like: The fate of Maghreb Jewry, or Eyewitness accounts: Events leading to the Holocaust and its aftermath in North Africa would have been much more fitting. While the translation of various first-hand accounts and documents from exotic languages is more than welcome, especially about the fate of the already completely disappeared yet for two millennia vibrating societies, a more balanced and detailed view of the described era and region would have been very much appreciated. Writing about wartime is unimaginable without knowing war.



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