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Dear Readers,

Dear Fellow Scholars,

As one of the co-organisers of the international conference entitled 'Counter-Terrorism, Technology and Development in Africa' held by the Africa Research Institute of the Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences at the Óbuda University (Budapest, Hungary) and the Center for Military Studies at the University of Stellenbosch (Stellenbosch, South Africa), let me greet you on the first page of this issue of the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies (JCEEAS)!

In September 2021 – as the first event since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bánki Donát Faculty of Mechanical and Security Engineering Óbuda University and the Center for Military Studies, University of Stellenbosch in April 2021 – more than 40 presentations in four panels were delivered by scholars and practitioners from all over the world, examining issues in the fields of human security, socioeconomics, technological development and cybersecurity, and leadership and corporate governance. Although the stimulating discussions and the exchanges of thoughts in the Question & Answer sessions cannot be reproduced, this issue of the JCEEAS tries to collect the written versions of some of the carefully selected presentations that covered numerous topics ranging from the more general approaches to the very particular issues of terrorism-related activities in Africa, as well as the roles and activities of various powers from and outside of the African continent.

The large number of applications, the variety of topics and the high standards of the presentations meant for us that the conference needs to be continued on a yearly basis but even before the second event, we did not want to let the discussions end, so the pages of the JCEEAS are offering an excellent opportunity to bring the topics and the findings to an even wider community as well as to give floor for a continued debate, though this time in a written format.

For all these, let me wish you all a great time reading, exciting discoveries and thought-provoking ideas!

Dr. Moses B. Khanyile, CD(SA)

Director, guest editor  
Centre for Military Studies  
Faculty of Military Science,  
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# Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

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## The Price of Instability

### Terrorism and Africa's Development<sup>1</sup>

Toyin Falola<sup>2</sup>

#### Abstract:

Africa's problems are compounded by terrorism — the use of violence to attain certain objectives, including but not limited to armed insurgency, and secessionist agitations. Terrorism is a consequence of the prolonged state of instability across the nook and cranny of the continent. Put simply, terrorism and underdevelopment are the prices that Africa pays for treating with levity the need for stability. Africa cannot continue this way. There needs to be a holistic approach to combatting terrorism. African states must adopt a united regional approach to combatting terrorism as insular national approaches have failed, even as new and expanding frontiers of cyber terrorism are fast gaining ground.

#### Keywords:

Africa; Nigeria; terrorism; insurgency; regional approach to combatting terrorism; secession.

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<sup>1</sup> Keynote Address at the 2021 International Virtual conference on Counter-Terrorism, Technology and Development in Africa; organized by The Centre for Military Studies, Stellenbosch University, South African Republic and the Institute of African Studies, Óbuda University, Hungary on 22 September 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Toyin Falola, DLitt. Professor, Jacob & Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities; University Distinguished Teaching Professor, University of Texas at Austin.



## *Introduction*

I applaud this event's organisers for continuing to oppose the tide of discouragement brought by the pandemic — they have put up a platform that convenes thinkers and change-makers from across Africa and the rest of the world to discuss urgent topics that affect our shared society. Despite the disruptions from current events, we have remained resilient. In this era of the new normal, we have to resume where we left off and continue to champion a positive course for our society's growth and development.

I am delighted to be here today, lending my voice to discussions about improving the African continent. Africa is my home, and I have never hidden either my love for it or my readiness to discuss progressive ideas that will bolster its growth and development. When I was invited to be the keynote speaker for this event, I recognized a terrific opportunity to rub minds with progressives from different spheres of life. Like me, they will stop at nothing until Africa truly reaches its zenith.

Although it gladdens my heart to be invited here to speak about the cost of Africa's continued instability, terrorism, and their effects on the continent's development, a part of me feels withdrawn and sad. We have returned to another forum that discusses Africa's ongoing problems, but we should have crossed this bridge long ago. However, I remain hopeful for our people's future, and I recognize that we must all come to terms with Africa's reality. Something as crucial as the safety of life and property is not something any nation or continent should handle with levity. After the September 11 terror attacks, states have focused their attention on ensuring a more secure society, and no African country should be left behind.

I am delighted that we are here today to crack open, evaluate, and proffer solutions for terrorism's menace, addressing how this threat has impaired Africa's growth and development. My duty here is simple, but it is not easy — this task must be clearly understood and handled with great caution, because Africa's development and growth depend on getting it right.

I am delivering this keynote address in two parts. The first part will address the current situation with terrorism and its different facets in Africa, discussing their continued predatory effects. The second part will address the current capacity of African countries and their ability to handle the multifaceted problems created by terrorism. It will consider how the continent can win the war against terrorism through other methods that complement conventional approaches.

I urge you all to follow closely. This discussion, unlike many others, goes to the root of Africa's developmental problems.

Different definitions have been used to describe what states, policymakers, citizens, and scholars consider to be terrorism. Like acts of terrorism themselves, this amorphous concept defies a single, encompassing explanation of its idea and acts.



However, different scholars have made some informed attempts that serve as a compass to make sense of activities that can rightly be called terrorism. This definition by Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas seems to offer some insight into understanding terrorism:

*Terrorism is the intended use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against non-combatants to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond the immediate victims.* (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2011).

Their definition accommodates different perspectives about what terrorism might be. First, it suggests that terrorism, unlike some other crimes, is not an impulsive act. It is a deliberate, strategically planned and orchestrated crime committed against a country and its people. The active nature of terrorism and the advance planning involved are some of the many reasons why the institutions and militaries of African states have had such a difficult fight.

Many of the unconventional methods adopted by terrorists involve sophisticated approaches that have become prevalent in many of Africa's developing countries (Spulak, 2015). Such countries find it difficult to respond with equal levels of activity and sophistication. This imbalance makes it much more challenging to fight these terrorists head-on.

The definition also notes that terrorism has an objective, which is normally political and religious. These objectives may not always be immediately evident, but they motivate every act of terrorism committed by a terrorist group. Terrorists want results from their actual or threatened destruction of life and property (Mertes et al., 2020).

The legitimacy of terrorist demands is the central point of conflict. The recurring objectives of many ideologically motivated terrorists often involve government takeover, the establishment of a religious state, the eradication of Western education, or control over a country's economic and political decisions (Mertes et al., 2020).

These demands are far beyond anything that either democratic or military governments can accommodate. At the very least, they ask that the administration of a state, its policies, laws, and the relationships among its citizens be handed over to outside forces that recognize no legitimately established authority. They threaten the basis of a government's authority and challenge its legitimacy and integrity. It is no wonder that terrorism is always addressed as war between governments and terrorist groups, and each state addresses terrorists directly to eradicate them and secure its national integrity.

State combat normally provokes aggressive responses from terrorist organisations, which has deadly and destructive outcomes that impair a country's growth and



development. These effects, driven by the existence of terrorism and the fight against it, have raised recurring concerns about Africa's growth.

Considering the rapid growth of terrorism on the continent, one is compelled to examine the possibility that African countries might inherently foster an ideal environment for the development of terrorist groups. To what extent has the African continent become fertile ground for terrorism?

The growth of terrorist activity is often ascribed to the instability that is prevalent in many African countries (Asongu et al., 2018). Recurring political upheaval combines with deplorable living conditions and the absence of basic social amenities to lay a foundation for terrorism in Africa. Political instability has weakened legitimate institutions and state security forces, encouraging citizens to take up arms either for defense against aggression from state forces or to demand the dividends of democracy from their country's government.

One such example is Libya, after the death of General Gaddafi. Incidents of civil unrest occurred due to human rights abuses before the General's demise, but the country was plunged into political turmoil and instability after his death. Conditions have continued to deteriorate into the present day, with active terrorist groups causing mayhem within the country (Kawczynski, 2011). A similar situation played out in Burundi under the reign of Pierre Nkurunziza, who unconstitutionally championed a third term in office and drove the country into a state of unrest (Nkurunziza, 2018).

Asongu has shared his own thoughts on the issue. He writes:

*The African terrain is also fertile for breeding terrorism because it is characterised by recurrent political strife and instability. Some recent cases for illustration include Burundi, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. The South Sudanese civil war and political crisis that began in December 2013 has resulted in hundreds of thousands of citizens being displaced across the country and thousands of death. (Asongu et al., 2019).*

Monumental cases of chaos and civil unrest have been recorded in the African countries of Libya, Burundi, Congo, Sudan, and others (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2015). There are many stories of African countries that collapse into states of unrest, and the source of these problems can be identified by looking in the right place.

It has been argued that political instability is not the sole source of terrorism — some remarkable arguments have suggested that good governance combined with unfettered freedom of expression can actually motivate terrorism (Elu and Price, 2015). That evidence has been generated by studies based on countries outside of Africa (Thompson, 2011) and it seems less applicable when considering African nations. Our experiences have shown that turbulent politics, economics, and other sources of instability precede the rise of terrorism in Africa (Cox et al., 2010). A large

part of the fight against terrorism on this continent can be won by dealing with the political and economic disasters that serve as a supply chain for terrorism.

Asongu has shared his own thoughts on how political stability and good governance can help to curb, eradicate, or reduce the possibility of rising terrorism:

*In so far as ordinary citizens have access to peaceful channels of resolving conflicts, they are not very likely to contemplate terrorism options as practical means to settling disputes. Within this framework... countries that promote good governance offer a peaceful environment for the settlement of conflicts. In other words, an atmosphere of good governance is not very conducive for domestic terrorism because citizens with grievances have peaceful options to making their voices heard (Asongu, 2019).*

The sobering reality is that African countries are in their current predicament due to poor governance and political instability. These shortcomings have been a key driver of terrorism on the continent that has affected its ongoing development. These crushing influences must be addressed before Africa can see any reasonable improvement.

## PART A

### *Faces and Facets of Terrorism*

The September 11 terror attacks took place outside of Africa, but they marked a new evolution of terrorism around the world (Paulson, 2002). It was elevated to become an issue of significant concern, but this national and international focus simultaneously strengthened the resolve of individuals behind terrorist attacks. They felt emboldened and encouraged to use lethal force, recognizing that their threats and deeds would draw the attention they sought from the people running political and economic affairs (Walsh, 2010).

Terrorism today has grown through an unbelievable geometric progression. Statistics from the 2020 Global Terrorism Index show that three African countries are among the worst hit by incidents of terrorism. They have suffered from a cumulative total of 863 incidents of terrorism, with 2,373 deaths and 1,287 injuries in 2019 alone (Global Terrorism Index, 2020). These countries are caught in a spiral of violence, with attacks and counter-attacks that have endemic consequences on societies, economies, and individuals directly and indirectly (Global Terrorism Index, 2020).

Three of the four deadliest terrorist organisations in the world — the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, Boko Haram, and Al Shabab — operate in different parts of Africa and carry out multiple attacks. Boko Haram alone saw a surge in the level of inter-state terrorism in 2019 (Global Terrorism Index, 2020).



Terrorist acts have affected many regions in Africa, interfering with economics, healthcare, education, and security. It harms the ability to conduct business, making investors reluctant to commit funds that could ensure meaningful national development. In heavily affected regions, such as the northeast part of Nigeria, these activities have displaced millions of people and disrupted normal daily activities (Salleh, M. A., Ahmad, A. A., and Jamil, S., 2018). Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons in Africa have been an underlying concern for the continent even as nations consider the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (Apanews, 2019).

Terrorism continues manifest in Africa through many different dimensions that pose problems for economic, structural, and human development efforts. African countries must all rise and answer the urgent call to oppose terrorism directly.

### ***Beyond conventional terrorism: Cyber-terrorism and its Growing Impact***

Many African countries have become familiar with terrorist activity that regularly results in actual or threatened attacks (Global Terrorism Index, 2020). These deplorable conditions show the sad state of security in Africa, but there seem to be even more problems ahead.

African countries already experience coordinated terrorist efforts that combine human resources and intellectual prowess to cause chaos in the country. However, a gradual escalation in methods and mechanisms have benefitted from technological innovation that can cause far more significant damage to economic, social, and human progress (Wilkinson, 2012).

Even now, terrorists in Africa have moved beyond the conventional methods of suicide bombings, raids on villages, brutal attacks where people are hacked to death, and bringing down airplanes and blowing up buildings. They are now believed to be actively involved in cyber-terrorism. This should keep us all awake at night, because these acts can be conducted on a scale that leaves everyone vulnerable. We all are potential victims of these new forms of terrorist attack.

The rapid technological developments in different parts of Africa have raised concerns that formerly beneficial internet connectivity could be deployed to achieve a terrorist agenda. These concerns have been strengthened by incidents showing that attacks around the world have moved beyond conventional terrorism. New terrorist acts might be committed from behind a computer screen with merely a keyboard and an internet connection.

Authors who have discussed cyber-terrorism have not come to a consensus about its definition. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation offers some insights to understand the term in the context of this address:

Cyber-terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs and data which result in violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. [The FBI offers this definition via its official website on <https://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm>.]

This definition explains how anti-state agents can affect data, internet, and computer infrastructure. Cyber-terrorism is every bit as premeditated as conventional methods, but it employs other tools to attack state institutions and private data. This has raised concerns over the possibility of African terrorists adopting technology to carry out their destructive plans. There is some disagreement about the time required to adopt this new technology, but few can argue that terrorists will not adapt and begin using these methods.

My point is that terrorists, although brutal and often fearless, make cognitive assessments of risk. They understand how security forces might foil their efforts. Their operations continuously reflect a desire to cause greater chaos without assuming increased risk (Wilkinson, 2012). As some countries see success against conventional terrorism, groups will switch to other methods for wreaking havoc. Cyber-terrorism offers that option.

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has explained how conventional terrorists might switch to cyber-terrorism as they suffer defeats in other venues.

Success in the "war on terror" is likely to make terrorists turn increasingly to unconventional weapons, such as cyberterrorism. Moreover, as a new, more computer-savvy generation of terrorists comes of age, the danger seems set to increase (Weimann, 2004).

This emerging method of terrorism offers many benefits that are missing from conventional terrorist methods. What is more disturbing is that the reach of such acts can be far greater than conventional methods. USIP has explained that cyber-terrorism has more attractive features than conventional terrorism. They write:

Cyberterrorism is, to be sure, an attractive option for modern terrorists, who value its anonymity, its potential to inflict massive damage, its psychological impact, and its media appeal. (Weimann, 2004).

Cyber-terrorism offers anonymity, impact, and affordability that is missing from conventional methods. When it is too risky for physical operations like blowing up a shopping mall, it becomes a contest between the between the government and the terrorists to determine whether superior cyber expertise can carry out damaging attacks on state infrastructure. This also offers anonymity to terrorists who might not even need to be within the jurisdiction of the affected area's authorities before committing terrorist acts.



The interconnected nature of the internet might allow a terrorist to plan a cyber-attack in Kenya while on vacation in Zimbabwe and then carry out the operation in Egypt. It is possible as long as a cyber-savvy terrorist has access to a computer and the internet. In these kinds of operations, it is almost impossible to trace the attacker. It is a herculean task to trace the attacker's identity. USIP has described the potential shocks that can be caused by such events:

The growing dependence of our societies on information technology has created a new form of vulnerability, giving terrorists the chance to approach targets that would otherwise be utterly unassailable, such as national defence systems and air traffic control systems. The more technologically developed a country is, the more vulnerable it becomes to cyberattacks against its infrastructure (Weimann, 2004).

Cyber-terrorism also offers the ability to harm a larger range of victims in a single attack. Internet connections are reaching farther into many African countries every day. Greater numbers of people have access to the internet (Chukwu, 2018) especially after the Covid pandemic drove digitalisation across every sector and greater connectivity through the internet of things. This implies that successful cyber-attacks have far-reaching implications.

A well-planned cyber-terrorist attack could bring down government agencies and destroy data (Chukwu, 2018). It could affect the military, different intelligence and security agencies, and parastatal organizations (Chukwu, 2018). Private companies could be attacked by these terrorists, and ordinary people might be victimized by these attacks. This kind of large-scale destruction — or threat of destruction — is a highly manipulative tool for terrorists that can allow them to influence government decisions to get what they want.

The relatively low cost of cyber-terrorism is another factor that makes it appealing to potential terrorists. It requires less money and fewer human resources than conventional methods (Weimann, 2004). This is an appealing opportunity for terrorists, and few would hesitate to seize it.

These points are not meant to dwell on the reasons why terrorists will adopt these novel and sophisticated methods of attack — and they almost certainly will — but to ask how robust Africa's technological infrastructure is. Can Africa's counter-terrorism forces defend against such a strike if there were actual plans for attack?

The answer to this question should inform the actions that must be taken by African leaders in response to terrorism.

### ***Predatory impact of terrorism on Africa's Development***

Terrorist threats and acts have a predatory impact on Africa's development. These crimes are directly responsible for death, destruction, and displacement across the continent. The effects of this death and destruction have a negative multiplier effect on the Gross Domestic Product of afflicted countries. In researching the cost of war in Darfur Sudan, Ali found that the war in Darfur cost Sudan 171% of its GDP in 2003 alone (Ali, 2013).

The lingering presence of terrorism in any country will always take its toll on growth and development. In explaining how terrorism affects Foreign Direct Investments, Bandyopadhyay states that terrorists understand the many ways in which their activity harms an economy. They exploit this weakness without remorse because it helps them achieve their political or economic agenda:

Terrorists are well aware of the potential economic harm their attacks can cause and view these consequences as pressure besieged governments to concede to their demands (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011).

Chuku et al. have explained that the economic impacts of terrorism are most prevalent through four different channels. First, there is a direct impact on the economy of a terrorist-afflicted country through vast destruction of life and property. Second, every government's need to combat terrorism leads to counter-terrorism expenditures that are primarily considered to be non-productive. This money is drawn from other developmental budgets, diverting funds from "production-related activities to defence-related activities."

The third effect is that terrorist activity creates economic risk and uncertainty, lowering the income of citizens and reducing their consumption, savings, and investments. The risk and insecurity in a country targeted by terrorists will force foreign investors to redirect their investments to places where the risks are much lower. The fourth and final effect of terrorist activity hurts critical sectors of the economy, including tourism, agriculture, and the financial sector (Chuku et al., 2019).

Recent statistics from the Global Terrorism Index show that terrorism's impact has decreased across the globe for the past five years, but this has not ameliorated terrorism's continued impact on economies. Despite this decrease, the 2019 Global Terrorism Index still says that five of the ten countries most affected by terrorism's economic costs are in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a 47.1% increase in the economic impact of terrorism (Global Terrorism Index, 2020). There is still a long way to go to salvage the continent's economy, and efforts to combat terrorism must be increased.



## PART B

### ***Fighting terrorism in Africa; capacity of the individual state as a core challenge (Raymakers, 2020)***

The counter-terrorism methods pursued by many African governments do not appear to be effective. For every step forward taken by governments and their counter-terrorism strategists, the terrorists and their cohorts take three steps ahead. A more strategic approach is needed to combat terrorism in Africa. The current approach has come up short, especially when it comes to fighting terrorists while protecting the lives and properties of innocent civilians. Chuku has explained this dilemma:

*The mechanisms underlying the activities of these terrorist groups suggest a strategic tactic. They often try to exploit the government's counter-terrorism dilemma using violence to provoke governments into harsh and indiscriminate counter-terrorism responses that often affect society, including the innocent population (Chukuet al., 2019, p. 6).*

This terrorist strategy has played out in the fight against terrorism in Africa. The physical and economic damage done by the Covid-19 pandemic has strained many African countries, and vast amounts of funds are being re-allocated to address threats to public health and national economies, hoping to absorb the massive shock of an extended free fall. Allocations to security and counter-terrorism efforts have decreased, with sobering consequences for governments, people, and their properties. These changes require African countries to re-think the methods they are using to address terrorism. Terrorists will identify and exploit weakened armies and counter-terrorism strategies, tightening their grip on state authorities and wreaking havoc with relative ease (Asongu et al., 2018).

The economic effects of Covid-19 have put individual African countries at a disadvantage in fighting terrorism. To make headway in their battles while acknowledging the realities of Covid-19 in Africa, there must be collaboration between African countries — an alliance to fight the common enemy that has debilitated the continent's development.

### ***Presenting a united front against terrorism in Africa; a call for tactful continental leadership***

The experiences of many countries over the past several decades have established that individual African governments cannot win a decisive victory against terrorism. However, some countries have seen modest successes. To determine the status of the continent as a whole, we must compare the recorded successes with the increasing



number of bottlenecks for African development. Without diminishing the efforts of individual states, we must ask whether enough successes have been recorded to ensure a safe society where lives and properties are protected. Unfortunately, they have not. African countries have actively fought against terrorism, but there is more that must be done.

Africa's fight against terrorism must become more collaborative if it is to be successful. Individual efforts cannot prevail against the geometrically growing strength and influence of terrorism. Our countries must adjust and adopt rapid, robust, and collaborative methods to fight it.

This is especially important for African countries. Other continents do not offer such favourable conditions — such as developmental stagnation and weak security forces — that accommodate terrorists looking to expand and create havoc. The Boko Haram group, which started in Maiduguri, Nigeria, more than a decade ago, has easily expanded its reach into countries along Nigeria's borders, including Chad, Mali, Niger, and some parts of Cameroon (Isaac, 2015). This growth is enabled by the porous borders existing between these countries. The expansionist agenda of terrorist groups does not recognize national boundaries, which puts other African countries at risk of actual or threatened terrorism.

The current situation makes a case for proactive counter-terrorism measures that use the collaborative strength of African countries. Every like-minded, progressive African country should come together and present a united front against terrorism on the continent. If African leaders fail to adopt a discreet, strategic counter-terrorism plan, lives and properties will continue to be at risk. This is not the time for fighting terrorism alone.

Experience has shown that little can be done through the individual efforts of African countries. Instead of surrendering or continuing to see feeble results on their own, African leaders should unite to address this continental crisis directly. A united front can make great gains in the fight against terrorism. The strength of each nation can be merged into combined counter-terrorism operations that consider the unique characteristics of different African countries, equitably allocating military forces and counter-terrorism strength across countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and places where terrorist groups threaten peace and stability. These joint measures could also prevent brutal terrorist groups from infiltrating other African countries that are not currently threatened.

It would be counter-productive, or at least ineffective, for African governments to be the exclusive actors in the fight against terrorism. The collaborative effort must include the private sector and national industries. A united front against terrorism can create fertile ground for cross-industry cooperation and private–public partnership across African countries. Terrorism affects the length and breadth of development in



Africa, and it has particularly affected the growth of the private sector. It seems appropriate for entities in the private sector to collaborate with state governments to defeat a common foe.

This collaboration will only be possible with a corresponding commitment from the continent's leadership. It will allow Africa to leverage the private sector's strategic expertise and financial muscle to gain an advantage in the fight against terrorism. These efforts would be more effective than the slow-paced achievements that individual states have recorded in their fights against terrorism. The united front will go a long way to address the continent's struggles with terrorism, but the methods that it uses will also determine how quickly they see victory.

African countries in the 21st century, either on their own or collectively, cannot rely solely on conventional methods to tackle unconventional terrorist threats. The methods adopted by African countries must reflect the realities of the 21st century to robustly engage terrorism in Africa. It is crucial to improve the state's capacity to deploy technology in collaborative counter-terrorism efforts.

The point of collaborative efforts are to rapidly respond to and arrest the overarching menace of terrorism, not to replace each African country's ability to handle its own security issues. These countries should adopt a united, collaborative response strategy, but each African state will always be the most effective at tackling its own internal problems and maintaining its territorial integrity. No African country should see the call for a united front as an opportunity to neglect its own development.

### ***The Way Forward: Technology to the Rescue***

The war against terrorism cannot be won with conventional means. Terrorism is strategically planned, deploying unconventional methods to achieve massive destruction of life and property. If the strategic plans of African states continue to rely on conventional methods, they will fail to achieve victory. The effects of terrorism will linger, and more destruction will continue to sabotage Africa's development. Collaborative measures offer the hope of incremental progress, but this progress can be accelerated and expanded by adopting technological methods to fight terrorism.

The rapid advancement of internet connectivity and its increasing penetration into the African continent has paved the way for the adoption of advanced technology. The path to victory in the fight against terrorism runs through the conscious adoption of technological devices and systems. Protective measures for state combatants can defend the front-line forces, preventing fatalities and offering rapid treatment for battlefield injuries. Surveillance systems and advanced methods for detecting explosives should be adopted to identify improvised explosive devices and aspiring

perpetrators of terrorist acts. Deploying these advancements will help prevent terrorist acts and reduce the number of fatalities due to terrorism.

Automated systems are essential in the fight against terrorism, but they must be guided by human activity. Human and automated approaches must be merged to draw on their unique advantages. For instance, the strategic deployment of robots can make massive headway in identifying and eliminating terrorist devices such as explosives and other weapons. They can also neutralize enemy targets. However, such robots are only as effective as their designers' programs, which is why continued human involvement is necessary to complement their activities.

More is required than the mere deployment of technology; states must collaborate with internet technology companies. As the internet penetrates further into Africa, more people rely more heavily on the internet for conducting their daily activities. The same behaviour applies to terrorist organisations, not only in Africa but around the world. Different organisations have explored the internet space to propagate doctrinal messages that target youths to be recruited into terrorist organizations (Freiburger and Crane, 2008). This raises enormous concern for Africa's vast population of young people, who are the primary users of this internet (Ephraim, 2013); they can easily be targeted and recruited to commit anti-state violence.

The terrorist exploitation of the internet demands enhanced conscious engagement with internet technology companies and social media platforms to combat terrorism in Africa. This partnership would allow internet companies and other big technology firms to help filter public conversations on their platforms, detecting conversations or ideologies that champion actual or threatened terrorism. After detection, the removal of such comments and the identification of the people behind it can be undertaken by security operatives working hand-in-glove with internet and technology companies.

This sounds easy, but real challenges must be addressed when fighting the threat of terrorism with technology and the internet. One such challenge is the protection of crucial human rights. The emergence and application of these anti-terrorism technologies brings accompanying risks to human rights, specifically the rights to privacy, expression of self, and dignity. African governments and internet and technology companies must carefully regulate the content on their platforms. A fragile line separates the removal of content that promotes terrorism and the suppression of free speech.

This delicate boundary demands the implementation of strict measures to protect human rights. Clearly defined procedures must be followed to program automated devices that combat terrorism or identify and remove terrorist ideologies from public discussion. Answers must be provided that can guide the moral compass of state-supported actors to ensure that human rights are not surrendered under a pretext of fighting terrorism.



At what point should social media content be flagged for instigating terrorism? It is also important to consider context when dealing with perceived terrorist acts. Humans are more capable than automated devices when it comes to contextual understanding — if the latter are deployed, how can we ensure that legitimate content is not flagged or removed under the mistaken conception that it promoted terrorism?

What measures will protect individual privacy while ensuring that terrorist acts and ideologies are properly identified? These concerns must be solved before we can take the practical steps necessary to deploy technology in the fight against terrorism. In providing clear answers to these questions, we can assure citizens that their rights will remain protected, securing their support in the fight.

It would be a good start to address these concerns, but it would not be the end — African countries cannot yet shout *Uhuru*. The deployment of technology in the war against terrorism is multifaceted; it must be addressed from multiple angles before African countries can declare victory.

Another area of concern is the proliferation of advanced technology and automation; no one can say that it is exclusively restricted to governments and other legitimate authorities in Africa. The current lax attitudes of African states regarding their security and their porous borders raises the concern over what could happen if terrorist groups had disruptive A.I. technology. It is a legitimate question to ask whether terrorists can acquire these devices and employ them against states. Terrorists who acquire advanced robotics can program them to massacre civilians independently, and self-driving automobiles can be loaded with explosives to carry out destruction and oppose the state.

These methods can make operations anonymous and untraceable. It reduces the possibility of casualties among terrorists, and they benefit from absolute or nearly absolute anonymity. The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant has already carried out attacks with A.I. technology, and it has announced that it is willing to deploy autonomous aircraft to destroy lives and properties (Brundage et al., 2018). If these possibilities become reality — and Africa's current state of affairs makes that seem plausible — it will be a nightmare for the entire continent.

This imminent danger requires robust legislation allowing African authorities to police the legitimate use of lethal weapons in the fight against terrorism. Ethical frameworks are necessary to regulate the deployment of lethal weaponry or automated technology for the fight against terrorism in Africa. These necessary measures will ensure that technology is deployed effectively, and that it will not be compromised to allow the proliferation of automated weapons that put innocent lives at risk.

The final concern that must be raised is the capacity of African countries for managing these systems. There are questions regarding their ability to integrate this technology with their existing counter-terrorism efforts, especially in the light of the previous argument: many African countries cannot effectively apply conventional methods in a direct fight against terrorism. The nature of these technological systems requires advanced expertise, capacity, funding, and commitment from African governments. It is sad that African countries are still in a position where they must endure valid criticism and questions about their capacity to handle technological advancements in this struggle.

This lack of capacity has been recognised as a potential bottleneck for progress among individual African countries, slowing the continent's development. There is an immediate need for a collaborative agreement between African countries to make progress in the fight against terrorism. An argument can be made that this counter-terrorism collaboration should also involve the expertise of the private sector and industry experts. These actions should address concerns regarding the lack of capacity to deploy different technologies and innovations in the fight against terrorism in Africa.

Technological advancements are changing the way wars are waged, and Africa must change the way it wages war against terrorists. Africa has much to do in order to realize genuine development and growth. Although this journey is excruciatingly long, it will be nearly impossible as long as terrorism threatens the continent. African countries should continually evaluate counter-terrorism methods and engage in the active use of technology while retaining legitimate safeguards. Terrorism might not be eradicated through the deployment of technology — no matter how robust — but technology can drastically reduce its menace, dismantle its chain of causation, and help African countries forge ahead with development.

## **Conclusion**

This keynote address has examined the political economy of terrorism in Africa, paying careful attention to the way that a country's political state is intertwined with its economy and development. I have covered three germane areas, which can be described as the Cause, Consequence, and Solution trajectory.

The cause is instability, which stems from the political management and affairs of African countries. The consequence of this instability is the existence and operation of terrorists, which has affected development and undermined the health of economies and the growth of countries. For a solution, this address is pushing for collaborative efforts from African leaders, development of state capacity for counter-terrorism, and the adoption of technology to make headway in the fight against terrorism.



The continued existence of terrorism will remain a barrier to development until conscious efforts are made to combat, suppress, and win the war against terrorist groups and their acts. Political and economic stability is the cornerstone of growth and development — in Africa, it is important to achieve this state of stability, because the development of any nation demands adequate planning through conscious efforts that are free from distraction. States cannot perform these vital tasks when the majority of their focus and resources are devoted to fighting terrorism.

To achieve national development, Africa must first eradicate, or at least greatly reduce, the menace of terrorism on the continent. When this is done, sanity can be restored to countries that are besieged by terrorism, formal and informal sectors can resume their daily operations, investor confidence can be restored, and the citizens can be assured of a society where their lives and properties are safe from violent attack and destruction.

### **Conflict of Interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

### **Notes on Contributor**

Professor Toyin Falola has written 130+ books on Yoruba, Nigerian, and African history, culture, religion, and politics. An editor of numerous academic book series and on the editorial boards of world's leading Africanist peer reviewed journals, Toyin Falola has shaped African Humanities on a global scale since 1981, when his PhD degree was taken at the University of Ibadan. He joined the University of Texas in 1991, and since then, he has been one of the world's best known experts on African decolonial history.

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## Al-Shabaab from Local to Regional and Global Terror Threat

Shaul Shay<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract:

The Al-Shabaab group, is an off-shoot of the former Islamic Courts Union (ICU) of Somalia and the branch of Al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab seeks to overthrow the government in Somalia and to establish an Islamic emirate ruled by a strict version of Shariah law.

In recent months, Al-Shabaab has stepped up its attacks as Somalia has been rocked by political crisis, the withdrawal of most of the US's troops from Somalia and a pause in American drone strikes that had targeted the Al-Shabaab group and its leaders.

Al-Shabaab poses a serious threat not only to Somalia's security but also to that of the African continent and the globe at large. It adheres to the same global Islamist ideology as Al-Qaeda and has made several public statements pledging allegiance to the group and praising its leaders.

### Keywords:

Al-Shabaab; Al-Qaeda; AMISOM; Kenya; Uganda; Djibouti; suicide bombings; cross border attacks.

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## ***Introduction***

Nearly 20 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Al-Qaeda's East African branch, the Al-Shabaab (Movement of Warrior Youth), is still considered as a regional and global terror threat.

In recent months, Al-Shabaab has stepped up its attacks as Somalia has been rocked by political crisis, the withdrawal of most of the US's troops from Somalia and a pause in American drone strikes that had targeted the Al-Shabaab group and its leaders (The New York Times, 2021).

Al-Shabaab poses a serious threat not only to Somalia's security but also to that of the African continent and the globe at large. It adheres to the same global Islamist ideology as Al-Qaeda and has made several public statements pledging allegiance to the group and praising its leaders. Al-Shabaab has links with Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda of the Maghreb and Al-Qaeda of the Arab Peninsula.

The group has issued several threats to strike outside Africa, including American and European targets. On January 5, 2021, Al-Shabaab's leader, Abu Ubaydah urged his followers to step up attacks against American and Israeli targets and also called for attacks on France for its "crimes" against the honour of the prophet Muhammad.

Abu Ubaydah marked the anniversary of the terrorist group's attack on Camp Simba in Kenya, claiming it was revenge for alleged U.S. crimes against the Muslims of Somalia. He added that it was also part of a series of attacks under the slogan, "Jerusalem will never be Judaized", launched by Al-Qaeda in response to the Trump administration's decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to the city of Jerusalem (JNS, 2021).

## ***Al-Shabaab – Background***

Al-Shabaab, is an off-shoot of the former Islamic Courts Union (ICU) of Somalia and the branch of Al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab seeks to overthrow the government in Somalia and to establish an Islamic emirate ruled by a strict version of Shariah law (Al-Jazeera, 2020). The US military estimates that Al-Shabaab commands somewhere between 5,000 to 10,000 fighters.

By 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was in control of much of Southern Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu. At that time, Al-Shabaab was the youth wing of the ICU and was "integrated quite tightly with the ICU armed forces, acting as a sort of 'special forces' for the ICU" (Shay, 2014, p. 97).

When the Islamic Courts Union (from which Al-Shabaab was born) was first instituted and sought to implement Sharia law, there was broad community support. Many people in Somalia admired and supported Islamic rule in the country after the era of warlords, since

Muslims believe Islamic Shariah to be the best and supreme law on earth. Some Somalis even returned from western countries to take part in what they saw as the new dawn in the country.

In December 2006, the ICU was defeated by a coalition of the transitional government (TFG) and the Ethiopian forces. Backed by the Ethiopian armed forces, the transitional federal government asserted rule in 2007.

Since 2007 the ICU group launched a guerrilla war against the TFG and the Ethiopian forces who invaded the country. Al-Shabaab emerged as a distinct force during the course of the insurgency (Shay, 2014, p. 98).

The break between Al-Shabaab and ICU came in late 2007. That September, the ICU attended a conference of opposition factions in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and re-emerged as the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Al-Shabaab boycotted the conference, and its leaders criticized the ARS for failing to adopt a global jihadist ideology (Middle East Quarterly, 2009).

In the years 2008-2009 a national reconciliation program took place and ICU came to the negotiation table with the transitional government. On January 2009 UN-sponsored peace talks concluded in Djibouti with Ethiopians agreeing to withdraw from Somalia and ICU leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad "agreed to stop fighting." On January 31, 2009 - Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad was elected as the president of the Transitional Federal Government.

Divisions about reconciliation led to the formation of Al-Shabaab as an opposition to the "moderate" ICU.

As Ethiopian forces left Somalia in early 2009, fighters affiliated with Al-Shabaab took over the areas that were occupied by the Ethiopian forces and implemented a strict version of Shariah in areas they came to control. The western-backed Somali government (TFG) has relied on the support of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to battle the Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab described itself as waging Jihad (holy war) against "enemies of Islam" and was engaged in combat against the Somali TFG and African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). It has declared war also on the U.N and on Western non-governmental organizations that distribute food aid in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab has been designated a global terrorist organization by the U.S. and several western governments and described as having ties to Al-Qaeda. Prominent members of Al-Shabaab responded in a celebratory tone. Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, told the BBC that he welcomed the designation as an "honour" because "[w]e are good Muslims and the Americans are infidels. We are on the right path."



He said that Al-Shabaab was "negotiating how we can unite into one" with Al-Qaeda. He continued, "We will take our orders from Sheikh Osama bin Laden because we are his students."

In 2010, Al-Shabaab controlled much of southern Somalia (at least a third of Somalia), including most of Mogadishu, the capital, where they enforced strict Islamic sharia law.

### ***The Fall and the "Come Back" of Al-Shabaab***

Since August 2011, the African Union Mission (AMISOM) of 21,000 soldiers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti and the relatively weak Somali army, with 35,000 troops, have liberated the major towns from Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab has shown little resistance, first losing control of the capital, Mogadishu, in 2011 and then being pushed out of all of Somalia's other major cities and towns.

After being pushed out of their main bastions by AMISOM in 2011, Al-Shabaab still controls swaths of territory outside the cities. The group is essentially a governing force that provides effective – if brutal – judicial services and imposes fines and taxes, even in government-controlled areas. (Shay, 2021)

Al-Shabaab's leadership also suffered several blows during last decade. Al-Shabaab was headed by Aden Hashi Ayro until he was killed by a US airstrike in early May 2008. After the death of Ayro, Ahmed Abdi Godane (also known as Abu Zubair) a devout ruthless hardliner became leader of the group. Godane himself was killed in a US airstrike as well. He was succeeded by Ahmed Umar (also known as Abu Ubaydah).

Al-Shabaab has continued to wage war against the government, with regular attacks in Mogadishu and against neighbouring countries (mainly Kenya) which have contributed to the AMISOM force (Al Jazeera, 2020).

Al-Shabaab opposes the presence of foreign troops and regularly attacks foreign interests and peacekeepers in the region including American, EU and Turkish targets.

Al-Shabaab is far from a spent force and has the ability to out manoeuvre the Somali government and its international partners. The Al-Shabaab group has been on the offensive since 2019 and the group has increased its attacks on African Union (AMISOM) bases, Somali government facilities and officials and security forces, hotels and targets in neighbouring Kenya (Shay, 2019, p. 93.).

### ***Al-Shabaab links to Al-Qaeda***

Bin Laden's organization has long had a presence in Somalia. It dispatched trainers to liaise with the Islamic Union group (IU) prior to the 1993 battle of Mogadishu when eighteen U.S.

soldiers were killed. Despite that connection, some scholars have questioned how deep the ties between Al-Qaeda and the IU really were. (Menkhaus, 2004).

In contrast, after Al-Shabaab emerged as a distinct entity, its leaders reached out to Al-Qaeda's senior leadership, and its chief military strategist openly declared his allegiance to bin Laden.

As early as 2006, Bin Laden accused the West of interfering in Somalia's politics as part of its "crusade" against Islam. Top Al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri, Abu Yahya al Libi, praised Al-Shabaab in propaganda tapes and encouraged the group to carry out attacks against the Somali government, neighbouring countries, and the West (The Sunday Times, 2008).

Before 2009, Al-Shabaab and its main ally, the Islamic party (Hizb al Islam), had always denied links to Al-Qaeda. In September 2009, Al-Shabaab pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The Emir of Somalia's Al-Shabaab, Abu Zubair, lent his support to Bin Laden in a video distributed on Jihadi blogs. The tape was Al-Shabaab's response to a message from Bin Laden to Somalis in March 2009, asking them to rebel against their newly elected president, Islamic militant-turned-politician Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmad (Shay, 2019, p. 91-92).

The motivation behind the change in the group's public position might have been prompted by a desire to give the group a more global dimension, which the leader Abu Zubair mentioned in his statement.

In late 2009, Osama bin Laden appointed Fazul Abdullah Mohammed to serve as Al-Qaeda's operations chief in East Africa and Al-Qaeda's link to the Al-Shabaab. The announcement was made at a ceremony in Mogadishu.

Fazul had been indicted by the US for his involvement in the 1998 attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In addition to his role in the embassy attacks, Fazul was the suspected mastermind of the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in the Kenyan city of Mombasa that killed 15, and a failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner at the same time (Shay 2019, p. 93).

Fazul was killed just four weeks after Bin Laden, by Somali troops at a checkpoint outside of Mogadishu, on June 3, 2011.

Al-Shabaab is said to have non-Somali foreigners in its ranks, particularly at its leadership. Sheikh Muhammad Abu Fa'id, a Saudi citizen, served as a top financier and a "manager" for Al-Shabaab. Abu Musa Mombasa, a Pakistani citizen, served as Al-Shabaab's chief of security and training. Mahmud Mujajir, a Sudanese citizen, was Al-Shabaab's chief of recruitment for suicide bombers. Abu Mansour al Amriki, a US citizen, served as a military commander, recruiter, financier, and propagandist. (International Business Publications, 2011, p. 116)

Fighters from the Persian Gulf and international jihadists were called to join the holy war against the Somali government and its Ethiopian allies. According to UN Security Council



documents, there were several hundreds of non-Somali fighters being used by Somali rebel groups, mostly Al-Shabaab.

Though Somali Islamists did not originally use suicide bombing tactics, the foreign elements of Al-Shabaab were blamed for several suicide attacks. Later local Somalis joined the suicide campaign of Al-Shabaab.

In December 2010, Al-Shabaab's spokesperson has openly called for Al-Qaeda to send fighters to Somalia to fight the Transitional Federal Government and African Union forces from Uganda and Burundi. "We call on our brothers [Al-Qaeda] to come to Somalia and to help us expand the East Africa jihad."

After the death of Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda's central command appointed on June 16, 2011, his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri as the new emir of the group.

In June 2011, Al-Shabaab's spokesman said that the group had sworn allegiance to al Zawahiri and would follow his orders (SITE, 2011). In January 2012, Al-Qaeda's new head welcomed a merger with the Al-Shabaab (SITE, 2011).

### ***The "globalization" of Al-Shabaab***

Al-Shabaab's main terrorist activity is concentrated in the fighting in Somalia and terrorist acts in neighbouring countries, but the organization also poses a threat of global terrorism:

- Terrorist attacks against military and non-military personnel and interests of the US, EU countries and Turkey on Somali soil and in Kenya.
- Attempts to carry out terror attacks outside the African continent against the targets of the United States, Israel and other countries.

### ***The 9/11 style terror plot against the United States***

Al-Shabaab has trained two terrorists of Kenyan descent as pilots for the purpose of carrying out terrorist acts using airplanes. The Philippine security forces have arrested Cholo Abdi Abdullah, a Kenyan member of Al-Shabaab, in Iba, Zambales in Philippines, on July 1, 2019 on local charges (Shay, 2021). Abdullah received training and completed the tests necessary to obtain his pilot's license from an aviation academy in the Philippines (BBC, 2020).

Before his arrest, Abdullah researched methods of hijacking a commercial airliner, such as how to breach a cockpit door from the outside. In addition, Abdullah did research about the tallest building in a major U.S. city and sought information about how to obtain an American visa (Rappler.com, 2019).

Abdullah was acting in Philippines under the direction of a senior Al-Shabaab commander, Salim Gichunge Osman, the leader of the Dusit D2 attack that took place in January 2019 at Riverside, Nairobi. He also had a cordial relationship with Osman Gedi, another Dusit attacker.

Abdullah was transferred on December 15, 2020, to U.S. custody on charges that he conspired to hijack an aircraft and crash it into a tall building in the U.S. (Rappler.com, 2019). Cholo Abdi Abdullah's plot was allegedly part of the operation "Jerusalem will never be Judaized," which was launched in 2019.

### ***Al-Shabaab - the second pilot***

Kenyan police have issued in March 2021, a terror attack warning and asked Kenyans to help the police with any information regarding Mr Rashid Mwalimu, whom they suspect will use his expertise as a pilot to carry out an aviation-linked attack on Kenya or from Kenya (All Africa, 2021). The Kenyan security forces believe that Mwalimu currently resides in Somalia and could sneak back into the country.

Rashid Mwalimu, joined Al-Shabaab in 2015, along with his friend Cholo Abdi Abdullah they have conducted numerous attacks in Somalia shortly after training in Boni along the Kenyan coast. Later they were trained as pilots in the Philip-pines (All Africa, 2021).

### ***Al-Shabaab - terror plot in Australia***

In August 2009, Australian security agencies foiled an Al-Shabaab associated plot to attack Holsworthy Army Barracks in Sydney. Codenamed Operation Neath, the counterterrorism operation disrupted the plot in its early stages. The terrorist men had sought weapons, dispatched others for training and conducted recon-naissance of Holsworthy Barracks. Two of the terrorists had travelled to Somalia to be trainee in Al-Shabaab camps and other members of the Australian cell had made calls to Somalia requesting the approval of Al-Shabaab's Muslim cleric to attack Australian targets. The trial concluded in December 2011 and five men were charged, and three were convicted of planning to attack the barracks. Al-Shabaab has denied operational links with the Australians. (Zamit, 2011).

### ***Al-Shabaab – terror plots in Denmark***

Two Danish brothers of Somali origin have been arrested in Denmark in May 2012, on suspicion of plotting a terror attack. The country's police intelligence issued a statement saying that the arrests had foiled "a concrete act of terror". The two brothers, aged 18 and 23, held Danish citizenship and had been living in the Aarhus area. They were arrested, one at his home in the city of Aarhus and the other as he arrived by plane at Copenhagen airport.



The statement said "The arrested are suspected of having been in the process of preparing an act of terror, among other things through conversations about methods, targets and the use of weapon types." One of the arrested is also suspected of having undergone training, instruction and teaching at an Al-Shabaab training camp in Somalia with the aim of carrying out an act of terror. (Al Jazeera, 2012).

### ***The assassination attempt against Danish cartoonist***

In January 2009, Somali national Mohammed Muhideen Gelle attempted to kill a Danish cartoonist who printed controversial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in 2005. While Al-Shabaab did not claim responsibility for Gelle's actions, Danish intelligence officials have alleged that Gelle had links to Al-Shabaab. In 2011, a Danish court has found Mohammed Muhideen Gelle guilty of attempted terrorism and attempted murder of the Danish cartoonist (DW, 2011).

### ***The terror plans of Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda – the "Fazul documents"***

Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the Al-Qaeda commander of East Africa, was shot dead by Somali forces in June 2011. A cache of intelligence has been found on the body and inside the bullet-ridden Toyota truck he tried to ram through a Somali government checkpoint. The documents provided a chilling look at the global aspirations of Somalia's Al-Shabaab.

The documents detailed plots for a kidnapping and attacks on the prestigious Eton College, Jewish neighbourhoods and the Ritz and Dorchester hotels in London. (Shay, 2014).

The Fazul documents show, the group's ambitions go beyond the Horn of Africa. When found in 2011, they gave intelligence officials the clearest picture yet of some of these foreign goals, prompting the U.S. and the U.K. to increase security around sites that were named as targets. Intelligence officials fear that such plans did not die with the Al-Qaeda leader.

The documents are chilling, both in the level of terror they describe and in their tone. They were written with a business-case formality that analyses the pros and cons of proposed attacks. It is not clear who authored the reports.

"Our objectives are to strike London with low-cost operations that would cause a heavy blow amongst the hierarchy and Jewish communities," begins the document labelled "International Operations." (Shay, 2014.)

"These attacks must be backed with a carefully planned media campaign to show why we chose our targets to refute hypocrites, clear doubts amongst Muslims and also inspire Muslim youth to copy."



The next two pages show specific plans for the hotels, for Eton school on opening day and for London's Stamford Hill and Golders Green neighbourhoods, which are populated with "tens of thousands of Jews crammed in a small area."

"The plan is to hit the hotel when it's fully booked to ensure maximum casualties . . . key players from all around the world stay in these hotels.

"We plan to book in advance," the document continues, "and take plenty of petrol with the brother and then set the 1st, 2nd, 3rd floor on fire . . . while we block the stairs so no one can run down.

"The martyrdom seeker would then make his way to the exits and start killing anyone fleeing the area."

Other scenarios are laid out, including one where a fire alarm is pulled and as guests emerge, attackers would "shower them with petrol bombs and gunfire."

Under "general summary of mission," the report states that the attackers should be trained in Somalia for two months and that the operatives alone would know their mission (Shay, 2014).

"The brothers will be pushed through many battles to see how they react under pressure, and they will be analysed to see if they can keep their composure."

Although time periods are specified, such as striking the Jewish community during Hanukkah, there is no mention of London's Olympics – which starts this month and has security agencies worldwide on high alert.

There is also no indication in the documents obtained by the Star that these plans were anything but aspirational.

In addition to the London plots, the Burundian, Ethiopian and Ugandan embassies in Nairobi were also on the hit list - presumably in retaliation for their joining the joint operations to battle the Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Shay, 2014).

A separate document outlined another plot to kidnap Sudan's deputy ambassador to Kenya in Nairobi and lists his phone number, license plate, a route he travelled frequently and his preferred mosque, among other details. The plot is an attempt to press Sudan to release one of the group's fighters, identified only as Abu Abdullah.

The "Plan B" kidnapping scenario involved taking the diplomat to a safe house in Garissa the Kenyan town near Somalia's border. (Shepard, 2012).

### ***Al-Shabaab and the U.K***

Up to 50 British "volunteers", including white Christian converts and British-Somali men, have been recruited to fight for Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has managed to generate tens of



thousands of pounds in funding through the UK-based Somali population which is estimated at 250,000. While some British Somalis willingly donate to the terrorist organization, a proportion of the cash legitimately sent back to extended families in the country is siphoned off by the Islamists. It is understood that the group is using the same connections to recruit young men from the Somali diaspora in the UK as well as British Muslims. The Security Service fears that British volunteers who survive the bloody civil war may return home as hardened terrorists eager to launch attacks against the UK (Shay, 2014.).

In 2007, Ahmed Hussein Ahmed, a 21-year-old student from Ealing, west London, dropped out of a business studies course at Oxford Brookes University to serve as a volunteer with Al-Shabaab, flying first to Kenya and then crossing into Somalia by foot on bush tracks. He then detonated a suicide bomb at a checkpoint manned by Ethiopian Army troops, killing 20 soldiers. In a "martyrdom" video shot before his death, he issued a call to fellow British Somalis to follow his example, delivered in a soft, earnest, English accent. "I advise you to migrate to Somalia and wage war against your enemies," he said, speaking against a backdrop of a black and white Al-Shabaab banner. "Death in honour is better than life in humiliation." (Sean Rayment, 2012)

On September 17, 2010, the head of MI5, announced that it was "only a matter of time" before a terror attack was carried out in Britain by UK subjects. He suggested that people who had gone from Britain to Somalia to attend Al-Shabaab training camps would be the assailants. Shortly after Evans' warning, a British terror suspect, with apparent ties to Al-Shabaab, was arrested at Amsterdam's Schipol airport by the Netherlands' military police (Shay, 2014). The man, of Somali origin, had intended to board a plane bound for Entebbe in Uganda. He had taken a linking flight from Liverpool's John Lennon Airport in Britain. His arrest had followed a tip-off from U.K. counter-terrorism officials.

In January 2012, one of those British volunteers Bilal al-Berjawi from West London, was killed when missiles fired from an American drone hit his vehicle outside Mogadishu. Berjawi was already an Afghanistan veteran and an Al-Shabaab commander.

In October 2012, Al-Shabaab has threatened to inflict on the UK a terrorist at-tack worse than the London bombings of 7 July 2005 for extraditing the Islamist cleric Abu Hamza to the United States. Britain extradited Abu Hamza and four other terrorism suspects to the US in October 2012 after a lengthy legal battle that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights.

Al-Shabaab made the threats in a series of messages on Twitter. One tweet threatened the biggest Islamist terrorist attack yet on Britain: "The nightmare that surreptitiously looms on British shores is bound to eclipse the horrors of 7/7 and 21/7 combined." Another read: "Britain will pay the heftiest price for its bra-zen role in the war against Islam and endless brutality against innocent Muslims." Al-Shabaab also said it would "go to every possible length to attain the freedom of imprisoned Muslim scholars".

### ***Al-Shabaab and the US terror blacklist***

On August 5, 2021, the US State Department added five alleged senior members of Islamic militant groups in Africa to its terror blacklist, blocking access to any property or interests they may have in the United States (Asharq Al Awsat, 2021).

Two of them were Al-Shabaab members: Ali Mohamed Rage, a spokesman for Al-Shabaab, and Abdikadir Mohamed Abdikadir, an operations planner, both had planned attacks for Al-Shabaab (Asharq Al Awsat, 2021).

### ***Al-Shabaab and Turkey***

Turkey is a key ally and a major donor of the Somali government in efforts to rebuild the country after more than two decades of conflict and famine. Erdogan became the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in nearly 20 years when he travelled there in 2011, as Turkey's prime minister. (Daily Sabah, 2018).

#### ***Turkey's military base in Somalia***

In September 2017, Turkey opened its largest military base abroad in the Somali capital, massively strengthening its presence in East Africa. More than 10,000 Somali soldiers will be trained by Turkish officers at the base of Mogadishu.

The construction of the training camp began in March 2015, at the cost of \$50 million. The training camp occupies 400 hectares in Mogadishu. It houses three military schools, dormitories, and depots. It has the capacity to train more than 1,500 troops at any one time, by Turkish military officers. Turkey has deployed 200 officers and soldiers as trainers and to provide the compound with security. The first batch of Turkish military personnel arrived in Mogadishu in August 2017 to commence the training program for the Somali national army.

#### ***Al-Shabaab and Turkey***

For al-Shabaab, Turkey is an unwelcome actor, helping the Somali government fight the group. It seems unsurprising, then, that Turkey has become a major enemy.

Al-Shabaab has built authority by claiming to be the only "legitimate" Islamic movement in Somalia. Turkey's work there undermines that claim. Turkey's Di-rectorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, has been funding mosque-building projects in a number of countries, including Somalia. Building mosques gives Turkey a platform to promote itself as a legitimate and authentic religious au-thority. It also gives it an opening to promote Turkey's vision of Islam.

There have been several attacks on Turkish targets and interests in Somalia:



### ***The attack on Turkish convoy***

On December 28, 2019, at least 79 people were dead and 149 more injured after a massive car bomb exploded at a busy intersection on the outskirts of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, on December 28, 2019. Two Turkish citizens were killed in the blast and another two were wounded.

It was the deadliest attack since truck exploded in 2017 near a fuel tanker, creating a fireball that killed over 500 people.

The attacker drove his vehicle into the Ex-Control checkpoint, a tax collection centre in Mogadishu. The attack happened during rush hour in the Somali capital and civilians including university students from the Banadir University in Mogadishu and soldiers were among the dead. (CNN, 2019).

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the bomb in Mogadishu. The group's spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage in an audio post on pro-al-Shabaab websites said the bombing targeted a "hostile Turkish convoy" near a busy checkpoint at an entrance to the city. Two Turkish brothers were among the dead. (Arab news, 2019).

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned the attack and on December 29, 2019, 16 people in critical condition were airlifted to Turkey by a Turkish military cargo aircraft to receive further medical treatment. The aircraft also brought 24 doctors specializing in trauma to help treat some 125 people injured in the blast.

### ***The hotel bombing***

On January 22, 2015, three Somali nationals were killed when a suicide car bomber blew himself up at the gate of a hotel housing the advance party of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who visited the country days later. The Turkish delegation of around 70 members was staying at the hotel at the time of the attack but was unharmed. Following the January bombing, the spokesperson for al-Shabaab, Sheikh Ali Mohamed Rage, named Turkey as one of its targets. "NATO is the biggest enemy of Muslims and Turkey is a part of it. NATO is a union of Christians. NATO uses Turkey as a hammer to smash Muslims," said Rage.

### ***The Daallo Airliner bombing***

On February 8, 2016, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive device on board of a Daallo Airlines plane and forced it to make an emergency landing in Mogadishu. The bomber was sucked out of the plane through the one-meter-wide hole when the blast ripped open the pressurized cabin in mid-air. Somali officials re-leased a video of airport workers handling a laptop believed to have concealed an explosive device that was detonated on a passenger plane traveling from Mogadishu to Djibouti. The footage showed two airport workers handing a laptop to the suspected bomber.

The 74 passengers aboard the flight, including the suicide bomber, have originally checked in with Turkish Airlines. Turkish Airlines cancelled its flight from Mogadishu that morning because their incoming flight from Djibouti could not come to Mogadishu due to strong winds. The Turkish Airlines requested Daallo Airlines to carry the passengers on their behalf to Djibouti where they would continue their journey on a Turkish Airlines flight.

The Al-Shabaab group claimed an attack on a Daallo Airlines flight from Mogadishu to Djibouti the initial target was a Turkish Airlines jet, but it attacked Daallo Airlines after Turkey's national carrier cancelled its flight.

In a statement the armed group said the attack on the Daallo Airlines flight was part of an operation targeting dozens of Western intelligence officials and Turkish NATO forces. It added that while the operation did not bring down the plane, "it struck terror in the hearts of the crusaders, demonstrating to the disbelievers that despite all their security measures and the strenuous efforts they make to conceal their presence, the Mujahideen can and will get to them" (Al Jazeera, 2016).

### ***Al-Shabaab and Israel***

As further indication of Al-Shabaab's intent to operate outside of African continent, the group has declared an "open war " against Israel and Israeli and Jewish interests in Africa.

On October 30, 2009, Al-Shabaab held a rally in Mogadishu, where crowds of people chanted anti-Israel slogans. "It is time to go for open war against Israel in order to drive them from the holy cities," Sheikh Fuad Mohamed Shangole, a top Al-Shabaab official said.

On November 1, 2009, in response to standoffs between Israeli police and Palestinians at Al - Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Al-Shabaab has threatened to attack Israel. Media reports indicated that in a sermon delivered after Friday prayers in Baidoa, Somalia, Al-Shabaab, commander Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansur urged his followers to attack Israel. "The Jews started to destroy parts of the holy mosque of Al - Aqsa and they routinely kill our Palestinian brothers, so we are committed to defend our Palestinian brothers," he said.

Al-Shabaab announced the establishment of Al - Quds Brigade, a military unit specifically tasked with attacking Israel and Jewish interests in Africa. In a rally held the previous week in Mogadishu, a top Al-Shabaab official said, "It is time to go for open war against Israel in order to drive them from the holy cities."

In addition to threatening Israel, Al-Shabaab warned of attacks on Jewish interests in Africa, declaring an "open battle with the oppressing Zionist entity as well as targeting its interests, especially in Africa."

### ***Israeli Arabs and Al-Shabaab***



Seven Israeli Arabs from the city of Nazareth have been arrested for allegedly murdering a taxi driver in November 2009, and carrying out a series of terrorist attacks. (Globes, 2010).

According to police, the group became more radical over the past few years after being exposed to online video clips posted by Osama Bin Laden and his followers, which also helped them obtain knowledge on the use of weapons and explosives. The group regularly watched Al – Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's lectures online and wanted to join the fight against Jewish and Christian "infidels."

In joint police- ISA (Israel Security Agency – ISA) operation, the seven, aged 19-26, were arrested in May 2010 for a series of attacks that were carried out with nationalistic motivations. The suspects used to pray and got acquainted to each other in Mosque in Nazareth, led by a radical imam.

Some of those arrested were allegedly involved in the murder of taxi driver Yafim Weinstein, who was killed, on November 30, 2009 night, in Kfar Hahoreshe near Nazareth, as well as other attacks.

The ISA also found that two of the men flew to Ethiopia in April 2010 in order to join Al-Shabaab in Somalia and fight "infidels". They failed to cross into Somalia from Ethiopia and moved to Kenya. In Kenya were caught by the Ken-yan authorities on the border with Somalia and handed over back to Israel.

Despite the Al-Shabaab's militant statements, no volunteers from the organization arrived in Lebanon or the Gaza Strip to take part in the struggle against Israel.

The only example of the organization's attempt to carry out terrorist activity against Israel occurred in 2011. A Somali was arrested at the Cairo airport in May 2011 and confessed to being part of a cell with plans to attack Western interest in Egypt and Israel.

### ***Operation "Jerusalem Will Never be Judaized"***

In January 2019 Al-Qaeda launched a campaign called "Jerusalem will never be Judaized" in response to the Trump administration's decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to the city of Jerusalem (BBC News, 2020). Under campaign "Jerusalem will never be Judaized" the group's affiliates in East and West Africa have carried out high profile terror attacks in respective regions and beyond (BBC News, 2020).

On January 5, 2020, U.S. Africa Command and Kenya Defence forces (KDF) repelled an attack on Manda Airstrip near the Camp Simba U.S. base in Lamu county, near Kenya's border with Somalia. A U.S. service member and two civilian contractors working for the Department of defence were killed, two other U.S. Department of defence personnel were wounded and six aircrafts were destroyed in the attack.

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack and Kenya's military said it killed at least four terrorists in repelling the attack. Al-Shabaab said that the attack was "part of Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen's - Jerusalem will never be Judaized' military operation".

On September 30, 2019, Al-Shabaab launched two attacks on U.S and Europe-an military targets in Somalia. The first attack was on the Belidogle military air-strip which is a base for U.S. and Somalia forces in the Lower Shabelle region in southern Somalia. A suicide car bomber detonated a vehicle packed with explosives at the gate of the Belidogle airstrip. AFRICOM officials clarified that one U.S. service member suffered a concussion injury. The U.S. military used the Belidogle airstrip base to launch drones that attacked Al-Shabaab targets and to trained Somali troops.

The second attack was by a suicide car bomber targeting Italian peacekeepers in Mogadishu. The explosion missed a convoy of the European Union peacekeepers but injured Somali civilians who were nearby.

On January 16, 2019, Al-Shabaab attacked the Dusit D2 hotel in Nairobi killing 14 civilians, including one American. In its statement claiming responsibility for the attack, Al-Shabaab said it was in response to U.S. President Donald Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. "Even if the Zionists and crusaders were to move all the embassies in the world to Jerusalem, the sacred land shall forever remain a noble Muslim sanctuary, without concession or compromise. Jerusalem will never be Judaized," the statement said (VOA, 2019).

### ***Al-Shabaab as a regional terror threat***

The Al-Shabaab has managed to expand its operations in the region, especially in Kenya since invading Somalia in 2011 to attack Al-Shabaab, who it accused of threatening its tourism industry. Kenyan forces have since joined the African Union force (AMISOM), battling the Islamists.

Al-Shabaab fighters have made a series of deadly incursions into neighbouring Kenya, including the 2013 killing of at least 67 people at the Westgate Mall in the capital, Nairobi, and the massacre of 148 people at a university in the town of Garissa in April 2015.

Al-Shabaab operations in Kenya are designed both to shift Kenyan political opinion toward withdrawing forces from Somalia and to recruit Kenyan Muslims to its ranks. Al-Shabaab has actively shifted focus onto Kenya using two main tactics (Arab news, 2019):

- Large scale terror attacks in Kenya - the attacks on the Westgate Mall (2013) and Garissa University (2015).
- Cross border attacks - Al-Shabaab frequently ambushes buses, tourists and police and security forces along the Somali-Kenyan border.



On December 8, 2021, Kenyan authorities said a suicide bomber killed himself and two others in Kisumu County, on the border with Uganda. Police said the suspect was a member of Al-Shabaab terrorist group. (Yusuf, 2021).

On June 20, 2021, three people were killed, in an attack by Al-Shabaab militants in Mandera county which borders Somalia. According to local police, the attack occurred in the Jabibar area of Mandera county, where a road construction project is underway (a.a.com, 2021).

On May 19, 2021, a Kenyan police official said that seven soldiers have been killed and one was missing in Lamu county after a bomb and ambush by Al-Shabaab rebels from neighbouring Somalia. The attack happened just days before President Uhuru Kenyatta launched a multi-million-dollar port in Lamu county (AP, 2021).

On May 12, 2021, three police reservists were killed after Al-Shabaab extremists attacked cell phone towers near the border with Somalia in an effort to cripple communication. (AP, 2021).

On May 4, 2021, at least two people were killed near Kenya's eastern border with Somalia when the vehicle they were travelling in ran over an explosive device suspected to have been planted by the Al-Shabaab rebels (AP, 2021).

It was the second attack in two months targeting vehicles delivering supplies to a construction site where Kenya is building a fence and trenches along the Somali border to prevent extremists, bandits and illegal immigrants from entering the country.

### ***Al-Shabaab's terror plot in Uganda***

The Ugandan army spokeswoman said in August 2021 it had foiled a suicide bomb attack against the state funeral of Major General Paul Lokech, nicknamed the "Lion of Mogadishu". The late General Lokech, served as a commander in Somalia with AMISOM and he led the units that routed Al-Shabaab fighters from the capital Mogadishu in 2011.

Security forces said they had arrested a man in the northern town of Pader. The suspect was found with a home-made bomb, suicide vests, detonators, ammonium sulphate, switches and mobile phones used to detonate the device (Ahram, 2021).

In July 2010, twin bombings in Uganda marked the first time the Al-Shabaab launched an international terrorist attack. The bombings, which tore through two venues where crowds gathered to watch the broadcast of the World Cup finals, killed more than 70 people, including an American aid worker (ADL, 2015).

Al-Shabaab spokesman who claimed responsibility for the bombings, threatened additional attacks against Uganda and other African countries if they do not withdraw their



soldiers from the African Union's peacekeeping mission stationed in Somalia to protect the country's transitional government (ADL, 2015).

### ***Ethiopia arrested militants (September 2019)***

In September 2019, Ethiopian security officials announced the arrest of a number of alleged Al-Shabaab suspects. The suspects aimed to attack "hotels, religious festivities, gathering places and public areas" in the capital Addis Ababa, Oromia and Ethiopia's Somali region, according to a statement by the country's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) read out on state television (ADL, 2015).

NISS did not specify how many people it detained, but the state broadcaster re-ported that it was 12. The suspects were said to have entered Ethiopia through Djibouti and Somalia, as well as the breakaway state of Somaliland.

Berhanu Jula, deputy chief of Ethiopia's military, told the state-owned Ethiopian News Agency that there is evidence Al-Shabaab "has recruited, trained and armed some Ethiopians."

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had also warned about attempts by the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab extremists to make inroads into Ethiopia, according to the As-sociated Press news agency.

### ***Al-Shabaab's terror threat to Djibouti***

In a video released on March 26, 2021, the leader of Al-Shabaab, Abu Ubaydah lashed out at Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh, who has been in power since 1999.

Abu Ubaydah accused Guelleh of turning the Horn of Africa country "into a military base from where every war against the Muslims in East Africa is planned and executed. Make American and French interests in Djibouti the highest priority of your targets," he said in the video.

### ***Summary***

Al-Shabaab has been on the offensive since 2019 and increased its attacks on African Union (AMISOM) bases, Somali government facilities and officials and security forces, US and EU forces and targets in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia.

The Biden administration has recently reduced its support to the Somali army fighting Al-Shabaab and it has already translated into an increase in militant activity and some territorial gains by the group.



Al-Shabaab group poses a serious threat not only to Somalia's security but also to that of the African continent and the globe at large.

It adheres to the same global Islamist ideology as Al-Qaeda and has made several public statements pledging allegiance to the group and praising its leaders.

The group has issued several threats to strike outside Africa, including American and European targets. The indictment of Cholo Abdi Abdullah was the latest re-minder that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain a threat to America nearly two decades after terrorists brought down the World trade centre in Manhattan and hit the Pentagon with commercial aircrafts.

It also highlights the importance of maintaining robust intelligence collection and counterterrorism operations in the region despite the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia.

### **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exist for this manuscript.

### **Notes on contributor**

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# China's Strategy in Africa

## An Overview

Marcell György Pintér<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract:

China's increasing presence on the African continent is today a widely known fact, welcomed by some, and warned against by others. There are those who say China brings a new, fairer approach to economic relations and a new outlook for the ex-colonial region, and then there are those who call China's endeavours on the continent a new way of colonisation in the second scramble of Africa. What's certain, however, is that China is there to stay.

Sino-African relations, albeit sporadically and significantly less intensively as today, date back way before the average person would think, and China is also more important to Africa than some realise. China today is Africa's largest trade partner and relies significantly on Chinese investment and loans. Africa, on the other hand, although not as significant for China when it comes to dependence on trade, is still a very lucrative market for Chinese privately-owned firms, especially the weapons market, and also a potentially useful diplomatic tool for Beijing in the UN and on the world stage in general. There are, however, questions raised regarding some things: the current public opinion of Africans on China is ambivalent due to bad first-hand experiences with Chinese businesses. The real reason behind and the purpose of the Djibouti naval base is also drawn into question by some, and the suspicion perhaps is not all that unwarranted, given the base's strategic position, Chinese President Xi Jinping's insistence on the importance of China playing a bigger role in the world, and an albeit slow but still perceivable overall change from a peaceful and hands-off China into a more assertive one, along with current tension-filled events surrounding the Asian country.

### Keywords:

China; Africa; strategy; military; economic partnership; diplomacy; overview.

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### ***The History of Sino-African Relations***

The history of the relations between Africa and China goes back a long time. Although we cannot speak for the African continent in its entirety, some countries knew of and/or were known in China for a long time. Ptolemy's Egypt under the rule of Rome in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD provably knew of Qin China through trade along the silk road as well as the maritime trade route on the Indian Ocean. (Berggren, 2000, p. 176) The first unofficial mention in Chinese texts of Berbera, Somaliland dates back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century in the *Miscellaneous Morsels from Youyang* by Duan Chengshi, (Chittick and Rotberg, 1975, p. 109) and the first official mention of the envoys of an unknown East African kingdom (probably Zanj) visiting the Chinese imperial court in 1071 was recorded in the *History of Song* (Wheatley, 1964, pp. 156-157). In 1226, Zanzibar and Somalia were discussed in Chao Jukua's *Description of Barbarous Peoples* (Freeman-Grenville, 1975). Chinese coins were found in Mogadishu and Kilwa from the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties (Pankhurst, 1961, p. 268). In 1415, Chinese admiral Zheng He reached the Horn of Africa, and even brought giraffes back to China (Snow, 1988, p. 23). Part of He's crew ended up shipwrecked on Lamu Island near Kenya in 1415, and then married with the locals and converted to Islam. (Brautigam, 2011, p. 28)

As these examples show, China's presence in Africa is not a novelty, and albeit its extent is sporadic and mostly superficial, it can still be a good tool to be utilised, especially for China who often tends to employ history as an instrument of diplomacy.

### ***Diplomacy and Economic Presence***

From its establishment in 1949 up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Africa policy of the People's Republic of China was influenced by Cold War politics and the rhetoric moved along the lines of its communist ideology, namely decolonisation, independence movements, and the figurative unification of the Third World under the guidance of communist China.

In the 1970's, China profited from souring relations between African countries and its new ideological enemy, the Soviet Union. When Egypt and Sudan expelled Soviet military advisors, China signed multiple arms deals with them. (O'Balance, 2000, p. 111; The New York Times, 1976; Lippman, 1979) Beijing also covertly provided aid to the FNLA and later UNITA against the MPLA in a bid to counter Soviet (and in this case, Cuban) influence in the Angolan war for independence together with Zaire (Immerman, 2013, p. 276), whose regime China also supported in the first Shaba conflict in 1977. (Time, 1977) During the 1977-1978 Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia, the Soviet Union backed Somalia, however, Moscow's support shifted over time to Ethiopia. Beijing then started to support Somalia with symbolic military aid. (CIA, 1980)

The birth of contemporary Sino-African relations could be viewed as to have started in 1996 when Chinese President Jiang Zemin laid the groundwork for the principles regarding



21<sup>st</sup> century relations between Africa and China, them being “sincere friendship, equality, solidarity and cooperation, common development, and being oriented to the future”. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, n.d.)

In 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held its first meeting. The ministerial conference is held every three years ever since, and it serves as a platform of consultation and improving relations between Africa and China. (FOCAC, n.d.) The People’s Republic is also supporting Nigeria in acquiring a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. (GlobalMarkets, 2004)

As for economic relations, trade volume between China and Africa has been increasing drastically over the last few decades. In 1980, the total amount reached 1 billion USD, which by 2000 increased tenfold, and by 2010 it grew to 114 billion. (Wonacott, 2011) In 2019, this number soared to 192 billion. (SAIS-CARI, n.d.) More than three-quarters of this amount is Chinese export to Africa. For comparison, this constitutes only 4.4% of China’s total exports, while almost half (47%) of it goes to other Asian countries, 20% to Europe and 20% to North America. (Wokrman, n.d.) On the other hand, the largest trade partner of Africa is China. However, if we regard the European Union as one entity, then the EU leads with 28% (31% with the United Kingdom) of both imports and exports, with China on the second place with 8% exports and 16% imports as of 2020. (Eurostat, n.d.) This shows that Africa relies way more on China economically than the other way around. This, however, does not mean that Africa is of little economic importance to it. Africa is home to 16 oil-rich countries, (Al-Jazeera, 2018) six of which are in the top 30 oil producing countries in the world. (Trading Economics, 2021) China’s fourth largest oil supplier with 7.9% of China’s total oil imports is Angola as of 2020. (Workman, n.d.) Apart from oil, Africa is also home to about 30% of the world’s resources. (Al-Jazeera, 2018) South Africa is the largest producer of manganese – which is used in steel-making and batteries – with one third of the world’s total output with more than 70% of global reserves, (NS Energy, 2020) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo produces 70% of the world’s cobalt – necessary for batteries as well as superalloys in jet engines and other machinery –, (NS Energy, 2021) along with 80% of global reserves of coltan, an ore used in cell phones, laptops, and other electronics. (Feick, n.d.) Incidentally, the People’s Republic is one of the largest manufacturers of such appliances.






Figure 1. African-Chinese trade and industry. Source: Economist Intelligence, 3 March 2021.

The above map shows the countries that have trade agreements with and industrial parks built by China, and those that have signed China's Belt and Road Initiative. There are more than 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa, most of them privately owned corporations, that invest in African countries' infrastructure, banking, and energy sectors. (Jayaram, 2017) Additionally, in return for investment capital and infrastructural development, some countries grant China resource concessions, secure loans against natural resources as collateral, or give stakes in the infrastructure projects. These countries include Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Zambia. Most of them are foreseen to default on their loans. (Kwasi, 2018) As of 2021, at least 21% of all African government external debt is held by the People's Republic. (Acker, 2021) Below is a map of African countries by debt as well as ports and power stations invested into by Chinese capital.




Figure 2. Debt to China, Chinese-backed ports and power stations. Source: Daily Mail, 8 May 2021.

Africa needs China just as much as China wants Africa. The main drive of interest for China is twofold: on the one hand, it is the ever-increasing economic presence through investments, trade, and loans. On the other hand, however, there are also 54 countries in Africa, which translates to 54 potential votes in the UN General Assembly – which accounts for roughly one quarter of it – that China could gain for itself by maintaining close relations with them. And it could in fact work out for China: for instance, after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, no African countries have officially denounced China for its response to the demonstrations. It could come in handy especially now that China under President Xi Jinping is trying to create a new, non-Western world governance model. (Pairault, 2021) Russia has, for a long time, also been vying for African countries' support in the UN General Assembly and in other official forums of the world organisation in a similar manner to the Chinese (Besenyő, 2019), giving credence to this strategy and warning of this form of diplomatic warfare to possibly play a more pronounced role in the future.

### ***Military Presence and Peacekeeping Missions***

China is increasingly taking part in UN peacekeeping missions worldwide. Not only is the People's Republic the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, but it is the largest contributor of peacekeepers as well among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. (Xinhuanet, 2020) As of the 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2021, China is contributing 1742 troops, 39 staff officers, 10 police personnel, and 24 experts across 5 out of the 6 peacekeeping operations in Africa, namely in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, South Sudan, the disputed area of Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan, and Western Sahara. (UNP, 2021) The reason behind China's interest in peacekeeping is highly likely a form of protecting the investment and keeping the region stable, in addition to improving relations by showing the country's commitment to Africa.

As mentioned above, China had provided military support to multiple countries during the Cold War. However, after 1991, China took a less military-oriented approach, and started focusing on peacekeeping instead. Despite this, China is increasingly more involved in arms trade on the continent, and African countries are shifting away from other sources such as Russia, Europe, or the United States in favour of China due to more affordable prices, without additional requirements regarding, for instance, human rights. However, China is still only relevant in the low-cost low-tech sector of the arms market in Sub-Saharan Africa, while also not being able to establish themselves in the continent's biggest arms market, the North African market. It is also important to point out that there appears to be no Chinese strategy involving the arms trade, and that it solely seems to be profit-oriented. (Encarnation, 2021) That being said, it may very well change in the future.

Regarding military bases, we can only speak of one: a naval base in Djibouti. China has engaged in negotiations with Djibouti in 2015 concerning a Chinese naval base, (Al-Jazeera, 2015) and established it in 2017 along with US, French, and Japanese naval bases, with its official purpose being a logistics facility – that is a refuelling station – for patrolling the Indian Ocean near the Somalian and Yemeni coastlines. The People's Republic has been accused of using the Djibouti naval base as part of its “string of pearls” containment strategy employed against India. These claims were dismissed by Beijing as untrue. (Reuters, 2017) However, there is a real possibility that China has more plans in store for this naval base, not necessarily against India, but given its advantageous position in the Bab-el-Mandeb – a narrow strait between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula –, it could be utilised to secure the maritime trade route going through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea between Europe and China. Not only that, but it may also serve as a precedent that could facilitate future military expansion into the continent in the form of other bases first along the coastline, then inland as well, citing the good intentions with no strings attached of Beijing's foreign policy and a “win-win deal” of increased stability around investments such as ports and power plants to protect and facilitate further investment.



## ***Cultural Presence and Reactions***

It can be noted that China is also present in Africa culturally, increasingly so. Cultural exchanges have been happening ever since the foundation of the People's Republic. (China.org.cn, 2003) The first Chinese cultural centre on the African continent was opened in 1988 in Mauritius, and ever since then, new ones have been opened. (SCIO, 2017) As of 2018, there are currently 54 Confucius Institutes in Africa, in addition to 27 Confucius Classrooms. (Freuda-Kwarteng, 2020) There are also several scholarship programmes for African students to learn in China, making up 40% of all university scholarships for Sub-Saharan African students. (Kigoto, 2020)

China also created a television channel called CGTN Africa in 2012 in Kenya. (Lim, 2018) As part of China's infrastructural investment in Africa, several stadiums have been built as a form of sports diplomacy, however, in many cases the condition or the actual utilisation of these stadiums questionable. (Dubinsky, 2021)

Perceptions of China are ambivalent on the African continent, ranking below the US on average as of 2020. On the one hand, China is viewed favourably when it comes to the economic benefits investment and trade brings to the continent. On the other hand, there are several negative factors as well: resentment towards the poor quality of products (Sanny, 2020), and there are also cases of mistreatment and discrimination of black African workers (Goldstein, 2018), as well as accounts of traders being displaced by their Chinese counterparts (Dankwah, 2019).

## ***Conclusion***

It is evident that we cannot really talk about an apparent, comprehensive, and established strategy of China in Africa, but rather the early stages and conception thereof, with some parts being more developed and utilised intentionally than the rest. The two main drives of Chinese interest in the continent are firstly economic – trade, mainly exports to Africa; investment; and loans –, and secondly political with regards to the possible future of Xi Jinping's global governance ideas. Everything economy-related that happens seems to do so to gain Chinese firms money, rather than it being closely monitored and managed by Beijing. It could be interpreted as a result of the Chinese internal policy of economic prosperity above all else – which incidentally is the main factor in the party's legitimacy and therefore the country's stability – which results in a hands-off approach; or as Beijing simply not caring enough about formulating a comprehensive strategy involving economic means yet, or even both. On the other hand, when it comes to diplomacy and politics, China's approach appears way more organised and forethoughtful, especially considering the People's Republic's endeavours of gathering support from African countries that can directly translate to potentially as many as 54 extra votes in the official forums of the United Nations. As for military and cultural presence, it is by comparison way less impactful, but still not at all

negligible. Currently, Chinese military efforts in Africa revolve around peacekeeping, which serves to further improve the stability of the continent for the sake of protecting trade and investments as well as relations and the view on China; and arms trade, which appears to serve a purely profit-oriented purpose. The Djibouti naval logistics base in particular, however, raises some questions about the intentions and future plans of China, given Beijing's rhetoric and the base's strategically important position in the Bab-el-Mandeb. It is obvious, however, that it gives China the ability and the precedent to further expand into the African continent in the future.

### **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exist for this manuscript.

### **Notes on contributor**

Marcell György Pintér is a PhD student at Óbuda University Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences and is a junior researcher at the doctoral school's Africa Research Institute. His research foci include China and its presence on the African continent.

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## Terrorism as a Challenge for Promotion of Human Security in Africa

### A case study of Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province

Mmaphuti Felicia Langa<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract:

The increasingly transnational and multifaceted nature of terrorism calls for a strong multilateral response. States have the primary responsibility for protecting their populations from the threats posed by terrorism. At the same time, given the often cross-regional nature of the terrorist threat, mechanisms for effective cooperation are needed at the global and regional levels. To this end, the international, continental and regional organisations have an important role to play. Human security is relevant in understanding terrorism and counterterrorism approaches. Using Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province as a case study, this paper seeks to address how and why terrorism creates challenges in promoting human security in the province. The purpose of the paper is to assess the extent to which terrorism has a real and direct impact on human security, with devastating consequences for the government and citizens. The paper argues that terrorism creates terror, a feeling of insecurity, and the idea that leaders can no longer protect those they lead. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilize governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development. The key issues to be appraised include discussion of the causes of conflict in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province, terrorism as a major threat to human security in Cabo Delgado province, the international and regional interventions in the province and government intervention.

#### Keywords:

Human security; terrorism; protection; counterterrorism; Cabo Delgado.

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## *Introduction*

Terrorism has become part of our daily lives. There are daily reports about assassination, political kidnapping, hijacking or bombing incidents around the world. The increasing number of incidents of terrorism in the past decade meant terrorism has become one of the rising concerns to governments around the world and of increasing interest to scholars. The terrorism term has no precise or widely accepted definition. One of the reasons for this, especially in Africa as quoted from Darrell Trent in 1974, is that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2014). The problem of defining terrorism is characterized by the fact that the word terrorism has become a trend often applied to different acts of violence which are not strictly defined as terrorism. Some government label as terrorism all acts of violence committed by their political opponents, while anti-government extremists frequently claim to be government terror victims. Thus, the definition of terrorism depends on one’s point of view (Becker, 2006).

Terrorism can be understood to refer to acts of violence targeting civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims (Ganor, 1999). The international community is yet to adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism. The existing United Nations (UN) declarations, resolutions and universal sectoral treaties related to specific terrorism aspects have defined certain acts and elements of the concept. At its fifty-first session, the General Assembly through its resolution 49/60 approved the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism and stated that terrorism includes acts intended to provoke state of terror in general public, a group of persons for political purposes and that such acts are unjustifiable even if political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious reasons are given to justify the act (United Nations, 1994). Ten years later in 2004, the Security Council in its resolution 1566 referred criminal acts including against civilians, committed with the aim to cause death or serious bodily harm, taking hostages with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons, population intimidation, compelling government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (United Nations, 2004).

Later in 2004, the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change emphasized this definition by identifying several key elements that must be included in the definition of terrorism. Such as recognition in the UN preamble that state use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments and constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity. Reiteration that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Convention and protocol. Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism and a declaration that they are a crime under the international law. Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 of 2004 (United Nations, 2004).

In Africa, terrorism is not defined, and the closest definition comes from the 35th Ordinary Session of Heads of State and Government which adopted the Organisation of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention) in July 1999 (OAU, 1999). This definition elucidates what a terrorist act is in Article 1 of the OAU Convention. The Convention further encompasses the nature of Africa in Article 3(1) which gives exemptions of terrorist acts as struggles waged in the pursuit of liberation, self-determination including colonialism, occupation aggression and domination by foreign forces. This exemption is fundamental in Africa as it protects freedom fighters from being labelled as terrorists (OAU, 1999). States can however circumvent this by refusing to ratify the Convention (OAU, 1999). Therefore, the United Nations definitions are clearly outlined but the coverage of the Algiers Convention is more detailed and has more protection especially about human security.

Terrorism aims at the very destruction of human rights, human security, democracy and the rule of law. It attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments such as respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules governing armed conflict and the protection of civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict (Nelles, 2003). Terrorist acts can destabilize governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, threaten social and economic development, and may especially negatively affect certain groups (OHCHR, 2008). Furthermore, terrorism threatens dignity and human security everywhere, endangers or takes innocent lives, creates an environment that destroys people's freedom from fear, jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and aims at the destruction of human security (OHCHR, 2008).

Terrorism has an adverse effect on the establishment of rule of law, undermines pluralistic civil society, aims at the destruction of the democratic bases of society, and destabilizes legitimately constituted governments. It also threatens the territorial integrity and security of states, constitutes a grave violation of the purpose and principles of the UN, is a threat to international peace and security, and must be suppressed as an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security (OHCHR, 2008). The direct destructive impact of terrorism on human security has been recognized at the highest level of the UN, notably by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the former Commission on Human Rights and the new Human Rights Council (OHCHR, 2008).

### ***Background and causes of conflict in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province***

Cabo Delgado is a province in north-eastern Mozambique bordering the neighbouring country of Tanzania. The province is an ethnic stronghold of the Makonde tribe, with the leading minority ethnic groups of Makua and Mwani. The capital city of the province is Pemba, with Montepuez and Mocimboa da Praia as the other two big towns. Although Mozambique is a majority Christian country, two northern provinces have an Islamic majority. The province of



Niassa has 61 percent and Cabo Delgado has 54 percent Islamic majority. The coastal administrative posts are also predominantly Muslim (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2017).

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is an ongoing conflict in the province shaped by religion and fought between Islamic militants with the aim of establishing an Islamic state in the region and the Mozambican security forces (Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, 2020). The main militant group is Ansar al Sunna (supporters of the tradition), which is also known by its original name Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo ((ASWJ) translated adepts of the prophetic tradition), locals call them Al-Shabaab even though they are a separate organization from the Somali Al-Shabaab (Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism, 2020). The Islamic State (ISIS) has claimed ties with the Al-Shabaab in Mozambique. The militant group was originally a religious movement when it was formed in 2008 by followers of Sheikh Aboud Rogo, a Kenyan Muslim cleric with the aim of advocating for the formation of an Islamic State in Kenya in a peaceful manner. Sheikh Rogo assisted in the bombing of the Embassy of the United States of America in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and was later sanctioned by the USA and the UN for providing support to Al-Shabaab (Obaji Jr, 2021). Following the death of Sheikh Rogo in 2012, many of his followers settled in Tanzania, before moving to Mozambique's northern district of Cabo Delgado around 2015, where they encouraged mosques in Mocimboa da Praia to adopt Sheikh Rogo's interpretation of Islam (Obaji Jr, 2021). However, given this information, the majority of the Al-Shabaab group members in the province of Cabo Delgado are mostly Mozambicans from Mocimboa da Praia, Palma and Macomia districts, with some foreign nationals from Tanzania and Somalia (Obaji Jr, 2021).

The militant group argues that the Islamic practice in Mozambique has been corrupted and no longer follows Muhammad's teachings (Morier-Genoud, 2019). Based on this argument the group's members entered traditional mosques with weapons to threaten worshippers to follow their own radical beliefs. The movement is anti-Christian, anti-Animist, anti-Western. Based on the argument that attending schools and going to hospitals is secular and anti-Islamic, they tried to prevent people from going to such institutions (Morier-Genoud, 2019). The group became increasingly violent overtime by calling for the implementation of Sharia law in the country, refused to recognize the Mozambican government and formed hidden camps in Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia and Montepuez Districts. The militant group received training in the hidden camps, recruited other Islamist militants in East Africa and some journeyed abroad to receive direct training by other militant groups. The group funds itself through heroin, contraband and ivory trade (Hussein Mohammed, 2018). Although religion plays a fundamental role in the conflict, the most important factors behind the terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado province are widespread social, economic and political challenges in Mozambique (Hussein Mohammed, 2018).

The social and economic factors behind the terrorist attacks are the exclusion, marginalization, and poverty of the local communities, who see no potential gains from the gas megaproject (Hussein Mohammed, 2018). Other factors fuelling the insurgency include youth unemployment, increasing inequalities, widespread corruption in the officialdom and

political exclusion. Young people who join the group are promised that the movement will act as an antidote to corruption and elitist rule. Many members of the group belong to the native Mwani and Makwa ethnic groups in the province. The two ethnic groups have expressed their sympathy to the movement because their province lacks infrastructure and has the largest rate of state underrepresentation (Hussein Mohammed, 2018).

Although the militant group has been operating and committing terrorist attacks in the province for a long time, it was the events on the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2017 that caught the attention of government and the international community (Saide et al, 2019). On this day the militant group staged their first attack in the province where they raided police barracks in Mocimboa da Praia district, ambushed vehicles, beheaded civilians and expanded their territorial reach by attacking new towns. The militant group captured the Cabo Delgado province, the fishing harbour of Mocimboa da Praia town and the connected roads of N380 and N381. The capture of the connected roads allowed them to secure a steady revenue stream through illicit trade in minerals and taxation prevalent in the province. Mocimboa da Praia town has been a key transit point for narcotics over a period of forty years, mostly from Afghanistan and Pakistan (Saide et al, 2019).

Since the capture of Mocimboa da Praia, the militant group has expanded their controlled territory to large stretches along the main N380 and N381 highways connecting Mocimboa da Praia to the provincial capital Pemba in the south of the province. Other towns such as Macomia, Muidumbe and in late March 2021, Palma have fallen under the control of the insurgents. Most of these towns have been attacked several times since 2017. As of June, the militant attacks and security force operations in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province had claimed nearly 3,000 lives, while displacing hundreds of thousands of people (ICG, 2021).

In response to the attacks, the government deployed military force to the province, to stop the militants from advancing towards the provincial capital Pemba and destroying some of their camps, however, they were unable to neutralise them. The group resurfaced and in March 2021, with the help of ISIS, they attacked Palma, the operational hub of a multi-billion-dollar French gas project of Total Energies. The group targeted shops, banks and military barracks (Renon, 2021). The fighting in Palma left more than 2500 people dead, 700 000 displaced and hundreds of both locals and foreigners were rescued from the area after the attack (Renon, 2021).

### ***Terrorism as a major threat to human security in Mozambique***

Since October 2017, Al-Shabaab has been staging attacks in the northern Cabo Delgado province, chasing away central government as well as the local population. The terrorist attacks have led to major human security issues in the province. Between April 2020 and April 2021, the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) more than quadrupled, from 172,000 to over 732,000 (OCHA, 2021). Around 45% of all IDPs were children, and over 90% of the



displaced lived with host families. Since 2020, increased violations against civilians, including killings, beheadings, and kidnappings, have been reported in Cabo Delgado. Furthermore, between January–June 2021, more than 9,600 people who sought refuge in Tanzania had to return to Mozambique through the Negomano border point in Mueda district. There is an urgent need for food, shelter, health, and protection. An estimated 1.3 million people in the three provinces of Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado (around 12% of the total regional population) need humanitarian assistance and protection (OCHA, 2021).

Following the March attacks in Palma, in 2021, nearly 104,635 people were displaced from Palma district; 77% lived within host communities, and 23% resided in one of the 29 displacement sites across Cabo Delgado (in Ancuabe, Chiure, Metuge, Montepuez, Mueda, Nangade, and Pemba districts) (OCHA, 2021). The humanitarian evacuations by air were suspended in April, from Palma. As a result of the suspension, the armed group targeted civilians who tried to flee to other areas by road or sea. Those who remained in Palma district urgently needed humanitarian assistance. IDPs need access to food, shelter, and health services. There was also a need for psychological support for displaced individuals, separated families, and unaccompanied minors. Continued and increasing levels of conflict and displacement have resulted in protection needs. Overcrowding in shelters and a lack of livelihood opportunities increased the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. Women and girls are at particular risk of kidnapping, rape, forced marriage, and forced prostitution (OCHA, 2021).

While the conflict has been going on since 2017, it has received very little political attention from regional governments or international organisations, except those interested in Mozambique's gas reserves or private military contracts (Demuyne and Weijenberg, 2021). Much less attention has been given to the growing number of displaced people and the critical humanitarian crisis facing the province (Whittall, 2021). The human security issues in Cabo Delgado have been neglected. The attention from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and the Mozambican government's international backers has been fixed almost exclusively on fighting terrorism. When a country is experiencing acts of terrorism, there are always fears that the proposed government solutions to tackle the terrorist attacks may overlook the urgent need to save lives and alleviate the suffering of communities affected by scores of conflicts (Whittall, 2021). Hundreds of thousands of people have fled violence and insecurity and they have ended up living in overcrowded camps or being hosted by local communities with already limited resources.

People have experienced significant trauma such as decapitation and kidnapping of family members as well as missing family members. Terrorist attacks lead to a situation whereby many people walk for days to find safety after hiding in the bushes, often without food and water. Others remain in locations where humanitarian organisations cannot reach them because of the ongoing insecurity. These acts therefore, instill fear, insecurity and lack of access to the basic needs for survival such as food, water, shelter and urgent healthcare services (Whittall, 2021).

Thus, in many cases acts of terrorism such as those from Syria to Iraq and Afghanistan lead to counter-terrorism operations generating additional human security issues while limiting humanitarian response. When government publicly labels a group as a terrorist group, they push the group underground. This makes dialogue opportunities with the group difficult and complex and this has a significant impact on human security and humanitarian access to the affected areas captured by the militant group. To uphold human security and impartially provide humanitarian assistance to affected areas, humanitarian workers are compelled to negotiate with any group that controls a territory (Whittall, 2021).

### **Government response**

The Mozambican government failed to adequately respond to and address the scale of the terrorist attacks. The government opted for a security response to the unrest in Cabo Delgado rather than addressing the root causes of the insurgency such as poverty, marginalization, expropriation, and lack of jobs. Furthermore the government intervention failed to address the fact that the province is one of the poorest in the country, with a [predominantly Muslim](#) population that feels neglected by the largely Christian ruling elite in Maputo, the country's capital located in the south (Demuyck and Weijenberg, 2021). The region is home to [major gas reserves](#) (worth more than 50 billion USD), which foreign energy companies have been actively extracting without any of the profits benefiting local populations (Demuyck and Weijenberg, 2021).

Against the broader socio-economic background to the crisis, the governmental response to Al-Shabaab's rise has first and foremost been one of force. Following the attacks in 2017, it sent in a special rapid reaction unit of the national police, the *Unidade Intervenção Rápida* (UIR, or rapid intervention unit), supported by the national military (Demuyck and Weijenberg, 2021). However, in part because Maputo had been put under foreign pressure to prioritise economic development over defence spending after its long civil war (1977-1992), these forces were [insufficiently equipped and trained](#), and suffered from [low morale](#). According to local reports, this led to security services refusing to defend towns such as [Mocímboa da Praia](#), which was eventually captured by Al-Shabaab (Demuyck and Weijenberg, 2021).

The government's response has not only suffered from a lack of resources. Several human rights groups have accused government forces of arbitrary arrest waves and detentions, torture and [extrajudicial executions](#) of both Al-Shabaab members and civilians suspected of collaborating with the group (Demuyck and Weijenberg, 2021). The national police supported by the national military lacked operational preparation and coordination, which exacerbated tensions because the government downplayed the severity of the situation and argued that the attacks were part of a foreign conspiracy to keep the country poor. Thus, refusing to acknowledge the existing local grievances that fuelled the anti-governmental sentiments among many people in Cabo Delgado (Demuyck and Weijenberg, 2021). The



government has also repressed, detained and expelled Mozambican and foreign journalists who tried to report on the attacks. The government prevented journalists from reporting about the attacks fearing that foreign industrial partners and investors would withdraw from the country. However, the French energy company Total responded to the attacks by suspending its operations in northern Mozambique due to “force majeure” in April 2021 (Demuyne and Weijenberg, 2021).

Aware of its limited capacity to counter Al-Shabaab, the government searched for ways to support its security forces. However, the government has been strikingly hesitant to accept or request foreign military support. This hesitancy by the government was met with bewilderment by countries who were ready to help, especially the neighbouring South Africa (Cilliers et al., 2021). In early 2021, the Mozambican government accepted the deployment of small Portuguese and US military missions even though for a long time it had remained reluctant towards conducting larger and more operational missions in the country.

The main reluctance by the government to request for help from other countries was over concerns of national sovereignty. The reluctance was further based on the wariness by the ruling socialist Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (translated Liberation Front of Mozambique) (FRELIMO) party of relying on other states for fear of imperialism. The government also generally distrusts several of its neighbours, [accusing Tanzania](#) of sponsoring Al-Shabaab and experiencing increasing strain in the traditionally warm [relationship with Zimbabwe](#) due to a border conflict. Nevertheless, critics also pointed to the fact that Cabo Delgado has long been a crucial hub for illicit trafficking of heroin between Asia and Africa as another reason and motivation for Mozambican government’s reluctance to request for international assistance (Cilliers et al., 2021). This trade is believed to be highly beneficial to several people close to the president, thus it was believed a military intervention will subject the government to external security (Cilliers et al., 2021).

### ***International Intervention***

Several countries, including the United States, France, and Portugal offered support to the Mozambican government to fight the insurgency. Portugal and Mozambique signed a new military cooperation accord in May 2021 to help confront a growing jihadist threat by beefing up training, notably of special forces (News24, 2021). Both the United States and France tried to intervene in Cabo Delgado by becoming involved in patrolling the coast of Cabo Delgado (Hanlon, 2020). The USA is supporting the Mozambican government’s counter-narcotics efforts by helping them disrupt some of the transnational organized crime at sea through more effective patrolling (Hanlon, 2020). The French intervention in Mozambique entailed a military maritime cooperation agreement in the context of possible support in the fight against insurgents in Cabo Delgado. The French Armed Forces of the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean (FAZSOI) have been promoting military cooperation, by conducting training with the Mozambican authorities on state action at sea (Hanlon, 2020).



The European Union (EU) adopted a decision setting up an EU military training mission in Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). The aim of the mission is to train and support the Mozambican armed forces in protecting the civilian population and restoring safety and security in Cabo Delgado province (Council of the EU, 2021). The mandate of the mission is planned to last for two years. During this period, the strategic objective of the mission will be to support the capacity building of the units of the Mozambican armed forces that will be part of a future Quick Reaction Force. The mission also provides military training including operational preparation, specialised training on counter-terrorism, and training and education on the protection of civilians and compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law (Council of the EU, 2021).

The Mozambican government also welcomed the Russian intervention by signing an agreement on mineral resources, energy, defence, and security. Russian energy giant Rosneft signed an agreement at the same time with Mozambique's state-owned energy company to help develop gas fields (Peters, 2020).

### *The regional intervention*

The SADC heads of state approved the mandate of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force mission to the Republic of Mozambique during their extraordinary summit of SADC heads of state and government (Moffat, 2021). The deployment of the Standby Force is in support of Mozambican efforts to combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado. The decision endorsing the recommendation of a technical team deployed in Mozambique was taken following the summit held in Maputo in April 2021. SADC members at the summit agreed on the deployment of a 3000 strong joint military force comprising land, air and naval capabilities. The deployment of the Standby Force falls under the framework of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact and is in line with the United Nation's "responsibility to protect principle" to prevent human catastrophe (Moffat, 2021).

The SADC mission in Mozambique was formally launched on 9 August 2021. The Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) is comprised of troops from Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa, and includes troops from Angola, Rwanda and Tanzania (ISS, 2021). The troops were deployed to the conflict-ridden province of Cabo Delgado to help fight against violent extremism. The decision to deploy troops to Cabo Delgado prevented the risk of non-African solutions in the Southern African region where lucrative natural resources prompted fears of the "Iraqification" (militarization and foreign agenda) of Mozambique (ISS, 2021).

This development was welcomed by many local and international observers that had advocated for a Southern African state to mobilize and help Mozambican forces to restore security and ensure civilian protection against attacks in Cabo Delgado (Moffat, 2021). The intervention by SADC has been perceived as the best chance of getting a response that is



comprehensive and serves the region. The arguments made in favour of the regional intervention are fear of the attacks spilling over into Mozambique's neighbouring states and the need for a coordinated response including tough cross-border intelligence to manage jihadist infiltration (Moffat, 2021). Moreover, it is in the regional powers' interest to find a durable solution to prevent attacks from escalating further.

### *The legal basis for the African Union's intervention in Cabo Delgado*

The human security agenda of the AU for the promotion of peace and security is enshrined in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (CA) of the AU. The human security ideas have also been integrated into AU binding agreements, declarations, decisions and policies. The CA empowers the AU to intervene in the affairs of member states with the purpose of preventing war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (AU, 2001). The AU created the African Standby Force (ASF) to fulfil the mandate of promoting human security through military intervention (AU, 2001). The AU conditions for a human security intervention in the internal affairs of a country is based on the criteria to protect human security (AU, 2003). The AU does not necessarily require the consent of a state to intervene in its internal affairs when the population is at risk. The decision to intervene under AU is based on a two-third majority vote of the Assembly (AU, 2003).

Clearly the AU has a duty to intervene in African conflicts where there are severe

situations of crimes against humanity. However, the AU's Constitutive Act fails to state how soon they should respond in any conflict situation where there are severe crimes against humanity. Even if there is a will to respond early enough it is still questionable whether the AU has the capacity to address crisis on the continent. Additionally, there are other concerns as to how severe a situation should get before there is any form of

intervention from international organizations.

Based on the outline and discussion of the AU CA, there is a need for the AU to address the root causes of human security issues in Africa. Regarding the AU intervention in Cabo Delgado, the organisation has failed to intervene through its AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) division to help or cooperate with SAMIM (ISS, 2021). The AU's PSC has to date failed to hold discussions about the situation in Mozambique. The issue was tabled to be discussed in May 2021; however, it was later withdrawn by the Mozambican government arguing that this was a SADC matter. The AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and other officials have asked African countries outside the Sahel to help combat terrorism, but there has been little response to this call.

The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis is an example for voluntary contributions to fight threats across regional boundaries. However, the initiative has failed because of states' resistance to foreign intervention, albeit from other African countries (ISS,

2021). Therefore, continental discussions and coordination around conflict intervention is urgently needed. The AU is the only continental body that can convene and mediate such discussions. The AU can use its vast continental experience and insight to persuade states to draw up workable plans to overcome long term violent extremism threats.

### **Way forward: How Mozambique can address the terrorism challenges to promote human security in Cabo Delgado province**

Considering the discussions above, it is quite clear that the root causes of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado are complex. The causes which were outlined amongst others include a long-standing sense among residents of being mistreated by the central government, and socio-economic factors such as unemployment and inequalities amongst the youth. The grievances about youth unemployment were further intensified by the exclusion of residents in the large-scale development of natural resources, including the major natural gas investment by the French Total Energies company. The company has been accused of in-sourcing labour, instead of hiring residents for the gas project. Therefore, to ensure that youth does not resort to joining the militant groups and committing acts of terrorism the government must address these grievances.

The Mozambican government with the support of continental, regional and international organisations is required to intervene in Cabo Delgado province to address the issues fuelling the insurgency. The interventions can also be directed towards preventing future recruitment of the aggrieved youth. The military intervention by the government and other organisations must prioritize the promotion of human security. In stabilising the province Mozambique must employ a people, rather than security-centric strategy to address the humanitarian, political, security, economic, social and religious aspects of the insurgency. For this approach to be achieved there is a need for a centralised government body to entrench an inter-agency approach and deliver a unified national response.

The government must contain the attacks by driving the militant group out of the areas they occupy such as the strategic port of Mocimboa da Praia. To achieve this the government must develop a detailed intelligence strategy. The government through the help of regional, continental, and international organisations must develop a 24-hour intelligence, policing and operations centre in Cabo Delgado, that is informed by a land, sea and air surveillance system. An intelligence sharing between SADC members and other countries with naval presence in Mozambique will ensure a constant supply of information on local developments, such as information sharing about new people entering villages and towns and external threats. To successfully tackle the insurgency and ensure the militant group does not regroup in the future, the government must station the police and military in Cabo Delgado that can move by road, air and sea throughout the country and the Tanzanian border. The deployed security forces must also patrol and secure the coastline.

Furthermore, regarding the promotion of human security in Cabo Delgado SADC and the AU must consider appointing special envoys to step up efforts to ensure the protection of



civilians, end the abuses by armed groups and government security forces, and hold all those responsible for abuses in the Cabo Delgado crisis to account. SADC must also urgently convene a special summit on the crisis to map out ways to support Mozambique to restore security and protect civilians. The AU Peace and Security Council should urgently place the issue of Cabo Delgado on its agenda. The council has the authority to coordinate efforts between regional mechanisms and the AU to promote peace, security, and stability. This will help demonstrate to the civilians that the Mozambican authorities, SADC, and the African Union prioritize their security and protection of their rights.

## **Conclusion**

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado has been ongoing since 2017 and has contributed massively to the challenges of human security in the province. The insurgency to date has resulted in the displacement of people, torture and death of ordinary civilians. The formula for peace in Cabo Delgado and elsewhere in Mozambique requires greater local autonomy for all Mozambicans to feel that their interests are represented. The government must implement decentralization and more participatory, transparent and accountable governance, combined with effective security operations to defuse the insurgency in Cabo Delgado and ensure Mozambicans benefit from the natural resources, including the gas project.

In conclusion, the promotion of human security is important in dealing with issues of insurgency on the African continent. For the AU and SADC to either prevent insurgency, to end it, and to tackle its aftermath, it needs to understand and operate based on the premise that at their root Cabo Delgado's security problems are related to resources. They are thus political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in nature. As such, Cabo Delgado's insurgency require responses that deal with the province's challenges not only through military force but also by tackling issues of human security both as they result from the insurgency (such as forced displacements) and as they cause problems (such as the lack of resources or political exclusion).

Lessons learnt from past peacekeeping experiences and opportunities presented by non-state actors can be turned into strategies upon which the AU can create a common agenda for peace and (human) security. This requires collaboration and the recognition that states, and governments hold the key to the success of any developmental or security-related programme because they (states and governments) ultimately control all national resources for social upliftment and are responsible for deciding how and for what purposes to use these resources.

## **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

## Notes on contributor

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# The Role of Perception in Countering Violent Extremism

## The Joseph Kony Case

Marek Pardyak<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract:

The issue of violent extremism has attracted media and policy attention all over the world, particularly after widely reported terrorist attacks. Extensive research and analysis as well as conferences and government projects have been dedicated to understanding the drivers of violent extremism and providing recommendations for what is known as “CVE” (countering violent extremism). This paper addresses the problem of extremism and terrorism from a different perspective. It covers research from before as well as after 9/11 and analyses a situation in which militants were forcibly kidnapped and then manipulated into becoming brutal executioners.

Finding the "keys to perception" has been and remains a goal for all those who wish to manipulate, e.g., voters, their opponents, sponsors, and supporters. The case of Joseph Kony, the charismatic leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, is worth considering in this context, as he managed to change the perceptual filters of many stakeholders, also those not directly related to his activities. The answer to the question of what irrational levers were used to achieve this goal may add much to the discussion, also in relation to other violent extremist groups including the so-called Islamic State, Boko Haram, or Al-Shabaab.

### Keywords:

Perception; counter-terrorism; CVE; PVE; extremism; terrorism; Kony.

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## *Introduction*

There has much been written about violent extremism, many studies have been carried out in this area and considerable evidence has been gathered. The concepts such as Arendt's "banality of evil" or Zimbardo's "Lucifer's effects" are already well established in social, psychological, and political sciences. Nevertheless, one of the missing aspects for understanding "the fluid nature of brutal extremism" is the perceptual prism. Perception is a multi-layered structure. It occurs in individual, family, social and broader, e.g., national dimensions. All its dimensions permeate and correlate with each other, becoming a catalyst for attitudes and, consequently, behaviours and actions. Depending on the characteristics of the external stimuli and the situational context, different components of perception may be activated to different degrees. The multitude of contextual, individual, and group factors influencing perception makes it difficult to estimate the repeatability of reactions to a given stimulus at the level of direct intervention. On the "meta" level, however, it is possible to identify cognitive patterns, which, if correctly identified, support the process of predicting the response from the target group.

Finding the "keys to perception" has been and remains a dream for all those who fight for the hearts and minds of their followers, voters, opponents, sponsors, or supporters. It is usually believed that the success of these efforts is connected with the best possible adjustment of the message to the addressee's stable perception profile and the basket of needs staying behind it. Practice shows, however, that there are mechanisms that have the potential to shatter the natural human perceptual construction, while simultaneously implementing a new set of schemes and values. The case of Joseph Kony, perceived as the charismatic leader of the Lord's Resistance Army (hereafter LRA), is worth considering in this context, as he managed to change the perceptual filters not only of his fighters, but also of some stakeholders not directly related to his activities. It also took place within areas that would seem to be the universal foundations of family and social coexistence. The re-evaluation of fundamental principles occurred not only in the group of children and young people most susceptible to "magical thinking", but also in the adults who had joined or supported the LRA over the years. The answer to the question of what irrational levers were used to achieve this goal may add a lot to the discussion on violent extremism, also in relation to other extremist groups, including the so-called Islamic State, Boko Haram, or Al-Shabaab.

Thorough examination of the International Criminal Court (The Hague) trial of Dominic Ongwen (one of the main commanders of the LRA) literature review and interviews with representatives of NGOs supporting the victims of atrocities in Uganda laid the factual foundations for this article. It endeavours to address the general research problem which is: "How knowledge of human perceptual functions can contribute to the prevention and fight against violent extremism?" In order to meet this challenge, this paper will attempt to reach the following objectives:



- 1) Specifying the theoretical foundation of Perceptual Security System (PSS), a psycho-social construct of human interactions amongst themselves and in relation to the context as well as time frameworks
- 2) Identifying and characterizing the main groups of entities functioning in PSS<sup>2</sup>
- 3) Determining the basic processes affecting the PSS actors
- 4) Defining a methodology and tools which can be used to analyse actors' responses to a specific violent extremism event
- 5) Specifying what counter-terrorist strategies could be applied to the different actors of the PSS when embracing the violent extremism case of Joseph Kony
- 6) Proposing methods of identification of "Perceptual Security Fuses" and "Terrorist Threats Alerts".

It is hoped that the following analysis will outline Perceptual Security as an important but under-utilized part of the National Security system as well as other, non-governmental research and development. So far, leaving this area unmanaged and without strategic coherence created a space that was successfully exploited by groups such as the LRA, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab.<sup>3</sup>

**"The rules of the universe that we think we know are buried deep in our processes of perception."**

*Gregory Bateson*

## **1. About Perception**

Perception accompanies man, as well as all living organisms, from birth to death. It is the basic medium of communication with the world, and on its basis we build both hierarchies of values, attitudes, and behavioural reactions (*Rummel, 1976*). Of the countless impulses which reach man through the five basic senses (sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch), only a small part is consciously perceived. Paraphrasing the concept of "Johari windows" (*Luft, Harrington, 1955*) we can basically distinguish four groups of stimulants:

- those that a person perceives and consciously reacts to (e.g. the light of a torch shining into the eyes),
- those that one notices but chooses not to react to immediately (e.g. street noise),

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<sup>2</sup> Later referred to as "pillars".

<sup>3</sup> Although the following text focuses on counter-terrorism issues, it is important to note that perceptual processes are very similar to those described also as critical to radicalization leading to violent extremism. This awareness should impose ethical obligations on the reader to make appropriate use of the information contained in this paper. Attention to the moral aspects of the knowledge conveyed has also modified the descriptions of the phenomena discussed, giving them a more general and selective character. Extended and practical versions can be made available to institutions involved in counter-terrorism or counteracting violent extremism.

- those that are not consciously perceived by human beings, but have an impact on them (e.g. carbon monoxide)
- those, which humans do not notice and do not react to them (nevertheless they can influence the person, e.g., suppressed trauma).

In the case of the first three groups, an impulse is registered by the sensory receptors, which encode it in the form of neural information. They then reach the brain, which qualifies, organizes, and interprets<sup>4</sup> them, preparing the feedback. This feedback can be manifested "externally" or internalized, both in its parts and in its entirety. It should be noted that just as the receiver has only a partial awareness of the number and character of the impulses he assimilates, so the sender of the message "sends much more than he thinks he sends" (*Mehrabian, 1971*). Each of the groups mentioned above offers a spectrum of possible interventions both radicalizing the recipient and having the exact opposite effect. In practice, the vast majority of interventions are aimed at easy-to-see stimulation, which, in addition, seems verifiable on the basis of the recipients' responses. Many theories are being developed to determine what impulse causes what reaction. Such research has been conducted at least since the 1930s (*Skinner, 1938*), but the results are so diverse (and sometimes contradictory) that, despite decades of effort, the clear impact on human perception remains undefined. One of the reasons for this is the insufficient interest in impulses from the second group (lack of immediate reaction despite perceiving a stimulant) and the third one (lack of perceiving an impulse that nevertheless has its effect on the recipient). This picture is further complicated by the fact that even if the recipients notice the stimulus and know that it has an impact on them, its interpretation is highly subjective. To simplify, we can give an example of radicalization. People have a distorted self-assessment of the level of this process.<sup>5</sup> It is extremely rare that they call themselves extremists, while they usually name their opponents as terrorists.

Research on the phenomenon of perception has shown that although the capacity for conceptual modelling is innate in all humans (*Anderson, 1983; Fodor, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983*) different nationalities, communities and genders have different ways of perceiving the world (*Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and Turner, 1983; Deregowski, 1972; Hudson, 1960*). Their conclusion is also that within their national, religious, ethnic, linguistic (and so on) groups, each person has their own unique way of perceiving incoming impulses. So how can one build counter-terrorist strategies for the national security in such an important and complex system?

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<sup>4</sup> Using a whole set of processes in which generalizations, distortions, and deletions also play a significant role.

<sup>5</sup> Moved at e.g. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg97916/html/CHRG-114hhrg97916.htm> accessed 15.09.2021.



## 2. *Perceptual Security System – Characterizing the Five Pillars and Basic Processes*

When considering the issue of perception in the context of security, it is necessary to define five pillars of which the Perceptual Security System (hereinafter System) consists:

- 1) Sender – an entity that intentionally or unintentionally interacts with the system
- 2) Recipient – a subject who is consciously or unconsciously exposed to messages
- 3) Context – the information environment surrounding the other pillars of the System at a given time, generating modifications to existing messages within them
- 4) Time frame – periodically occurring groups of social and psychological phenomena affecting the System
- 5) Message – a set of information that changes its properties in interaction with other pillars

All of the pillars identified above interact dynamically with each other, with each pillar both influencing and being influenced by the other elements.

Taking the perspective of one of the pillars<sup>6</sup> and the subsequent weight-attribution analysis of all the components of the System allows us to define **PERCEPTUAL COHERENCE**. It includes a parameterized set of perceptual processes related to radicalization into violent extremism as they occur at a given time within – and between – the five pillars. The verification of the contribution of each pillar to Perceptual Coherence makes it possible to build hypotheses about the relationships occurring between the five elements of the System,<sup>7</sup> indicating at the same time the pillar representing **PERCEPTUAL DOMINATION**.<sup>8</sup>

The example of the interview with Joseph Kony that follows illustrates, in a simplified way, how Perceptual Coherence can be used in the analysis and design of counter-terrorist activities.

### 2.1 *Sender, Receiver and Message*

The architecture of human perception consists of a number of cognitive models/patterns with different levels of complexity (*Vernon, 1955; Herschfeld and Gel, 1994; Mayer et al., 1995; Hjørland, 2002*) whose common function, however, is the selection, organization, and interpretation of incoming data.<sup>9</sup> As mentioned, each subject has a unique “perceptual set”

<sup>6</sup> Sample Research Assumption: “What is the effect on Recipient A of Message B generated by Sender C in context D and time E?”

<sup>7</sup> E.g., what influence would the Context have on the Sender in formulating the Message for a particular Recipient

<sup>8</sup> Perceptual Dominance – the numerically determined perceptual advantage of one of the pillars over the others, also answers the question of which pillar has the greatest influence on the Perceptual System

<sup>9</sup> Cognitive patterns help to cope with an excess of stimuli that reach a person. In a world of increasing information overload and the expectation of faster and more unreflective reactions to incoming stimuli, the role of cognitive patterns will continue to grow. They accelerate and simplify all existing communication processes.

(Allport, 1955; Bruner & Minturu, 1955; Sternberg, 2009, p.449-457),<sup>10</sup> which of course does not mean that all its components and the processes that permeate it differ significantly. Within a single species, nationality, culture, religion, and gender, they are diverse manifestations of the same phenomenon. Numerous scientific debates that are conducted around the issue of perception contribute, on the one hand, to a better understanding of this phenomenon, but, on the other, (paradoxically) they may decrease the cognitive accessibility of the studied matter for a wider audience. Two mainly polemicizing camps are related to the concept of mental models assuming that humans create and manipulate their mental representations to predict and/or cause outcomes (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Fodor, 1983). vs. connectionism camp (Churchland, 1989; Marcus, 2001), claiming that the reference point is an internal understanding of the external world through networks of relationships. One of the more recent, popular, and very clarifying concepts that explain perceptual issues is the “filter bubble” (Pariser, 2011), according to which people often build around themselves hermetic, “safe shelters” into which they allow only information that represents the same characteristics as their own bubble.

From an information security perspective, it is significant that cognitive patterns are distributed on a scale from very general to specific. The former determine what information will be subsequently analysed by the latter. A good illustration of this phenomenon (referring to Pariser) would be to imagine perception as a set of “filters” in which smaller ones are placed in these larger, “more general and external” ones. The data that arrives at these internal ones is the set left over from the first “filtering”. General cognitive patterns, which here are called structural, are also of a more permanent and unchanging nature. The next ones, detailed patterns, often related to its specific content, show greater susceptibility to modification. Perception research should therefore be carried out in at least two sets of cognitive patterns: structural (general) and “content like”.<sup>11</sup>

An important research assumption that is firmly established in practice and theory (e.g., Senge, 1990) is that the confrontation of two different cognitive patterns is conflictogenic, whereas the “meeting” of two similar patterns significantly expands cognitive availability. Patterns, represented by different subjects, can be congruent or conflicting. In the first case, when, e.g., the parametrized pattern of the Sender is the same as the pattern of the Recipient, one can speak of a **COGNITIVE BRIDGE**. This phenomenon encompasses both general and specific (content) patterns, at both individual and group levels. Cognitive Bridges are “roads without barriers” that the Sender may use to influence the Recipient. It is worth emphasizing here that convergence at the level of general cognitive patterns cancels or minimizes differences at lower levels, which can be summed up by the often-quoted proverb “We may disagree about details, but having a common goal, at least we can shake hands”. This hypothesis is of fundamental importance for anti- and counter-terrorist activities. The

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<sup>10</sup> Perceptual set, which includes past experiences, assumptions, given meanings, combined with information emotions, etc.

<sup>11</sup> This would become a significant change from the current situation, in which institutions related to the security sector analyze and react mainly to “extremist content”.



media and political establishment very often focus on responding to the most current manifestations of extremism, which is completely in line with the calculations of terrorists. It is the general schemes – and not the specific ones – that shape the “terrorist consciousness” (e.g., *Falk, 2008*), and counter-terrorist strategies should be built on them. When the situation is reversed – i.e., there is a convergence of lower-level patterns (detailed, content-related) and a conflict of general ones – the information is usually not analyzed at all.

Another aspect related to the Sender and the Receiver is the difference between the intention and the actual “value” of the message sent or received. The Sender sends more data than formally contained in the message itself, and the Recipient may absorb it without having full conscious control over it. If, for example, an information attack is to be considered, one should also mention the “collateral” recipients (similar to a conventional “collateral damage” attack) – entities which the message has reached despite the fact that it was not intended for them. Their reactions should also be analysed, as these recipients may influence the attacked subject in many ways. This broad spectrum of audience analysis is particularly relevant to the study of terrorism, which, by definition, focuses on influencing actor A (such as the government, media, international community, etc.) by attacking actor B (ethnic and social minorities, security services, symbolic artefacts, etc.). Designing effective anti- and counter-terrorist actions in such a social panorama is a difficult but necessary challenge to undertake.

**Message** can be defined as any portion of information that has been generated by the sender in any way with the intention (or not) of delivering it to the recipient. It should be noted here that messages can refer to stimulation of any of the senses and take verbal, visual, olfactory, gustatory, and haptic (or combined) forms. Thus, they will include, for example, both radio messages, news and photos on social media, the use of specific incense, specific foods as well as the laying of hands with a “blessing” on the head. Messages immediately after leaving the Sender begin to “live their own life”, subjected to a whole range of different influences, noises, and distortions on their way to the Recipient. Thus, they acquire their own subjective character and should be treated as such. The consequence of such an assumption in the perceptual analysis is also the need to consider the attributes of the Message in the light of its potential impact on the cognitive schemata of the other pillars of the System. In the approach presented the Communication is “subjectified”, i.e., treated as a pillar that has its own perceptual attributes. In the information space it does not carry the same semantic values assumed by the Sender but fluctuates under the influence of other pillars just like any other subject. The empowerment of the Message (as well as of the Time Frames and the Context) allows for their more precise examination, comparative juxtaposition, and identification of the Perceptual Coherence.

## 2.2 Time Frames and Context

Time frames are fixed sets of attributes that occurred at specific moments identified as important in the past. They were significant enough to change the architecture of the entire System, intensely affecting other entities. Examples of such moments include elections, coups, epidemics, natural disasters, etc. The analysis of Time Frames has a fundamental prognostic-preventive significance – knowing how the forces in the Perception System were shaped in the past, we can prepare scenarios for how to react if similar events were to occur in the future.<sup>12</sup>

**Context** in classical strategic analysis terms can be encapsulated by the acronym PESTLE (politics, economics, sociology, technology, legislation, ecology). The context is the nucleus of many ideas about the systemic causes of terrorism. In cognitive terms, it is, on the one hand, more transdisciplinary and integrative, and, on the other, focused on the research objective (it analyses macro, meso, and micro processes, as in the example of the interview with Joseph Kony below). The context in the light of terrorism research has generated the greatest number of publications, speeches, conferences, and declarations. It is also an extremely structurally diverse pillar of the Perception System, encompassing de facto all the social, economic, and political processes surrounding the Sender and the Recipient. This makes it in many cases so complex that it is impossible to fathom. From a perceptual perspective, however, it is different. Humans have a limited capacity to assimilate new information, and they use a number of processes that reduce the complexity of the external world. In this sense, the Context for a given Recipient, Sender, Message, and Time acquires specific features, has a specific “value”, and in a specific way affects the decision-making processes of the Recipient. Thus, it is no longer an infinite number of competing hypotheses, but is reduced to a single “form” that is “compressed” enough to “squeeze” through the narrow tunnel of human cognition.

## 2.3 Construction of Pillars

Each pillar has its **PERCEPTUAL PROFILE**,<sup>13</sup> which, in turn, consists of perceptual dimensions. These dimensions were conceptualized as a result of:

- 1) Identifying the socio-psychological phenomenon associated with radicalization into violent extremism
- 2) Identification of cognitive schemata and their attributes found in a phenomenon
- 3) To isolate in one dimension those attributes that “complement each other” and to describe their importance in radicalization.

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<sup>12</sup> It should be noted that not in every Perceptual System study is there a need to include analysis of Time Frames. During periods of relative normalization or normality, the Context attributes may be a sufficient information base.

<sup>13</sup> Perceptual Profile – a set of specific features defining cognitive properties of a given subject

Each dimension is composed of two or three attributes. The attributes of the perceptual dimensions<sup>14</sup> are combined in such a way that, within a given dimension, they form a coherent form “*Gestalt*” of the identified psycho-sociological phenomenon related to violent extremism and terrorism. The distribution of attributes “on a numerical axis” allows not only for a more complete understanding of a given phenomenon, but also to see what in a psychological/sociological sense is on the “opposite side” of, for example, a particular narrative used by terrorist organizations to recruit new members. Attributes within one dimension are not always “black” and on the other side “white”. However, they always aim at the fullest possible cognitive description of a given phenomenon.

Dimensions are described by two criteria: **intensity of occurrence and direction**, which indicate which attribute in a dimension becomes dominant.

For example, if to be considered on the “Me, Others, Mission” dimension, which describes a preferential, automatic way of ordering incoming data in the direction of Self (focus on the realization of one's own needs), Others (focus on the realization of other people's needs), Mission (focus on the realization of the set “higher goal”). This dimension is described from other perspectives also in various other sociological, anthropological, and psychological concepts (e.g., related to motivational psychology). It is commonly referred to as “egoist”, “altruist”, and “missionary”.




Figure 1. Me, Others, Mission, 2020  
(Source: Pardyak, M.)

Once complete Perceptual Profiles of the pillars have been built, the next stage of the analysis is to verify which of the dimensions belonging to different entities exhibit similarities and which show differences. The profiles are then “superimposed” onto a single data network, where it is possible to identify in graphical form which strategy of influencing the perception of other entities is adopted by the selected pillar.

<sup>14</sup> Perceptual attribute – a specific feature, phenomenon describing from a particular perspective the examined socio-psychological phenomenon.



### 3. Methodology and Tools for Analysing the Perceptual Security System

#### 3.1 Application of Integrated Attribution Analysis (IAA) to the Joseph Kony Case

The author's *Integrated Attribution Analysis* described here in brief is a transdisciplinary concept for the study of cognitive susceptibility to radical content. It consists of 45 correlating perceptual dimensions (and a total of 105 of their attributes) that describe socio-psychological phenomena related to radicalization, extremism, and terrorism. Its conduct involves the following steps:

- 1) Deciding on the scope of analysis
- 2) Choosing the time frame, receivers, and context territory
- 3) Assigning weights to each of the five Pillars
- 4) Realizing assessment
- 5) Deciding what CT strategy to choose for which receivers.

Methodologically, it is based on the tenets of *Structured Professional Judgement* (hereafter SPJ), an approach that is used in many radicalization risk assessment methods. Its description goes well beyond the scope of this paper (it can be found with practical applications in: Cole, Cole, Alison, Alison, Waring, Elntib, 2016; Dolnik, 2011; Meloy, Gill, 2016; Nakayama, Lee, 2018), while in operational practice, SPJ has found its application in, among others (Pardyak, 2021):

- a) **Extreme Risk Guidance (ERG22+)** – HM Prison and Probation Service, Great Britain and Wales
- b) **Islamic Radicalisation (IR-46)** – Dutch National Police
- c) **Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP)** – University of Liverpool
- d) **Terrorist Radicalisation Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18)** – American Board of Professional Psychology
- e) **Violent Risk Assessment (VRA)** – University of Ottawa, Netherland Institute for Forensic Psychology and Psychiatry, Correctional Service of New South (Wales)
- f) **Violent Risk Extreme Assessment (VERA)** – Public Safety Canada
- g) **Multi-level Guidance (MLG)** – Fraser University, Canada
- h) **Searching Concealed Information Test (SCIT)** – Kansai University of International Studies, Japan
- i) **Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalisation (COPpra)** – Europol, Cepol, Belgian Federal Police, EU members



A simplified summary of IAA will be presented for a specific moment in Joseph Kony's more than 30 years of activity, which was the interview the LRA leader gave to Sam Farmer on the Uganda-Congo border in 2006. This was a period of relative "ceasefire" between Joseph Kony and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, after more than two years of devastating fighting between the two sides. Kony (Sender) directed his Message mainly to the international community (Recipient), which pressured both Uganda and South Sudan<sup>15</sup> to become more active in the fight against the LRA.<sup>16</sup>

The following table summarizes the survey results for the selected 12 (out of 45 available) perceptual dimensions derived from the analysis of the above interview. Perceptual Coherence was generally defined as either not existing or existing. In the first case, if coherence is not present, it means that for a given dimension there is such a large variation in the directions of pillars that using this dimension for counter-terrorism (CT) purposes will be ineffective. This is because the variation is too great, and the observed differences will work to the disadvantage of all the System's actors (including counter-terrorism institutions if they step in). In other words, anti-terrorist actions would also be neutralized by the influence of other pillars. In the opposite case if there is Perceptual Coherence, there is a risk of radicalization into violent extremism, which requires CT intervention.

Dimensions and their attributes	PERCEPTUAL PILLARS				
	Sender (Kony)	Receipients (Intl comm.)	Message	Context	Perceptual Coherence
Me, Others, Mission	Me	Others	Mission	Others	<b>absent</b>
Stress, Normal, Comfort	Stress	Normal	Normal	Stress	<b>absent</b>
Attention, Resonating, Escalating	Escalating	Resonating	Resonating	Resonating	<b>present</b>
Unconsciousness, Interference, Consciousness	Interference	Consciou sness	Consciou sness	Consciou sness	<b>present</b>

<sup>15</sup> Also present at the same meeting was the Vice President of South Sudan, Mr. Riek Macker.

<sup>16</sup> This interview in the form of a short report can be found in an open source: <https://vimeo.com/8617828>, accessed 21.11.2020.

<b>Emotions – Rational analysis</b>	Emotions	Rational	Rational	Rational	<b>present</b>
<b>Revolution – status quo</b>	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	<b>present</b>
<b>Religiosity – Secularity</b>	Religiosity	Secularity	Secularity	Religiosity	<b>absent</b>
<b>Quick reward, Prolonged feedback</b>	Quick reward	Prolonged feedback	Prolonged feedback	Quick reward	<b>absent</b>
<b>External / Internal authority</b>	Internal authority	External authority	Internal authority	Internal authority	<b>present</b>
<b>Punishment – Forgiveness</b>	Punishment	Punishment	Forgiveness	Forgiveness	<b>absent</b>
<b>Blaming / Justification</b>	Justification	Blaming	Blaming	Justification	<b>absent</b>
<b>Past / Nowadays / Future</b>	Future	Future	Future	Past	<b>present</b>

Table 1. Dimensions, Attributes, Pillars, and Perceptual Coherence, 2021  
(Source: Pardyak, M.)


The above table indicates twelve dimensions that can become the basis for building a counter-terrorism strategy. Such activities should cover all the pillars in parallel (in the analysed example: Sender, Recipient, Message, Context) in a coherent and individualized way for each pillar.

### 3.2 Identification of Counter-terrorism Strategies

Once the dimensions of Perceptual Coherence have been identified, the counter-terrorist institution can choose from four main response strategies as shown in the diagram below. These strategies may include either individual dimensions, specific groups of dimensions, or the entire Perceptual Profile containing all attributes of the analysed entity.

The most intensive efforts should be directed at the pillar that represents the largest share of Perceptual Coherence (rather than, as is often the case, only on the Sender or, even worse, mainly on the Message). Such an approach is a paradigm shift in operation, as it

focuses not on populist “firefighting” but on influencing the actors that most constitute vulnerability to the message sent by terrorist organizations. The “same dimension, same direction” strategy is the most confrontational. A potential failure in its application may not only have particularly severe consequences for the counter-terrorist institution, but may also entrench the terrorists. In the case of two of the four strategies on the diagram, the dimensions they contain are different from the one currently being analysed. The methodology of their selection is based on correlations between dimensions:



*Figure 2. Reaction strategies to terrorist actions; perceptual perspective, 2020  
(Source: Pardyak, M.)*

Using historical databases relating to the fluctuation of dimensions and directions within different pillars, it is also possible to build more complex counter-terrorism efforts by, for example, rotating strategies for the same actor, sensitizing a given pillar to specific perceptual dimensions, or combining terrorist strategies with others in such a way as to discredit the former. Staying with the base model, the following example presents a palette of possible responses for one of the dimensions (Attention, Resonating, Escalating), assuming that the Recipient is Kony himself.




Figure 3. Perceptual response strategies to Kony's message in the dimensions "Attention, Resonating, Escalating", 2021  
(Source: Pardyak, M.)

The choice of a particular strategy for a given pillar depends on strategic and operational objectives. Rarely is the immediate annihilation of a terrorist organization possible and equally rarely do attempts to do so have a positive long-term effect. Cutting off one head of the Laemean hydra caused it to grow two others. After the experience of several decades of the "war on terror", one can already draw clear conclusions about effective anti-terrorist strategies and those that had exactly the opposite effect. Acting on all the pillars is a kind of "holistic" and long-term anti-terrorist strategy. This activity may take various operational forms, such as:

- kinetic actions
- socio-psychological actions
- diplomacy (including economic diplomacy)
- attacks on supply chains
- exploiting the advantage in information technology
- and so on.

All of them require a change of perspective and a considerable dose of self-reflection. From the moment an anti-terrorist institution decides to react, it automatically becomes a Sender, and thus contributes its own profile to the Perception System. It rarely happens that its participation is dominant (which in some countries is difficult to admit in front of the



dispensers of financial resources). A similarly high degree of objectivity is required in determining the Perceptual Profile. Arguably, many counter-terrorism institutions would like to be perceived as:

- 1) caring about others (Me, Others, Mission dimension)
- 2) for the safety and comfort of citizens (Stress, Normal, Comfort dimension)
- 3) in the clear. (Unconsciousness, Interference, Consciousness dimension)
- 4) and rational way. (Emotions, Rational Analysis dimension)
- 5) communicating (Attention, Resonating, Escalating dimension)
- 6) its stabilizing functions (Revolution, Status Quo dimension)
- 7) based, among other things, on the equality of different religions. (Religiosity, Secularity dimension)
- 8) Implementing long-term action strategies (Quick reward, Prolonged feedback dimension)
- 9) and building on its extensive experience in countering extremism; (External authority, Internal Authority dimension)
- 10) capable of (Blaming – Justification dimension)
- 11) and punishing anyone (Punishment, Forgiveness dimension)
- 12) who would dare violate the public good (Past / Nowadays / Future dimension).

Unfortunately, often it is only wishful thinking, and an external assessment would be highly advisable. IAA is dynamic and specific for a given Message, Context, Sender, Recipient, and Time. One subject may have as many as a dozen of his base profiles, just as every person may be assessed in different ways depending on whether he is perceived, for example, through a professional, private, spiritual, social, or physiological prism.<sup>17</sup> He can also step into different roles depending on the situation at hand. And it is still the same person. This reflection can lead to another one – the will to influence a subject should include a wide spectrum of influence on and by various other subjects (pillars). Analyzing the LRA example – in column one of the table below is an abbreviated perceptual profile of Joseph Kony. Assuming – for the sake of clarity – that the same Recipients (international community) and context remain, the table below provides an example of what dimensions and attributes could be used to describe CT messages to each of the remaining three actors.

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<sup>17</sup> The multiplicity of dimensions that are evident in humans' reactions were addressed also by the Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen (2006).

<b>PILLARS Dimension / Directions</b>	<b>Receiver 1 (Kony)</b>	<b>Message 1</b>	<b>Receiver 2 (Intl comm.)</b>	<b>Message 2</b>	<b>Receiver 3 Context</b>	<b>Message 3</b>
<b>Me, Others, Mission</b>	Me	Me	Others	Others	Others	Others
<b>Stress, Normal, Comfort</b>	Stress	Normal	Normal	Stress	Stress	Normal
<b>Attention, Resonating, Escalating</b>	Escalating	Attention	Resonating	Attention	Resonating	Escalating
<b>Unconsciousness, Interference, Consciousness</b>	Interference	Interference	Consciou sness	Interference	Consciou sness	Interference
<b>Emotions - Rational analysis</b>	Emotions	Emotions	Rational	Emotions	Rational	Rational
<b>Revolution - status quo</b>	Revolu tionary	Status quo	Revolu tionary	Revolutionary	Revolu tionary	Revolutionary
<b>Religiosity - Secularity</b>	Religiosity	Religiosity	Secularity	Religiosity	Religiosity	Secularity
<b>Quick reward, Prolonged feedback</b>	Quick reward	Prolonged feedback	Prolonged feedback	Quick reward	Quick reward	Prolonged feedback
<b>External authority / Internal authority</b>	Internal authority	External authority	External authority	Internal authority	Internal authority	Internal authority
<b>Punishment - Forigiveness</b>	Punishment	Forgiveness	Punishment	Forgiveness	Forgiveness	Forgiveness



<b>Blaming / Justification</b>	Justification	Blaming	Blaming	Blaming	Justification	Blaming
<b>Past / Nowadays / Future</b>	Future	Past (Lakwene)	Future	Nowdays	Past	Past

Table 2. Differentiation of anti-terrorist messages for different pillars of the Perception Security System, 2021  
(Source: Pardyak, M.)

The analysis above is not complete as it does not take into account the impact of the Sender and the possible Time Frame, therefore the Perceptual Coherence has not been defined and, for the sake of clarity, the counter strategies have been limited to the same dimensions as the Recipients. Nevertheless, even in this limited form, it is possible to construct a sample “core message” dedicated to different pillars.

*CT's response to **Kony's profile (Receiver 1)** should be based on influencing his egotistical vision of himself while creating a semblance of normalcy to the situation (stress heightened his cruelty). It would be necessary to cause a split in attention by using both “real life” and immaterial means. The message should arouse emotions, as they were the catalyst for changes in the LRA structures. It is not Kony but a “force majeure” (also religious) that should be the initiator of these changes, thus limiting his personal sense of influence. The search for any guilt should begin with the sins committed by Kony himself and all his fighters, as only this will save them from the fate that befell his aunt Alice Lakwene (Behrend, 1999; Currey, 2000).<sup>18</sup>*

*The CT response to the **international community (Receiver 2)** should raise attention to the real, not assumed, needs of others, which are based in the LRA countries on the symbiosis of spiritual and real life. Stress and emotional tension should be created, because only these attributes have been conducive to change in the past. It is necessary to have a greater understanding of other cultures but also of the real impact that international action has on the “on the ground situation”. The international community, especially Christians, should be encouraged to exert pressure on global and local clerical representatives, because these actions have had positive effects and “stripped” Kony of his supernatural qualities. It would be important to emphasise the time factor and the need to act “here and now” – every day of delay means more civilian victims. Accusations could be directed at the sluggishness of the clergy, part of the media, and politicians (both local and foreign) who used the activities of the LRA<sup>19</sup> to satisfy their particular interests. Forgiveness (or none) should be the option and the choice made by the victims, not internationally ordered or imposed.*

<sup>18</sup> Alice Lakwene – Joseph Kony's aunt, on whose activities, mistakes, and successes Kony based the creation and development of the LRA

<sup>19</sup> In the years prior to Sam Farmer's interview, the local political and military kaleidoscope was very complex – Uganda was supporting Sudanese insurgents, the Khartoum government was helping guerrillas in Uganda. Sudan armed guerrillas in Chad,



CT response directed to **Context**, which contains information that is more general and can be further disseminated. The message should include that it is necessary to take care of the needs of others. The situation may become normalized if the duality of the functioning of the spiritual and material worlds is emphasized more intensively. There is a need for a “cooler” and more calculated assessment of the occurring events. Such an approach may bring the desired changes, although we will certainly have to wait patiently for them. The awareness of the significance and role of secular structures should be deepened, if not nationwide then regionally, at the municipal/civic or even tribal levels. It would be necessary to emphasize locally occurring resources, raising the belief in one’s own potential for healing. Accusations should be attributed to the perpetrators so that they weigh on them, but in parallel, much forgiveness is needed. “Peace is sometimes more important than justice” (anonymous Acholi).

#### 4. Perceptual Security Fuses & Terrorist Threat Alerts

Integrated Attributional Analysis can be used for a broad set of CT/PVE activities in both the reactive and proactive countermeasures subgroups. It also has “perception fuses” built into its structure, i.e., algorithms that automatically report increasing levels of threat that require immediate intervention. Calibration of the fuses can take place for different categories of data and for different entities, but they are all subject to the same three-stage, progressive scale of threats. It is expressed by three types of alerts:

- 1) convergence
- 2) closure
- 3) domination

Ad.1) The convergence condition occurs when the Perceptual Attributes of the Sender coincide with those of the Recipient:

PILLARS Dimension / Directions	Sender (Kony)	Recepti nts (Intl community)	Message	Context	Perceptual Coherence
Me, Others, Mission	Me	Others	Mission	Others	absent
Stress, Normal,	Stress	Normal	Normal	Stress	absent

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and Chad, in turn, sent rifles to rebels in the Central African Republic. The Central African Republic harboured Congo insurgents at home, and the Congo is a safe haven for rebels from many Great Lakes countries. Ethiopia was trying to harm Eritrea and Somalia, and Somalia was destabilizing Kenya.



<b>Comfort</b>					
<b>Attention, Resonating, Escalating</b>	Escalating	Resonating	Resonating	Resonating	<b>present</b>
<b>Unconsciousness, Interference, Consciousness</b>	Interference	Consciousness	Consciousness	Consciousness	<b>present</b>
<b>Emotions - Rational analysis</b>	Emotions	Rational	Rational	Rational	<b>present</b>
<b>Revolution - status quo</b>	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	<b>present</b>
<b>Religiosity – Secularity</b>	Religiosity	Secularity	Secularity	Religiosity	absent
<b>Quick reward, Prolonged feedback</b>	Quick reward	Prolonged feedback	Prolonged feedback	Quick reward	absent
<b>External authority / Internal authority</b>	Internal authority	External authority	Internal authority	Internal authority	present
<b>Punishment - Forgiveness</b>	Punishment	Punishment	Forgiveness	Forgiveness	absent
<b>Blaming / Justification</b>	Justification	Blaming	Blaming	Justification	absent
<b>Past / Nowadays / Future</b>	Future	Future	Future	Past	<b>present</b>

*Table 3. Perception Fuses – analysis for the “convergence” alert, 2021  
(Source: Pardyak, M.)*

Ad.2) Closure condition occurs when the convergence condition is met and, in addition, the Message and/or Context in the given dimensions represent the same attributes:

Dimension / Directions	Sender (Kony)	Receipts (Intl community)	Message	Context	Perceptual Coherence
Revolution - status quo	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	<b>present</b>
Punishment - Forgivelessness	Punishment	Punishment	Forgiveness	Forgiveness	present
Past / Nowadays / Future	Future	Future	Future	Past	<b>present</b>

Table 4. Perception Fuses – analysis for the “closure” alert, 2021 (Source: Pardyak, M.)

Ad.3) The Perceptual Domination condition occurs when the closure condition is met and, in addition, the Sender represents the highest share of Perceptual Coherence for the dimension:

Dimension / Directions	Sender (Kony)	Receipts (Intl community)	Message	Context	Perceptual Dominance
Revolution - status quo	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	Revolutionary	<b>Context</b>
Past / Nowadays / Future	Future	Future	Future	Past	<b>Context</b>

Table 5. Perception Fuses – analysis for the “dominance” alert, 2021 (Source: Pardyak, M.)

In the example above, none of the dimensions reached the Alert 3 ceiling. Perceptual dominance was assigned to the contextual dimensions.

Perception Fuses find their application both in the analysis of threats of individual and group acts of terror. Each alert level is combined with a series of specific recommendations intended for various actors of national anti-terrorist systems.



Integrated Attributional Analysis with all its functionalities is a concept designed for professional users. A caveat: like any other set of tools used in similar contexts, it can be used either ethically or in violation of moral principles. The principles governing human perception are universal and should be explored to enhance security, prosperity, and humanitarianism regardless of national, cultural, or religious differences.

### ***Summary of Interim Findings to Date and Prospective Research***

Despite some enthusiastic (and highly subjective) analyses,<sup>20</sup> Joseph Kony and the LRA have stood the test of time. The organization, which began its activities (according to various sources) in 1986-1988, although weakened and divided into factions, still exists today.<sup>21</sup> Each of the operations carried out against the LRA took place at a disproportionately high cost to the civilian population,<sup>22</sup> leaving behind transgenerational trauma, regardless of whether these actions were directly military or other causes.<sup>23</sup> The LRA organizational culture was built on fear and cruelty toward vulnerable civilian populations. When threatened – it was these elements that were most explored and directed mainly at the civilian population. From the perspective of thirty-odd years, it appears that one of the significant motives of at least some of the forces fighting the LRA was to “achieve spectacular success”, i.e., the capture or killing of Joseph Kony, which might then have been internationally publicized. Would it really have been worthwhile? After all, just as he had taken Alicia Lakwena's place, a successor could quickly be found after his death.

Another perspective rarely raised is that the “humanitarian balance” between the treatment of victims and perpetrators has been upset. Perhaps this is due to the fact that most LRA fighters were both of them. The common narrative was that a 12-year-old from Gulu in Uganda living with his family was a bullied child, while a 12-year-old, kidnapped by the LRA, beaten, raped, and forced to murder others, became a “bloodthirsty beast”.<sup>24</sup> Did the concern for those children, 70% of which (at least until the Iron Fist operation) were in Kony's ranks (*Jagielski, 2005*),<sup>25</sup> result in sending against them later the machinery of the most powerful army in the world? Compared to that fact, one must also ask how much was done for the long-term protection and rehabilitation of the survivors.

<sup>20</sup> As in the report of Kasper Agger dated October 2013, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Completing-The-Mission-US-Special-Forces-Essential-to-Ending-LRA.pdf> accessed 20.09.2021.

<sup>21</sup> One of the most precise online maps showing the on-time terrorism incidents <https://crisistracker.org/map>, access 25.09.2021.

<sup>22</sup> It is estimated that, after Operation Iron Fist, the number of displaced persons increased several times to 1.7 million (mainly Acholi); after Operation Lightning Thunder, the number of newly displaced persons exceeded 400,000 (coming from DRC and CAR), the subsequent Operation African Union bears large discrepancies in statistics. The comprehensive report of the aftermath of Operation Lightning Thunder dated April 2009, Schmerus M, Tumutegyerize [https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/AfterOperationLightningThunder\\_200904\\_ENG.pdf](https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/AfterOperationLightningThunder_200904_ENG.pdf) accessed 10.09.2021.

<sup>23</sup> Such as the handbills and subsequent trial of Dominic Ongwen at the International Criminal Court <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen> or the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of US President Barack Obama <https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ172/PLAW-111publ172.pdf> accessed 12.07.2021.

<sup>24</sup> Such narratives were a gift to Kony, helping him maintain discipline in the group.

<sup>25</sup> Later, due to the trans-border nature of the conflict, statistics vary widely. So do estimates by various organizations stating that the LRA has abducted between 25,000 and 70,000 children through its entire period of operation.

On a slightly broader note, Kony became globally recognized (*CNN, BBC, New Yorker, Oprah Winfrey* etc.) after 1996, when the LRA abducted 139 schoolgirls from Saint Mary's College. A dozen years later and over 4,000 km further northwest, there was the process of a major "internalization" of another terrorist organization, Boko Haram. This group abducted 276 schoolgirls from the Nigerian region of Borno. With this action, the group gained "international fame", which continues to this day.<sup>26</sup> Joseph Kony kidnapped girls for the internal purpose of realizing his "mission" in Uganda, but unintentionally gained global recognition. This behaviour became a model for other terrorist organizations, which, in the following years, also wanted to use media leverage. One of the most effective ways to achieve this goal would be to attack and abuse minors. Thus, the kidnapping of girls will continue as long as, in the opinion of terrorist organizations, it is the most effective way to achieve their goals. The publicity that Kony drew has inspired subsequent imitators and will continue to do so as long as new paradigms of CT/PVE strategy are not adopted. The use of existing ones will unfortunately often be counter-productive.

The role of perception in countering violent extremism is crucial, and in an environment of information overload, its importance continues to grow. It is perception that determines whether or not people are radicalized, recruited, ideologized, and persuaded to commit violent acts. Perception, by analogy, can also play a supporting role in the prevention, deradicalization, and rehabilitation of those experiencing extremism. Finally, perception can become a mortal weapon. The Perception Security System is another space of constant struggle between humanistic development and extremist hatred. The rivalry for hearts and minds is as important as the advancements on any other preventive or combat solutions.

Creating a "*culture of security and defence*",<sup>27</sup> both from internal and international perspectives, requires active promotion, well thought-out strategies, and effective tools. Perception plays a key role in these vitally important domains.

### **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exist for this manuscript.

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<sup>26</sup> Despite the fact that a year later in the village of Baga they massacred probably 2000 inhabitants of this village. Allison S. "I am Charlie but I am Baga too. On Nigeria's forgotten massacre" Daily Maverick 12.01.2015 <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-01-12-i-am-charlie-but-i-am-baga-too-on-nigerias-forgotten-massacre/> accessed 22.10.2021.

<sup>27</sup> Cieślarczyk M. (2007) *Kultura bezpieczeństwa i obronności*: Siedlce, Wydawnictwo Akademii Podlaskiej. [Cieślarczyk M. (2007) *The Culture of Security and Defence*: Podlaska Academy Press]



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## Developmental Authoritarianism in Africa

### The cases of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda

Lumanyano Ngcayisa<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract:

Post-independence Africa saw a rise in authoritarianism; however, this political system was led by malevolent autocrats who ruled with an iron fist, accumulating absolute power, redirecting wealth to small coalitions, and passing policies favouring only a few. However, these ideals and principles have evolved over the past decade, noticeably in countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, introducing a different variant of authoritarianism, known as “developmental authoritarianism.” Ostensibly inspired by the Chinese authoritarian developmentalism model, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda should be studied to comprehend the objectives and functionality of this school of thought. In these East African cases, this article scrutinises whether the culture ostensibly cultivates the sacrifice of individual liberties for common objectives, countering liberal principles while promoting economic prosperity and development. The political leadership of these political systems is pivotal in achieving socioeconomic development in Africa. Benevolent autocrats like Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, President Paul Kagame, and President Yoweri Museveni, among others in Africa, are critical in bolstering economic growth and ensuring state development for their countries. However, achieving rapid economic growth and robust state development comes at the cost of forgone civil liberties, as human rights violations persist in these countries. Notably, the culture within these countries fosters severed liberties for the common good. This article investigates this fairly new political system in Africa, how it is used by these East African regions, and the ostensible African culture which subdues many into accepting illiberal practices for ostensible broad-based economic prosperity and state development.

#### Keywords:

Development;  
authoritarianism;  
Ethiopia; Rwanda;  
Uganda.

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## *Introduction*

After independence, authoritarianism in Africa was characterised by malevolent autocrats that reigned over their countries, resulting in the underdevelopment of their people while enriching small coalitions. According to Kodero (2020), authoritarian systems can emerge from the state's economic foundations, as states with wealthy natural resources can distribute their wealth to secure patronage for political elites. However, when those resources are depleted, coalitions become smaller and political elites become more authoritarian in their pursuit to maintain power. Schoppert (2020) highlights those examples of malevolent African autocrats who reigned over their people, ranging from Idi Amin of Uganda (1971–1974), Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan (1989–2019), to Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (1987–2017). Historically, authoritarianism has been detrimental to Africa, while the legacy of colonialism left inherent challenges ranging from public services to policing. Many African states pursued authoritarianism to enforce policing and regulate public services in light of these challenges. However, authoritarianism did not necessarily result in development but rather regress. Since then, many African states have not successfully implemented sustainable development and economic growth due to incapacity, weak institutions, and corruption (Cheeseman and Fisher, 2019).

However, recently, some African states have innovated authoritarian ideals and principles, leading to a rise in developmental authoritarianism. It is a political system where the state produces substantial public works and services while exercising power over most facets of society, enabling governments to prioritise the development of national interests and cultivate economic prosperity to achieve state development (Matfess, 2015: 182-188). Arguably, developmental authoritarianism in Africa is inspired by the Chinese model of authoritarian developmentalism. Yang (2016: 49) suggests that it is the strategy employed by the ruling elite to establish economic growth, generate employment, and sustainable growth for the state while exercising centralised state power.

In Africa, authoritarianism's evolution has seen a rise over the past decade of progress regarding free and fair elections in 33 out of 55 African states (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). However, this has not resulted in a guarantee of significant inclusivity and accessibility to electoral processes. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2019) argues that progress in democratic elections is not parallel to significant citizen participation, as African political participation decreased by 0.6 points between 2013–2017. The political participation of African citizens is under threat in the region, as civil participation (playing an active part in political processes or affiliating with a political party) declined by 72.9%. As a result, less civil participation combined with African personhood ideals creates a vacuum that developmental authoritarian political systems can monopolise. African personhood encourages African societies and cultures to embrace collective empowerment and growth over individualism (Molefe, 2019: 313-316).

In contributing to the analysis and nexus between non-democratic states and economic development, this article investigates the impact of developmental authoritarianism in Africa.

It focuses on three East African countries, namely Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. Although authoritarianism in Africa is no new topic, its variant, developmental authoritarianism, is a relatively recent occurrence in Africa and in these cases. The article analyses the contributions and limitations of developmental authoritarianism in Africa as a political system while noting the Chinese model's influence and inquiring whether developmental authoritarianism capacitates robust state policies for development in Africa while establishing economic relations internationally without compromising their political, economic, or social structures.

The article will use constructivist qualitative methods to explore and interpret developmental authoritarianism as a political system. On the other hand, qualitative methods in the social sciences work well with inductive research design. A qualitative and inductive approach allows new theories/systems to emerge rather than limiting research to previously defined classifications (McKibben et al., 2020: 2). The article analyses and critiques developmental authoritarianism derived from the Chinese model, mainly using Hilary Matfess and Dali Yang to clarify the theoretical framework. The article also briefly highlights the concept of African personhood by Motsamai Molefe. It critically analyses applied developmental authoritarianism in the cases of Ethiopia's, Rwanda, and Uganda, providing positive and negative indicators. Lastly, the study provides its findings with recommendations.

### ***Developmental Authoritarianism: A conceptualisation***

According to Puddington (2017), developmental authoritarianism (DA) has thrived where totalitarianism failed because of nuanced and readjusted repression strategies, redefined exploitative measures on civil societies, and disseminating illiberal principles. Modern autocrats in these systems devote themselves to debilitating opposition instead of annihilating them while disregarding the rule of law and projecting ostensible legitimacy, order, and prosperity. The resurgence of authoritarian rule came rebranded, as autocrats ensured a growing number of dependents on state handouts for greater control over the populace. Modern autocrats sometimes ostensibly provide aspects of liberal democracy (e.g., substantial service delivery) as a mechanism to disguise their illiberal traits (e.g., extended terms of office). These autocrats provide basic services for centralised state power. Guriev and Treisman (2019, p. 102) identify these leaders as 'informational autocrats,' seeking to distance the populace from their opposition through covert efforts that censor them, while populists publicly criticise the opposition. Essentially, propaganda is their instrument of choice.

Inglis (2019) highlights several checklist points to identify authoritarianism; however, these also apply to developmental authoritarianism. First, elongated executive power, where autocrats simultaneously accumulate power while weakening state institutions, judiciaries, media, and civil activists that provide checks and balances. Second, centralised repressive state power, lack of accountability, and elite patronage for financial backing leads to citizens' inability to hold those responsible to account. Third, autocrats use populism and nationalism to capitalise on existing social tensions to solidify their support while weaponizing media and



new technologies to regulate domestic news and misinform the international community. Finally, autocrats institute the 'emergency card,' using traditional tactics such as declaring a state of emergency to facilitate repression and elongated executive state power.

Furthermore, Gebrekidan (2020) suggested that the covid-19 pandemic is a catalyst for invoking illiberal principles and practices even in democracies worldwide. Governments are exploiting the health crisis to accumulate power, with little regard for preventing the abuse of their newly acclaimed authority. These invasive illiberal measures range from Uganda closing schools, banning large gatherings, and vehicle movement (Biryabarema, 2020) to South Africa enforcing a lockdown alert level 5, suggesting a high covid-19 outbreak and insufficient health system preparedness (South African Government, 2021). Moreover, norms have changed as developmental authoritarian measures pursue invasive surveillance systems previously criticised for abandoning liberal principles and practices.

In the African context, the resurgence of authoritarian rule in the contemporary era has provided a platform for establishing developmental authoritarianism, particularly in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda. According to Matfess (2015, pp. 181-204), developmental authoritarianism is described in five fundamental components. First, the domestic ascension into power after civil dissolution unifies citizens and creates accessible political mobilisation. Second, this political system imposes statutory restrictions on identity, speech, and association, influencing the possibility of civil dissolution and conflict, justifying restrictions. Third, Matfess (2015, pp. 181-204) suggests that these political systems use a significant proportion of the economy, promoting economic and civil development, committed to mercantile capitalism (state development and economic growth that is based on trade, and more significant exports than imports, while the middle-class is dependent on the state).

Furthermore, they exhibit party mobilisation and militaristic association concerning the development of the populace. They caution regional and domestic instability to encourage mandatory participation in political initiatives and development strategies. Lastly, these systems create relationships with the West for the interest of regional security, in exchange for aid, and to foster foreign direct investment. In contrast, they dismiss civil/human rights and democratic legitimacy. Ironically, the United States (liberal democratic state) and Ethiopia (illiberal/non-democratic state) have had diplomatic relations since the early twentieth century and have maintained such relations throughout the changing forms of government. The U.S. recognises that today the country is officially known as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and is founded on "developmental democracy". The United States defines Ethiopia's political system as a model that prioritises economic growth over civil rights (US. Department of State, 2020).

According to Del Sordi (2018, p. 218), modern autocratic repression occurs primarily in two forms, high and low intensity. High-intensity repression involves outright violence towards prominent opposition, be it an organisation or individual. Low-intensity repression is more covert and subtle, characterised by reduced violence. Thus, developmental authoritarianism

seemingly takes a soft approach, arguably extends its low-intensity repression beyond opposition, and targets the populace, hindering dissenting opinions. Human Rights Watch (2018) suggests that the Chinese government used high-intensity repression against 13 million Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang region, implementing arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and torment. At the same time, one million were detained and forced to participate in communist political education and learn Mandarin. This relentless violation of human rights conditions the Turkic Muslims to praise the Chinese Communist Party and its government, also noticeable in Hong Kong with the new security laws protecting national security over local/provincial objectives. Although this example is drawn from Asia, modern African autocrats ostensibly derive their system from China.

The People's Republic of China uses the authoritarian development model in conjunction with the high and low-intensity repression approach. Noticeably, in the events which unfolded in Xinjiang, China used high-intensity repression. According to Li (2015, pp. 130-131), the authoritarian development model is an evolved political system categorised as a political meritocracy, which differs from traditional socialism due to its use of the market system and its redefined Chinese democratic commitment and party leadership. As a result, China's economy has done remarkably well, placing it among the world's fastest-growing economies. The World Bank (2020b) records China's average GDP growth around 10% annually, lifting 850 million people out of poverty in the past three decades. However, it is noteworthy to recognise that the Chinese state is capable, having the skills and professionalism to enforce a state-led development role, unlike African states that seek to emulate the Chinese in this regard. Since the late 1970s, Chinese reforms have been the catalyst for significant socioeconomic transformation, increasing foreign direct investment, industrialisation, and marketisation resulting in economic growth. The Chinese model protects the state-owned economy outside of the Western democratic principles, giving rise to "state capitalism" while strategically monitoring specific sectors of the economy without political competition and implementing restrictions on civil freedoms to achieve national objectives (Li, 2015, pp. 130-131).

Furthermore, in the African context, the notion of ubuntu (meaning I am because we are) plays a significant role in African Personhood, encouraging African societies and cultures to embrace collective empowerment and growth over individualism and self-enrichment, making them susceptible to exploitation by developmental authoritarianism. Motsamai Molefe (2019, pp. 313-316) suggests a distinction between being human as a biological truth and being a person having moral awareness. Therefore, personhood develops an accepted character, where a person's life is shaped by moral virtue. In contrast, African scholars note that personhood is achieved in social relationships, allowing one to achieve moral perfection and personhood through a community. The best method to realise one's humanity is by empowering and contributing to other human beings. The act of ubuntu promotes others' good while promoting one's good, intertwining the individual and communitarian facets, establishing African personhood.



Developmental authoritarianism capitalises on African personhood and ubuntu because it encourages African communities to accept development at the cost of authoritarianism for communal growth and prosperity (Motsamai Molefe, 2019: 313-316). Essentially, this leads to neglecting civil and human rights for collective economic prosperity and state development. Modern autocrats using developmental authoritarianism seemingly latch on to the ideals of African personhood to promote the political system used and subdue the citizenry to compromise liberal principles in the hope of achieving ostensible economic prosperity and state development.

### ***Developmental Authoritarianism: Contributions and Limitations***

Developmental authoritarianism enables significant state intervention and control of the societal and economic facets to achieve state development. Raising the question, does it facilitate economic growth? On the other hand, according to Magnus (2018), there are no grounds to suggest that democracy outperforms authoritarianism from an economic argument, and empirically, records illustrate that authoritarian states can reach high economic growth rates, e.g., Singapore and South Korea. Developmental authoritarian systems can organise and distribute labour and capital to achieve economic growth; however, this is generally favourable only in the early phases of economic development. Kroenig (2020, pp. 39-41) notes that autocrats can impose decisions on the system, allowing them to redistribute resources for crucial state objectives while side-lining political opposition in the name of state development.

Additionally, benevolent autocrats in these systems can facilitate economic growth through property rights reform by redistribution of land across marginalised communities (Riley, 2018, pp. 7-8). The facilitation of higher and faster economic growth can be achieved, establishing a potential transition into democracy. Developmental authoritarian systems arguably facilitate economic growth easier than democracies, as they can implement policies and practices efficiently to achieve their objective because no one can oppose such decisions. For example, anti-rights authoritarian states such as the Chinese government promote state development and economic prosperity over human rights. These systems hold centralised and coercive power to be deployed purposively and systemically to establish capitalist transformation in their societies while establishing a class system that draws in higher wage employees (Harrison, 2019, pp. 281). An added advantage used by modern autocrats in these political systems is that they do not necessarily implement the maximum tax rate permissible in their states; thus, curbing the norm of taxing citizens the maximum rate until productivity decreases, providing these states with a competitive edge regionally, e.g., China, the United Arab Emirates, and Kenya (Fuller, 2017, p. 73).

Furthermore, according to Rough (2020), developmental authoritarian systems are more likely to impose draconian laws with relentless efficiency and suppress information that triggers mass panic or dissenting opinions. The covid-19 outbreak of 2020 became a catalyst

for draconian practices even in democracies, normalising illiberal principles for the common good. Modern autocrats in these systems have the competitive edge of immediately addressing an issue like the Covid-19 crisis, implementing nationwide lockdowns or a state of emergency, as fewer veto participants need to consent. Ailoaiei (2020) suggests that a state of emergency encompasses reducing civil liberties instituted during war or national security threats to the state, entrusting more power to the state to protect its citizenry from imminent threats. During this public health crisis, lockdowns and travel bans have ensued to curb the spread of Covid-19; draconian regulations are seemingly the opted tactic by democratic and non-democratic countries.

Developmental authoritarian political systems can efficiently enforce decisions, achieving this through delineating authority and politicking behind closed doors. Simultaneously, they portray a unified, stable, and reliable image to the nation (Kroenig, 2020, pp. 39-41). For example, the Chinese government built two hospitals within days to combat Covid-19, presenting a high level of control and outbreak response, which the World Health Organisation commended. Kavanagh (2020, p. 135) notes that a strategic component to curb the pandemic is reliable information and acting swiftly to hinder the continued spread of Covid-19 before introducing emergency measures, which developmental authoritarian systems can use.

On the contrary, according to Riley (2018, p. 7), the lack of economic growth in developmental authoritarian states can be caused by power struggles. The lack of succession planning provokes political rivalry for that position, like Rwanda's case, where the political system is closely identified with the President, Paul Kagame. However, in a capacitated state like China, leaders use precise succession planning interchangeably, allowing the political party to govern and be associated with the political system, not an individual.

As a result, economic growth weakens due to autocrats reallocating funds to preserve their position of power while losing legitimacy with weak succession planning. Autocrats cannot govern alone, and a focal point of research on authoritarianism suggests that controlling most of the populace while excluding them from power is challenging (Brosché et al., 2020, p. 113). Across the range of political systems, political leaders rely on maintaining ruling coalitions, whose patronage is crucial to their longevity. In developmental authoritarian systems, ruling coalitions are greatly dependent on the discretion of the elite. In Africa, developmental authoritarian systems establishing prominent coalitions require stabilising the need for ethnic inclusion to ensure cooperation, otherwise risking violent protests from excluded groups, e.g., identity politics between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groupings during the Rwandan genocide.

Furthermore, the lack of property rights is a catalyst for lack of investment, as banks directly contribute to economic development. Bastiaens (2016, pp. 142-144) suggests that feeble government infrastructures, significant intervention in business operations, expropriations or nationalisations, and lack of property rights in developmental authoritarian systems classify political risks. Waning institutions reduce the credibility of the state for foreign direct investment. Also, autocrats may use these policies for personal interest, as they hold little



accountability to the public, thus benefiting themselves the most and providing them with direct access to state resources and revenue. According to Bellinger and Son (2019), international markets find civil unrest distasteful, especially when the government violently constrains its populace. Foreign direct investments tend to depart, primarily when little opposition exists to check the government on economic growth and property laws.

In contrast, history associates authoritarian systems with inadequate provision for social goods and services, which can occur in developmental authoritarian systems too, reallocating their budget meant for social welfare (e.g., education and health) to purchase weapons and fund their military sectors (Khan et al., 2016, pp. 657-659). Autocrats do this because they do not need support from the public, resulting in lower economic growth. Bove and Brauner (2016, p. 610) suggest that developmental authoritarian systems lack popular legitimacy and rely on the military to support their power. These systems tend to be more susceptible to violent insurgency, making them more likely to use mass-scale force, causing dependency on the military and increased military expenditure. Notably, this occurs in the absence of economic growth and state development, which is in the 'social contract' between the state and its people.

Moreover, high censorship in developmental authoritarian systems places them at a disadvantage during world crises like the covid-19 pandemic. Censorship hinders the media from broadcasting and promptly conveying essential information to the public (Kavanagh, 2020, p. 135). Arguably, developmental authoritarian political systems are susceptible to falling victim to their propaganda and censorship. These systems use what is called 'digital authoritarianism' (networked cyber tracking to spy on citizens) for surveillance, censorship, and suppression of their people. Sherman (2019) mentions that these systems start by introducing artificial intelligence into their surveillance systems to enhance authoritarian governance. Rather than provide an open approach to internet governance and online content, these systems insist on 'cyber sovereignty' (state control of the internet as a facet of state sovereignty and self-governance) in the name of police control, responsiveness, and crime prevention, e.g., China, Singapore, and Russia (globally). Nevertheless, these developmental authoritarian systems use artificial intelligence technology to enforce mass censorship, filter and influence online content, and ban virtual private networks within their borders while instituting internet shutdowns when necessary.

Lastly, developmental authoritarian systems fail to protect fundamental civil rights; thus, malevolent autocrats are not held accountable for their arbitrary actions. These political systems cripple civil society organisations and restrict civil activists from criticising them, particularly African governments (Smidt, 2018, pp. 1-3). They constrain international donations to civil society organisations in their countries, as foreign donors tend to advocate enhanced civil rights for the populace. These restrictions prevent the further establishment of independent civil society organisations prone to critique the system's policies, making them susceptible to supporting the system's political opposition. In 2009, the Ethiopian government implemented a regulation that hinders civil society organisations from accepting more than



10% of their total funding from foreign donors. As a result, out of the 2 275 civil organisations in Ethiopia (in 2009), only 1 701 were still operational by 2011. Although these organisations can engage in human and civil rights programmes, their capacity to radically foster transformation is constrained through limited funding (Include, 2018).

### ***Ethiopia: Positive and Negative Indicators***

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who started his tenure in 2018, introducing a wave of reforms in his first year in office. According to the committee for The Nobel Prize (2019), Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed received a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to establish peace and international cooperation, especially for his efforts to resolve the border conflict with Eritrea. Moreover, Ahmed's wave of reforms granted him international praise as he released tens of thousands of political prisoners his predecessor had detained. He also instituted civil rights reforms while publicly acknowledging past grievances and allowing previously banned opposition groups to return home (Bader, 2019). In contrast, Ahmed's peace agreement with Eritrea remains moot, as the Eritrea border is still closed, while his government faces regional tension over the Nile with Egypt.

These unresolved tensions are fuelled by a lack of reciprocity from the respective heads of state. Noticeably, in July 2021, Ethiopia increased tensions on its nearly decade-long diplomatic standoff with Egypt and Sudan over the Nile river, allegedly making a unilateral decision to fill the Renaissance Dam (Aljazeera, 2021). Since Ethiopia is landlocked, Ahmed's economic-led model (striving for development) requires neighbouring ports, like Somaliland's Berbera and Port of Djibouti on the country's southern shore, to increase exports for economic growth. As a result, peace and regional cooperation are essential in increasing international trade for Ethiopia, making matters increasingly difficult for the Prime Minister.

On the other hand, in 2020, the outburst of violence after the murder of Hachalu Hundessa (Ethiopian singer, songwriter, and activist) resulted in at least 239 deaths, leading Ahmed to shut down the internet and insinuate that Egyptian security agents carried out Hundessa's murder to instigate unrest, under the command of Cairo. Some claim that Ahmed uses the tension with Egypt to unite Ethiopians against a common enemy and divert citizens, as he postponed the national elections and continues to shut down the internet (Hairsine, 2020). Although Prime Minister Ahmed seems amiable, his senior military and intelligence background, coupled with the lessons learned from the Rwandan genocide, make him ferocious at suppressing dissenting voices (Aga and Plaut, 2018). As a result, he implements internet shutdowns, media censorship and elongates his executive power in the name of avoiding civil unrest, which is closely associated with the common traits of developmental authoritarianism.

In comparison to Ethiopia's social ills, Jeffrey (2019) highlights that rapid economic growth (defined by Agarwal (2020) as a brisk increase in the value of goods and services produced in



an economy over time) has not meant much for Ethiopia's unemployed youth over the past decade. Although this political system seemingly follows the Chinese authoritarian developmentalism model, whereby civil rights are forgone for economic growth and poverty reduction, many are yet to benefit. At the same time, the country's Tigray conflict risks deterring foreign investment and impedes domestic production, thus reducing the capacity to create employment. In Addis Ababa, over 23.5% of households have an unemployed adult (in 2017), while underemployment, low income, unemployment, and inadequate working conditions are high among youth, especially in rural areas (World Bank, 2017).

However, the World Bank (2019a) also recorded positive trends in poverty reduction in Ethiopia's urban and rural areas in recent years. Citizens living under the national poverty line decreased from 30% in 2011 to 24% by 2016. Although this growth happened before Ahmed's administration, Ethiopia exhibited high-intensity developmental authoritarianism as the government explicitly violated human rights, detained dissenting voices while it drove state-led economic development. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), later implemented by the Ahmed administration, increased infrastructural development through public investments and converted the country into a manufacturing centre.

The GTP aims to average 11% Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth annually, bringing about a 20% expansion in the industrial sector and resulting in more job creation. According to Green Growth Knowledge (2020), the GTP aims to stimulate economic structural transformation and sustainable fast growth towards lower-middle-income status by 2025. The GTP (second phase) focuses on establishing expedited, sustainable, and broad-based growth through strengthening the productivity of the agricultural and manufacturing industries, enhancing production and the market. The GTP focuses on state development and exhibits aspects of African personhood, as it fosters communal prosperity over individual growth.

Additionally, the World Bank (2019a) highlighted Ethiopia's economic performance in the 2016/17 financial year as robust, establishing the path to rapid economic growth and reducing poverty among the Ethiopian society. Economic growth has affected the country's stable inflation rate, although it is still in double digits. Ethiopian reforms support growth, aiming to achieve an average of 8% annually, and these economic reforms encompass the private sector's support for faster growth, resulting in private-led and export-oriented economic policies for Ethiopia's Agenda 2025. The World Bank (2020a) notes that Ethiopia's reform agenda has fostered more significant investment in the economy, receiving a US\$312.2 million grant and US\$187.8 million credit from the International Development Association. Ethiopia also implemented energy sector reforms to advance efficiency while protecting the indigent. These enable the private sector to provide value-added services like exports, imports, and logistics, thus stimulating the economy. Although these reforms would be possible in a democracy, developmental authoritarianism expedites them by suppressing dissidents, whereas democracy requires parliamentary and popular support.

However, developmental authoritarian systems have their woes, and even potentially prosperous systems like Ethiopia face many challenges in achieving their goals. According to the World Bank (2019b), Ethiopia faces several developmental challenges, particularly sustaining its positive economic growth and continued poverty reduction, which requires significant job creation (such as the additional 14 million jobs target by 2025) and improved governance. Additionally, the government faces challenges related to limited competitiveness (which is detrimental to manufacturing, job creation, and exports), an underdeveloped private sector (limiting foreign investment and industry growth), and finally, political instability (social unrest, lowering economic growth, tourism, and exports), among other challenges.

DuPée (2017) suggests that Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) Agenda 2025 is set back by an ongoing surge of civil unrest and instability in the East-African region. For instance, in 2017, the government instituted a six-month-long state of emergency and later added four months more due to domestic instability. Although Ethiopia has a potential mining sector, the economic vision is undermined if the government does not ensure infrastructure maintenance or build a new transportation and mineral-processing site; the GTP Agenda 2025 will be in vain. Although the transportation project between Addis Ababa and Djibouti is complete, landlocked Ethiopia is at a disadvantage. The country relies heavily on neighbouring states' ports to ensure international trade (imports and exports).

Furthermore, Ethiopia's economic strides are arguably not sustainable, and if the expected government spending is reportedly fruitless, it will merely grow the economy without improving productivity. The Ethiopian government is at risk of not increasing tax revenues, although receiving significant investments resulting from fruitless spending and a lack of good governance (Kopf, 2020). At the start of the twenty-first century, Ethiopia ranked as the third-poorest country globally, and by 2011 averaged a GDP per capita of US\$620. According to the World Bank (2020a), Ethiopia moved from third-poorest ranked country to twenty-fourth globally, and the GDP increased from US\$620 to US\$857.5 per capita. Although the country has made great strides to improve, productivity has been chiefly replaced with capital investment, particularly by government and state-owned enterprises.

Negative Ethiopian indicators also include undermining democratic principles through civil rights violations and the postponement of general elections, scheduled for the end of August 2020, then later to July 2021 (due to the 2020 state of emergency against Covid-19). Developmental authoritarianism and its modern autocrats have readjusted their repressive methods, and this recently enforced state of emergency in Ethiopia proves as an example of low-intensity measures. According to Human Rights Watch (2019), the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front holds all the seats in parliament, which results in little to no regard for the opposition, causing a higher number of violent protests within the country. Although the general elections have taken place, the International Crisis Group fears that the ruling party's recent victory and blatant disregard for the opposition will lead to more violent protests and boycotts. National politicking between elites fuels the current land dispute in northern Ethiopia's Amhara and Tigray regions. The dispute has escalated into conflict. The



confrontation led to military intervention and exposed the ethnic tension within the Ethiopian army (International Crisis Group, 2020).

### ***Rwanda: Positive and Negative Indicators***

According to Cascais (2020), Rwanda's benevolent dictator Paul Kagame marks over twenty years of his tenure. Kagame's rise to power is accredited to his contributions to economic recovery and peace in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide (between the Tutsis and Hutus), paving the path to his presidency in 2000. Some have commended Kagame for his contributions to women's rights and environmentalism in the country and many Rwandans admire Kagame's contributions to progress in the country over the past two decades. However, he does not go without criticism, as some suggest that he runs the country with an iron fist. He has been criticised for suppressing dissenting voices across Rwanda, earning him the title 'benevolent dictator,' as some perceive him as a leader who "pursues unselfish objectives for the state's development". A benevolent dictator is an autocrat who rules with absolute power, deciding on the objectives and executing them (often quicker than in a democracy) while being perceived to be civic-minded (Mkhondo, 2019).

Kagame once commanded the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi militia group based in Uganda, which ended the Hutu's slaughter campaign against the Tutsi. As such, Kagame became socialised in war, and his militance is evident in leading Rwanda, as bodies like the Human Rights Watch (2020) suggest that he is aggressive, violent, very emotive, and prosecutes dissidents. The Rwandan president can suppress opposition because of developmental authoritarianism. He is suggested to have been involved in many murders, arrests, and the disappearance of dissenting voices. Developmental authoritarianism fosters the notion that freedoms and democratic practices should be subdued by the intention to achieve collective economic growth, development, and prosperity. Kagame encourages Rwandans to embrace communal empowerment and economic growth, but he also violates many human rights, typical of any developmental authoritarian system.

The Rwandan capital, Kigali, is home to the Kigali International Financial Centre (KIFC) headquarters, an initiative of the Kagame administration. According to Mwai (2020a), KIFC is a government initiative established in 2019 that intends to position Rwanda as a business and financial hub in Africa while reforming financial services. Although the surge of Covid-19 has slowed the initiative, attracting investment into the country is crucial during this time. The government agency Rwanda Finance Limited, managing KIFC, has readjusted its delivery approach to attract more investment, leveraging technology to render services. Moreover, the Rwandan government's response to Covid-19 and Kagame's leadership reputation gives foreign investors' confidence during this time of uncertainty.

Certainty established by the Rwandan government is admired in the country and across the continent. The KIFC and many other businesses use this to attract investment, as investors

look at stable markets to manage their capital. In 2019, foreign private capital increased by 2.4%, from US\$463 million in 2018, driven by investment in electricity, gas, ICT, manufacturing, and finance sectors, among others in Rwanda's economy (National Bank of Rwanda, 2019: 16). Providing such certainty and mobilising funds to bolster initiatives like the KIFC would be difficult for Kagame without developmental authoritarianism; unlike democracies, he does not have to consider various opinions that would sway him to mobilise funds for other initiatives. Moreover, foreign direct investment means that he can fulfil objectives like economic growth, development, and job creation, resulting in improved socioeconomic conditions for many Rwandans, especially the youth in rural areas.

Another positive economic indicator is the project to process Coltan ore costing RWF1.3 billion (US\$1.4 million), providing a professional wash plant that processes 25 metric tons of minerals every hour. Mining investments in Rwanda include collaborating with the Mining Board on over 5 500 hectares and another in exploration. Rwanda aims to generate US\$800 million annually from mineral exports by the end of this year, raising the figure to US\$1.5 billion by 2024. Thus, the Rwandan Mining Board is tasked with conducting exploration projects across the country, obtaining geological data, and using that to attract more private investment to stimulate economic growth (Kingsland, 2019). Kagame's leadership and developmental authoritarianism enable him to provide stability and speedily implement drastic policies in the country, subsequently attracting foreign and private investment. Moreover, projects in the Western Province have an immense socioeconomic benefit, creating jobs, fostering economic growth, and establishing development zones that bolster business activity in the community highlighting the notion of African personhood.

According to Mwai (2020b), Rwanda's National Strategy for Transformation (NST) received support from the World Bank Country Partnership Framework (CPF), providing a six-year support plan on its strategic priorities while also supporting Rwanda's recovery from the impact of Covid-19. The framework is based on the CPF's analysis of opportunities to achieve poverty reduction and collective prosperity in Rwanda. In light of such, it suggests that the World Bank acknowledges Rwanda's developmental authoritarian system. The World Bank seemingly supports the notion of collective prosperity and poverty reduction outlined in the system; however, it does not address the subversion of democratic principles, particularly civil/human rights.

The programme focuses on five strategic objectives. They are enhancing human capital, improving conditions for private sector development, broadening access to the digital economy and infrastructure, increasing agricultural productivity and commercialisation while intensifying urban agglomeration (World Bank, 2020c). These five strategic priorities are imperative in accomplishing Rwanda's middle-income status by 2035. The World Bank has eighteen projects, four regional operations worth US\$1.9 billion in Rwanda, ranging from providing access to basic infrastructure to electricity for rural households. The partnership enables the government to address numerous socioeconomic issues in the country that resonate with the critical objectives of a developmental authoritarian political system.



Although Rwanda's developmental authoritarianism shows promise for economic growth and state development, many criticise the system's tactics for addressing socioeconomic challenges. According to Kendunga (2020), skills development through higher education and work experience does not align with labour market needs, as the students' quality is low because of a weak secondary education. Since these institutions are ineffective, only 50-65% of graduates are employed after their tertiary studies. Only a limited number of high-level skills are developed through direct work placement programmes, while no high-skilled sub-sector accounts for more than 5% of employment; this showcases Rwanda's low quality of skills.

The World Bank (2015: 9) suggests that low-income Rwanda has a high unemployment rate, with a 19% unemployed working-age population. In 2020, Rwanda's unemployment rate fluctuated between 16% and 20.3%, primarily due to the impact of Covid-19 (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2021). The rise in inactivity from 2011 caused by a larger proportion of youth that remains in the schooling system and unemployment indicate Rwanda's low-income status and significant dependence on the agricultural sector. Although the official unemployment rate is low, underemployment and low-quality employment are prevalent. In 2015, almost 70% of employed Rwandans worked less than 35 hours a week, and a substantial number of youth and women are unpaid employees on farms or small enterprises. Also, when considering the 19th Conference on Labour Statisticians, the working-age population unemployment in Rwanda rises to 42%.

The Rwandan government realised its shortcomings in achieving vision 2020, so it extended the development deadline to 2035. However, the pandemic's impact, although partial to the shortcomings of vision 2020, is two-fold. Firstly, Rwanda's economic regress is expected to cause a revenue shortfall of 4% of the GDP, while Rwanda's Economic Recovery Plan argues the shortfall to be only 3.3% of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2020). Secondly, the pandemic allows for an easier transition into draconian policies in the name of fighting the invisible enemy. Thus, Rwanda's unsustainable development and economic growth strategy, coupled with other invasive draconian practices, are to the detriment of ordinary citizens of Rwanda. In this regard, African personhood is subverted as elites and capitalists absorb most of the economic growth and development, leading to the opposite intent of the concept, individual prosperity, and selective benefit, among others, instead of communal.

The African Development Bank (2020) also notes Rwanda's concessional loan of US\$97.675 million to strengthen the state budget and cushion the impact of Covid-19, commending the country on its swift, decisive response and countermeasures. However, like any other developmental authoritarian system, funding and policies at play have a centralised agenda, as Rwanda calls for bolstering surveillance and contact tracing of infected persons in the country. Subsequently, Rwanda will equip itself with surveillance and monitoring abilities in the name of combating the siege of the pandemic. Unfortunately, these capabilities will not disappear at the end of this troubling time but instead continue and be used to enforce despotism.

### *Uganda: Positive and Negative Indicators*

Over three decades, Uganda has been defined by Museveni's leadership. Noticeably, his tertiary education depicts much of his leadership today. In university, Museveni studied economics and political science, focusing on the ideas of Franz Fanon and violence as the most efficient form of political mobilisation (The New Humanitarian, 2006). Known as a Marxist and pan-Africanist, Museveni also received military training in Mozambique during his youth. Today, he continues to reign over Ugandans on the notion of economic development and security, winning him support over the decades. According to Kwesiga (2020), Museveni's rise to power was obtained through the gun and is maintained by the gun. He commanded 55 000 troops in his youth after Idi Amin fell from power, leading them through the Ugandan Bush War. The National Resistance Army, led by Museveni, was lauded for overthrowing the previous government without looting citizens' property. Since his presidency, the military continues to actively participate in Uganda's political and institutional affairs, producing the Ugandan constitution of 1995 and holding parliamentary seats.

However, Freedom House's global freedom scores Uganda 34 out of 100, meaning it is "not free" (Freedom House, 2021); this is primarily attributed to election violence, limited political rights, and constrained civil liberties. According to the International Crisis Group (2017), Uganda's security sector, especially the police, functions beyond preserving law and order, but instead acts as the presidential defence against opposition and dissidents. Along with disrupting the opposition's activities, the police are allegedly involved in criminal activities, from officers turning a blind eye to racketeering to participating in organised crime. Police failure to effectively fulfil their duties increased violent crimes and murders. Furthermore, informal security groups like Crime Preventers (un-uniformed militia) mobilise pro-Museveni voters while intimidating opposition during elections. The Museveni administration governs with decayed accountability and pro-government police while weakening the security sector by reducing well-trained and disciplined officers from the police force. Typical of developmental authoritarian systems, their modern autocrats debilitate opposition while disregarding the law and project ostensible legitimacy, order, and prosperity.

In contrast, Ahluwalia (2021, pp. 121-122) suggests that elections in Uganda are merely a legitimising mechanism for the political system and reaffirms its grip on state power. Museveni received 58.6% of votes, although predictable, much protestation by the Wine supporters caused unrest. Wine's campaign was stung by shootings and intimidation, alongside mass detentions and over 50 murdered during the campaign. After the reinstated president, Wine was placed under house arrest due to the violence during his campaign. Before Wine's arrest, Museveni shut down the internet a day before the elections to limit opposition and election observers. Although the United States and the European Union condemned the act, nothing was done. Arguably, international donors to the Museveni administration are concerned with the security of their interests which take precedence over values instilled in their societies like democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Wine alleged fraud against Museveni, encouraging voters to disregard the election results. 5.85 million voters reinstated



Museveni, and although Wine was defeated, he received 3.48 million votes, 34.8% votes (France 24, 2021). Although Wine suggested he had proof of his allegations, the internet was still shut down, and a blackout occurred in certain areas. In developmental authoritarian systems, elections are not free or fair, and small coalitions or individuals exercise state power.

In comparison, Tripp (2021) notices that throughout Museveni's three-decades-long presidency, women representation became critical, as Vice President Jessica Alupo, and Prime Minister, Robinah Nabbanja, are among other leading women in Uganda. Recently, Museveni's cabinet increased women representation from 27% to 43%, while Alupo serves as the second woman vice-president. Former Vice President, Specioza Kazibwe, served from 1994 to 2003. Women representation in government invoked much debate regarding women's rights in a developmental authoritarian political system. Women's movements have made noteworthy gains in the country over the years. Today, 33% of parliamentarians are women, 43% are cabinet members, and over 46% hold local government posts. Wang and Yoon (2018, pp. 300-301) highlight that Uganda has reserved legislative seats for women representation over the years, which led to rising women representation in parliament. Although these seats are not permanent, Uganda reserves parliamentary seats for women to promote growth, experience, and an opportunity for women to contest for seats against men and prove themselves to their constituency.

In contrast, the Republic of Uganda, in partnership with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), embarks on the construction of strategic roads to improve trade and commerce among the two countries (Xinhua, 2021). The roads will connect the Mpondwe border in Uganda's Western Region and the DRC's Kalindi in the North-Kivu province. Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and the DRC's Felix Tshisekedi believe these roads will bring rapid socioeconomic development for the two countries through the export zone. The construction and upgrading of 223 kilometres in eastern DRC will bolster trade and reduce insecurity amid the security situation in the region. Woof (2021) notes that the new road and trade link will cost over Ush1.187 trillion (US\$334.5 million), boosting trade between the two countries. The project's funding will be split between the two countries, surfacing and maintaining 89 kilometres of road in linking Bunagana, Rutshuru, and Goma, while 54 kilometres from Beni to Butembo, and another 80 kilometres between Kasindi and Beni. Not only will ordinary citizens benefit from this development, but the two countries will achieve state development. Seemingly, foreign policy and diplomacy can be positively impacted by the notion of African personhood existing within developmental authoritarian systems.

Comparative to other developmental authoritarian systems, Uganda hosts regular elections; however, their credibility becomes increasingly questionable since autocrats like Museveni rule for over three decades. Today, the ruling National Resistance Movement continues its grip on power by manipulating national resources, politicising the prosecution of opposition, and intimidation orchestrated by state security forces. It is no surprise that Uganda scored 34 out of 100 in 2019 for its global freedom score (Freedom House, 2021). In 2020, the freedom score increased to 36 out of 100 (still ranking "not free"), while its internet



freedom score is 56 out of 100 (ranking "partially free"). Political rights were scored 11 out of 40, and civil liberties scored 23 out of 60. Uganda's civil society and media sectors remain active, albeit challenged with state violence and legal harassment. Opposition rallies and protests are disrupted by police, detaining opposition leaders. In contrast, the media regulators suspended dozens of journalists, albeit courts blocked the directives later. Noticeably, even social media accounts with a large following are mandated to register and submit to state monitoring.

In contrast, one of the significant setbacks of developmental authoritarianism is that laws can be readjusted to favour only a few, and Uganda is no exception; this comes with ramifications, especially regarding property laws. Matovu (2021) suggests that land acquisition in Uganda is dreadful, navigating the uncertainty of the rules before and after purchasing a property. In Uganda, land tenure refers to the systems that govern land ownership; however, the ownership of property may differ in some regions of the country. Ownership may speak to a vested interest in property rather than owning it. Uganda's 1995 constitution and the Land Act provides four terms of land ownership; freehold, leasehold, Mailo, and customary tenure. Unfortunately, questionable property rights in developmental authoritarianism are a catalyst for low investment, as banks directly contribute to economic development.

Additionally, the International Crisis Group (2017) argues that Uganda's governance system is deteriorating, hindering infrastructure and agriculture, among others, that have increased demand amid a rapidly growing population. Ramifications include the delay of the start of oil production and stagnant foreign investment. Government initiatives, masked as economic stimulus, come in the form of handouts to secure political support. The strategy used by Museveni's government is not isolated. Typically, developmental authoritarian systems ensure increased state dependency to foster larger voter support and leverage for campaigning against the opposition. Furthermore, Museveni's administration established new administrative districts. However, their efforts have not amounted to many improvements for local service delivery, instead causing communal tensions over mineral resources and land.

According to the World Bank (2021), in the 2020 financial year, Uganda's real GDP grew at 2.9%, significantly less than the 6.8% growth of the 2019 financial year, albeit mainly caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Not much is expected to change in 2021, as the country still battles the ramifications of its lockdown regulations, closing borders that disrupted the Ugandan economy. Public investment was reduced while private consumption followed, leading to catastrophic ramifications for informal, industrial, and service sectors. Additionally, Uganda's GDP per capita also shrunk by 4.5%. Even if the GDP spikes from 2022 onwards, the GDP per capita will probably retain its low trajectory. Over the past five years, before Covid-19, even higher productivity jobs and real GDP per capita growth declined to 1.3% from 2.2%, while the population grew by 3.7% annually. As such, the poor remain significantly vulnerable to economic shocks (e.g., the 2016 drought, which temporarily increased poverty). The economic shocks caused by Covid-19 left households with less income, coupled with the high



vulnerability of poverty and limited social security. Uganda needs to create 700 000 jobs annually to balance the labour force growth and the economy. Unfortunately, the country currently averages 75 000 jobs annually.

In comparison, Uganda is seemingly regressive and exclusionary in the socio-political realm. In 2014, the Ugandan parliament passed the Sexual Offences Bill that prevents and punishes sexual violence, also criminalising homosexuality and sex work within the country. The Sexual Offences Bill penalises homosexuality by up to 10 years imprisonment while also discriminating against people living with HIV/AIDS and sex workers (Akullo and Kagumire, 2021). Although Museveni signed this bill, enacting it to penalise even Ugandans residing outside of the country and permitting a death penalty for specific sexual offences, the constitutional court repealed the bill due to irregular legal procedure and subverted human rights. The bill would result in security, economic, and health challenges for the LGBTQI community.

### ***Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations***

Arguably, authoritarianism has not been explored thoroughly in Africa, which has left room for establishing developmental authoritarianism. Matfess (2015, p. 182) describes it as a government model that instils certain democratic practices, such as public goods and services, while also exercising central control over many societal facets. Authoritarianism in Africa has been detrimental to its states and people. Consequently, African states have been unable to establish sustainable development and economic growth due to their incapable governments, weak institutions, and corruption. African systems have benchmarked other regions without comprehensive insight into their internal functionalities, flaws, and accolades. Although this article urges African states to review East Asian systems' achievements regarding developmental authoritarianism, they must establish capable states through technocracy, meritocracy, and benevolent leadership. Many African states find the Chinese model appealing in two aspects; establishing the greater influence of the state on the citizenry through the military and police, and for the ruling party's survival.

African states must be wary of China's emphasis on its party-army model, as it reaffirms the ideological relations between China and Africa, which date back to China's support for liberation movements on the continent. Although China and developmental authoritarian systems in Africa align ideologically, China is a capable state and an emerging superpower; thus, African states will need to ensure bilateral relations without exploitation or at least avoid China's debt trap diplomacy.

Democratic values are undermined within developmental authoritarianism; however, the state must fulfil its social contract duties if citizens succumb to that. These systems in Africa must establish themselves as capable states, ensuring solid institutions and a responsive government. Although they are less open and competitive than Western democracies, these

hybrid political systems must ensure prosperity for the livelihoods of their people. In addressing the unsustainability of development and economic growth, developmental authoritarian systems must diversify their economies, invest in emerging sectors, manufacturing, and move away from their dependency on the low-productivity agricultural sectors. Developmental authoritarianism does capacitate states with robust development policies; however, this political system is doomed to end in catastrophic tyranny without benevolent leadership and precisely planned succession.

Ethiopia presents positive economic indicators, but much is still flawed and needs to be addressed. Ironically, Ethiopia has strong ties with the United States government (a traditional Western democracy) through foreign direct investments, and although Ethiopia exhibits much repression, the United States mentions little about subverted democracy and human rights. Instead, the United States lauds Ethiopia for its state-led economic development. Ahmed, unlike his predecessor, exhibits low-intensity repression, silencing dissidents. Mainly, Ahmed's economic-led governance model aims to achieve economic growth and development, peace, and cooperation in the region and allows him to focus on his reform policies and increased international trade. His efforts led to the establishment of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). The World Bank (2019) highlights that the GTP increased infrastructure development through public investments and converted the country into a manufacturing centre.

The sustainability of Ethiopia's system, like many developmental authoritarian systems, is questionable. Ethiopia faces several developmental challenges, sustaining its positive economic growth and continued poverty reduction, requiring significant job creation and improved governance. The country also relies heavily on neighbouring states' ports to ensure international trade. If Ethiopia fails to foster peacebuilding and cooperation in the East African region, detrimental consequences will emerge. Ahmed's leadership within developmental authoritarianism achieves rapid economic growth and state development; prosperity is broad-based; however, low-intensity repression is quite evident. The sustainability of this system in Ethiopia is unlikely; although the system is seemingly supported by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, there are insufficient succession planning and volatile fluctuations of intensity repression with each Prime Minister.

In Rwanda's case, mining projects (particularly Coltan ore) provide positive economic prospects for the country. With his developmental authoritarian system, Kagame's leadership allows him to provide stability and speedily implement drastic policies, attracting foreign and private investment. Projects in the Western Province have an immense socioeconomic benefit, creating jobs, fostering economic growth, and establishing development zones that bolster business activity in the community. It is crucial to note that although Rwanda is a development-led authoritarian system, institutions such as the World Bank acknowledge its political system, seemingly supporting the notion of collective prosperity and poverty reduction. However, these international institutions and, at times, democratic states, do not address the issue of subverted democratic values and human rights violations under Kagame's



leadership, noting that the World Bank established eighteen projects, four regional operations worth US\$1.9 billion in Rwanda (World Bank, 2020). As Rwanda aims towards middle-income status by 2035, patronage from the World Bank in Rwanda increases the likelihood of Kagame's vision.

Rwanda has made great strides towards attracting private and foreign investment to achieve its 2035 middle-income status by providing fiscal incentives like preferential corporate tax rates, tax holidays, or exemption of capital gains tax, among others. Typical of these political systems, they intend to maintain support amidst neglected democratic principles. Moreover, Rwanda is an emerging technology hub within central and east Africa, and the pandemic fosters greater integration of technology for many Rwandans. Consequently, surveillance and monitoring will become more prominent. Like any developmental authoritarian system, funding and policies are a centralised agenda, as the Rwandan government calls for bolstering surveillance and contact tracing of infected persons in the country. These capabilities, however, will not disappear after these troubling times but instead continue being used to enforce despotism. Although Kagame's leadership within developmental authoritarianism achieves rapid economic growth and state development, prosperity is not broad-based, favouring bureaucratic elites, foreign and private investors. The sustainability of developmental authoritarianism in Rwanda is unlikely, as the system is solely driven by the autocrat, with insufficient succession planning.

In Uganda's case, Museveni's leadership defined the country with his military training and role during the Ugandan Bush War, making him a relentless autocrat and entrenched his existence in the history of Uganda. Notably, Museveni's rise to power through the gun results in his elongated presidency through the gun Kwesiga (2020), causing significant military involvement in the state and a high cost to Ugandans. Sadly, Ugandans encounter election violence, limited political rights, and constrained human liberties, among other social ills and foregone liberties. According to the International Crisis Group (2017), Uganda's security sector, especially the police, functions beyond preserving law and order as the presidential defence against opposition and dissidents. As such, increased violent crimes and murders occur concerning mobilising pro-Museveni voters while intimidating the opposition.

Over the three decades of Museveni's rule, women representation has become critical, as his cabinet increased women representation from 27% to 43% (Tripp, 2021). However, women representation in government invoked much debate regarding women's rights in a developmental authoritarian political system. Some Western democracies believe that increasing women representation in government is merely a ruse to ensure elongated state power, typical of developmental authoritarian systems. Although Uganda's efforts to empower women have resulted in some women representation in the legislature, this aids the prolonged autocratic rule and maintains the legitimacy of Museveni's grip on state power and ordinary Ugandans. Seemingly, African personhood ostensibly subdues citizens to accept Museveni's rule since it fosters women empowerment more than ever before in Uganda.

Furthermore, the International Crisis Group (2017) argues that Uganda's governance system is deteriorating, hindering infrastructure and agriculture, among others, that have increased demand amid a rapidly growing population. Ramifications include the delay of the start of oil production and stagnant foreign investment. Some government initiatives, masked as economic stimulus, come in the form of handouts to secure political support. Noticeably, supportive Western democracies and international financial institutions have failed to fully democratise Uganda, with some noting women representation as a reason for non-interventionist relations. In contrast, the government's response to the public health crisis is questionable, as reports suggest that billions went to irregular spending. Although much of Uganda's stagnant economic growth is due to the Covid-19 pandemic, low agricultural productivity negatively impacts the livelihoods of many Ugandans. Therefore, Uganda must solve environmental and governance challenges while broadening economic prosperity to achieve a successful macroeconomic recovery.

### **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

### **Notes on contributor**

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## The DNS Educational System as a Device Helping to Prevent the Spread of Radicalisation in Malawi

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### Abstract:

In the last 5 years, extreme radicalisation has increased in the northern provinces of Mozambique leading to numerous violent acts. Malawi is only one province away from Cabo Delgado (where the outburst of violence is the most significant) and yet no terrorist attacks have been reported. However, it is very important to focus on Malawi as the rural settings of the “Warm Heart of Africa” and northern Mozambique are very similar. Both places have poor education and are stricken by poverty. In this article it is argued that however there are no undoubted arguments for it, still, good quality education can mitigate the chances of spreading extreme radicalisation through overcoming poverty and helping to give children a very strong moral ground and knowledge. A very effective teacher training system, the DNS is introduced. DNS means The Necessary Teacher Training College and was first established in Denmark in 1972. DNS has been operating in Malawi since 2003 and has significant achievements in training primary school teachers for rural posts.

### Keywords:

DNS educational system; radicalisation; Malawi; Mozambique.

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## *Introduction*

What is radicalisation?

Radicalisation is a process in which an individual or a group increasingly accepts extreme political, social, or religious ideas and aspirations that reject or destroy the vision and ideology of a nation.

Extreme radicalisation is largely due to deep poverty, the associated food insecurity and the lack of adequate education. Although several studies show that radicals and terrorists do not come exclusively from undeveloped and/or poor regions, it is clear that these conditions are conducive to the spread of extremism.

As a result of low-quality education, a significant proportion of the population in several developing countries, such as Mozambique and Malawi, is characterized by aimlessness, insecurity and a lack of vision.

At first sight, these shortcomings can be remedied by radicalisation, as belonging to a radical group in many cases reduces the feeling of vulnerability and gives purpose to those who otherwise live without a goal who did not originally have a stable worldview.

The groups mentioned above are in many cases well organized and operate on the basis of existing international patterns. They also share their financial resources with members and members' family members.

Based on the above, it can be stated that if no other alternative is provided to eliminate the insecurity of existence and achieve the purpose of life, then those concerned may turn to radicalism.

Among the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the attacks directed by terrorist organizations for regional and global purposes and their preparatory work stand out, which, using modern means and a wide range of propaganda methods, have become a worldwide problem. While the primary goal of radical groups is to protect the organization's headquarters, structure, and active fighters, they also pay significant attention to securing supplies. With the development of modern technology, their recruitment is reaching more and more potential supporters, and their convincing power has been able to spur hundreds of active and passive foreign sympathizers to help their teams in recent years.




Figure 1. Moghaddam's staircase to terrorism, 2011 (Borum, R.)

According to Moghaddam's interpretation, the road to terrorism has six stages. The number of people present is decreasing at all levels, and the fifth phase (which is the actual execution of terrorist acts) is reached by only a few. Those at the lowest level experience relative poverty and limited social mobility, which is also associated with resentment and oppression perceived by the majority society. Stepping through the phases, the perception of exclusion is further strengthened, in the third phase a verbal expression of aggression appears, followed later by sympathy with the ideology of terrorist organizations and finally the execution of the terrorist action (Fatali, M 2011).

Paul Gill's survey also supports the fact that families play a significant role in radicalisation. His research showed that more than 64 percent (8111 in other sources) of families were aware of the ideological commitment of perpetrators of terrorist acts (Gill, Horgan 2014). This was confirmed by, among others, Didier Bigo (Bigo, Bonelli 2008), a researcher at the European Parliament, and Scott Atran, a researcher at Oxford University. in an April 2015 speech. The latter said his survey shows that one in four European radical fighters choose the jihadist line for family influence (Downey, 2015).

Several forms of radicalism and extreme radicalism are known. Of these, Islamic radicalism is currently best known in public consciousness, but in fact there are other religious and political groupings that more or less follow this path.

The radicalisation of female members of Muslim families can also be traced back to the characteristics of family ties and traditional ways of life. Due to a lack of knowledge about education and the wider environment, as well as a high degree of social segregation, Muslim

women living in a community with supporters of radical ideologies are more receptive to pursuing radical ideologies. (Youth Justice Board, 2012)

A significant role can be attributed to the role of individuals who grow up in radical conditions (learn fundamentalist ideology as students in training camps), through which the process by which the youngest members of the age group embrace the narrowed, extremist worldview can be demonstrated (Nógrádi and Pákozdi, 2016).

### *Radicalisation in Northern Mozambique*

The influence of international jihadist ideology has emerged in northern Mozambique. The presence of a new militant Islamist group called al Shabaab (the youth) locally also known as Swahili Sunnah (the Swahili path) raises a lot of concerns. The group attracts many new recruits from the marginalised Muslim communities and causing frightening terror acts in the area. This is met by heavy security responses by the government security forces. The group use the same jihadism ideas and hold similar aims such as the establishment of an Islamic state. They also only believe in following the Sharia laws and minimising education, especially eradicating secular education. The militant group's fundamentalist interpretations of Islam reinforce an ideology introduced in the region in recent years by youth who have received scholarships to study in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States. The jihadist messages, the desire to establish an Islamic state and the often horrific and brutal atrocities found resonance among part of the people -especially the youth- due to considerable social and economic factors. In northern part of Mozambique unemployment among young male is very high. Due to their poverty, they cannot pay the bride-price to secure a wife and a family. This denies them the chance to become an adult in their traditional culture. These unemployed, unmarried young men became easy recruits for these new jihadist groups (Pirio, 2018)..



Figure 2. (Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 2021, edited by Authors)

## Malawi

Malawi, a small, landlocked country that lies south of the equator in Sub-Saharan Africa, stretches about 520 miles (840 kilometres) from north to south. It has a width varying from 5 to 100 miles (8 to 160 km). Its size (118.113 km<sup>2</sup>) is slightly bigger than the size of Hungary (93.030 km<sup>2</sup>). Malawi's climate is subtropical. The rainy season runs from November through April. There is little to no rainfall throughout most of the country from May to October (Stalker, 2010). Malawi has been experiencing rapid population growth at a rate above average for sub-Saharan Africa. The birth rate is among the highest on the continent, but the death rate is also high, and life expectancy for both genders is significantly lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa, primarily because of the incidence of HIV/AIDS. Nearly half the population is younger than age 15, and about three-fourths of the population is 29 or younger. A modest reduction in the country's high fertility rates in the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries may be attributed in part to government policy aimed at improving female literacy and promoting more-effective contraceptive methods (Ingham K. 2021). The last census was carried out in 2018. According to its statistics the size of the population is 17,563,749. This is an approximate 35% increase in a decade, as the 2008 census enumerated 13 million residents. Life expectancy is 61.1 years for men (79.4 in the UK) and 67.4 for women (83.1 in the UK) (UNDP, 2020; ONS, 2021). Although Malawi is one of the most densely populated countries in southern Africa, it is also one of the least urbanized, with more than four-fifths of its people living in rural locations. The official languages are Chichewa and English.



Figure 3. (Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 2021)

## Malawi's Economy

Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world: in 2019 it had a gross domestic product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity of US\$1,035, compared with a GDP per capita PPP US\$1,970 for Africa as a whole. For comparison in the same year per capita GDP was US\$46,071 in the UK. Agriculture accounts for more than one-third of GDP and 90% of export revenues. Nearly 90% of the population engages in subsistence farming. The performance of the tobacco sector is key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half of exports. The economy depends on substantial inflows of economic assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor nations. Around 52.6 per cent of the population live below the national poverty line while 70.3 percent of the population get less than PPPUS\$1.9 a day. Malawi was approved for relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)



program. The government faces many challenges, including developing a market economy, improving educational facilities, facing up to environmental problems, satisfying foreign donors with fiscal discipline being tightened. In 2019 the adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rate stood at 9.2% which has slightly improved having stood at 11.9% in 2007 (UNDP, 2021) (Juhász et al, 2021).

Relating to radicalisation Carol Lancaster, an expert on aid to Africa, wrote that "poverty does not produce terrorists" and the elimination of poverty is not likely to eliminate terrorism. She added, however, that in some cases there appears to be an indirect relationship between poverty and poor governance that can lead to civil violence and state collapse. These conditions can lead to regional insecurity and possibly create a haven for terrorist groups (Lancaster, 2003). Other scholars concluded similarly using recent World Bank poverty data. Examining it and terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa it was concluded that reducing poverty will have only a modest positive impact on countering terrorism. At the same time, supporting poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa is the right thing to do for a number of reasons, regardless of its minimal benefits in the fight against terrorism (Shinn, 2016).

However, as Yoroms states:

At least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, poverty continues to be seen as one of a number of factors that creates an environment more likely to lead to acts of terrorism. It competes, however, with disease, corruption, poor governance, insecurity, conflict, socioeconomic inequality, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and political marginalization (Yoroms, 2007)

### ***Malawi's Education***

Formal education is a powerful tool for transforming attitudes (UNGEI and UNESCO 2015). As the central socializing environment outside the family, schools can play a powerful role in transforming inequitable gender norms and protecting children from violence (Mensch et al. 2001; Pinheiro 2006). However, schools may also serve as environments in which dominant gender norms and other sources of disadvantage play out and are reinforced rather than rejected (Mensch et al. 2001; Leach and Humphreys 2007; Chisamya et al. 2012; Barasa et al. 2013)

Before Malawi gained independence most of the primary schools had been run by missionaries who had taught reading, writing and arithmetic as well as religious studies.

Malawi gained her independence in 1964 and like most sovereign African countries one of her aims was to expand education so that it covered most of the Malawi population and also to make it more relevant to the needs of society. As a result of the efforts made, the primary education system expanded from a total enrolment of 359,841 pupils in 1964 to 847,157 in 1980 and to 1,895,423 in 1994.



Malawi changed her political system of government from one party to a multi-party system in May 1994. During the one-party government period, primary school pupils paid token school fees. The new democratic government introduced FPE (Free Primary Education) in the 1994/95 academic year, partly in response to the Jomtien Conference on Education for All (EFA) which was held in Thailand in 1990, but also in fulfilment of one of the promises the new government had made to its electorate. The introduction of Free Primary Education in Malawi has seen a large increase in the number of pupils going to primary school. Enrolment rate rose rapidly from 1.9 million to 3.2 million. However, this increase in access has also brought major infrastructure problems and a significant decline in the quality of education offered. The primary education system in Malawi is beset with serious problems in areas of access, equity, quality and internal efficiency.

The quality of primary education in Malawi is not desirable. This statement stands its ground not just compared to achievements of developed countries but also in comparison with other sub-Saharan African countries' primary education. Poor quality can be concluded because class sizes of over 100 are typical just as the lack of highly skilled teachers.

The supply of teachers has always been problematic since, even before FPE, not enough teachers were being trained to reduce pupil-teacher ratios and increase enrolment rates. The requirements of PIF, teacher migration to the increased number of public and private secondary schools, attrition due to HIV/AIDS, reduced dropout, and expansion in the size of the school-age cohort have all contributed to increased demand.

In 2010, a staggering 97 percent of Standard two learners and 69 percent of Standard four learners were unable to answer a single Chichewa comprehension question correctly. By 2018, following intensive investment by the Government of Malawi and USAID to support the National Reading Program, the percentage of grade four learners reading vernacular grade level text with comprehension almost doubled to 15 percent (from 7.8 percent in 2017). These improvements indicate the beginning of a solid foundation for early grade learners in Malawi, though more needs to be done. While the net primary enrolment rate has remained stable and high at around 90 percent, which is among the highest in the Eastern and Southern African region, student retention in primary education remains a major problem. By Standard eight, only 41 percent of students complete their primary education on time (USAID, 2021)

While from the previous data it is strongly suggested that there are many improvements needed in the education sector in Malawi, can it be clearly said that education is the panacea for tackling radicalisation and extreme violence?

There are numerous literatures on the impact of education on radicalisation however it cannot be stated that only by educating people humanity can eradicate radicalisation and extreme violence. Notwithstanding, proper education can definitely help in this cause.

As Sjoen states:



Based on the narratives of students and educators from a range of educational settings, research suggests that a general basis for building resilience against extremism is dependent on the use of student-centred pedagogics. General prevention requires support from the target audience and it seems evident that the 'right' form of knowledge and values cannot be instilled from above. This favours bottom-up initiatives that require active engagement from students through exploring different meanings, knowledge and values, and the strengthening of their ability to think critically and behave morally. (M.M. Sjoen, 2019)

Malawi and Mozambique are also experiencing significant urbanization, leaving behind those who do not have the opportunity to leave the countryside. The level of job opportunities, education, health, transport and other infrastructure is generally higher in cities and their catchment areas. This is one of the reasons why the more backward rural regions are preferred by extremist political and religious groups. In these locations, it is usually easier to radicalize the population and set up and operate training camps.

The sites chosen are often areas with mineral resources and/or agricultural land with adequate facilities. The product from here (not infrequently raw drug material) provides part or all of the livelihood of group members and relatives, the financial resources needed to train, operate and develop, and often profits that can be invested elsewhere for newer groups or other ideologically important activities.

It is interesting to note that drawing largely on evidence from terrorist activity in the Middle East, Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova concluded there is little reason to believe that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would meaningfully reduce international terrorism. They added that "any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak.". However, it is important to note the authors focused on international terrorism in their analysis (Krueger, 2003). Their view is strengthened by other authors who stated that perhaps contradicting the conventional view of schools as societal peacebuilders, scholars have struggled for quite some time to find clear evidence that education can be a counterweight to political violence and terrorism (Ostby, 2010).

DNS education, which is present in both of these countries, aimed to introduce quality education in rural areas. It trains teachers with innovative methods who undertake to teach in the countryside after graduation, thus helping to educate masses of pupils involving them actively and forming their good moral ground and understanding of the main issues of their life and by doing so hopefully contribute positively to avoiding the development of radicalisation.

### *Det Nødvendige Seminarium*

DNS is an abbreviation for Det Nødvendige Seminarium, which means The Necessary Teacher Training College in English. DNS started in Denmark in 1972.

DNS is an international teacher training college with a learning-by-doing approach, which offers a 4-year-long course. The "necessity" is referring to the need of educating teachers in a broad parameter of training areas and based on their own experiences about the world in which we live and in which the students will later function as teachers. It is an untraditional and challenging program that covers a wide variety of theoretical and practical skills, provides lots of experiences in several areas and emphasises the personal development of the future teacher through challenges ("DNS", n.d.)

The DNS system has been adapted to the African context and has been used by the international nongovernmental organization Humana People to People. Expansion in sub-Saharan Africa began in 1993 when the second DNS TTC opened in the world.

The program and the curriculum are very innovative, both in their contents and their methods. Overall, DMM - Determination of Modern Methods – is the method of the teacher training college. This method makes the student the main navigator of his own training. It is put together by three different categories of instruction: Studies, Courses and Experiences. This method utilizes computers and places the student in the centre stage of his own training. Together the program, the curriculum and DMM in unison qualify and educate teachers in manifold ways to work and improve conditions in the countryside, both in schools and in teaching and through personality building of the future generations, as well as in many other matters, not least in training and organizing rural teachers to contribute to the fight against poverty in rural communities (Humana People to People, 2006).

The period of the training is two years though the organization of the training is different. Previously to 2009, student teachers were spending one year at college and another year teaching at a primary school within the catchment area of the college.



The current teacher training is organized as follows:

YEAR ONE			YEAR TWO		
Term 1	Term 2	Term 3	Term 1	Term 2	Term 3
In college learning subject matter with a special focus on methodologies for lower classes	In college learning subject content with a special focus on methodologies for upper classes	Out in teaching practice schools practicing teaching mainly in either lower or upper primary school classes	Out in teaching schools practicing teaching mainly in lower or upper primary school classes	In college with a special emphasis on reflection, inclusion and further practice on teaching methods	In college with special emphasis on subject content, policies and frameworks

However, in terms of the DNS program, the training is organized in periods for example in one school term student teachers can have two to three periods depending on the term. These DNS periods act as a guide when operating the national curriculum for teacher training. The DNS period has more to offer than the national curriculum for teacher training. It is of course these additional elements that make a huge impact on students at the exit point and have its majority be able to stay in the rural areas. One distinct feature of the module and the syllabus is that it is driven by a teacher education philosophy which is to produce a reflective, autonomous, lifelong learning teacher, able to display moral values and embrace learners' diversity. All the student tasks in the module are tailored to help students at the exit point resemble the philosophy. This philosophy translates well with the approach of training teachers in DAPP colleges.

The curriculum which was used before 2009 in DAPP colleges was revised from two and half years to a three-year program. This program allowed students to travel for up to 4 months in southern Africa and within Malawi.

The Studies are done by each student individually but directed by the teacher.

The training programme is for 2 ½ years and is divided into 8 periods plus the additional travel period for the students to acquire more experiences.

Each period has its name and characteristics. The periods are:

1st: The world which we live in

2nd: Our country (Mozambique, Angola or Malawi)

3rd: We continue building our college

4th: Teaching practice and further studies

5th: Specialisation and charter subjects

6th: Teaching practice

7th: The Pedagogical Workshop

8th: Final Examination

DAPP TTCs' curriculum and teaching practices follow the guidelines of the Government of Malawi mixed with the DNS DMM. All the students have to fulfil the requirements set up by the Malawi National Examinations Board (MANEB) in order to receive the T2 primary school teaching certificate.

Students are assessed by tests, exams, through observations and presentations, individual and group work.

Students have to fulfil 3 different requirements so as to successfully graduate.

These are:

a. Continuous assessment: lecturers record and mark tasks given to the students daily, weekly, fortnightly, monthly and at the end of each period. Grades are sent to MANEB.

b. National examination: the students of the DNS TTC sit for a written exam in 10 subjects that are set up and supervised by the MANEB.

c. Teaching practice: during the two and a half years the students spend 5+11 months in rural primary schools as interns. For the period of the first 5 months, students are assessed according to the continuous assessment practices. As students are posted to local schools from which they return every day to the college lecturers are able to monitor them. Over the 11-months-long teaching period when students are posted to distant primary schools, the assessment is also extensive. The headmasters work with the interns and observe them on a daily basis. Lecturers from the DNS TTC visit the students 4-5 times a day to monitor their performance and discuss it with the headmaster. The given marks are sent to MANEB. Only once during this 11-months-long teaching period the students are observed by a board of MANEB members. MANEB representatives also discuss the performance of the interns with the headteacher and the grade given by them is combined with the grades sent by the lecturers of DAPP TTCs.

The DAPP TTC curriculum includes additional subjects (compared to the government curriculum) therefore the students are awarded an extra certificate. This recognizes and certifies that the student received training and had successfully graduated in additional subjects. These are community development projects, community work from college, construction, the World which we live in and Malawi – our country. This is not recognised by



the Government of Malawi but according to the graduates it is still an attractive and appreciated feature (Szeremley 2009).

The DNS TTC in addition, compared to the state TTCs, emphasises the verbal form of examination. This is used only in internal exams and only by the lecturers within the college. According to the principal and the dean of the DNS TTC the verbal exams have a good effect on students. Teachers should be able to express themselves clearly not only in front of the class but in front of communities and community leaders. That is essential in achieving a good relationship with the people of the surrounding areas of the primary schools.

The DNS TTC system puts emphasis on follow up work with their graduates. In Malawi the TTC Chilangoma secured funding for 3 consecutive years to arrange seminars and meetings at the college for its graduates who were teaching in rural areas. During these two- or three-days long seminars the “fresh” teachers could share their newly acquired knowledge of teaching in rural areas, involving the community and other experiences. Additionally, there were two people who visited the teachers’ school by school, and took notes of their experiences, working and living conditions.

The agreement between the Government of Malawi, DAPP Malawi and Humana People to People was signed in April 2002 with the intention to establish a TTC in Malawi and the first one opened in 2004 (Szeremley 2009).

The need for primary school teachers has remained high hence another DNS TTCs opened.

The four Teacher Training Colleges of Chilangoma, Amalika, Dowa and Mzimba have to date trained a total of 2,991 teachers out of which approximately 80 percent are employed by the Malawi Government and working in rural Malawi primary schools. In 2019, the colleges had a total of 589 students under training with 480 doing teaching practices in 54 schools around their respective colleges.

Since 2012, DAPP has expanded its education program beyond Pre-teachers’ training to include in-service teachers in a concept called “We Do More Teachers” which is aimed at improving inclusive quality education and creating conducive learning environments for all children. Presently, the 400 Primary School Project, a network of DAPP graduated teachers is working with 100 teachers in 18 districts across Malawi. The teachers meet regularly to plan and evaluate their work during what is called Production Camps. They voluntarily stick together to share knowledge and experiences on how they can improve the environments around their schools.

DNS Teacher Training Colleges continued supporting caregivers in Early Childhood Development centres with in-service training on how they can teach the infant learners and produce teaching and learning materials. In November 2019, DAPP Malawi together with the Ministry of Gender, Children, Disability and Social Welfare organised a caregivers training which took place at DAPP Chilangoma Teacher Training College where 25 caregivers were trained and certified by the Ministry. The Government also approved DAPP Malawi Teacher

Training Colleges to be training and certifying caregivers. In 2019, the Colleges worked with and supported 93 preschools – also known as Early Childhood Development centres.

## **Conclusion**

With substantial available data, it can be concluded that Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the World with a weak educational system that is failing to provide quality education to most of the children of the country. Its citizens however are yet to be infected with radicalisation and extreme violence. There is a danger as very close to Malawi, in the northern part of the neighbouring Mozambique, where people live in similar settings, there have been already many terrorist attacks in the past 5 years. Can it be concluded that one of the main factors in unfolding extreme radicalisation is the lack of education?

It is undoubted that good quality education leads to a reduction in poverty (Buheji, 2019; Tilak 2002; Khoo, 2012). It is not that straightforward however that reduction of poverty leads to reduction of radicalisation. Nonetheless, it is supported that poverty continues to be seen as one of a number of factors that creates an environment more likely to lead to acts of terrorism (Yoroms, 2007). Therefore, it can be safely concluded that by strengthening education – which leads to the elimination of poverty -, radicalisation will be reduced. And education can not only be used to fight radicalisation through eliminating poverty.

As Sjoen and Jore concluded in their research it is rather a complex issue whether education can have a positive impact on preventing radicalisation. According to them, it is difficult to assert that education can actually be used to ward off violent extremism. There are indications that some pedagogical approaches may work better than others do. It is highlighted that student centred education can have positive effects (M. M. Sjoen, 2019).

The DNS teacher training program with its uniqueness can help to fight the spread of radicalisation in Malawi (as well as in other African countries) as it uses student-centred education with active student engagement and its trained teachers are staying in their posted rural primary schools on a higher percentage compared to the traditional governmental trained teachers. DNS teachers are highly trained and use student-centred education and furthermore assisted by their teacher training college even after graduation to make sure the teachers can deliver their goals at their primary schools.

A higher number of well-trained teachers means that there are more children getting the opportunity to get a quality education which contributes to their open-mindedness to be able to correctly judge radicalisation and develop a strong moral ground.

With better education, the chances of the youth also increase in securing a job and being able to provide for themselves and their families therefore they do not need to turn to radical ways.

With the access to good quality education in the rural areas of Malawi local children have their chances elevated to reach a better life quality, food security, a job and overall, a happier



life therefore their need to turn to radicalisation, especially extreme radicalisation and violence could be more likely minimised.

### **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

### **Notes on contributors**

Dr. Péter Gergő Juhász graduated from the University of Nyíregyháza in 2002 with a degree in agricultural engineering. In 2006 he graduated as an environmental agricultural engineer at Szent István University in Gödöllő. Since 2007 he has been an entrepreneur. He has worked as a development consultant in Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia and Zambia. In 2017, he obtained a PhD degree at the Doctoral School of Management Organizational Sciences at Szent István University. His research and publications focus primarily on food security in developing countries. He is the President of the Planetrise Association for Culture and Environmental Protection. With his scientific work, he has contributed to the development and operation of several humanitarian, environmental and agricultural projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia, South Africa and Malawi.

Csaba Szeremley graduated at the University of Pannonia in 2002 as an economist in the field of tourism. He spent his 18-month-long internship at a Brookdale Living Inc. in the USA. In 2009 he obtained his MA degree in Educational Planning, Economics and International Development at the Institute of Education, University College of London. Before moving to Malawi in 2012 he worked for Development Aid from People to People UK as the general manager. In Malawi he set up his own company in Audio-visual production and worked for several big NGOs and firms besides running the Hungarian Trade and Cultural Centre. In 2016 he returned to Hungary and has been an entrepreneur with still strong ties to Malawi as he continued his participation in 10 medical missions as a coordinator. In 2021 he enrolled at the Doctoral School of Safety and Security Sciences at the University of Óbuda.

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## African Relationships with the Military Industry of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Milica Sikimić<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract:

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country in the Western Balkans that emerged in the 1990s, after the war in the former Yugoslavia. It is not a member of the European Union and has a population of just over 3 million. The main industries in the country are the production of iron, steel, coal, textile, tobacco, along with wood industry. Domestic producers of military equipment and weapons are factories that have inherited production facilities from the Yugoslav heavy and military industry and mainly export their products to foreign markets, thus making a profit. Several domestic companies engaged in the production of weapons and military equipment also produce for the African market. The main goal of this paper is to present modern technical solutions and achievements of the military industry of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to identify the types and quantities of these products that are exported to the African market. Also, the data on the number of peacekeepers on the African continent who are members of law enforcement agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be presented. According to the data of the Foreign Trade Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a few domestic companies from the military industry sector registered cooperation with African partners, requested and obtained a permit from the state authorities for the export of goods to certain African countries. These companies are as follows: Matra Group, Unis Group, Technical Overhaul Bratunac. Regarding relationships with Africa, it is important to mention the participation of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian police and military forces in UN peacekeeping missions in the Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, and Liberia.

### Keywords:

Military industry; export; market; Bosnia and Herzegovina; peacekeepers; Africa.

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## Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) is a country on the Balkan Peninsula - a geographic area in Southeast Europe. This is an area of great powers' competitions and historically has never been fully respected as the country of its nations (Lampe, 2020; Mishkova, 2020; Balta, 2021). It is not a member state of the European Union and with several other countries formed on the divided territory of the former Yugoslavia belongs to the geopolitical space of the Western Balkans. Although recognized as a sovereign and independent state, even today, in addition to constitutional, parliamentary, and overall democratic procedures, it happens that the "national law" is passed by the Office of the High Representative - OHR<sup>2</sup> (see more: Erwan, 2016; European Parliament, 2019; Myl, 2020; Kecmanović, 2016; OHR, 1 September 2021). As a country in transition emerging from the war less than 30 years ago (see more: Madej, 2018), BH has been trying to strengthen existing and establish new economic ties worldwide (Krasniqi and Topxhiu, 2017; Halaba et al., 2017; Bakota, 2019; Krajisnik and Popović, 2019; Petkovski et al., 2020; FIPA, 2020). BH's most important foreign trade partner is the European Union (Ilgün & Coskun, 2009), with around 72.3 per cent of exports and the main partner countries being Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. Hungary is the ninth most important trading partner in the total foreign trade of BH, with a share of 2.58 per cent. In addition, authors named the cooperation with the Islamic world, specifically Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, as a distinct foreign economic phenomenon in the region (see more: Kromják, 2021). Along with trading across Europe, BH exports to the African market, thus this article strives to obtain and process available data on economic ties between BH and African countries, especially to emphasize and present military industry export to Africa.

Moreover, Africa is the second largest continent on the Earth, covering 6 per cent of the Earth's total surface and as much as 20 per cent of its total land area. According to the data on number of inhabitants living in 54 independent states, Africa is on the second place by that criterion too (Waldman, 2021). Despite the largest number of independent states concentrated on one continent, emigration is constant and a relatively large number of people from Africa try to reach the European mainland on various routes (see more: Besenyo, 2016). However, the world's greatest and strongest states as well as regional powers do not hide their interest in the African market and raw materials (Besenyo, 2021; Vogel, 2018). Interests of a European country for an African market are usually based on exploitation of African raw materials. This article deals with the BH industrial offer that some African countries have been using and with the indirect contribution of BH to African security through peacekeeping missions in certain African countries (see more: Adebajo and Landsberg, 2007; Bove and Elia, 2018, Hunt, 2020; Besenyo, 2020). Although thousands of miles away from Africa, BH and its peoples are connected to Africa by an unenviable status on the world geopolitical and

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<sup>2</sup> The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an *ad hoc* international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See more: <http://www.ohr.int/about-ohr/general-information/> (Accessed: 19 September 2021).

economic scene, as well as with common presence in the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO missions (see more: Madej, 2018; Djukanovic, 2019; Myl, 2020). BH's industrial offer in recent history has been changing and in 1990s focus was given to the heavy and military industries (Musa and Šakić, 2019), which presently employ approximately 10000 workers (Bakota, 2019: 5). Nowadays, the most important export products are: iron, stainless steel, wood, charcoal products, furniture, lighting signs, prefabricated buildings, machinery, boilers, electronic and mechanical equipment, and footwear products (FTC of BH, 1 September 2021; Kromják, 2021: 157). Firstly, the paper presents the results of the analysis about the total value of all exported products from BH to countries on the African continent. In addition, the export in the category "Weapons, ammunition: their parts and accessories" was analyzed, and the analysis is based on the periods 2019, 2020, and the first half of 2021. The most significant African importers of weapons and military equipment from BH are Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria. The examination identified domestic industrial manufactories from which weapons and equipment have been exported to Africa for at least three years. Furthermore, in accordance with the aim of the paper here, an overview is presented of the basic technical characteristics of the exported products and the manufactories in which they are produced. Finally, the paper contains data on the number of participants in peacekeeping missions on the African continent, who are members of the military or police structures in BH. In 2001, the first peacekeepers from BH have made a step on African ground.

### ***Relationships between the African market and the industry of Bosnia and Herzegovina***

Based on cooperation and exportation of products to the African countries, BH generates millions of USD income yearly. For the purpose of this article, analysis of the data of the Foreign Trade Chamber of BH (FTC BH) was performed. The largest value of the homeland industries' export to the countries in North Africa was reached during 2019, totaling approximately 74 million euros (146,838,371 BAM). It is followed by East African countries with a value of exported products worth approximately 8 million euros, and South African countries worth 1.4 million euros. About 1.3 million euros worth of products were exported to the west of the continent and 1.2 million euros to the central part of Africa. Egypt is the most important export target with a value of 55 million euros in products. On the second place is Morocco with a registered value of 8 million euros worth of exported products and the third place goes to Rwanda with 4.5 million euros. Finally, the stocks produced in BH's own industrial plants have been exported to Africa with a total value of approximately 86 million euros in 2019. This amount represents about 17 per cent of the total exported value from BH during 2019 (FTC BH, 21 July 2021).

The allocation of exports to the regions of Africa remained almost the same during 2020 (in comparison with 2019). The largest amount of industrial products was exported to Egypt with a value of about 38 million euros. After Egypt, the top African partners of BH was Algeria



with 4 million euros, and Tunisia with 3 million euros. The total export of BH to the countries of the African continent during 2020 amounted for approximately 59 million euros, or about 11 per cent of the total exported values worldwide (FTC BH, 21 July 2021).

During the first half of 2021, products totaling 40 million euros were exported to Africa, of which 36 million euros mainly to the North. The top three destinations were Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia (FTC BH, 18 August 2021).

African importers of weapons, ammunition, their parts and equipment, nuclear reactors, boilers, machines, and mechanical devices from BH are Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. On the first place is Egypt, to which in 2019, BH delivered 1,426,347 kg of weapons and ammunition worth about 29 million euros. In 2020, this figure was 1,533,590 kg, for half a million euros less than in the previous year (FTC BH, 21 July 2021).

Destination Country	Amount of invoice (BAM currency)		
	2019	2020	½ 2021
Eritrea	5.635	3.914	0
Ethiopia	305.942	196.638	55.761
Kenya	6.357.548	15.837	141.876
Rwanda	8.915.454	218.876	242.144
Seychelles	7.965	0	35.302
Tanzania	249.317	27.382	93.880
Uganda	115.707	590.612	0
Cameroon	2.371.622	3.434.382	2.289.173
DR Congo	0	9.584	0
Congo	45.278	23.772	0
Algeria	7.366.912	7.936.260	13.015.218
Egypt	110.150.836	75.609.382	29.678.802
South Sudan	0	0	2.347
Libya	3.268.037	2.883.982	5.275.399
Morocco	16.779.826	3.127.845	6.557.410
Sudan	1.811.500	296.618	6.557.410
Tunisia	7.461.260	6.366.260	10.453.559
Angola	396.760	516.379	65.288
Botswana	74.692	0	0
Lesotho	2.758	0	0
Mauritius	57.319	113.078	341
Mozambique	81.449	94.158	49.795
Namibia	1.575.148	5.181.829	156.913
South African Republic	893.112	604.310	750.264
Swaziland	42.387	0	0
Zambia	0	0	1.594
Zimbabwe	0	4.694	0
Benin	1.819	32.102	0
Burkina Faso	97.339	46.769	1.207.799
Chad	0	46.225	0
Ivory Coast	138.676	776.772	312.873
Gambia	13.048	140.935	0
Ghana	500.442	398.432	996.007
Guinea	22.101	5.867	0

Liberia	0	0	44.738
Libya	132.969	126.919	141.4
Mauritania	929.398	1.649.523	1.036.320
Niger	24.046	101.488	0
Nigeria	384.329	1.992.496	1.025.491
Senegal	329.079	302.923	32.422
Sierra Leone	17.211	32.942	35.105
Togo	56.491	55.180	0

Table 1. Values<sup>3</sup> of exported products of BH industry to African countries during 2019, 2020, and in the first half of 2021 (Data from the Foreign Trade Chamber of BH; Table made by the author)

In the first half of 2021, the amount of 500,709 kg of weapons and ammunition delivered to Egypt reached a price of about 12 million euros. It was followed by Morocco with 186,648 kg of imported weapons and ammunition during 2019, worth about 4 million euros, then in 2020 in the quantity of 40,792 kg worth approximately 0.8 million euros. In the category “nuclear reactors, boilers, and machines” during 2019, exports to Algeria reached a quantity of 34,500 kg and a value of 1.2 million euros. During 2020, 103,012 kg of weapons and ammunition have been delivered to the same country, worth about 1.9 million euros. During 2019, Kenya got 40,427 kg of weapons and ammunition from BH, with a reported value of around 2.9 million euros. The largest African importer of nuclear reactors, boilers, and machinery from BH was Namibia with the quantity of 15,028 kg, or about 0.6 million euros during 2019. The same type of products were exchanged during 2020, in the quantity of 18,638 kg and in the value of 2 million euros (FTC BH, 21 July 2021).

Weapons and ammunition; their parts and accessories						
Period of time	2019		2020		½ 2021	
	Quantity in kg	Value in BAM	Quantity in kg	Value in BAM	Quantity in kg	Value in BAM
Egypt	1.426.347	57.694.573	1.533.590	56.950.520	500.709	24.373.905
Morocco	186.648	8.419.009	40.792	1.687.628	-	-
Kenya	40.427	5.871.791	-	-	-	-
Algeria	-	-	103.012	3.806.289	-	-

Table 2. The top African buyers of Bosnian weapons and ammunition during 2019, 2020, and in the first half of 2021 (Data from the FTC BH; Table made by the author)

During the analyzed period, there have not been a million transactions in trading weapons and ammunition with other African countries and the quantities (as well as values) of delivered products are marginal (when compared with the above).

<sup>3</sup> Values presented in BH convertible mark - BAM. 1,00 BAM ≈ 0.51 euros.

## ***Production of weapons, ammunition, and their parts and accessories in Bosnia and Herzegovina***

According to available data, few companies from BH reported export of weapons and ammunition, namely: *MATRA GROUP D.O.O., POBJEDA - TEHNOLOGY d.o.o. Goražde, UNIS "GINEX" d.d. Goražde, UNIS Promex d.o.o., UNIS-GROUP D.O.O., ZRAK OPTOELEKTRONIKA a.d., TECHNICAL OVERHAUL a.d. Bratunac*. Some of these companies do not sell their products to African countries. *Matra, Unis group and Technical Overhaul Bratunac* are African partners (FTC BH, 2 June 2021), and products of these factories will be presented in this article.

The company *Matra* specializes in the production of magazines (Matra, 1 July 2021), as follows:

- AK-47 Magazines, caliber 7.62x39 mm, made from steel, with 30 round capacity;
- AK-47 Magazines, caliber 7.62x39 mm, with 20 round capacity;
- AK-47 Magazines, caliber 7.62x39 mm, 10 round capacity;
- AK-47 Magazines, caliber 5.45x39 mm, 30 round capacity;
- Lee-Enfield Magazines, caliber 0.303 British, 10 round capacity.

Below, in the following table are presented other relevant data on all of *Matra's* magazines offer (Matra, 1 July 2021).

SPECIFICATION	Magazine AK 47 cal. 7.62x39 mm Steel 20 round	Magazine AK 47 cal. 7.62x39 mm Steel 10 round	Magazine AK 47 cal. 5.45 x39 mm Steel 30 round	Lee-Enfield cal 0.303 British Steel 10 round
Use	AK 47 AR, in all of its variants	AK 47 AR, in all of its variants	AK 47 AR, in all of its variants	Lee-Enfield
Material	Steel	Steel	Steel	Steel
Surface protection	Blue oxide	Blue oxide	Blue oxide	Blue oxide
Salt chamber, hours until first rust spots	10	10	10	10
Dimensions A x B x C	172,24 x 83,94 x 26	113,9 x 83,94 x 26	198 x 78,50 x 26	89 x 84,1 x 27
Capacity Max. bullets/magazine	20	10	30	10
Weight of empty magazine, kg	0,295	0,250	0,325	0,160
Weight of loaded magazine, kg	0,665	0,435	0,646	0,410
Rate of fire, theory, rounds/minute	600	600	600	60
Rate of fire, practical, rounds/minute	100	50	150	30
Temperature range	-30 C to +50 C	-30 C to +50 C	-30 C to +50 C	-30 C to +50 C
Extreme functionality conditions	Exceptional	Exceptional	Exceptional	Exceptional

*Table 3. Offer of Matra factory*



The *Unis-group* is a company fully owned by the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a government authorized defense industry concern, the *Unis-group* is the leading exporter of weapons and military equipment in BH. The company's vision is to become the leading company in the defense industry in Southeast Europe and, as such, be recognized and acknowledged as a respectable business partner (Unis Group, 21 August 2021). Production and offer of the *Unis group* consist the following:

- Small arms ammunition;
- Weapons;
- Fuses and grenades;
- Modernization;
- Large caliber ammunition;
- Protective equipment; and
- Sighting devices.

For the production of small arms ammunition, *Unis Group* company has one factory based in town Konjic. The *Igman* factory produces all types of ammunition with various types of cartridges such as ball, tracer, armor piercing, armor piercing incendiary, armor piercing incendiary tracer, and other combinations of all types (Igman, 1 September 2021). This factory is completely oriented toward the export of various types and calibers of military and hunting ammunition for numerous customers in the world market. The *Igman* factory emphasizes ammunition production in accordance with contemporary standards (Unis Group, 2021). For the previous years, this factory reported export to over 50 countries worldwide, including the African continent. However, the most important market for them are New Zealand, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Portugal, Germany, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States of America, and Canada. In the plant in Konjic, the ammunition production includes:

- Caliber 12.7 x 108 mm;
- Caliber 12.7 x 99 mm;
- Caliber. 5.56 x 45 mm;
- Caliber 7.62 x 39 mm;
- Caliber 7.62 x 39 mm Ignition Charge for Rifle Grenade;
- Caliber 7.62 x 51 mm;
- Caliber 7.62 x 54 R;
- Caliber 7.62 x 63 mm;
- Caliber 7.9 x 57 mm;
- Caliber 9 x 19 mm.

Regrading Blanks (Igman, Final Catalog, 2020), the offer includes the following:

- Caliber 12.7 x 99 mm BLANK M1A1;
- Caliber 5.56 x 45 mm BLANK M200;



- Caliber 5.56 x 45 mm BLANK M200A1;
- Caliber 7.62 x 39 mm BLANK M68;
- Caliber 7.62 x 51 mm BLANK M82;
- Caliber 7.62 x 63 mm BLANK M1999.

Special ball offer:

- Caliber 12.7 x 108 mm Sniper;
- Caliber 12.7 x 99 mm M33 Sniper, Solid Ball, API, AP;
- Caliber 7.62 x 51 mm Match M118;
- Caliber 7.62 x 54R Sniper (Igman, Final Catalog, 2020).

Within the *Unis group*, a join-stock company under the name of *BNT-TMiH* (Machine and Hydraulics factory) is specialized in manufacturing and upgrading complex artillery weapons and military equipment. Even though through the *Unis Group*, this sister company has registered export on the African market, its most important partners are Saudi Arabia, Austria, Croatia, Italy, Germany, Holland, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. Its production program (Unis Group, 2021) includes the following:

- Guns and Howitzers;
- Mortars;
- Recoilless Guns;
- Rocket Launchers and
- Machine Guns.

Regarding conversions, it is noted that the factory made significant improvements of artillery weapons such as: “conversion of gun 130 mm M-46 into gun howitzer 155/46 and 52 calibers, modernizing of howitzer 105 mm, attaining extended range and efficiency on the target.” It is important to mention “transfer of technology for mortar 82 mm for Egypt, and also has designed build and put in operation factory for production of howitzer 122 mm D-30 in Iraq. This factory was capacitated for production of 200 pieces of howitzer 122 mm D-30 J per year” (Unis Group, Weapons, 2021).

BNT-TMiH products					
Guns	Production and Upgrade Howitzers	Production and Upgrade Machine gun	Mortars	Recoilless gun	Rocket launchers
23mm GŠ-23Y	122mm D30J How	40mm M-2003	60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 120mm	82mm M60A	128mm MLRS
76mm M48 B1A5,	105mm How	-	Standard and extended range	82mm M79	262mm MLRS
100mm TOPAZ	152mm Gun-How	-	-	-	-
125mm Tank Gun	-	-	-	-	-
130mm	-	-	-	-	-
155mm M46/96	-	-	-	-	-

Table 4. Offer of Matra factory

Another joint-stock company is *Binas*, located in the city of Bugojno, in the central part of BH. The main activity in this company includes production of all types of the fuses for caliber 60mm to 280mm: “fuses for artillery shells (mechanical, piezo-electric, proximity and time – pyrotechnic and electronic); fuses for mortar shells (mechanical, proximity); fuses for artillery rockets (mechanical, piezoelectric, electronic-time); fuses for anti-armor weapons (mechanical and piezoelectric)” (Unis Group, Fuses and Grenades, 2021). Also, all types of gun primers for artillery ammunition and for artillery rockets. Mine-explosives products are hand grenade, TNT demolition charges, and hand-operated devices for the initiation of electric primers. The most important export partners for Binas are the United States of America, Turkey, North Macedonia, Austria, and Egypt. Regarding Africa, alongside Egypt, products from this company reach Angola too.

For some future partners can be significant to picture some manufacturing technologies (Unis Group, Fuses and Grenades, 2021), such as:

- Mechanical treatment by cutting;
- Plastic deformation proceeding;
- Heat treatment of metal parts;
- Surface covering (zn-plating, ni-plating, electro-chemical plating, anodic oxidation using requested color, chroming, phosphating, varnishing);
- Machine tools production;
- Assembling of products from production program;
- Processing of explosives by pressing and casting;
- Static testing of products from production program;
- Quality control tests of products;
- Mechanical/metallographic testing;
- Testing of explosives;
- Testing of corrosion and anti-corrosion protection;

- Plastic material testing;
- Other laboratory tests.

BINAS products						
Fuzes For Mortar Ammunition	Fuzes for Artillery Ammunition	Fuzes for Rifle Grenades	Fuzes And Grenades – Cart.40mm – Low velocity	Fuzes And Grenades – Cart.40mm – High velocity	Hand Grenades	Gun Primers
UT M68 P1	UTIU M71	DI M60	HE M6	HE M9	BR M75	TK M1
UT M68	UTIU M72	UT M70 P1	HE M6P	TPT M9	BRV M75	TK M28 A2
UT M78	UTIU M85	-	HE M6P – SD	TP M9	-	TK M28 YA
-	UTIU M85 P1	-	TPT M6P	TPF M9	-	TK M40 A1
-	UT M88	-	TP M6	HE DP M9	-	TK M49 P1
-	AU 62	-	PT M6P	-	-	TK M71
-	-	-	-	-	-	KT-EU M84

Table 5. Offer of Binas factory

*Pretis*, also a *Unis group* joint-stock company, aims to provide a wide spectrum of defense products. The main products are various types of mortar ammunition, artillery ammunition, tank and anti-tank ammunition, rockets, rifle grenades, and air bombs. More precisely, the production program (*Unis Group, Large Caliber Ammunition, 2021*) includes:

- Mortar shell ammunition of all types and calibers;
- Tank ammunition 76 -125 mm caliber;
- Artillery ammunition 76 mm -155 mm caliber;
- Rockets – 122 mm, 128 mm and 262 mm caliber range from 1000 m to 100 km;
- Air bombs 100 and 250 kg;
- Infantry weapon ammunition: Grenade rifle (Anti-personnel, Anti-tank, ILL, Practice);
- Rocket 90mm HEAT.

Regarding export market in Africa, on the top of partners list is Botswana. In addition, the important markets of *Pretis* are in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Malaysia, Iran, Georgia, Kuwait, Libya, Bangladesh, Pakistan, North Macedonia, and Saudi Arabia (*Unis Group, Large Caliber Ammunition, 2021*).

Protective equipment is manufactured in Hadžići, suburb of Sarajevo, and the program includes military vests, military helmets with visor, protective suits, and anti-riot shields. This joint-stock company named *Technical Overhaul Institute (TRZ)* in the last year reorganized one part of the manufactory for personal protective equipment against COVID-19 such as safety suits, masks, and visors (face shields) as well as disinfectants (*TRZ, 30 August 2021*).

Technical Overhaul Institute Hadžići (TRZ)		
Helmets and Visors	Protective and Undershirt Vest	Riot Shield
Military Helmet	Protective Vest (Blue)	Riot Shield
Police Helmet with Visor	Protective Vest (Dark Blue)	-
Self-Supporting Visor	PT M68	-

Table 6. Offer of Technical Overhaul Institute Hadžići

Beside these products, the factory also offers services for military as well as civilian sectors. The military offer is based on the overhauling of military vehicles, artillery and personal weapons, modernization of weapon, and military tech. The civilian offer includes general remounting and/or modifications of all types of hunting and sport weapon systems, machine vehicles (with rails, wheels and special purposes); building and mining equipment, additional vehicle parts like truck trails; machining engines and aggregates; medical equipment, and various types of machine and tools (TRZ, 1 September 2021).

Moreover, the special offer from *Technical Overhaul Institute Hadžići* are: Light hand grenade launcher RPG-7Mx2 40mm, and anti-shield weapon system for soldiers. They are dedicated for destroying tanks in close combat and shielded vehicles from the distance of 300 meters. They must be handled by two soldiers, one who aims it and his assistant, with a wide, 30 meters blast radius behind (TRZ, 1 September 2021).

Regarding sighting devices, the *Unis group* military concern offer (with the specialized factory *Zrak*) includes all types of the fuses from calibers 60mm to 280mm, all types of gun primers, mine-explosive products, HE 40 mm cartridge for grenade launchers, manufacturing of pyrotechnical compounds, and processing of explosives. The main activities of the joint-stock company for this manufacture wing cover areas of precise mechanics, optics, optoelectronics, electro-mechanics, laser techniques, and quality assurance. "Military production program includes fire control systems, observation and sighting devices for tanks and armored vehicles, mortar sighting devices, howitzer sighting devices, anti-aircraft guns sighting devices, hand rocket launcher sighting devices, compasses, observation-measuring devices, passive (night) devices, hand binoculars, sniper optical sights, etc." (Unis Group, Sighting devices, 2021). As the most important market for sighting devices, the *Zrak* factory emphasizes the United States of America, Turkey, North Macedonia, Austria, and Egypt. According to the available data, the Egyptian army is in the top five buyers of equipment, and has undergone a modernization process with the help of the *Unis group* company. The modernization program consists of upgrading M18 76mm and T-55 Tanks as well as BRDM-2 Armored Amphibious Scout Cars (Unis Group, Modernizations, 2021).

Beside the *Unis group* stock companies in BH operates *Technical Overhaul Bratunac* (TRB), located in the town of Bratunac, Republic of Srpska. The main products of the Technical Overhaul are:

- Armored vehicle DESPOT,
- Pistol RS9 Vampir;

- System for humanitarian demining MH -17;
- Fuze;
- Ammunition line;
- Radar systems;
- Mobile security system (see more: TRB, Brosure RS9 Vampire, 2021; TRB, Demining Machine, 2021).

„DESPOT belongs to the category of state-of- the-art armored vehicles designed to carry out a vast range of missions from the domain and scope of the police and armed forces units.” It is an off-road 4x4 multi-purpose vehicle, highly protected and extremely durable. High levels of mobility in all terrain and weather conditions are extraordinary values of this vehicle. General data on the dimensions and mass are as follows: length – 6.05 m, height – 2.70 m, width – 2.56 m, wheelbase – 3.5 m and ground clearance – 0.48. Additionally, maximum vehicle weight is 14 t. Regarding performance, maximum speed is 120 km/h, vertical barrier 0,5 m, and water barrier 1.1 m (TRB, Katalog Despot, 2021). In the fuse line, manufactured types are artillery fuses, hand grenade fuses, aerial bomb fuses, landmine fuses and naval mine fuses. The offer of TBR includes engineering services with Know-how documentation, Equipment installation, Supervision over installation, Commissioning of production, Trial run, Equipment performance test, Maintenance after commissioning, Training, Turnkey solution, and Plant engineering (TRB, 9 October 2021).

#### *DESPOT<sup>4</sup>*



This company reported collaboration with African states, namely with Namibia and Egypt (TRB, 1 September 2021).

<sup>4</sup> Picture Available at: <https://trb.ba/en/portfolio/despot/> (Accessed: 1 September 2021).

## *Peacekeepers from Bosnia and Herzegovina in EU, UN and NATO missions in Africa*

In the period after the Cold War, peacekeeping missions became normal in conflict and post-conflict territories (Boutton and D'Orazio, 2019). During and after the war between 1991-1995, different international operations have been launched in BH (see more: Madej, 2018; Bove and Elia, 2018). BH has the experiences of a host country for numerous peacekeepers (Duclos and Jouhanneau, 2019), but also sent its own soldiers and police officers to contribute to the peace and stability of other countries. Police and military structures from BH have been participating in peacekeeping missions and peace support operations from 2000 onward (Ministry of Security of BH, 2019; Centre for Security Studies – BH, 2018). At first, members of the police structures joined the United Nations mission in East Timor. The first forces to Africa have been sent in 2001, who were members of the BH Armed Forces, as part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Since then, members of the BH Ministry of Defense have participated in missions in the Republic of Mali, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Berdal, 2018; Rand and Madel, 2017). BH police forces have entered African mainland for the first time in 2004, as part of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). This mission aimed to maintain peace and strengthen the capacity of the local police force by providing police services to citizens with an emphasis on vulnerable populations. According to available data, 81 members of police structures from BH were in Liberia, and they were assigned to the positions of police advisors for criminal investigations, team leaders, and deputy regional commander. Regarding the gender structure of the BH mission staff, in this mission 11 women and 70 men have served (Centre for Security Studies – BH, 2018).

The next mission in which 19 police officers from BH have participated is UNMIS - United Nations Mission in Sudan -, and the mission's task was to build capacity, and to reform and reorganize the police (Hunt, 2020). Mission staff were engaged in the tasks of organizing various types of training for the local police. A number of 86 police officers from BH have been sent to the new UNMISS mission - United Nations Mission in South Sudan - since 2011. This mission is special because the largest number of women participated (see more: Berry and Rana, 2019; Mušić, 2019) among the mission staff, i.e. 16 female police officers from BH (Centre for Security Studies – BH, 2018).

## *Final remarks*

The total value of exported products of BH's industry to African countries in 2019 reached the value of 86 million euros, which is equal to 17 percent of the total export profit of BH in that year. In the following year, hindered by the COVID-19 blockade, goods worth only 59 million euros or 11 percent of the total export values of BH were exported to Africa. A similar trend continued in 2021, although with significant increases in the quantity and value of exported goods, and the value of products delivered to Africa in the first 6 months has reached 40



million euros. An integral part of the presented data are the products of the military industry delivered to several African countries. Standard African buyers of weapons, ammunition, their parts, and equipment are Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. Egypt is the most represented buyer of military equipment in BH with multiple millions in value paid during the analyzed period. In 2019, the purchase was worth 29 million euros, and in 2020, almost the same, and for the first half of the current year, Egypt has bought equipment worth about 12 million euros. Egypt is followed by Morocco, Kenya, and Algeria, and BH's military equipment manufacturers list Namibia and Botswana as very important collaborators. The unavailability of data on the quantity of particular pieces of military equipment delivered to Africa is a main limitation of the paper.

The presented data indicate the justification of the analysis, but also the need for further scientific research on the links between BH and several African countries. Namibia and BH's internal entity, the Republic of Srpska, have been cooperating since 2016, and this cooperation will continue in the future (RTRS, 17 October 2018; ATV, 25 May 2016; Žurnal, 21 April 2018). The Technical Overhaul Bratunac has also emphasized partner relations with Namibia.

Furthermore, peacekeeping missions will not stop anytime soon, and the question of the specific contribution of the BH contingent in the building of stability in Africa is open for further scientific research.

### **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

### **Notes on contributor**

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## How international volunteering can contribute to the development of Africa

Zsolt Molnár<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract:

International volunteering has an unquestionable role in global development, but its complexity and contribution is yet to be widely emphasised. Working to implement humanitarian and/or development aid programmes initiated by the UN and other transnational bodies, international volunteering supports global change in general, and offers concrete benefits for both the recipient and donor societies. Africa is the biggest beneficiary of global support, with approx. 30% of all international development assistance (ODA) allocated to the continent, worth USD 38 billion annually. Africa also has the biggest concentration of international volunteers: approx. 45% of them work in the continent supporting the implementation of social, educational, health, economic, or agriculture development programmes. The economic value of volunteers' labour amounts to several billion USD worldwide every year.

### Keywords:

International volunteering; volunteers; development of Africa; global change; social, economic, and political benefits; humanitarian and/or development aid programmes.

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## **Introduction**

International volunteering has a long history of contributing to global development through its complex support potential. It helps local communities and countries by providing enthusiastic manpower to implement development projects, and it also offers the necessary skills and knowledge transfer to achieve social and economic sustainability. Volunteers take part in global, regional, or national aid programmes and work hard to force change. By doing so, they also undergo a positive personal development that will promote mutual understanding and cultural exchange in their home countries. This is the complex interpretation of international volunteering that creates benefits for both the donor and the recipient societies; the hard and soft advantages include social, economic, and political opportunities. Africa is the biggest host continent and beneficiary of international volunteering, but it suffers its major drawbacks as well. It must face, manage, and regularly overcome many cultural barriers and conflicts of individual volunteers as well as differing voluntary programmes.

In this paper I will first introduce international volunteering, then discuss the different opportunities and challenges regarding development in general. Finally, I will present and evaluate the positive impacts of a completed international volunteer programme. Through this, I will argue that not only global and regional bodies, but smaller independent projects can also achieve recognised results.

## ***International volunteering: historical overview***

International volunteering, by definition, is an activity where volunteers contribute their time to work without financial compensation in a foreign country with the objective to help other people or communities to achieve dedicated social, economic, or political goals (Devereux, 2008a; Harkin, 2008a, Palmer 2002). This is the traditional or functional interpretation of volunteering that historically originates in the faiths, ethics, and religions of ancient societies, which include helping other people in need to ensure the survival and development of their community (Salamon–Papp, 2012; Zentai, 2006a). This attitude has a long history in African tribal culture as well where individuals are an inseparable part of their community, and where community unconditionally supports needy individuals (Aihiokhai, 2017; Celucien, 2018; Turnbull, 1966). This social worldview includes the “*generous expansion of hospitality*” and a “*readiness to share if needed*” approach (Gathogo, 2008: 3) as embodied in the well-known traditional *Ubuntu* or *Harambee* philosophies as well (Modise 2006, Moga 1984, Oppenheim 2012) that still have a long-lasting acceptance in modern African societies. It was based on this community–based altruistic approach (Feischmidt, 2018) how volunteering historically started and lasted until the 20th century through different human and organisational forms such as tribal, communal, religious, or, later, governmental. After the 1st World War, volunteering was expanded to international level with the objective of taking common responsibility for poor and underdeveloped countries (Lewis, 2005a; Smith – Laurie, 2010). Although the first

volunteer-sending non-government organisations (NGOs) were already formed in the 1930s to offer emergency assistance and economic relief to developing countries<sup>1</sup>, most of the largest and most reputed international volunteer cooperation organisations (IVCOs) were established only after WW2. These included, among others, the British Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) in 1958, the US Peace Corps in 1961, and the German Development Service (DED) in 1963, followed by the United Nations Volunteer (UNV) programme in 1971, and the Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971. They targeted the newly independent countries of Africa to bring social understanding and economic development to the post-colonial era. Since the 1970s, public awareness around global issues (fighting famine, social injustice, lack of education, inadequate health situation, or climate change) has increased and opened ways for dedicated UN development programmes<sup>2</sup>, which also rely on international volunteering as an instrument of implementation (Lough, 2015; Mikesy – Molnar – Reicher 2011). Most volunteer programmes support global development goals initiated mainly by the UN, the EU, or other international bodies, by providing young and enthusiastic manpower, and social and/or economic skills to implement organised development programmes in the host countries. Today, international volunteering is institutionalised and professionalised and has a wider focus from targeting individuals and social groups to entire countries. It has also started to engage volunteers from developing countries, as part of the transformation thereof. The traditional “*from North to South*” way of volunteering<sup>3</sup> has been supplemented by “*South to North*” and “*South to South*” directions. The idea is to encourage participants from traditional host nations to work in international projects in other countries to gain experience, widen their perceptions and improve their skillset that they take home to foster local development. More than 70% of UN volunteers are currently from the Global South and many of the volunteer agencies recruit participants regularly from 3rd world countries (Devereux, 2008b).

International volunteering, on the other hand, offers benefits not only to the host countries but to the donor societies as well, including personal and social development of the volunteers, business opportunities for companies, as well as geopolitical and diplomatic advantages for the governments concerned. Former American volunteers report increased intercultural understanding and change of attitude towards foreign cultures (95%) as well as to international social and economic development (Lough – McBride – Sherraden, 2009a). According to a German survey, international volunteers feel that their life satisfaction level has risen compared to non-volunteer peers (Meier – Stutzer, 2004a). Returned volunteers experienced that even their employment possibilities have improved due to their new skills and competencies obtained through volunteering (Wilson, 2000). In general, international volunteering contributes to a happy lifestyle, and to the fulfilment of personal identity (Hustinx – Lammerty, 2003, Meier – Stutzer, 2004b), it strengthens responsibility for other people, and builds mutual trust and civic commitment (Zentai, 2006b, Wu, 2011). The corporate sector can also take advantage of volunteering as part of their CSR activity or engaging in direct business opportunities in the host countries. At a national level, donor



governments can use volunteer programmes to fulfil their international development obligations or to build awareness and political reputation.

This approach is the complex and postmodern interpretation of international volunteering that unites the mutual interests of all participants – individuals, communities, social and political institutions, and business entities– of both the donor and recipient societies. It is built on the belief that global development can be achieved only with close cooperation, common understanding and appreciation of each other.

### **Contribution to development**

As discussed earlier, international volunteering is a multidisciplinary instrument to bring social change and economic improvement to host countries. Volunteers turn humanitarian and/or development aid programmes into local development gains (Lewis, 2005b) by sharing their ideas, transferring their knowledge and education as well as supporting in physical activities. They contribute to human security, international development, and sustainability (Devereux, 2008c) in social, agricultural and economic terms alike.

International humanitarian and/or development aid is a global sector that includes government investments, economic, health or social development programmes, and direct assistance and relief to countries in need. Within this professionalised framework of combined efforts of international bodies, such as the UN, the EU, the OECD etc., volunteering plays a definite but important role. Although it may be an exaggeration to state that “*without volunteers, many development programmes would cease to exist*” (Burns et al, 2006: 81), the value of international volunteering value is undeniable. A European Parliament (EP)<sup>4</sup> report states that volunteering is not only an important business driver but also a social capital that strengthens solidarity and supports community development and interpersonal relationships (Harkin, 2008b). The United Nations proclaimed 2001 as the International Year of Volunteers<sup>5</sup>, while the European Council called 2011 the European Year of Volunteering<sup>6</sup>, because “*voluntary activities reduce racism and prejudice and contribute to intercultural and inter-religious dialogue*” as well as to the “*social cohesion of societies*” (ibid.).

International volunteering has, therefore, a very complex framework of mechanism of impact on global development, including all direct (e.g., dissemination of aid, physical execution of development and humanitarian projects etc.) and indirect (global education, public outreach, change of attitudes etc.) effects. Africa is the centre of international development, as it is the largest recipient of all aid programmes in per capita terms (see *Table 1.*).



	Net ODA USD million	Population million
AFRICA	37,844	1,309
Asia	40,373	4,199
America	7,936	618
Europe	4,518	158
Oceania	1,901	11
Unspecified by region	34,843	-
<b>All ODA recipients</b>	<b>127,415</b>	<b>6,285</b>

Table 1. Net ODA<sup>7</sup> and population of aid recipient countries by region in 2019  
(Source: OECD, 2021)

Africa receives almost one third of all international financial and aid support in net value, while the amount of its aid per capita is USD 28.9, compared to the average of USD 20.2 across all developing countries (USD 12.8 in America and USD 9.6 in Asia)<sup>8</sup>. According to OECD statistics, the biggest beneficiary of international aid is the social sector, including education, health, and civil society (44.2%) development, followed by the economic and production sector (22.3%) and humanitarian projects (18.9%)<sup>9</sup>.

Below the paper examines the regions of deployment, and sectors of volunteer activities, to see whether they are in line with the structure of global financial support to development. Different NGOs report between 45% and 50% of their volunteers deployed in Africa, followed by 25% – 30% working in Asian countries. *Chart 1* shows the combined figures of 16 volunteer-sending organisations worldwide (FORUM, 2018).




Chart 1. Regions of volunteers' deployment  
(Source: FORUM, 2018)

There is also a very strong correlation as regards the sectors: most volunteers work in programmes targeting social (including education) and health improvement (30% – 49%), children's programmes (22%), economy and agricultural modernisation (21% – 29%) as well as the development of civil societies (15%) in African countries and communities (see *Table 2*).

Sectors (FORUM statistics, 2018)	Ratio	Sectors (US data, 2004-2010)	Ratio
Education	19%	Culture & education	9%
Economy	20%	Economy	21%
Agriculture	9%	Agriculture	
Government	15%	Political development	18%
Civil society		Social & community service	
Reduce inequality	2%		
Health	11%	Health	22%
Environment	6%	Environment & animal care	8%
Water sanitation	6%		
Other	12%	Children's programme	22%

Table 2. Sectors of volunteer activities  
(Sources: FORUM, 2018; Lough, 2012)

As one can see, the geographical and sectoral deployment of international volunteers is very similar – almost identical – to the global allocation of humanitarian and aid support to developing countries, and to Africa in particular.

Unfortunately, international volunteering in general is a very under-researched area (Lewis, 2005c; Lough – McBride – Sherraden, 2012): very little reliable data is available as only the largest volunteer-sending NGOs provide statistics or get involved in surveys. This paper, therefore, collects and analyses the available information of several volunteer-sending organisations and associations to estimate the total number of international volunteers (see Table 3) assisting development programmes in Africa every year. Among the biggest NGOs, British VSO had approx. 4200 international volunteers working overseas in 2019<sup>10</sup>, the European Voluntary Service (EVS) had approx. 5000<sup>11</sup>, the US Peace Corps had 7500<sup>12</sup>, while the umbrella association of 30 different international volunteer-sending NGOs, the International Forum for Volunteering in Development (Forum), reported about 18,000 of their volunteers being on global assignment in 2018<sup>13</sup>. As a comparison, the number of international volunteers in Hungary is estimated between 300 and 500 annually. On the other hand, a large-scale survey involving approx. 60,000 households in the US between 2004 and 2010 revealed that the number of Americans volunteering internationally amounts to 800,000 – 1,000,000 annually, and this amount was typical for every year in the research (Lough 2012).

Organisations	Numbers
International Forum for Volunteering in Development (Forum) with 30 NGO members (survey incl. 16 member organisations, 2018)	appr. 18,000 / year
US Peace Corps (2019)	appr. 7500 / year
EVS (European Voluntary Service) <sup>14</sup>	appr. 5000 / year
British VSO (2019)	appr. 4200 / year
Hungarian volunteers	appr. 300 – 500 / year
Americans volunteering internationally (large-scale survey incl. 60,000 households 2004-2010)	800,000 – 1,000,000 / year

Table 3. Annual number of international volunteers (Source: own compilation)

Considering that there are a multiple number of volunteer-sending organisations in almost every developed country, including humanitarian networks, e.g. the Danish Humana People to People that has 30 member organisations alone, the overall number of international volunteers engaged in global development programmes annually can be estimated between hundreds of thousands to over a million.

Africa benefits from international volunteering through a variety of development programmes. This amount of help is measured by the economic value of the volunteers that, according to a study, may amount to approx. USD 2.3 to 2.9 billion, based on US volunteers alone<sup>15</sup> (Lough – McBride – Sherraden, 2009b).

### **Contradictions and challenges vs. results**

These findings support that international volunteering is a powerful and effective mechanism to pursue development in Africa, but only when it is organised and managed properly. It is often argued that international volunteers on short-term placements have a limited or even questionable impacts on their host communities (Brown, 2015), primarily because their cultural adaptation is not yet completed, and they still suffer from cultural shock and stress due to being in a foreign and unknown environment (Lough, 2010). This cultural shock is a scientific phenomenon (Oberg, 1960) that is practically inevitable for most volunteers. They must pass the psychological stages to get to the full adaptation level called “mastery stage”, enabling the volunteers to behave appropriately according to the cultural norms of the host country and function effectively in the new environment (Black – Mendenhall, 1991: 226). The efficient cooperation is based on a mutual understanding which needs tolerance and openness from both parties. Many European habits and cultural behaviour<sup>16</sup> are unfamiliar to some local communities (Mezei 2019), which volunteers need to be aware of and find the right approach to bridge the differences. In many cases, they must change first to be able to generate change in the host societies, but this is not easy and needs time. That is why several American volunteers reported that “*their presence in the community have caused some problems or challenges*” (18% of respondents), “*they did not share similar goals with local staff / they were sometimes in competition*” (16%) or “*the community did not want or request their services*” (6%). The main reasons for cultural difficulties included “*cultural imperialism, gender and racial tensions*” between volunteers and host community members. They also faced other problems, such as “*challenges resulting from differences in power and privilege*” and “*concerns over local labor replacement, local conflicts, resource consumption and dependence*” (Lough – McBride – Sherraden, 2009c). On the other hand, adaptation is also challenged by the cultural heterogeneity in African countries with several hundreds of different tribes and cultures living together; making it hard for the volunteers to adjust easily (Neszmelyi, 2016).

On many occasions, communication is what lies at the root of most misunderstandings. Usually, language barriers are the biggest challenges for volunteers but the difference in style and structure of communication according to the context (Hall, 1976) is equally a standard



problem. In most parts of Africa, communication is typically high-context, indirect and implicit (Tick, 2007). This makes it hard to get on with European or American volunteers, who are accustomed to an originally low-context communication with more direct approaches.

More serious and harder to overcome is the orientalist perception (Said, 1978) which is the West's stereotypical patronising attitude towards the "East" (i.e., the former colonised societies). Even though, in most cases volunteers are not even aware of it, but it is nonetheless recognisable by local community members. A similar aspect and consequence of the colonialist past is that many local people still subconsciously suffer from a deficit in their self-esteem feeling that white men are superior to them (Fanon, 1952). Even Nelson Mandela sorrowfully realised that when he boarded an airplane with a black pilot (in Ethiopia in 1961), he was in panic and shock because his first reaction was that "*a black cannot fly a plane*" (Mandela, 1994: 69). This perception and attitude may still result in severe psychological barriers between the parties that block the application of the notion of cultural equality that is subject to mutually efficient cooperation.

Luckily, the above-mentioned difficulties were experienced by the minorities of the volunteers only, 95% of them reported high levels of intercultural understanding. The majority of US volunteers agreed that volunteering was very successful, as "*they made a lasting contribution to the host organization or community*" (76%), "*they transferred a useful skill to the host organization*" (70%), or "*they had a specific skill needed by the host organization*" (69%) (ibid.). This supports the conclusion that despite occasional cultural difficulties on an individual level, international volunteering is needed and important to the development of Africa.

### **Case study: volunteers successfully fighting HIV/AIDS17**

Besides the general achievements and contributions of volunteering, this chapter introduces a specific humanitarian programme, the Total Control of the Epidemic (TCE), as a case study. This programme was immensely supported by volunteers during its implementation between 2000 and 2017 by the Danish *Federation Humana People to People (Humana)*.

The Humana is a world-wide non-profit organisation established in 1996 but with an additional 20 years of charity activity started by a couple of fibid enthusiastic Scandinavian youth in the 1970s. Today, it comprises 30 member associations active in 45 countries in all five continents. With nearly USD 90 million spent in 2020 on development projects globally, it is one of the biggest charities in the world.

Confronted with the shocking death toll of AIDS sweeping through Sub-Saharan Africa, and the similarly fatal social and economic consequences of the global epidemic since the 1980s, Humana designed a thorough prevention programme with the philosophy that "*Only the people can liberate themselves from the epidemic*". The programme was based on the idea that people should change their own attitude and behaviour to be able to fight the disease;

but for that they need education, behaviour guidance and ongoing personal support. Since in the rural parts of Africa the mass media is not widely available or is non-existent, people should be reached through extensive and intensive personal visits. The TCE (Total Control of the Epidemic) programme ran systematically for 3 years in every country, whereby each community member was visited regularly and repeatedly by a TCE professional with structured information on HIV/AIDS. The countries were divided into geographical areas of 100,000 inhabitants, each covered by 50 local TCE field officers supported by international volunteers from all over the world. One TCE officer oversaw, therefore, 2000 people or approx. 350 households, providing face-to-face information to families about HIV/AIDS to raise awareness, get attention, educate, and activate people to be able to avoid the infection.

The international volunteers trained the TCE officers, localised the campaign, created ideas, raised awareness for the programme and supported their teams. The programme started in Zimbabwe in 2000, then in Mozambique a year later, followed by other African countries. During its 17 years of activities, altogether 10 countries (Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe) took part in the programme that was unique by its conceptual approach, military-like structure, and disciplined implementation. In every country, strong government support was established, and the success of the programme was acknowledged by its important financial sponsors of global international funds including e.g., the Global Funds, UNICEF, UNAIDS, World Bank etc.

After the completion of the programme in a specific country, Humana assigned an independent monitoring agency to measure and evaluate the outcomes. The programme reached 18.5 million people overall and the result was noticeable everywhere. Community members' level of information and knowledge have risen, their attitudes have changed, and they have become more conscious about the disease and/or improved their sexual habits according to the guidance. The number of tests taken has also increased; and the nationwide statistics' results of positive cases has started to decline. In the Republic of South Africa (RSA) and in Namibia in-depth interviews and surveys were conducted to explore the inhabitants' and the stakeholders' awareness level and opinion about the programme (see *Tables 4 and 5*).

<b>Major findings, HSRC survey (2010)</b>	
80%	Participated actively in the TCE project
85,3%	Were visited by someone to talk to them about HIV
92,9%	„They made lasting changes in their lives in relation to HIV&AIDS“
94,4%	„TCE was helpful to people“
93,8%	„TCE increased their resolve to know their HIV status“
94,2%	„The one-to-one approach helped them take total control of the epidemic“
90,2%	„TCE had impact on their sexual behaviour and practice“

*Table 4: Results of the TCE programme in South Africa<sup>18</sup>  
(Source: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 2010)*

<b>Major findings, KIT report (2008)</b>
86-100% of people living in regions covered by the TCE programme were aware of the programme.
89% of inhabitants participated actively in the programme.
In 2008, 9% of pregnant women tested positive, down from 21,1% in 2006.
Over 10,5 million condoms were distributed (TCE-covered regions have a population of approx. 780 000).
84% of the respondents mentioned condom as an effective prevention method, with prevention knowledge on the rise.
84% of women and 85% of men agree that children of 12-14 years should be taught about the use of condoms to avoid AIDS.
Almost all people reported a high level of acceptance towards people living with HIV (over 90% would care a family member with AIDS; 75% would buy food from a vendor infected with HIV; and 87% would allow an HIV positive female teacher to continue teaching), being an important result against stigmatisation.
The majority of people in the survey told they had been tested or planned to go testing.

*Table 5: Result of TCE programme in Namibia<sup>19</sup>*

*(Sources: Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), 2008 and Demographic and Health Survey, 2006-2007)*

In most of the aspects, there are significant changes in the awareness level of people reached by the TCE programme compared to people living in other regions and not covered by the programme. The South African impact evaluation compared the results of one of the intervention areas with data collected in a randomly chosen control area with similar demographic characteristics (*Table 6*). The results show that the TCE programme resulted in a noticeable positive difference in the community members' opinion and their attitude regarding HIV/AIDS and the main prevention methods.

<b>Comparison study, HSRC survey (2010)</b>	<b>Intervention area</b>	<b>Control area</b>
Have thorough knowledge of the virus	93,5%	90,9%
Know how to avoid being infected with HIV	90,7%	83.1%
Ever tested for HIV	62,3%	55%
Ever visited to talk about HIV	85,3%	65,3%

*Table 6. Changes in people's attitude and awareness in intervention vs. control area  
(Source: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 2010)*

## **Conclusion**

International volunteering is a complex social instrument that can unite different, and sometimes opposing, parts of the world creating hard and soft benefits for all participating societies. Host countries and communities gain access to valuable information, education, skills, and knowledge needed for sustainable social, economic, and political development. Volunteers, on the other hand, gain substantial experience and can develop their personal and interpersonal competencies that contribute to their social and personal development. The

donor countries can also benefit from volunteering by incorporating the shaped attitude of the volunteers, including their improved value on the labour market.

The donors and recipients have mutual interests in supporting volunteering: besides the increased cultural understanding and tolerance, they can develop precious economic, agricultural, or other advanced forms of cooperation. On the long run, volunteering finds its place within the network of global development, bringing positive change to local communities and societies.

Africa is a huge and heterogeneous continent with countless different ethnic groups and local cultures, but they are all open for international cooperation (Neszmelyi, 2017) provided by volunteering. Despite local misunderstandings and difficulties, voluntary programmes are active and vigorous in the continent. Not only international development projects initiated by the UN, or the EU can achieve change, but even small independent humanitarian campaigns can take stand in serious cases as illustrated above. Common to that is the effective involvement of international volunteers. When volunteering is based on a mutual agreement and common participation, advantageous results will be inevitably evident for all parties involved.

### **Conflict of interest**

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

### **Notes on contributor**

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[2-efolyam-5-szam/100-oenkentes-segites-magyarorszagon-ma-es-holnap](#) (Accessed 9 October 2021).

## Notes

- 1) Service Civil International is believed to be one of the oldest international volunteer-sending organisations, established in 1934 (Lough, 2015)
- 2) MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) in 2000, and SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals 2015 – 2030)
- 3) The „developed” countries in the North provided help to the „underdeveloped” nations in the South
- 4) The European Parliament’s report on the role of volunteering (2007/2149(INI))
- 5) The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 52/17 of 20 November 1997
- 6) Council decision on the European Year of Volunteering (2011) {SEC (2009)725}
- 7) Official Development Assistance (ODA), defined by OECD as government aid to help developing countries
- 8) Aid at a Glance Charts, 2019 (OECD) (<https://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-glance.htm>, accessed: 13.12.2021) and OECD.Stat, 2021 <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=Table2A>, accessed: 13.12.2021)
- 9) Same OECD references as above
- 10) VSO annual report 2019-2020
- 11) Averaged per year, as they had appr. 100,000 over their 20 years of working
- 12) US Peace Corps annual report 2020
- 13) This number contains only 16 member NGOs’ statistics out of 30, the others did not provide their volunteers’ number (FORUM Basic Measurement Data Survey January-May 2019)
- 14) Replaced in 2017 by European Solidarity Corps (ESC)
- 15) This number refers to all US volunteers working overseas and not only to those working in Africa
- 16) Especially tribal or religious habits or sexual-related behaviour or education
- 17) Sources: [www.humana.org](http://www.humana.org); [www.tce-aids.org](http://www.tce-aids.org); Humana Progress Report 2020; Human Sciences Research Council, RSA, 2010; Royal Tropical Institute, Netherlands, 2008
- 18) The TCE programme was active in South Africa between 2002 and 2010. Data depicted in this paper were collected by mixed quantitative and qualitative research conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 2010.
- 19) The TCE programme started in Namibia in 2005 and lasted until between August and December 2005 (depending on the regions). Data used in this report include the Demographic Household Survey’s results (measuring behavioural change) collected in November 2006 – February 2007; and the National HIV Sentinel Survey’s results (monitoring HIV prevalence among pregnant women) collected June – October 2006.

## A review of: “The Rwandan Patriotic Front 1990-1994”

by Adrien Fontanellaz and Tom Cooper<sup>1</sup>

Zsolt Szabó<sup>2</sup>

The Rwandan Civil War is a theme that has been thoroughly documented; however, the research of the war concerning the military features of the conflict is missing evaluation. The authors, Adrien Fontanellaz and Tom Cooper concentrated on these sides of the bloodshed, taking into consideration to be understandable for the average reader; they omitted most of the footnotes from inside the text and left them at the end of the book, so the researchers interested in the work can also find it interesting to read. The aim of the authors is to interconnect the conflict with the countries of Uganda and Zaire. They intended to summarise the documents, articles and books related to the topic, however the magnitude of the theme suggests that it is impossible to take into consideration the full spectrum of works. Their main intention was to avoid insensitive expressions like „terrorist” in order to describe the situation in a well-fashioned manner.

The Rwandan Civil War was a bloody conflict that devastated the country and had a serious impact on the neighbouring states as well. The disaster that culminated in 800,000 deaths and 860,000 refugees destroyed the society, infrastructure, environment and political situation of Rwanda was a catastrophic event that characterizes the past and recent conflicts of the continent. The Civil War is a very complex and terrible series of events which are difficult to summarize on such short notice. The several leaders who took part in the conflict are innumerable and they are responsible for the lives of hundreds of thousands whichever side they were on. The numerous clashes between the ethnic tribes of the Hutu and Tutsi resulted in a cruel war that caused the death of many innocent civilians. The consequence of the bloodshed was horrible and it ended only after four years of killing, raping and murder.

The main figures were Juvénal Habyarimana, the leader of the FAR (*Forces Armées Rwandaises*), the Rwandan military and the president of the country, Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda, the head of the Front for National Salvation (*FRONASA*), the president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, Mobutu Sese Seko, president of Zaire, Paul Kagame, the leader of the RFP (*Rwandan Patriotic Front*), Fred Rwigyema who was the founder of the organization and Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, vice-president of the front, Colonel Gilbert Canovas from the French Army and advisor of the FAR. They all played a major part in the events, which ended in the victory of Paul Kagame and the RPF, but unfortunately the Civil War carried tragic events

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<sup>1</sup> Fontanellaz, Adrien and Cooper, Tom, *The Rwandan Patriotic Front 1990-1994 (AFRICA@WAR24)*. Solihull, Helion & Company Limited, 2015. ISBN: 978-1-910294-56-7, pp. 64. USD 35 (paperback).

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with itself: a massive genocide took place, where mainly the Hutu ethnic tribe decimated the Tutsi minority of the country.

The book consists of six chapters, each of which follows the events of the Civil war as they happened. The first chapter contains the introduction of the Rwandan Civil War. In describing the early history of Rwanda, the book goes on to tell that from the 1880s, the Germans made Rwanda into a protectorate (*Ruanda-Urundi*), then the Belgians created a mandate of the area called *Rwanda-Urundi* (1947-1962). The country became independent in 1962. The two main ethnic groups were the Hutu and the Tutsi. The Tutsi were the aristocracy, while the Hutu were the leaders of the country. In 1959, a civil war started between the previously peaceful groups, and the Hutus forced a lot of the Tutsis to flee from the state to Uganda. From 1973, Chief of Staff of the FAR, Juvénal Habyarimana orchestrated a coup d'état, and became the president of Rwanda, who based his rule on the catholic values and created a stable economy sympathetic to Western supporters. His army, however, was characterized by clientelism, and it was seriously divided. Habyarimana kept close ties with foreign supporters, foremost the Belgians (who gave him advisors) and the French, who supported the country militarily. By 1990, the FAR had been strengthened. Its HQ was in Kigali, and its elite force was the Presidential Guard. The air force was very weak, it lacked manpower and aircrafts. The FAR was responsible for the domestic protection of the country. One of the main jobs of the FAR was to exercise counter-insurgency attacks (*COIN*) against rebels. It hosted mainly the Hutu ethnic group.

The second chapter is about the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army and Front. There were several reasons why this ethnic group gained a foothold in the territory. The first one is that when in 1990 the *Anglo-German treaty* separated Rwanda and Uganda, thus a lot of Rwandans stuck in the new country. The second was in the early 1900s when the Belgians imposed harsh economic laws on the Rwandans who went to Uganda for better work. The third one is that in 1959 the disturbing events caused 336,000 persons to emigrate to the neighbouring countries, including 78,000 to Uganda; they were called the '59ers'. In Uganda they settled mainly in refugee camps and they became farmers. The chapter then continues to describe the subsequent Ugandan Liberation War, which had consequences on the Rwandan refugee community. They wanted to return to their homeland, and there Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame became their leaders, who first took part in the Ugandan army. Accordingly, a lot of Rwandan refugees served in the country's force, where they improved their military skills. The Tutsi received high ranks in the Ugandan army. Soon they began organizing their own movements within their community. In 1987, they created the RPF (*Rwandan Patriotic Front*) which later became one of the main participants in the Civil War. In 1989, Rwigyema became president of the RPF, while Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe was elected vice-president. Harsh conditions from the Museveni-government led the Tutsi refugees to think that moving to Rwanda was an option. Political decisions opted Rwigyema to act and begin to invade the country in 1990. They used guerrilla tactics, but they also waged ordinary warfare with a few fighters. The RPF also had an alliance with the Ugandan NRA (*National Resistance Army*).

The third chapter describes the invasion that the Ugandan Tutsi community executed against Rwanda. The Rwandan Civil War started with a conversation among Rwigyema and Kagame on 28 September 1990. In October 1990, Habyarimana was in New York so the two officers planned to invade Rwanda at the time. They began the movements three months before the invasion, soldiers and supplies were gathered. They planned to attack unexpectedly to ensure their victory. The Ugandans however received information about the attack. The FAR reacted by placing battalions to the border. They also detained lots of Tutsis in retaliation of the events, and tortured and executed them. In response, the Belgian government stopped aiding Rwanda. On 2 October 1990, another incident happened: Fred Rwigyema was shot dead allegedly by one of his comrades. This of course had a negative effect on the discipline of the troops. Since after his death, the RPF began to become more radical. Habyarimana reacted as well: he called for help from France, Belgium and Zaire. The French were the most active in supporting the regime. Thus the combined FAR-foreign powers counter-attacked. The RPF responded as well, and advanced further. A stalemate developed in Nyagatare. Meanwhile, the RPF started to recruit young men for the fights. On 23 October 1990 the RPF started to mobilize. Finally, the FAR repulsed the RPF from the area. This way, the FAR defeated and chased away the RPF to Uganda. Thus the October-war ended.

The fourth chapter focuses on the re-birth of the RPA (the military wing of the RPF). After Rwigyema's death, Paul Kagame became the leader of the RPA. He began to invade Rwanda again. The RPA encamped in the Virunga Mountains to hold their positions. They gathered ammunition and supply from several countries, including East Europe and neighbouring states. The RPF then mobilized reinforcements from the Tutsi community. Until 1991, they gathered 5,000 soldiers. By 1992, their number reached 12,000. They went to train in Uganda. The atmosphere of the training was brutal and their treatment was harsh. The training officers welcomed the soldiers to give their lives in battle. The FAR reinforced their army as well. Their army's number reached 27,000 persons during preparations, but their discipline was poor. They collected weapons as well: Egypt, South Africa, Greece, Poland, France (for example the special commando, *GSIGP*) were the transporters. On January 1991, the RPF began a new offensive. After exchange of fire and territory, the RPF was repulsed into Uganda. All over 1991, there were clashes between the two sides. However, after fierce fights, the RPF started to gain foothold in Northern Rwanda. Later on, The RPF resumed its fighting against the FAR on 28 May 1992, which is called Byumba Offensive – named after the province the RPF attacked. With the intervention of the French, the RPF withdrew, but later they reestablished themselves and captured a 10-30 km area in the Rwandan territory. After that a ceasefire came into existence which lasted until six months, during which a peace agreement talks took place in Arusha, Tanzania.

Chapter five discusses further attacks and the tragic Rwandan genocide. It was the Hutu who committed the first atrocities against the Tutsi population in January and March 1991 which resulted in 300-1,000 deaths. The following year, nearly 3,000 Tutsi were murdered (41). The RPA was neither innocent, as they were responsible for several killings in February



and November 1993. The RPA again prepared for war. The attacks started on 7-8 February 1993. This time the insurgents approached the capital itself. The French didn't hesitate to intervene. The RPF was repelled, and a demilitarized zone (DMZ) was created at the border. This was the time when the UN intervened: UNOMUR (*United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda*), a border-patrolling unit was dispatched to the area. Because of its weakness, the UN sent another mission, UNAMIR (*United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda*) to Rwanda, to observe the compliance of the *Arusha Peace Treaty*. UNAMIR was unsuccessful too. During the conflict several radical militias were created, which committed horrible crimes against humanity using machetes and AK-47 assault machine guns (47). For example, these were the *Interhamwe* and the *Impuzamugambi*. The main event triggering the Rwandan genocide was Habyarimana's murder: his airplane was shot down. The Tutsi suspected Hutu soldiers committed the action, so they started to kill the Hutu civilians between 7-10 April, where approximately 20,000 people died.

The sixth chapter evaluates the 100-days campaign and the end of the Rwandan Civil War. With Habyarimana gone the army lost its potential and internal difficulties arose. Its supply decreased, because France and UNAMIR stopped providing weapons to the FAR. The UN implemented an arms embargo on the country as well. The RPF however mobilized its troops which reached 20,000 persons. Nevertheless, the FAR was in preparation for war too, gathering 24,000 troops. Kagame orchestrated a two-sided plan, with two directions for the soldiers, both reaching at the end the capital, namely Kigali. Their plan was to attack at night by the element of surprise. The assault started on 6-7 April. The FAR counter-attacked on 8 April. By 10 April, the RPA was at the gates of Kigali. After exchange of fire the FAR received a major blow: the RPF got access to their maps, order of battle, and other intelligence sources. From then on, the insurgent campaign was in advantage. The final encounter between the FAR and the RPA for Kigali took place in May-June 1994, when the desperate FAR units tried to use militiamen to win the war. The sides reached a stalemate, but the tired FAR forces sought a final solution to end the bloody massacre, trying to break out of the town. Nevertheless, the RPA repulsed the effort, and on 19 June they officially conquered Kigali and Gisenyi and proclaimed their victory and a new rule led by Paul Kagame (55). This signaled the official end of the Rwandan Civil War. Because of strong Hutu propaganda, approximately 1,244,000 refugees fled the country to Zaire and 577,000 to Tanzania in November. Subsequently the French and the UN sanctioned the UNAMIR II in August to control the situation.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide was a brutal and tragic event. This book presents a well-documented description on the conflict relying on proper and numerous sources. The authors use thorough methods to make the situation and the historical event understandable even for the average reader. Therefore, I recommend this book not only for scientific researchers, but also to the everyday man who wants to learn more about the ongoing conflicts on the black continent.

## Flaming Darfur

### A review of: “Darfur Peacekeepers: The African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (AMIS) from the perspective of a Hungarian military advisor” by János Besenyo<sup>1</sup>

Szilveszter Póczik<sup>2</sup>

Some leaders of human rights and aid organizations have repeatedly stated that peace has been restored in Darfur and fighting has ceased. Nevertheless, it is a strange peace where every day there are more and more deadly victims of the tribal wars. Two weeks after the United Nations had withdrawn its peacekeepers from the Darfur region in January 2021 after 13 years, the fighting between local tribes in Al Geneina District, West Darfur, left 84 people dead and 160 wounded. A couple of days later the death toll have reached 129 people, including women and children. The residence of the provincial Governor of West Darfur was under an attempted attack by unidentified gunmen. By the end of January, the UN refugee agency revealed that since the outbreak of tribal clashes in Darfur in January, at least 250 people have lost their lives. Three humanitarian workers were also killed. More than 100,000 people, mostly women and children have been displaced, fleeing into the neighboring Chad. The United Nations urged the Sudanese government to see to the de-escalation of violence in West Darfur and safeguard civilian lives. The government put a curfew in place and announced a state of emergency in Sudan’s West Darfur region. In spite of that, in April, fresh tribal clashes erupted in El Geneina, which led to the death of at least 40 people and about 58 people were injured. The decision to declare a state of emergency in the region and to deploy security forces to the region was welcomed by the UN who urged the government to hold all perpetrators of the violence responsible, to ensure the protection of humanitarian organizations and to provide services to the victims of the violence. Though Sudan’s government-initiated talks with the Arab Rizeigat and the non-Arab Masalit tribes, some groups expressed their refusal to accept the result of the mediation. In June, clashes between the Arab Taisha and ethnic African Fallata tribes in South Darfur claimed the lives of 40 people, with 37 others wounded. The clash erupted as a result of a land dispute between the two conflicting parties. This is the balance of the first six months of 2021, only.

Dr. János Besenyo is former colonel of the Hungarian Defense Forces and practical peacekeeper, later leader of the Military Staff’s Scientific Research Center. After finishing his military career, he has devoted himself to scientific work. Today he is associated professor and

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<sup>1</sup> Besenyo, János, *Darfur Peacekeepers - The African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (AMIS) from the perspective of a Hungarian military advisor*. L’Harmattan, France, Paris, 2021. ISBN 978-2-343-23696-4, pp. 230. EUR 29.

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leader of the Africa Research Institute at the Óbuda University. He participated in several peacekeeping missions in different positions, e.g., in the MINURSO mission in Western Sahara.<sup>3</sup> He served six months in Darfur in the most dangerous period of this region as a logistics consultant delegated by the European Union to the AMIS peacekeeping mission. In his new book published in English by L'Harmattan, Paris he presents the background to the events in Darfur, his own experiences and points out certain contexts that make the conflict easier to understand even for those who do not deal deeper with happenings on the African continent. He describes the region, then the conflict, the parties involved and the African Union (AU) peace operation, as well as the Hungarian experience gained there. He gives a literally multidisciplinary study into the reader's hands.

In his preface the Author states that he aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the Darfur crisis and genocide and the African Union's attempts to combat the crisis in order to refresh the international interest. Regrettably the Darfur conflict slid back into international obscurity in the last 10 years despite ongoing violence against civilians and the continued risk of conflict escalation. The described mission was not simply a multinational operation, but an engagement on the basis of cooperation between several international organizations. Hungary's involvement in the mission was difficult due to a combination of factors, including the specificities of international and European Union crisis management, as well as of the situation in Hungary. The African Union (newly established in 2001), the European Union, and the NATO – including forces from the US, Great Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden - were involved in the operation following the UN's call on the basis of UN resolutions and UN support. Hungary that had no previous experience in the region participated in the operation under the umbrella of the EU. Also humanitarian and other organizations participated in the mission however their presence imposed a greater task on the leading organizations because of the security situation than the benefits of their activities were. This type of coordination and integrated crisis management, including the unified chain of command and communications, as well as the unified logistics and civil-military coordination represented a major challenge. The EU's engagement was providing assistance in building up the construction and operational capacity of the African Union and establishing a framework for cooperation and organizing the first joint crisis management operation.

In the first chapter the reader receives a detailed picture on geography, history, infrastructure, economy, ethnic, social and cultural stratification of Darfur, this western region of Sudan with a territory of almost 1,900,000 km<sup>2</sup> bordered by South Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Libya. Its population of 7.4 million is divided in 12 language communities, and respectively ethnic groups. In its poorly documented history Darfur belonged to different multiethnic states. Due to the political instability and conflicts little is known about its early

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<sup>3</sup> More on his experience in Western Sahara: Besenyő, János: Magyarország és a nyugat-szaharai válság, [Hungary and the crisis in Weester-Sahara], Budapest, publ. by Monarchia Kiadó, 2020 (ISBN: 978-615-80864-1-7). To the topic of the Hungarian peacekeeping missions in Africa see: Besenyő, János: Participation of Hungary in African Operations between 1989-2019, Óbuda University, Doctoral School for Safety and Security Sciences, Budapest, 2019. (ISBN: 978-963-449-121-7)



history. In the period 1600 to 1916 Darfur functioned as a sovereign territory independently from the states established in the Nile Valley but in 1916 it was forced to integrate into Sudan and consequently became part of the British colonial empire. In 1956 Sudan became independent and Darfur received partial autonomy. The central government initiated only minimal developments in the region and eliminated Darfur's partial autonomy in 1972. At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s as a side-effect of the civil war in Chad, more and more firearms were taken into Darfur and low-intensity violence increased significantly between the ethnic groups, particularly between the native tribes and the Arab population who settled down in Darfur between 1960-1980, only, as a result of the civil war in Chad. The desertification made the major part of North-Darfur uninhabitable and resulted in mass emigration. The natives' weight continued to decline. Moreover, pogroms by Janjaweed, the so-called self-defense military units of Arab volunteers were initiated against the natives with the support of the government that recruited specifically among the local and rootless Arab nomads. These actions against civilians obviously aimed for expulsion of the native black population.

Finally, it led to the insurgency of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit ethnics against the Khartoum regime in February 2003. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLMA) and its ally, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) considered themselves the representatives of the Darfurian population's majority. The government has responded with military strikes. The Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed units burned down and destroyed hundreds of villages, causing the death of tens of thousands of citizens, chased away millions of people and systematically raped thousands of women and girls. The US Congress has named these events genocide. A congressman visited the region and reported that Khartoum supports the Arab militias. An EU civilian and military expert mission visited the region in August 2004 and came to similar findings. US Secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in Khartoum on 30 June 2004, where discussions were held with Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also became involved in the consultations. The Americans threatened with embargo measures if Khartoum did not bring the Janjaweed under control. With the help of the African Union, the UN, the EU and the US, negotiations were held in Addis Ababa. Finally the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government signed a cease-fire agreement. The agreement was supervised by the African Union with the support of the USA and the EU. The agreement allowed the deployment of military observers to Darfur. This is how AMIS, i.e. the African Mission in Sudan started its operation.

The ceasefire agreement was violated from the beginning, giving continuous tasks to the observers. The work of the AMIS was extraordinarily difficult, the establishment of its camps was exceedingly slow, the African unit had no unified leadership, no adequate equipment and weapons, no unified communication system, and the internet did not operate properly. Albeit the African peacekeepers were unable to prevent the spread of violence, the AU wanted to get greater international support for the AMIS. The EU sent eight and the United States sent five advisors to Darfur but the role, the activity and the review of the work of the foreign consultants significantly differed from each other. It became obvious very soon that the few



dozens of observers and the few companies of their security units were unable to provide efficient work at the vast expanse of territory. In October 2004, the Military Staff Committee of the AU Peace and Security Council finalized the plan on the enlargement of the peacekeeping mission with a one-year mandate, the costs of which were USD 221 million. This covered the activities of the personnel of 3320: 2,341 soldiers, 815 police officers, 132 civilians as well as 32 other employees. The plans were grandiose, but the implementation had been less successful. A newer plan (AMIS II) would have increased the personnel to approximately 4,000 people until the beginning of 2005, but this did not come true. In May 2005 only 2,100 peacekeepers stayed in Darfur. Despite the extension of the AMIS mission, it was not able to guarantee the protection of the civilian population terrorized by the Sudanese army, the Janjaweed groups, various insurgent units, and also by other armed criminal gangs. As a reaction to the lack of success the mission AMIS III with its extended mandate to 20 December 2005 was designated to implement the tasks given to its predecessors. Also Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and Norway as well as Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal sent larger units to Ruanda. The soldiers settled in 34 camps, the number of police stations was 65. For a while the extension of the mission had a positive impact on the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. Humanitarian organizations began to return, refugees got aid, former epidemics disappeared but beyond other difficulties the Sudanese government posed continuous bureaucratic obstacles, and hampered the activities of the peacekeepers where it could. In some areas AMIS was yet unable to guarantee the safe operation of humanitarian organizations. The Africans significantly reduced the number of patrols and the soldiers became even more passive when for more than three months they did not receive a salary. The UN Security Council Resolution No. 1769 adopted on July 31, 2007 made a decision about starting a joint international mission together with the African Union called UNAMID (United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur) in order to maintain the achievements of 2004. Following the new and new requests by the AU to give more support and to send more and more professionals, the EU invested astronomic amounts into the support of the Darfur peacekeeping mission through the ATHENA mechanism and coordinated the activities of the European advisors. The strategic logistical tasks were coordinated and carried out by the NATO as it had the proper capacities and experiences in this field.

The participation of Europeans in the mission encountered a number of difficulties. European observers were not prepared for the conditions in Darfur, so they had to learn everything on the spot. Logistics supplies followed the deployment of observers only with a long delay, which meant that peacekeepers could not perform many tasks or only later than planned. They did not have the right equipment, they did not have enough vehicles, they were not fed enough, the patrols could not even communicate with each other. Outdated maps were given to patrols, so they got lost several times. In this chaos, it seemed a miracle that the camp was completed by the end of October, designed to accommodate and serve 70 people, but had to provide for than a hundred people on a daily basis. The lack of water was a problem. Due to insufficient water supply, compliance with hygiene regulations was inadequate. Clashes between government forces and rebels were common, and even peacekeepers were

often targeted by various armed groups who fired on AMIS camps and attacked patrols several times. In the first period the observers had neither adequate accommodation nor an office. They lived in a large tent where more than forty officers and non-commissioned officers were housed. Cultural and hygienic differences and political contradictions between the residents of the tent became quickly clear. For example, Rwandan officers categorically refused to live in a tent with Nigerian officers.

By 2004 Hungary sent one advisor to Darfur and contributed with an amount of EUR 95,000 and with high value medical equipment to the solution of the Darfur conflict. Shortly after the withdrawal of the first Hungarian observer, the Hungarian Army had to find an officer with a degree in logistics and African experience. This is how the Author landed in the mission. He arrived in Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the AU, on June 29, 2005. Although Hungary left the mission at the end of December of the same year, in order to focus more on its mission in Congo, this short period was enough for the Author to get a deep insight into the structure and work of the peacekeeping forces, and to document all relevant occurrences. János Besenyő's book is characterized by extreme accuracy, rich data and a very critical approach. The reader can learn about the strengths and weaknesses, structure, organization, territorial distribution and responsibilities of peacekeepers in Darfur.

The Author sadly states in his conclusion that the Darfur operation didn't bring a general and sufficient political solution and the security situation has only improved a little. The operation was increasingly losing the credence of locals. Due to the precarious situation and the weak mandate, the peacekeepers' activity was not very effective, and the understaffed mission was almost invisible. By the beginning of 2006, it became clear that the mission faced serious challenges having a negative impact on operational capability. The opposing sides could not agree at all, so chaos became steady and terror and massacres kept spreading in Darfur. The AU's and the world's three-year peace strategy failed. At this point, most African leaders were aware that, in Darfur, they were unable to handle "African problems with African methods" in Darfur.

According to the author, it is regrettable that the experience in Darfur was not discussed in Hungary at a systemic level. This was mainly because Hungary did not have a coherent Africa policy at that time, even though Hungarian foreign policy started to increasingly prioritize the continent. It would be necessary to thoroughly reflect on the Hungarian experience in African peace-keeping operations to date and capitalize on it not only in military but also government, economic and other circles.

The book is mainly recommended for military professionals, especially those preparing for peace missions. But the book is also suitable as an educational material for higher military and police institutions and civilian universities too.



## A review of: “Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria” by Adam Mayer<sup>1</sup>

Attila Pongácz<sup>2</sup>

Adam Mayer’s volume (Mayer 2016), a well-considered Cold War history of Nigeria’s radical left as well as a history of political theory and labour organization, grew out of its context of Hungarian African studies in an organic way. Nigeria, especially in comparison with Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Mali, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Congo Republic, Benin, Burkina Faso, or Madagascar, is a relatively lesser-known theatre of Africa’s Cold War history. Never a people’s republic, always firmly on the side of the Anglo-Saxon powers, Nigeria seems to embody the capitalist ethos in a West African – or pan-African – context and comparison. Mayer, through meticulous research of out-of-print, hard-to-reach theoretical and historiographic material as well as interviews and archival sources, uncovers here a forgotten aspect to Nigeria’s Cold War history.

My review is less concerned, however, with what this excellent volume does to the history of ideas in a West African context (however interesting that question is – as others had written on these aspects before me). What I would focus on here is the way Mayer’s work is an outgrowth of Hungary’s African Studies, a discipline that, compared to other regions of the Third World (such as Latin-America), was in a somewhat marginal position during the Cold War and beyond.

The Warsaw Pact operated in a peculiar way in the Third World: the European people’s republics had regions in which they augmented the USSR’s foreign policy roles, and had embassies and trade offices, and others where they were absent almost completely. Hungary focused on Arab North Africa in this kind of specialization. Sub-Saharan Africa was more a focus for Czechoslovakia and for the GDR, along with the USSR of course. This also had direct repercussions in terms of the status and relative importance of disciplines that studied these regions. In Hungary, African liberation movements – and socialist tendencies – were a topic confined to media and had an almost exclusively political relevance. In that context, this relevance was perceived as real. To illustrate this point, we must make mention of the fact that András Sugár, the star of 1970s and 1980s political journalism and broadcasting in Hungary, wrote books on Angola where he travelled regularly to interview the fighters (Sugár, 1978). A real ‘Area Studies’ focus (with a left-leaning bent but going beyond mere journalistic propaganda) was practiced by Mihály Benkes in these decades and after 1989 (an example is

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<sup>1</sup> Mayer, Adam, *Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria*. London: Pluto Press, 2016. ISBN: 978-0-745336-62-6. pp. 256. GBP 85.

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Benkes, 2006). Benkes calls his sub-discipline „politikai afrikanisztika” (Political African Studies), a confluence of Political Studies and Africanist Area Studies.

Mayer drew on Benkes, György Kalmár, and others, when reconstructing the picture of 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s Communist theory and agitation in Nigeria, but for the Anglophone public (Benkes had focused on Francophonic Africa, and especially the Congo/Zaire).

Mayer’s volume (and subsequent article output: Mayer, 2018; Mayer, 2020; Mayer, 2021) had been strengthened by the recent resurgence of Africa Research Institute Studies in Óbuda (where the Africa Research Institute is located) and Győr (where a new African Studies major is being created newly in 2021 around the doyen of Hungarian African Studies, Gábor Búr (Búr, 1988) and also Júlia Szőke, János Besenyő, and him). At Óbuda University, Doctoral School on Safety and Security Studies – and also a Humanitarian Management MA – is attracting talent in the field of African Area Studies today. The Africa Research Institute’s founder, Dr. habil János Besenyő, also founded the very journal which hosts this review. Besenyő’s role as blue beret officer in Africa (Darfur, Western Sahara) allowed him to come out with extremely strong, field-centred analysis on these theatres of conflict (Besenyő, 2017; Besenyő, 2020; Besenyő, 2021). Besenyő and Mayer have cooperated on research, as in the case of the extremely pertinent article on Boko Haram’s early years (where Mayer was stationed as a young instructor at the American University of Nigeria, Yola) (Besenyő and Mayer, 2015). These works are signs that practical field experiences, as well as cutting edge research on Africa’s own social science, is enriching Hungarian African Studies in 2021 – the field is already strong due to the efforts of István Tarrósy in Pécs (Tarrósy, 2017).

These positive developments take place in the context of the Hungarian government’s Southward Opening initiative (since 2015) that seeks for economic and other opportunities and roles that can widen Hungary’s outreach and international presence. Research that goes beyond immediate economic concerns (such as research on Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Peace Studies as well as Security, National Security, and realist and neo-realist IR) is as necessary as research that is enriched by increased awareness of Africa’s own, home-grown social science (beyond the application of Northern theory).

Mayer’s historical account, *Naija Marxisms*, thus grows out of Hungarian as well as African historical experiences and schools of historiography. This prevents Mayer from looking at African Marxist fighters with rose tinted glasses. He finds orthodox Marxist-Leninists as well as Social Democrats, Maoists, and even hippie style communes amongst them, showing us that Nigeria in the 1970s was a very fashionable place (even if occasionally misguided in its fashions).

Today, when Africa as a field of FDI and also economic growth is receiving more and more attention, it is reassuring to see that Hungarian African Studies scholars are at the forefront of breaking new ground in research on the continent’s 20th century history.



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