Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

Africa Research Institute

Dear Readers,

Dear Fellow Scholars,

This is the last issue of the first volume of the new-founded journal of the Africa Research Institute at the Doctoral School of Security Sciences, University of Óbuda. Articles and reviews published in the *Journal of Central and Eastern European Studies* over the past year have highlighted Africa's many and varied faces, challenges, or developments. Authors have submitted numerous excellent articles from all over the world. This issue also contains articles from researchers in a truly diverse range of topics and areas.

The first part of the articles deals with security cases. Joseph Makanda examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the largest social problems in recent years, on the perspective of refugee women in South Africa. László Pálfi also presents a South African phenomenon in the field of security science; he is analysing the privatisation of security services. Security is the main theme of Attila Gulyás's writing on security developments in Nigeria. The papers of Attila Zsitnyányi, Tibor Babos and Jordán Petrőcz highlight a topic from the field of military industry.

The other section of articles focuses on social studies. Zsolt Szabó and Asnake A. Chanie analyse two different crises, in Darfur, Sudan and Tigray, Ethiopia. The next two papers examine two special fields; Chongo Terun Dese introduces the aspects of Muridism in Senegal, János Besenyő and Tibor Fülöp detail a historical cartographic study.

To all our Authors and Reviewers in 2021, and to all of those who helped our work to publish the first volume of JCEEAS, I would like to thank you on behalf of the Editorial Board!

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Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

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COVID-19 Social Protection and Exclusion Nexus

Narratives of Women Refugees in Durban, South Africa

Joseph Makanda[1]

Abstract:

Globally, most governments have come up with COVID-19 social relief and protection measures to render expedient and effective assistance to vulnerable populations, ranging from nationals to foreigners. This study utilizes narratives of 15 refugee women and 5 South African women to interrogate whether the South African national COVID-19 social protection and relief policies (such as wage subsidies, social grants and unemployment benefits) have been inclusive. While the South African government has made efforts to meet the obligation of its Refugee Act 130 of 1998, the views of participants reveal that the government's COVID-19 response policies have been prejudiced into excluding and vilifying refugees and asylum seekers based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners. This has increased migrants' vulnerability to poverty and social disintegration. The study warns that by giving sub-optimal attention to the plight of migrants with regards to combating the COVID-19 pandemic, the South African government risks exacerbating devastating impacts of COVID-19 to both refugees and South Africans alike.

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Introduction

Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa has made significant progress in ensuring that all its citizen meet their basic needs. However, Okoi and Bwawa (2020) contend that the current impacts of corona virus pandemic (COVID-19) have exposed how the country continues to be dogged by stark inequalities, especially access to basic needs among majority of its black population. Similarly, Finn and Kobayashi (2020) argue that the lack of access to basic needs by majority of the black population as a result of COVID-19 has made it not to be ruled out that in modern-day South Africa locals' experience of unemployment and poverty still very much depends on where they are born, how wealthy they are, and the colour of their skin. As South Africa continues to grapple with the devastating impacts of COVID-19, an influx of migrants, especially those from the African continent remains a thorny issue the country is struggling with. Musoni (2020) and Makanda (2021) say that South Africa attracts African migrants because it is one of the most developed African countries with better migration, refugee and asylum seeking policies in the continent. For instance, in South Africa, refugees do not live in camps, are allowed to work, study and do business in any part of the country. This is contrary to countries like Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania where refugees still live in camps or demarcated areas (Loescher 2014). Still, South Africa is one of the countries in the continent with an inclusive Refugees Act (130 of 1998) meant to protect and uphold the rights of forced migrants such as refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons. According to Kleinsmidt and Manicom (2010), the Refugees Act 130 guarantees refugees and asylum seekers entitlement to services such as healthcare, education, employment, legal protection, and housing. The Refugees Act also stipulates that refugees and asylum seekers should integrate and reside within and amongst locals anywhere in the country. In this study, refugees and asylum seekers refers to persons who have been forcibly displaced due to persecution or conflict, human rights violations, environmental and political upheavals in their countries of origin (Republic of South Africa, 1998).

South Africa reported its first confirmed case of COVID-19 on 5 March 2020. Three weeks later, President Cyril Ramaphosa declared a national state of disaster starting on the 15th of March, and a week later, the national lockdown was enacted from 27 March 2020 (Le Grange, 2020) to combat the spread of the virus. In its attempt to address the impacts of COVID-19, like other countries, authorities in South Africa put in place a national lockdown that involved the closure of public places and the country's borders, social distancing, stay home except for emergencies and banning of public transport. Authorities also instituted several public health measures such as washing hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds (especially after being in public places, or after blowing or sneezing and coughing), using hand sanitizers (containing 60% alcohol) and to avoiding touching of eyes, nose, and mouth with unwashed hands (Department of Health, 2020). Further measures were mandatory quarantine of suspected cases and people with recent travel history. While the foregoing measures were broadly thought

to be effective against the pandemic, they carried some risks particularly for vulnerable groups such as the poor, sick, refugees and asylum seekers. The COVID-19 pandemic has been seen to magnify pre-pandemic issues for various groups including women, minorities and refugees, as such, these ameliorative attempts can easily intensify discrimination, stigma, poverty, unemployment and gender-based violence for the same. It is because of the foregoing reasons that the African Union, in particular, is concerned that lockdown restrictions in many African countries were going to make it difficult and further exclude vulnerable populations such as refugees and internally displaced persons in accessing attendant human rights protected in the international law (Wadvalla, 2020).

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants worked mostly in the informal sector in the main cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban (Makanda, 2021). Still, Mulu and Mbanza (2021) note that most of these migrants live in inadequate accommodation facilities, crowded, without access to water, sanitation and hygiene facilities for good hand washing and practices that reduce transmission and exposure to the COVID-19.

As pack of instituting a nationwide lockdown, the South African government introduced a generous R500 billion economic relief package aimed at supplementing the existent social safety nets and buffering the economic sector from the impending effects of COVID-19. This included a 6-month temporary top up for all existing social grants and a new grant—COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress—which targeted those who were vulnerable, unemployed and were not previously receiving other forms of government assistance (de Villers, 2020). Like other South Africans who work in the informal sector, refugees and asylum seekers were among the first to lose their employment and source of incomes. Although most locals who lost their jobs were able to access the mentioned government relief services, Jain et al. (2020) noted that many refugees and asylum seekers were initially excluded. As a result, the impact of lockdown restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic has hindered migrants' capacity to eke a living. Currently, the government is in the processes of vaccinating all people who live in South Africa against COVID-19. However due to lack of proper communication from authorities, according to Oxford Analytica (2021), there is fear that most refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants may not come forward due to fear of detention or deportation. This may become a health risk and thwart the government's efforts of curbing the spread of COVID-19.

To this end, this study utilises social exclusion theory to empirically critique access to the South African government COVID-19 social relief and protection services such as wage subsidies, unemployment benefits or social security and social protection measures by refugees and asylum seekers. To do that, the study investigates the narratives of twenty (20) women from Durban, South Africa (15 migrants and 5 South Africans). The main aim of the study is to unpack how migrants' access, or lack of, to

government COVID-19 relief policies in South Africa has exacerbated the exclusion of those whom they are supposed to protect because they are perceived as "foreigners or outsiders".

Social Exclusion Framework

French policymakers, René Lenoir and Jacques Delors, were among the first scholars to coin and systematically develop the concept of social exclusion in the 1970s as a paradigm of explaining social relations and institutions that prevents one group of individuals from full access to various rights, opportunities and resources in a particular society (Abrahamson, 1995; Silver, 2019). Saunders (2015) say that the concept's central referents can be traced to several political philosophies that were and are still influential in Europe, in particular, French Republicanism, social Catholicism, and social democracy. From the French Republicanism, social exclusion has been associated with the way the French population was not protected by social security and thus constituted an excluded class. In Britain, Levitas (2004) say that social exclusion emerged after a 1979 publication by Peter Townsend on the prevalence of poverty in the United Kingdom. Townsend had argued that in the United Kingdom poverty was a relative term arrived at after a comparative analysis of certain factors. These factors were the resources of one family, compared to those commanded by the average family unit living in the same setting. Such a comparison helped to ascertain whether those individuals were excluded from the ordinary living patterns, customs, and activities respective to their context (Townsend, 1979). During 1980s and 1990, social exclusion and poverty gradually became interrelated and closely associated within a framework that identified poverty as part of a wider pattern of social inequality in the UK (Levitas, 2004).

More recently, social exclusion has been used in Latin America as an extension of the studies of "marginalization" (Galabuzi, 2004). Consequently, social exclusion has become a guiding framework on a wide range of research on deprivation and inequalities in the global South. For instance, Silver (2007) says that social exclusion has become a paradigm of analysing multidimensional processes of progressive social rupture that detaches one group or groups and individuals from social relations and institutions. These detachments prevent one/groups from full participation in the normatively prescribed activities of the society in which they live. In this regard, social exclusion exists in three primary dimensions; i) disengagement (a lack of participation in social and community activities), ii) service exclusion (unable to access key services), and iii) economic exclusion (restricted access to employment, economic resources and a capacity to derive an income).

There are two major devastating impacts of social exclusion. Firstly, exclusion of one or more group/s of persons in a particular society affects their quality of life and the general equity and cohesion of society as a whole. Secondly, social exclusion causes the

unobtainability of not only political participation but also representation. Within a specific context, it can be argued that social exclusion not only encroaches upon the demand for social justice, but it also reduces social solidarity. This means that the absence of social solidarity is normatively negative because in its absence, the interests of the excluded are likely to be opposed and obscured in the interests of the included (who may or not usually be the majority).

From the preceding paragraphs, social exclusion is a paradigm that is designed to highlight the role of both institutional structures and community attitudes in creating barriers that lead to exclusion and denial of social and constitutional rights to a particular group of people within the same state/society. Some of the key tenets of social exclusion are redistributive state policies and the strength of familial, group, and social ties and obligations. As a theoretical framework, social exclusion is concerned with explaining social ills not as clearly delimited social problems, but as part of the most fundamental social relations—that of belonging or not belonging to one's society. Accordingly, social exclusion underscores that rupture within any social bond leading to social ills such as abandonment, segregation, assistance, marginalization, and discrimination. Hence, social exclusion paradigm is concerned mainly with identifying the constituent elements of a particular policy that may proffer exclusion of an individual or groups of people within a particular society. For instance, in one policy, some people can only be excluded or included relative to others. Still, social exclusion can be said to be a framework of analysing the tendency of policy makers whose focus is mainly on those who are "excluded" to the relative neglect of the "included."

In relation to this study, South Africa has one of the most progressive constitutions and an enabling migration policy (Refugees Act 130) in the world. As a result, the country continues to attract an influx of migrants popularly known as "foreign nationals". When South African authorities instituted the countrywide lockdown in a bid to reduce the spread of COVID-19, like in other countries, these efforts disproportionately affected those sections of society reliant on the informal market, most of whom are foreign nationals (illegal immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers). These groups, including many South Africans, mostly depend on the informal economic activities, such as tailoring, hairdressing, trading in precious and scrap metals, and vending food and second-hand clothes (Makanda, 2021). As such, the South African government lockdown directives, and the constituent stimulus package, while aiding the informal sector, only targeted South African-owned activities and citizens (Republic of South Africa, 2020), leaving foreign nationals in the same sector vulnerable to the negative impacts of lockdown. Countrywide lockdown was perceived as a general problem in most low-income countries. However, given the high rate of unemployment in South Africa, where locals also struggle to eke a living, the situation is worse for refugees and asylum seekers who lack contingency livelihoods and social support networks that can serve as shock absorbers and coping resources (Mukumbang, Ambe and Adebiyi, 2020). Still, lockdown

has further aggravated the negative effects of COVID-19 on social support networks for forced migrants in South Africa. For instance, it is argued that unlike their South African counterparts, refugees and asylum seekers who lost their livelihoods due to COVID-19 lockdown restrictions are yet to gain access to government's COVID-19 relief and protection services. Hence, the focus of this study is on the implementation of the COVID-19 response policies by the South African government and the question of barriers that lead to the exclusion and the denial of the social and constitutional rights to refugees and asylum seekers.

Methodology

Data was collected from 20 women participants – 15 refugee women and 5 South African women. Women were selected for this study as they compose the majority of the global refugee and asylum population. According to the World Bank Report (2019), women and children form over 60 percent of the global refugee population. All the participants interviewed had been employed in the informal sector, for example as childminders, hairdressers, nail technicians, or car guards, jobs that were already precarious and open to exploitation pre-COVID-19. With the start of the lockdown their workplaces were closed, resulting in loss of jobs and income. One rebuttal that can be raised against this study is that 20 participants cannot be generalised to represent all the views of women refugees and asylum seekers in Durban or entire South Africa. However, given the narrative nature of this study, it is hoped that the views of participants gave a glimpse of the thinking of refugees and asylum seekers on the topic under investigation. Thus, the sample chosen is hoped to have yielded the required empirical data that can fill in the gaps and to a scarce body of knowledge on the impact of COVID-19 policy responses and the question of exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers. Among the participants, there were 7 Burundians, 5 Congolese, 3 Eritreans and 5 South African women. While the study's main target were women refugees and asylum seekers, it was important to include South African participants so as to determine whether or not the implementation of COVID-19 policy responses impacted more on migrants than their local counterparts or vice versa. In addition, refugee participants' diverse origin presented a higher probability for independent individual responses to the interview questions. All migrant participants interviewed were documented and had rights to work, live and access to social protection from the South African state as stipulated in Refugees Act 130 of 1998.

Durban was chosen for this study due its proximity to the researcher; it was cheaper and an easier and interesting case for investigating the views of participants. Still, the city of Durban is also known for its growing population of migrants from different countries, especially African migrants from Malawi, Nigeria, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and Democratic Republic of Congo among others. Oni (2018) says that in South Africa,

migrants prefer to congregate within major cities and towns such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.

Participants were purposively sampled taking note of their country of origin and migration status (15 women refugees and 5 South African women) in South Africa. The interview-guiding questions were elaborated in English and translated into most migrant participants' languages. This is because not all 15 migrants were able to speak English. The semi-structured interviews included questions on:

i.   The impacts of COVID-19 lockdown restriction to participants well-being
ii. Access to government's COVID-19 social relief and protection services.
iii. Different ways participants felt included/excluded
iv. COVID-19 relief services, its implication to their livelihood

Prior to interviews, all participants were informed of the purpose of the study and granted their willingness to participate and permission to be audio recorded. It is also important to note that the study was conducted upon the issuance of an ethical clearance certificate by the University of Johannesburg and after the consent of participants. All names used in the study are pseudonyms to protect participants' identity and for confidentiality. Interviews were later translated into English, transcribed and analysed and presented as themes.

Results

Lack of information on national response plans

Limited access to information with regards to COVID-19 and government response plans was acknowledged as one of the major components of the nationwide lockdown among most narratives of migrant participants. Most participants argued that limited access to information due to the language barrier exacerbated their risk to COVID-19. Specifically, all the 15 migrants interviewed specified that most information about COVID-19 was communicated in English and other South African languages, which they struggled to understand. For example, Shosho (40 years old Burundian) said:

> I arrived in South Africa in January 2020. I only understand Swahili, Kirundi and some French. I am poor in English and I can't understand any other South African language. Because I don't know English, I do not know what to do during this COVID-19 times.

Shosho's views reveals how most refugees and asylum seekers speak other languages (such as French, Swahili, and Arabic among others) other than those spoken in South Africa. As such, this limits their comprehension of the governmental directives, public health messages as well as information, education and communication messages.

Another participant Jugu (32 yrs old Eritrean) said:

> It is a pity that due to COVID-19 lockdown, we do not have interpreters to help us who are still learning English.

Bobo (43 yrs Congolese) added:

> There was a humanitarian organisation that used to help us with languages. But now since their staff cannot move easily because of lockdown, I do not understand what they…meaning government…. are saying about COVID-19.

On the contrary, all 5 South African participants said they could understand all communication from the government especially on COVID-19 social grant among other social relief services that were available. For instance, Pretty (34 yrs South African) said;

> I am well informed on what to do in case I come in contact with COVID-19 or if I feel "fluish". I also know where to go if I am to get my COVID-19 grant.

Linking COVID-19 to the question of exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers, the views of Shosho, Jugu and Bobo reveal that refugees' right to information concerning prevention and protection from pandemics and disasters is curtailed by language and communication barriers. Moreover, South Africa's strategic response to the pandemic is based on self-reporting based on the occurrence of symptoms (Department of Health, 2020). This is challenging for migrant participants as they seemed frightened of approaching health providers and local authorities due limited knowledge of English and other local languages. For instance, Faustina (28 yrs Congolese) narrated how she felt extremely sick during lockdown but could not go to the nearest government hospital because she did not know how to explain to the doctor.

The fact that most migrant participants interviewed do not understand English and the major South African local languages means that they did not get first-hand and timely information about COVID-19 and national response plans that were announced by the president on monthly basis. This is purported to have exposed them to the risk of getting inaccurate information regarding COVID-19 from peers and other secondary networks. It also might have excluded them from the on-going efforts to prevent and control the pandemic. Yet, as argued by the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2020), lack of culturally and linguistically accessible information and services related to COVID-19 may increase risks of contracting and spreading the virus among vulnerable populations.

Local Authorities and Isolation of Migrants

Migrant participants narrated how in most cases they felt isolated and stigmatized by police, health personnel and other local authorities. This is similar to the findings of the United Nations (2020) that the COVID-19 pandemic had increased social stigma and social isolation of migrants, especially refugees and asylum seekers in African and Asian worlds. Research indicates that stigma limits compliance with established control measures, health-seeking, and access to services and may lead to further spread of COVID-19 (Manderson and Levine, 2020: 4). For instance, Aweje (26 yrs Burundian) said:

> I met this policeman who told me that I must not walk around spreading COVID that I came with from Africa, meaning my home country. I felt so ashamed of being in this country.

Furthermore, Lolo (32 yrs Congolese) narrated how some of her foreign colleagues were being arrested falsely for breaking COVID-19 protocols and for minor offenses during the lockdown. According to Lolo, most foreigners in her area were being denied bail unless they bribed the police. What can be said here is that the COVID-19 lockdown has also exposed how the South Africa's progressive legislative systems continues to be dogged by stark inequalities in legalising and recognizing the rights of forced migrants.

In relation to access to health care, Miche (36 yrs Eritrean) narrated:

> One day I went to a private clinic along the street. The doctor was wearing just a mask while attending to South Africans. When my turn came to consult him, he wore protective apron all over his body and a face shield. I felt very bad. It was as if I am the one who was spreading COVID.

Asked on whether she has visited a clinic or a health facility during COVID-19 lockdown, Sane (24 yrs South African) said, "yes, I have visited the nearest clinic twice and I was attended to without any problem."

The views of Aweje and Miche reveal how during lockdown in South Africa COVID-19 was perceived as "imported": coming from foreigners and authorities are suspicious of foreigners including refugees. What this means is that refugees and asylum seekers are among those perceived as potential carriers or transmitters of COVID-19. Hence, they risk being discriminated and stigmatized against by the local people and authorities (such as police, community leaders and health workers). This is regardless of reports by the government stressing that refugees and asylum seekers who are already in South Africa would receive the support and solidarity consistent with the Department of Health directives.

Migrants Access to Social Services

Most participants in this study rely heavily on social services that are provided by humanitarian and civil society organisations. Hence, another pertinent issue revealed at the time when this study was being conducted is that the nationwide lockdown in South Africa had reduced access to services (such as reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health interventions and psychosocial support services) provided by several humanitarian and civil society organisations. For instance, Buru (a 29 yrs Burundian) argued that she was relying on one humanitarian organisation for food and medicine. Buru said;

> Am an asylum. Am in the process of acquiring my refugee papers. Ever since I came here, one organisation has been providing me with food parcels and when I am sick, I could collect medicine from their offices. Now that there is a lockdown, I am struggling to get food and medicine since their offices are closed.

Buru's view reveals how humanitarian and civil society organisations still play a pivotal role in the providing livelihood to refugees and asylum seekers. However, from Buru's view, it is evident that during the nationwide lockdown, migrants' humanitarian and civil society organisations were not classified as essential service providers. Still, from Buru's view, it can be argued that the personnel working for most migrants' humanitarian and civil society organisations were not accorded special travel permits. Consequently, the closure of public transport posed an enormous challenge for humanitarian workers, who faced increasing travel restrictions.

While it is essential for the government to put in measures to reduce exposure and prevent the spread of the COVID-19, not classifying migrants' humanitarian and civil society organisations as essential service providers is problematic for most vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers such as women and children who have limited options in South Africa. Moreover, refugees, including adolescents, children, pregnant women and those with chronic illnesses, such as those living with HIV and AIDS, are at risk of reduced access to medicines and care. Although the government had put in place the capacity of frontline workers such as health care staff and other social care workers (such as social workers) to understand the specific needs of locals, closure of migrants' humanitarian and civil society organisation that could deliver appropriate protection to refugees was an exclusionary measure.

The COVID-19 Social protection/migrant exclusion nexus

South Africa has instituted social protection as an agenda for reducing vulnerability and risk of low-income households concerning basic consumption and services so as to address the impacts of COVID-19's lockdown in the country. The government adopted

various economic and hunger alleviation measures. Firstly, the government announced social grant of 350 South African rand (ZAR), food support/distribution to the vulnerable populations, unemployed including those who lost their jobs as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic for a period of 6 months from May to November 2020. Secondly, the South African government increased the value of the child and social support grants until October 2020. Thirdly, the country began to provide tax subsidies for small businesses and individuals and lowering contributions to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF).

While the South African government is to be lauded for providing social relief to those most vulnerable to the impacts of COVID-19 lockdown, the 5 South African respondents argued that the 350 ZAR and food support/distribution they were being given by the government was not sufficient to meet their basic needs. Sthe says;

> What can one do with 350ZAR? I have four kids and this is too little. This government is not serious. They…meaning government…should just open the country so that I fend for myself.

While Sthe complained that the 350ZAR she was receiving was not enough, unfortunately, all 15 migrant participants were not able to access it. For example, all the 15 migrant participants faulted the targeting criteria for entitlement to the social grant of 350ZAR and food support/distribution to the vulnerable populations affected by COVID-19. It was narrated that the targeting criteria for entitlement to the social grant and food parcels did not explicitly target refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, all 15 migrant participants said that the ongoing food and financial distribution required people to present national identification cards, which refugees and asylum seekers do not have. For instance, Mulolo (28 yrs Burundian) says;

> I heard that the government was giving R350 as a relief grant for all those who are unemployed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, when I went to apply for it, I was asked for the green book South African ID even though I was carrying my refugee papers.

Ahinate (33 yrs Eritrean) added;

> I am a legal refugee in this country. My business had employed about 20 South Africans. I lost my business due to COVID-19. I tried to apply for tax subsidy for my business but I was told that it was only meant for South Africans not foreigners.

While the Refugee Act 130 of 1998 in South Africa guarantees forced migrants` entitlements to social protections just like locals, at this point, Ahinate's view reveal how the COVID-19 social relief and protection was only meant to benefit of South African citizens and not immigrants. All the 15 migrant participants were not benefiting from the COVID-19 food distribution, social grant and tax subsidy which is jeopardizing their wellbeing and coping capacities. Unlike refugees, all the 5 South African participants said

that they were able to access social protection, especially social assistance instituted by the government. What this means is that the COVID-19 lockdown restrictions have rendered refugees and asylum seekers and their families more vulnerable to lack of food and its associated consequences including starvation and malnutrition. It is also increasing refugees and asylum seekers' anxiety, stress, and psychosocial problems (United Nations, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, and 2020d). Instead of addressing their wellbeing, Mulolo and Ahinate's views show how COVID-19 response policies are driving refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa to abject poverty and misery.

At this point, this study argues that when the South African government announced the state of disaster in March 2020, both local and migrant who work in the informal sector were among the first to lose their sources of income and livelihood. As a result, the government came up with COVID-19 relief and social protection policy that was specifically tailored to assist vulnerable groups; poor locals, refugees and asylum seekers. At this point, it can be said that the government response was silent on the plight of refugees and asylum seekers. This is because foreigners, especially refugees and asylum were not able to access the available social relief and protection at the time when this study was being carried out. Inaccessibility to COVID-19 social relief and protection services by refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa reaffirms Abrahamson (1995) argument that social exclusion is a process of social disaffiliation, whereby a particular group is disfranchised from the publicly available social protections and social security.

Discussions and Implication of the Findings

The key desire of migrant participants in this study is an end to the practice of government exclusionary measures. Implicitly, all 15 participants expressed that while the South African government had made efforts to meet the obligation of Refugee Act 130 of 1998, the implementation of the current COVID-19 response policies have been prejudiced into excluding and vilifying them based on the perception that they are foreigners. Hence, while the effects of COVID-19 have affected South Africans and foreigners alike, it has increased migrants' vulnerability to poverty and social disintegration, isolation and stigmatized them in South Africa. Against this backdrop, it can be argued that the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that there still exists institutional structures and community attitudes that continue to create barriers that lead to exclusion and denial of social and constitutional rights to refugees and asylum seekers in the country. This is against the tenets of the South Africa's Refugees Act 130; that is meant to protect and uphold the rights of forced migrants such as refugees, asylum seekers and stateless person just like those of South Africans.

One important finding of the study is that when the South African government declared a national state of disaster on 15 March 2020 to combat the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), most scholars' concern was on the impact of government's policy responses, such as national lockdowns, on the economy of the country. Some scholars have acknowledged lockdown's efficacy in combating the spread of COVID-19 but argue that it has had devastating impacts on the economy and livelihoods. It has to be reiterated how scholars in the mainstream migration studies are still preoccupied with two main theoretical constellations; i) how South Africa is grappling with an increasing influx of migrants and, ii) various enactments of surviving and active livelihoods strategies by migrants in cities and townships in South Africa. As a result, few studies have empirically explored the issue of policy implementation and migrants' inclusion or exclusion in South Africa. For instance, it is easily argued that migrants are responsible for social ills that the country is experiencing. In this regard several scholars argue that competition for scarce socio-economic opportunities between locals and foreign nationals is the greatest challenge that South Africa must deal with (Marschall, 2017; Musoni, 2020; van der Walt and Whittaker 2020). In retrospect, the foregoing scholars argue that South African state need to come up with a proper migration policy if it is to address the issue of xenophobia caused by competition for scarce socio-economic services.

What has been moot are empirical studies on how the South African government COVID-19 containment policies could be socially excluding refugees and asylum seekers in the country. Here, what most migration scholars in South Africa have paid attention to is the theoretical speculation on how pandemics have led to the implementation of policies that socially exclude migrants in countries such as China and the US. Most of these theoretical studies have emphasized on migrants' need for both psychosocial and humanitarian help to cope with the impacts of COVID-19 lockdown (Mukumbang et al, 2020). While Refugees Act 130 allows refugees and asylum seekers to set up businesses, offer labour services for others, and move freely in different spaces in the country, at the time when this study was being conducted, there was dearth of empirical scholarship that was unravelling how government COVID-19 social protection policies were adversely leading to a multiplicity of risks and limiting refugees and asylum seekers' living opportunities in South Africa. As a result, despite its well-known humanitarian orientation, the findings of this study reveal that South Africa is joining a league of countries that are adopting structural anti-migrant policies that are excluding and internalizing the oppression and marginalization of refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons. Similar scenarios have been observed in the United States and India. It is also argued that anti-immigration legislation is probably one of the main driving forces behind the United Kingdom's election to leave the European Union.

This study also reveals other negative consequences emanating from social isolation and stigmatization of migrants; social exclusion's capacity to cause the unobtainability

of refugees and asylum seekers not participating and represented within the South African polity. For instance, when South Africa implemented hard countrywide lockdown, migrants' humanitarian and civil society organisations were not recognized as essential service providers. This limited migrants' representation in the country and made refugees and asylum seekers more vulnerable to the local authorities, especially the South African Police. For instance, Kolo (41 yrs Congolese) said:

> How was I going to see my brother who had been arrested for breaking COVID-19 regulations? The organisation that used to helping to bail foreigners who are arrested had closed its offices because of COVID-19. Police are mostly targeting us saying that we must not hover around. It is tough without organisations that help us. Does this mean that foreigners do not deserve to live in South Africa?

Kolo's views raise a serious cause for concern (in relation to the demands of the Refugee Act 130). This is because lack of migrants' representation during COVID-19 lockdown not only encroaches upon refugees and asylum seekers' rights but also reduces their demand for social justice and social solidarity. While Saunders (2013) and Jinnah (2017) concur that the absence of social solidarity is normatively negative, the interests of the excluded are likely to be opposed and obscured in the interests of the included whom are usually in the majority. This was revealed by the views of participants who were denied food parcels, social grants, and tax subsidies simply because they are foreigners. Exclusion, isolation and stigmatization of migrants by authorities that are made to protect them is probably what re/constructs anti-migrant sentiments among locals who blame refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants for their misfortunes. The re/construction of anti-migrant sentiments among locals because of exclusionary government policies, in some instances, have supported prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify most forced migrants simply because they are foreigners. While the COVID-19 government relief policies were ideally expected to render expedient and effective assistance to all vulnerable populations, ranging from nationals and foreigners, views of participants reveal that they have to some extend intensified discrimination, stigma and poverty among refugees and asylum seekers. This is against what the government intended in its COVID-19 responses (Republic of South Africa, 2020).

What the findings of this study points to is the scholarship on ubiquitous understanding of government policies and their link to social exclusion or inclusion of forced migrants. For instance a study done by Umana-Taylor (2004) and Tholen (2017) established how racism, discrimination and dialectal differences were impediments to forced migrants` social inclusion and integration in Australia. According to the scholars, social, symbolic and cultural capital were found to be important in the reinforcement of social inclusion and exclusion in relation to group identities of migrants in Australia. In this regard, once a dominant group identity is established (through policy), and in a bid

to increase their competitive advantage, they often monopolise resources, restricting access to outsiders based on their race, language, social origin, religion and so forth. Similarly, in the current study, faced with social exclusion from the South African formal labour market, most refugees and asylum seekers are forced into informal sector and engage themselves in domestic or farm work, petty enterprises, street trading, hawking, private security industry and so forth. Their exclusion from accessing government's COVID-19 relief such as wage subsidies, unemployment benefits or social security and social protection measures stems from the fact that they are firstly, foreigners and secondly, that the dominant need of the locals is yet to be met. For instance, the fact that all information regarding COVID-19 and government relief plans was communicated in English and other local South African languages – which most participants did not understand - meant that the government was concerned with satisfying the needs of locals first before anyone else. This meant that refugees and asylum seekers were excluded from the government's efforts to prevent and control COVID-19. On contrary, lack of policies that pay attention to refugees and asylum seekers in relation to COVID-19 response plans does not only exacerbate the devastating impacts of COVID-19 to migrants but also poses greater risks and challenges to the South Africans.

Still, the findings of this study points to other studies that underscore a plethora of deprivations among forced migrants in Brazil and South Africa. In Brazil for instance, a study done by Marió and Woolcock (2008:13) discovered that most forced migrants failed to penetrate the Brazilian formal labour market simply because "they were not protected by any social benefits, nor by labour legislation in this sector". In a similar vein, Masuku and Rama (2020:9) established that there were "legal structural agentive processes of obstruction that significantly inhibited Congolese refugees in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa from participating in the South Africa's formal economy. In retrospect, some of these exclusionary legislations and actions in South Africa have recently been exemplified by the views of the leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Julius Malema. On April 16, 2021, Malema said that the government needed to ensure that all migrant workers, who are yet to be recognised by labour laws, who lost their jobs due to COVID-19 are able to access UIF and other relief services that were being accorded to those who are in the formal sector (Eyewitness News 2020). The views of Malema indicate that there are different ways of understanding social integration/disintegration in relation to government's COVID-19 response policies. According to Malema, it is an inclusionary goal, implying equal access to COVID-19 relief services by all workers, including migrants. In the case of this study, becoming more integrated implies refugees and asylum seekers being able to access wage subsidies, unemployment benefits or social security and social protection measures from the government just like their South African counterparts. To others, however, increasing integration and advancing refugees and other forced migrants rights to the South African national COVID-19 policy responses conjures images of an unwanted imposition of uniformity to both South African citizens and forced migrants.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the vulnerabilities that participants who are refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa are facing. Although they are few in numbers, their narratives are indicative of what other forced migrants in South Africa are experiencing. Using social exclusion framework, the study reveals how it is difficult for most forced migrants to transcend the pre-existing structural obstacles that determine their inclusion or exclusion within the South African society. One argument of this study is that although South Africa has put in place a globally respected Refugees Act 130, the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed how refugees and asylum seekers remain at the peripheries of the social capital order where they have been exposed to vulnerability, poverty and socioeconomic disaffiliation. For instance, the South African government's COVID-19 social relief and protection (services such as wage subsidies, unemployment benefits or social security and social protection measures) were meant to offer expediency to all indiscriminately. On the contrary, the findings of this study reveal how socially excluded forced migrants are in South Africa. In the end, the study offers semiotic signposts and compels one to consider the possible ways in which different government policy responses to pandemics may socially include or exclude those who are voiceless before implementing them.

Given the paucity of government-led services to contain the epidemic, the paper recommends that for holistic response to this pandemic demands appreciation and recognition of the psychosocial and socio-economic impact of COVID-19 to all vulnerable groups; locals, refugees and asylum seekers. The paper argues that contingency planning must involve refugees, other migrants, and their communities to access government relief and social protection.

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Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Security in Private Ownership?

A Brief Study about the Outsourcing and Privatisation of Security Services in South Africa

László Pálfi[1]

Abstract:

The movements 'Black Lives Matter' and 'Defund Police' provoked debates that were disputed in the late 1980s and early 1990s: "Should we choose privatisation or outsourcing of the Police?" Nowadays, the distrust in police in the USA by the movements mentioned above has been disseminating the idea of dissolution of armed forces.

The trend of NPM reforms, neoliberal measures from the United Kingdom, became popular in the post-apartheid South Africa: Cape Town had its security services partially privatised and outsourced, and this measure was then applied nationwide. This led to the birth of PSIRA and led to the foundation of modern private security companies.

However, the expectations were high about reducing crime, increasing professionalism, and providing solutions to the social issue of crimes committed by young people, and in the long-term the solutions that had been applied did not make Cape Town safe. This study is an effort to verify the Weberian statement according to which the police and security-related fields should be controlled by the state.

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Introduction

After the first democratic elections of 1994, the South African state still had a well-equipped, well-organized and well-trained police inherited from the era of the apartheid. Notwithstanding the change in the South African politics, the police was an organisation connected to the previous oppressive regime, which was based on racial segregation and policies that favoured the white minority.

The structure and the mission of the South African Police Service changed radically: people of colour could become officers and advance to high ranks, and the duties were not related to oppression of dark-skinned people anymore. This meant a transition, which contained a type of obscurity, as it is a feature of every major political change.

On the one hand, the South African Police Service became insecure about what they could do instead of reacting harshly, as they used to before 1994. On the other hand, South Africa became a member of the Commonwealth again, and the British policies turned trendy: privatisation meant higher quality and more efficient services and saving money for the state. Private ownership shifted responsibility onto the supplier; therefore, the NPM (New Public Management) reforms were seen as a solution for the problems of the public sector. (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, p. 173)

NPM reforms were typically implemented in English-speaking countries. The preferred methods were privatisation and outsourcing, but the goals could vary. Ewan Ferlie, Lynn Ashburner, Lousie Fitzgerald and Andrew Pettigrew classified the NPM-models into four groups: 1) The 'Efficiency Drive' that made the public sector similar to the private one; 2) 'Downsizing and Centralization' that created a strongly centralized, more democratic system; 3) 'Search for Excellence' that emphasized the work ethics and the role of the members of organization, and 4) 'Public Service Orientation' that implemented of the methods of the private sector in the public sector. (Ferlie et al. (1996) pp. 10-15) As it is going to be demonstrated in this paper, the privatisation of law enforcement in Cape Town is a mix of the second and fourth method.

The Context of Outsourcing

The context of outsourcing is purely based on the social problems of Cape Town. After the collapse of the apartheid, the inhabitants of townships were not forced to stay there; they could walk in the streets of areas that were inhabited by wealthy people. This meant the spreading of crime to these areas, since uneducated young men of poor background sought to acquire goods from the rich. They organised themselves into gangs, and as a result the value and public safety decreased in the late 1990s. (Blerk, 2003, p. 558)

After 1994, the UN sanctions against apartheid were lifted, and South Africa could receive credits from international banks. (Hefeker and Menck, 2002, p. 6) This economic situation

created an opportunity to solve the problems stemming from unemployment. The unemployment was not only an issue of 'dark skinned people', since the implementation of sanctions led to the second wave of poor whiteism. The rise of AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), led by Eugène Terre'Blanche is connected to the considerable number of impoverished white people did not receive any welfare benefits in the collapsing period of the apartheid in the 1980s. (Hyslop, 2003, p. 226)

Western Cape is the most developed and richest South African province. Widely-known cities such as Cape Town, Paarl, and Stellenbosch are all situated in this province, which pave the way for higher chances to have a job. In the case of Cape Town, the population dynamics shows the increase of previously racially discriminated population from 1996 to 2001: while the number of whites remained almost constant (small shrinkage from 543,425 to 542,581), the number of Coloureds and Black Africans grew. The Coloureds, which make up the majoritarian group, grew from 1,239,943 to 1,392,658. Within these five years, the Black African population of Cape Town grew rapidly from 644,181 to 916,520. (Western Cape Provincial Government, December 2001, pp. 4-5) The change in numbers can be explained by the traditionally high number of children within traditional communities, the internal migration, and emigration to other English-speaking countries.

The change in politics did not have an effect on the financial circumstances. On the one hand, young people living in vulnerable areas without proper life goals can be easily involved in criminal groups. On the other hand, the Police were not able to handle the new situation. Upon acknowledging this situation, Cape Town's leadership decided to outsource the security services in order to maintain safety in the city centre.

The CCID

The main goal of this measure was to decrease crime in Cape Town City Centre. In 1999, Cape Town was led by Gerald Morkel and the New National Party. The Christian democratic-oriented predecessor party of the former National Party decided to create a public-private partnership within a new public management reform. The implementation of this reform promised higher efficacy of crime prevention. (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, p. 175)

"A public-private partnership, the Cape Town Central City Improvement District (CCID) was established in November 2000 by local property owners with a vision for the Cape Town CBD [Central Business District] to rise from the 'crime and grime' scenario it had fallen into, to once again become a safe, clean and caring urban environment." (Cape Town CCID) Since 2000, the CCID has been working as an organization responsible for not only the development, but also the maintaining of the internal order.

The necessity of outsourcing of security services can be explained by the importance of Cape Town's special role: Cape Town is the centre of economy and tourism of Western Cape, and also the centre of legislation of South Africa. Therefore, the CCID is in charge with

"guarding of 'public-private spaces' such as shopping centers, the company is involved in policing the public space of the city" (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, pp. 175-176)

The 'public element' of the CCID refers to the traditionally public duties connected to the duties of Cape Town. To avoid injustice and breaking the law, the CCID has got permanent connection to the South African Police Service. This practically means that the CCID does not perform police duties. The 'private element' is related to classical outsourcing, which in this case means the involvement of a private security company, the G4S. The British Group 4 Securicor took part in the development of the CCID. (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, p. 174)

To understand the process in the context of public administration, there are several points to clarify regarding the administrative structure of Cape Town. As Rudy Giuliani had been elected mayor of New York City in 1994, he led actions against crime in vulnerable areas, which especially targeted the nightlife. (Hae, 2012, p. 571) The new leadership of New York City established Business Improvement Districts, which were non-profit organisations that were founded from additional tax. Cape Town implemented this structural administrative reform, and created 15 City Improvement Districts. One of these, the CCID, received the mission to maintain law and order. However, the CCID is mainly a security organization, with its budget divided to fund several tasks: in the 2000s, 50% of its budget was allocated to security, 25% to cleaning the city, 17% to the city marketing, and only 8% to social development. (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007, p. 246)

However, a typical NPM reform is based not only on privatisation, but also on a strongly limited role of public bodies. Cape Town's City Council and the South African Police Service is very influential within the CCID; hence, the CCID can be called a 'hybrid security network'. The establishment of CCID pushed criminal elements from the City Centre into Cape Town's vulnerable areas. In the suburban areas, the South African Police Services and the city police are responsible for maintaining law and order. (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2007, pp. 247-248) A form of symbiosis came into existence between CCID and police forces: meanwhile, the officers of CCID are preserving the security of the City Centre and the police do not need to deal with less dangerous felonies, since the presence of CCID officers is enough to deter the criminals. Nevertheless, the CCID officers are members of a regular authority, which in practice means the involvement of police forces in serious issues.

Birth of the PSIRA

Wealthy people are able to pay high taxes in order to have a benefit of security in return. If public authorities cannot provide security, they will purchase it from the free market. The free market was full of former soldiers of the South African Defence Forces, the 'old Weermag'. The fluctuation within the South African military and police helped these soldiers to find their luck in the private security industry. The experiences and expertise of these former soldiers and policemen are widely known in Africa; people around the world could learn about this

fact from the movie 'Blood Diamond' released in 2006, in which Colonel Coetzee, played by Arnold Vosloo, commands a well-equipped private security company. The more knowledgeable people met South African contractors in various news reports, when a significant number of former South African soldiers and policemen were also involved in various African peacekeeping operations, partly in security and other positions. (Besenyő, 2021, p. 160.) In the case of Darfur we should note the official presence of the South African National Defence Force: "Only the South African contingent was totally equipped to comply with the requirements of a fully capable battalion in the mission area. They had their own logistics platoon and a lot of officers who had logistics qualification and experience." (Besenyő, 2006, p. 49)

According to the hypothesis postulated by American economist George J. Stigler, „every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to control entry" (Stigler, 1971, p. 4). (Stigler, 1971, p. 4) It was stated by another European Academics too, when it came to researching the defence industry. (Ilchenko, et al, 2021, p. 439) This, in the case of security industry in South Africa, means a remarkable power of former soldiers and policemen who were connected to the era of the apartheid. On the one hand, these people were well-organized thanks to their expertise, and on the other hand the South African state had to avoid any form of escalation of tensions. However, a possible civil war was mostly emphasized by White supremacists, e. g. members of the AWB, as men who were trained to fight wars were seen as capable to start one. And as Mancur Olson, another American economist proved, smaller groups are able to use their power more effectively than large ones. (Olson, 1997, p. 80)

The free market offered opportunity to match the two sets of needs: wealthy people needed a higher grade of security in order to defend their properties and the area where they lived, and the veterans of SADF, who could not find a civil job or build a new career, could cater to this need of the rich. The equilibrium, which was born as a lovechild of the interests of these groups, created a new form of private security industry.

Based on the success of Cape Town's experience, the private security industry has begun to bloom from the 2000s, and nowadays their development and spreading seem to be unstoppable: today the private security companies in South Africa are not only working in the field of protection of certain people or their properties, but services of technology-related fields, cyber protection, and also accountancy can also be included into the various packages provided by any well-equipped security company. Further development needed new regulations, which secured the private security industry market for former soldiers and policemen.

The Private Security Industry Regulation Act No. 56 of 2001, which regulates the whole security industry in South Africa, was passed in 2001. According to the definitions of this act, a security officer can be a natural person who 1) is employed by another person or the state; or 2) provides assistance to a security provider; or 3) offers security service controlled by

another security provider; or 4) makes security service available as an employee of a security provider. Security officers receive remuneration, rewards, fees or benefits in return for their service. (Republic of South Africa, 2002, p. 8)

The post-apartheid South Africa has got deep-rooted traditions of trade unionism. Based on the Tripartite Alliance, members of the COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) and the South African Communist Party have had mandates on the list of the governing party, the ANC (African National Congress) since 1994. This coalition is the ruling one in South Africa. Trade unionism is a core element of the South African welfare state; thus, the regulatory public policy seeks to avoid racial and structural antagonisms between employers and employees in the labour system. (Gordon and Maharaj, 2014, pp. 126-128)

The industry is supervised by the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, a juridical person with its head office in Pretoria, South Africa's capital city for executive power. The PSIRA, as it is officially abbreviated, oversees the legality, the professionalism and the transparency of the industry, and determines the standards of the security providers. These standards provide for equipment and training of the security officers. (Republic of South Africa, 2002, pp. 10-14)

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? To ensure legality, the authority is led by a council. The councillors include a chairperson, a vice-chairperson and three additional councillors who are appointed by the current Minister of Safety and Security. The Council of PSIRA exercises general control over the private security industry. The public control is based on the accountability of the Council: the Minister of Safety and Security has to be supplied with information about current activities, such as annual financial reports. (Republic of South Africa, 2002, pp. 16, 18) To ensure professionalism, "the Department of Labour determines the wages and employment standards for security companies, and the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA) monitors security training". (Diphoorn, 2016, pp. 167-168)

Improvement the Wrong Way?

The private security system does not have glaring drawbacks, nevertheless; there are various definitions of what we label as success, improvement, and poor decisions. Therefore, we should examine the advantages and disadvantages of this system closely.

The 1990s were an optimistic era of history: dictatorships ended and new structures of cooperation began to emerge. This period was influenced by neoliberal political theories, which are based on the balance of mutual interests and criticism of the state power connected to totalitarian regimes. According to neoliberal theories, reducing the power of the state can elevate the level of freedom in general. Until the anti-terrorist wars on Middle-East led by the United States, this optimistic mindset influenced various policies. Individual freedom and privatisation were walking hand-in-hand until the Millennium.

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, who is a German-born American libertarian anarcho-capitalist economist and thinker, strongly believes that the privatisation of security can solve the problems, which are related to exploitation, wars, and basically the collapse of our civilization. According to his theories, the state is the core of the problem, since the state can exploit its citizens with no limits: Having total control over police and military, the state is robbing money from the citizens via taxation, and this phenomenon causes oppression and exploitation. At the same time, the (welfare) state finances the life of the poor, which means support of weak elements of the society. Based on this phenomenon, the weaker elements will always outnumber the useful elements of the society, and this leads to 'decivilisation'. Hoppe's book 'The Democracy the God that Failed' has a proposition to abolish all these problems, which are connected to taxation and redistribution: All states should be abolished, since their existence is based on oppression and exploitation. The state should be replaced by micro communities, where the citizens are the owners of every good. These citizens will be interested in defence of their goods, and they will contract a private security provider. To avoid the harmful conflicts, the best providers will survive on the free market, and bargaining and cooperation can create peace and smash the exploitation and the unlawful actions. This means practically the full privatisation of security and defence. (Hoppe, 2001, pp. 274, 278-287)

Since the states are existing recently, Hoppe's theories seem to be rather utopian than realistic, although, we should emphasize, that effective cooperation of citizens can solve a lot of problems, and the does not need to allocate its sources, which means decreasing the role of bureaucracy. Moreover, this leads to stronger morals in the society, which can elevate mutual trust. However, in the current, very non-utopian situation, the state has to provide security and defence in order to avoid harmful outcomes. Therefore, we should take seriously what Max Weber wrote about the role of the state and its monopoly in executive power.

In Weber's theory, the 'legitimate order' is emphasized. The legitimacy can be derived from tradition, the virtue of effectual attitudes, virtue of rational beliefs, and anything that is recognized to be legal. This order is based either on the basis of voluntary agreement or on the basis of legitimate authority. (Eisenstadt, 1968, pp. 11-12) The voluntary agreement is the key element of Hoppe's theory. There is considerable difference in the concept of power: "The 'Power' (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. 15.) If we compare Hoppe's theory to the Weberian one, only the state has got the real power, but the individuals who created a community, cannot have this.

This sociological point of view about the meaning of power needs to be mentioned, since we can identify the problems of privatisation of security. In the anarcho-capitalist theory, the security provider companies can introduce tyranny, based on their well-trained and well-equipped quasi armies. The situation of South African security provider companies can be similar; hence, the authority of the state based on the role of the Minister of Safety and

Security guarantees the control over the security industry. The well-trained former soldiers and policemen, especially those, who were involved in certain conflicts, are able to create anarchical circumstances.

As it happens frequently, security officer behaves like a policeman in certain situation. When a security officer faces a persona non grata, the security provider (ab)uses the power in order to replace the police. The experience can be harmful on a daily basis, and some of the 'old reflexes' can come back to practice, just like in the case of the incident on Clifton Beach. (Tilburg, 2019)

Evaluation

There is no chance to evaluate the South African model of outsourcing and privatisation of security in a descriptive narrative. Therefore, two types of normative analysis are needed to create a wholesome description of this unique phenomenon.

On the one hand, a free market-oriented evaluation is needed. Based on this point of view, the reform was a successful one: The well-trained soldiers of the former SADF and the policemen of the apartheid-era could find jobs on the free market. They can use their skills to fulfil the needs of the wealthy people. In this case, the private security providers can give something extra, and this makes the services more efficient compared to the public one. This means equilibrium in this sector.

On the other hand, the evaluation of social and legal context is absolutely needed. This reform meant only the outsourcing and involvement of the actors of the private sector. The measure was not about helping the poor, just only their removal from the city. The broad group of South African youth which is called the 'lost generation' could not enjoy any remarkable change within the new circumstances. Actually, what happened to them is quite the contrary, since they are treated as outcasts based on their wealth instead of their skin colour. Furthermore, according to the current statistics, the outsourcing of the security and the birth of PSIRA was not able to provide higher level of security, since there are the following South African cities among the twenty most dangerous cities in the world of 2021: Pietermaritzburg (No. 11), Pretoria (No. 13), Durban (No. 15), Johannesburg (No. 16), Cape Town (No. 19). (Armorax, 2021)

Conclusion

This study verified the raison d'être of monopoly of the state in the case of law enforcement. This statement does not refer to exclusion of private security services. It is rather about emphasizing the obligation and the right of the state to have monopoly in certain sectors. Security belongs to this sector mostly: the state can provide the security as a public good, when it comes to control the borders and maintain the law and order inland.

For this reason, the privatisation of security leads to legal particularism. This phenomenon can cause the abolishment of legal certainty, since the private security officers are doing the job of the policemen; meanwhile, the policemen are the only authorized people who can act that way.

The fact that well-equipped, well-trained, well-paid police and military have no alternative, should be an axiomatic argument. These features of armoured forces can maintain a legal, sustainable, and transparent system, which can provide real security for citizens as a public good, career for the participants who intend to be soldier or policeman, and achieve high level of calculability of the whole system.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

László Pálfi is a Hungarian historian. He is writing his doctoral dissertation about the history of the German-namibian relations at the Eötvös Loránd University. He wrote his bachelor thesis about the history of Namibia, and his master's thesis about the history of the apartheid in Rhodesia and South West Africa, both were written at the Eötvös Loránd University. His main field of interest is the modern history, especially the history of Africa and Central Europe. He has a master's degree in Public Policy and Management at the Corvinus University of Budapest, and his thesis is about the private security companies in South Africa. Currently, he is working as an external researcher of the Pilecki Institute.

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The Role of the Civilian Joint Task Force in the Improvement of Security in Borno State, Nigeria

Attila Gulyás[1]

Abstract:

The Nigerian state has been fighting Boko Haram since the establishment of the terrorist organization. Due to the equipment's poor quality, the lack of experience, and the staff shortages, the Nigerian Army could not defeat the enemy and provide a secure life for the citizens in Borno state, which is the base of Boko Haram. That was why the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) or locally known "Yan Gora" was established in 2013 by volunteer citizens. The organization's personnel consist of mainly jobless young and undereducated people with poor quality of equipment and weaponry.

As a non-state actor (NSA), CJTF has been fighting the terrorist organization along with the Nigerian Army and caused severe loss to Boko Haram while it has also been suffering from serious losses.

Besides the fight, the organization participates in different civil security activities such as security scans, body searches of individuals, protecting public buildings, and supervising checkpoints.

Although the Borno state government financially supports the organization, it covers only a small part of its budget. That is why most of the twenty-six thousand CJTF fighters are self-sufficient. The low budget and the lack of salaries can be the reason for crimes allegedly committed by the members of the CJTF.

The organization was initially considered as an important, apolitical actor to protect the communities, but it gradually transformed into a group with political connections which impact the future of the CJTF.

This paper is searching for the answer to how effective the CJTF is and the organization's vision after the defeat of Boko Haram.

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*"We run from Boko Haram, then our CJTF is
again punishing us, where do we go?"*
(Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2018)

Introduction

Thousands of scholars have been studying terrorism and searching for the answers for this phenomenon, and there is rich literature dealing with the most notorious terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda or the Boko Haram. My interest has turned to the other side, and I aim to shed some light on those who fight against insurgents without significant state support to protect their communities. I intend to study and present the heroism of those young people who have grabbed sticks or machetes and chased out of their town the Boko Haram terrorists, who were armed to the teeth and have been fighting the insurgents since then. The members of the CJTF are far from saints, but they have set an example for most of us because they protect their communities with bare hands for free, without any salary or stipend.

In my study, I relied on the scientific literature and studied the Nigerian press and social media sites on a daily basis. I contacted Nigerian citizens on Twitter and Telegram channels to collect personal impressions and opinions. Those people helped me find sources but asked me to keep them incognito. Their request is acceptable because Twitter has been banned in Nigeria since this May.

Having these resources, I tried to depict an accurate, objective picture of the bright and dark side of the organization and its possible prospects.

What is Boko Haram?

This chapter focuses on the notorious terrorist organization because it is impossible to discuss the origin and the role of the Civil Joint Task Force (CJTF) without getting more profound knowledge of the Boko Haram insurgency. Although, according to some scholars, its origin reaches back decades and outside Nigeria as a Salafist movement (Thurston, 2016) (Besenyő, Mayer, 2015), others trace back its origin to Mohammed Yusuf (Umar Lawal Yusuf, 2020). The latter is widely accepted. The popular belief is that the organization was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2001-2002 in Maiduguri. The country had a democratic turn in 1999, and the population was hoping that this would eliminate corruption and raises the standard of living. At that time, a new young preacher appeared who called for the application of Islamic law and called for the people to turn away from the western way of life. He was Mohammed Yusuf. He preached that "Western education is a sin," which sounds like "Boko Haram" in the Hausa language. However, the long-awaited changes didn't occur. The people in the country were dissatisfied. This milieu was a good fertile soil for Mohammed's teachings and his radical thoughts, although he initially opposed the use of violence (Deutsche Welle, 2021). The

members of this sect guided by the Salafist ideology wanted radical cultural changes in the North-Eastern Nigeria, or perhaps Nigeria. In their opinion, the Northern part of the country was led by corrupt and false Muslims, so they wanted to introduce Sharia law and create a "pure" Islamic state (Umar Lawal Yusuf, 2020). The name given to themselves was "Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad" (People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad).

Mohammed shaped his beliefs between 2001 and 2002, and he gave the following reasons for opposing western education (Umar Lawal Yusuf, 2020):

- The Darwinian Theory of evolution excluded God's divine hands in creating man and the universe as Islam holds God as the Omnipotent Creator of the Universe and all it contains.
- The concept that man originated from the monkey is against the Quranic injunction that man was created from clay.
- The concept of a spherical earth and the static sun is described in Western science books as opposed to the Quran, which says that the sun, earth, and moon move on their own.
- Banking is non-Islamic since it forbids financial transactions.
- Growing immorality of the modern secular world like mixing the sexes, semi-naked dressing, fornication, alcoholism as a product of westernization.
- He sees democracy as Haram (forbidden) and therefore non-Islamic as democracy has increased poverty, hunger, unemployment, and prostitution among the citizens.

He had a personal car and wore western clothes and mobile phones despite his beliefs. When he was confronted, he replied that such things are not only the product of Western education but the product of the knowledge of mankind, so he had the right to have them.

His movement was very popular in the North-Eastern part of the country, especially in the state of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. The sect members protested on the streets of the main cities and had daily conflicts with the security services during the demonstrations. Yusuf became very popular and, in parallel with it, poses a security risk for the Nigerian state. When the Boko Haram demonstrations were banned at the end of July of 2009, riots broke out in the city of Bauchi, spreading through Yobe, Borno, and other regions. The uproar lasted for days, and more than 300 people died in Maiduguri alone. The Nigerian government responded with large-scale police operations and violence. The police arrested Jusuf and a large number of demonstrators. According to the police spokesman, Jusuf tried to escape from the captivity on July 30, 2009, and he was shot to death. In contrast with the spokesman's statement, members of the sect reported that the police tortured him to death in captivity (Deutsche Welle, 2021).

Yusuf already earlier appointed his successor in the person of Abubakar Shekau. After killing his master, Abubakar launched a revenge campaign, a merciless Holy War against the Nigerian state. The sect members went underground and carried out attacks and suicide

attacks against police stations, military barracks, and governmental institutions. That is the point where Boko Haram as a terrorist organization was born. Over the years, they spread the fear in the region by increasingly brutal terror attacks against civilians. Since this change, more than 40,000 people have been killed and 2.3 million forced to leave their homes. In the beginning, the country leadership didn't take "Boko Haram" seriously. After the two-year bloody amuck of the terrorists, President Jonathan Goodluck declared the state of emergency in the North-Eastern part of the country and shut the borders with Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. A year later, he confessed that Boko Haram infiltrated the military, the police, and different governmental institutions. Another year later, in May, he extended the state of emergency to cover Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. Despite these provisions, Boko Haram occupied Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state in 2013. The United States designated Boko Haram a terrorist organization in November 2013. Following the US declaration, the United Nations added the organization to its financial and arms embargo list. Nigeria postponed the presidential elections for six weeks in February 2015 because Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad formed a multinational joint force and began a campaign against Boko Haram.

Shekau, the leader of the terrorist organization pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015. Two months later, the organization changed its name to Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). In November 2015, according to the Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram had overtaken the Islamic State, the deadliest terrorist organization, because it killed 6,644 people in 2014. US intelligence reported in June 2016 a split between Abubakar Shekau and ISIS over the use of children as suicide bombers. The IS tried to oust Abubakar from his leadership role and replace him with Musab al-Barnawi, because in addition to the use of children suicide bombers, he also refused to cease the attacks against innocent Muslim civilians. From this point, the organization splinted into Boko Haram and ISWAP. However, Abubakar maintained his allegiance to the IS. Unfortunately, the media didn't make a distinction between the groups, and they were often mixed. That is one of the reasons why there are no exact numbers on the victims and the losses in connection with the organizations.

The Nigerian Army placed a three million Nairas bounty on Abu Shekau in February 2018. It was complemented with seven-million US dollars by the United States in March 2021. The first bloody chapter of Boko Haram ended with the death of the insane bloodthirsty Abubakar Shekau on 20 May 2021 (Channels Television Abuja, 2021). After the death of their leader, the Boko Haram fighters in June 2021 released a 13-minute-long video in which Boko Haram, and ISWAP factions reunite and pledge allegiance to Aba Ibrahim Al-Hashimiyil AlKhuraishi, whom they considered as "Khalifan Muslimai", translated as "The Leader of all Muslims" (PRNigeria, 2021). Abu Musab al-Barnawi, in a voice message on 25 June 2021, accepted the declaration of allegiance of the Boko Haram fighters (Musab al-Barnawi, 2021).

Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

The federal government tried to solve the Boko Haram crisis with various strategies, from the amnesty to the declaration of the state of emergency, not to mention the different counterterrorism measures to root out the organization from the country (Bamidele, 2016). Meanwhile, the terrorist activity was far beyond the possibility of the amnesty offered by the government. Moreover, Abubakar Shekau answered that they did not need amnesty because they didn't do any wrong. During the negotiations, Shekau vowed to stop the violence to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. After the failed negotiations, Boko Haram killed hundreds of people, including police officers, in a short period in 2013 June in the North-Eastern part of the country. Boko Haram occupied Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. Obviously, the negotiations and the declaration of the state of emergency didn't achieve their desired effects. The counterterrorism measures and actions seemed to fail because the security forces had not enough intelligence, they didn't know the local languages (in Borno state, there are 26 registered languages), the terrain, the customs, the leaders of the local communities. Their actions often lead to forced interrogations, torture of innocent people, and extrajudicial killings (Bamidele, 2016).

There was a gap between the local communities and the security forces to fill or bridge this gap militia groups emerged to augment the Nigerian military responses to the militant Boko Haram. These groups are known as the Yan Gora (Civilian Joint Task Force), Kungiyar Maharba (Hunters), and the Yan Banga (Vigilantes). The Hunters and the Vigilantes deserve to be presented in some sentences for the readers before the role of the CJTF is discussed in detail. The history of the Hunters looks back to hundred years. They professionally hunted for animals for their livelihood and sold their prey. They also maintained the security of the local communities, and they fought against thieves, robbers, and other outer attackers (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2018).

The history of the Vigilantes looks back to decades. In the 1980s, poverty, insecurity, and crime struck the country due to budgeting issues, growing population, and climate change. In this situation, the civilians were frequently robbed on their way to markets, so the communities needed some security mechanism to protect them. The Hunters started patrolling the roads to deter the thieves. These Hunters became known later as Yan Banga (Vigilantes), and some of them joined the Vigilante Group Nigeria, which is a national organization to unify similar groups in the country (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2018).

The militias mentioned above also take part in the fight against Boko Haram, but the presentation of their activity is out of the scope of this study.

Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was born

"...new national heroes!!!"
President Goodluck Jonathan

By the mid of Summer 2013, life in Maiduguri was unbearable for the citizens. Boko Haram spread fear among the population due to the bombings, suicide bombings, and violence against the residents. The shops and markets were closed, curfew was introduced, so everyday life was paralyzed. It was a very bad situation because the area's economy is primarily based on services and commodities trade, with an insignificant share of manufacturing. If the residents reported the insurgents to the security forces, the terrorists took revenge on them, if they were silent, the security forces arrested them as accomplices. In parallel with this, in pursuit of the terrorists, many innocent people were arrested and tortured by the security forces because they had no background knowledge and didn't know the languages, customs, and communities. As a result of this terrible situation, some young men grabbed sticks and started to pursue the hidden terrorists in their neighborhood. They arrested them and handed them over to the security forces. Their spontaneous actions spread across the town and its neighborhood. Many communities grabbed sticks and machetes and started to defend themselves. With the support of the older community members, the youngsters formed the "Yan Gora" which means "Youngsters with sticks" in English. Muslims and Christians protected each other's places of worship, patrolled the town and the communities and identified the Boko Haram members, and burnt their houses and in cases they committed extrajudicial killings (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2018). Their actions were so successful that they largely stopped Boko Haram killings and bombings, and life in the city started to return to normal step by step. The vigilantes organized themselves into sectors and worked under the supervision of JTF sector commands. They were given security badges and ID cards. Thanks to these groups, the security situation in the city and its neighborhood has significantly improved. President Jonathan Goodluck called them "new national heroes" on 17 July 2013 (International Crisis Group, 2014). While many communities took part in forming Yan Gora, some others refused cooperation with the security forces because they feared retaliation by the insurgents.

What makes the CJTF different from other militias is that it is not organized on an ethnic or religious basis, or it is not against the government or other militias. It is established for ousting Boko Haram from Borno State. The CJTF as a bi-religious militia doesn't make a difference between its members on a religious basis. The recruits are required to swear an oath using the Bible or Qur'an depending on their faith (International Crisis Group, 2014). There are many reasons why Yan Gora was created even though communities already have militia groups (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2020):

- The Kungiyar Marhaba Yan Banga groups couldn't always respond to the security threats posed by insurgents because they had no adequate equipment.
- The existing groups considered that the fight against insurgents is inconsistent with their mission and feared their communities would be victims of retaliation.
- The number of group members wasn't enough to fight against the insurgents, and they didn't want to lower the entry requirements to add members.
- The members of the Kungiyar Marhaba and Yan Banga groups are mostly tribal religious, so the people rather joined the Yan Gora to avoid being involved in tribal religious practices.
- The existing groups had their own customs, ways of working, and leaders, so they were reluctant to work with the military. This circumstance spurred the establishment of a new militia group.

Members of the CJTF

The militia is a child of necessity, a citizen-driven communal response to the security challenge. Thousands of residents were caught between hammer and anvil, from one side the Boko Haram, and from the other side the security forces. They had to choose a side. The first members didn't join due to unemployment; rather, they wanted to protect their communities against Boko Haram attacks and recover their lives. Most members volunteered or were later sent by the communities to the militia, but in some unfortunate cases, they were forced by the militia or the communities to join.

Since its establishment, the CJTF has evolved into a complex and hierarchical organization, each local government area has its own commander. Today the organization has about 26,000 registered members of which 23% are women. Sixty-two per cent of the members have been recorded as youths below the age of 35 in Borno State and the neighbouring Yobe State, which are the areas most affected by the insurgency (Today.NG, 2021). The Borno State government set up the Borno Youths Empowerment Scheme BOYES to curb the discontent of the CJTF members, who sacrifice their job opportunities to join the militia. Only the members of this organization (about 1,800 persons) get an allowance from the BOYES, which is 50$ (15,000 nairas) per month. The members got limited military training, uniform, patrol cars, identification documents. In addition to the Borno state government, the Every Nigerian Do Something (ENDS), North East Regional Initiative (NERI), some private politicians, residents of Borno State, and entrepreneurs also support the CJTF. According to the BOYES plans, the program would have trained up to 6,000 members, but the program stopped at about 1,850 members because the military found too many potentially unreliable persons among the trainees (Idayat and Pieri, 2018). Nearly 750 members got "special forces" training and fight along with the military units. The CJTF also has an intelligence unit of 100 officers spread across the states in plainclothes (Idayat and Pieri, 2018). Many problems stem from the under-budgeted organization, and the unpaid personnel discussed later in this study in a dedicated chapter.

Women in CJTF

"To protect my fellow females and the greatest misfortune is that my husband, my children, and other relations were killed. So I said to myself since one dies once, I decided to join and protect my country." A woman among the Civilian JTF" (Ozden and Kwabe, 2021)

There are two main components of recruiting female members to the CJTF. The first is the traditional reason because female warriors or hunters are not uncommon in the tribal culture in this part of the country. The other is that Boko Haram changed its tactic and started employing women and men pretending to be women to execute suicide bomb attacks.

The reasons why women join the Civilian JTF vary. One part of the women lost her relatives or loved ones in the fight against the Boko Haram, they have nothing to lose, so they want to take revenge on the insurgents, while others feel responsibility for the security of their community (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2018).

Women's service in the organization is essential for the effective fight against insurgents (Idayat and Pieri, 2018, p.78). Because of certain religious and traditional cultural restrictions, there are tasks that can only be carried out by women. Only women can carry out perquisition in the absence of the husband, or they can pat down women at the checkpoints, to name a few. They are very good at intelligence as well. Another very important area where the women are irreplaceable is helping female victims and the investigation of sexual abuses because, for religious reasons, victims can only talk about their abuses to women. An excellent example of the female volunteers' competency is that today there are female sub-unit commanders in the CJTF.

Although nearly one-third of the CJTF members are female, their situation is not problem-free because of the organization's religious and traditional masculine attitude. The male members (especially the Muslim males) mock them for being in the organization instead of not being at home next to the stove and taking care of their husbands or children.

Children in the CJFT

From the first days of the organization, children took part in counter-insurgency activities. They were ideal messengers or intelligence collectors, crowd controllers, and they helped support activities such as food procurement, equipment maintenance, etc. It is no surprise that children wanted to join the organization because they got protection, food, and security. The positive example and the respect from the community towards Yan Gora also played an important role in their decision to join. In addition to these reasons, young girls joined the organization to express their solidarity with the abducted or sexually abused young girls and women. Unfortunately, children often witnessed physical violence or executions, and sometimes they participated in such activities. That was the reason why the UN raised its voice

against children's employment in the militia. The Civilian JTF complied with the request and, in 2017, dismissed child members from its ranks. Although it wasn't an easy process because children were reluctant to give up their livelihood or the respect they got from the community (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2018).

Disabled members in the CJTF

The disabled people represent an uncommon category in a vigilante militia. In contrast with any malevolent prejudice, they are valuable members. Many of them were injured and paralyzed in the fights against insurgents but didn't leave the Yan Gora, they stayed instead, and take part in different not combatant activities. They play essential roles in checking the traffic in and out of IDP camps or taking part in community dispute resolutions. All in all, they are respected members of the communities (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2018).

## The organizational structure of the Civilian JTF

Figure 1. The organizational chart of the Civilian Joint Task Force (Source: Author)

Collecting information on the organizational structure of the CJTF is cumbersome because there is no officially published chart available in open sources. The author assumes two reasons: First is the security, while the second is the strict internet censorship in the country

(Akinpelu, 2021) and (2020 World Press Freedom Index | Reporters Without Borders, 2021). The only available open-source resource is a study: "Community Perception of the Role of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Resisting Boko Haram Culture of Violence in Borno State, Nigeria" by Umar Lawal Yusuf. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the organization is hierarchical, similar to a general military, hierarchical order. The organization is divided into sectors and under each sector are subsectors and under each subsector are chairmen who supervise their variable number of subordinates. The headquarters or the leadership is in Maiduguri. Interestingly, rather than the central division of tasks, the work is organized locally together with the local security services. Though the sectors communicate with each other, they share their experiences. Typically, the higher-ranked leaders have prestige in the community and have civilian jobs such as entrepreneur or lawyer. Their reputation, work experiences, and organizational skills guarantee their successful leadership.

The two-folded roles of the CJTF

The activities of the Civilian JTF can be divided into non-combatant and combatant tasks.

The Non-Combatant role of the Civilian JTF in Borno State

As discussed above, the life circumstances were unbearable for the civilian people in Maiduguri and its neighborhood. They were caught between hammer and anvil because the insurgents and the security forces killed and tortured them alternately. Shops, markets, and government offices were closed, curfew was introduced, so everyday life was paralyzed. Under these circumstances, a handful of young residents decided to take their fate into their own hands. They knew the Boko Haram members and sympathizers, and they knew where they lived, so the youngsters grabbed sticks, went house by house, captured the insurgents, and handed them over to the security forces. Their **braveness was an example for other youngsters,** so the local initiative evolved into a movement. The security forces realized their valuable help in the fight against insurgents and formed a close connection with the militia named Civilian Joint Task Force. Since then, the security forces have been exploiting their special knowledge in relation to the language, culture, and terrain. They also participate in other security-related activities like maintaining checkpoints at the entrances of settlements or the IDP camps. The members of the CJTF pat down the suspicious persons. They are responsible for the security together with the military in IDP camps, and they also contribute to food distribution. The militia secures safe traffic on the high roads and carries out escort missions for the farmers as they take their goods to markets. CJTF members have also contributed to transporting women in labor to health facilities helping children in education and sports.

The militia plays an important role in improving civil-military relations as well. The CJTF has an intelligence unit whose officers are deployed to different places in plain clothes to carry

out covert intelligence-gathering about insurgents to share with the army (Idayat and Pieri, 2018, p.6.). The Civilian JTF also emerges where criminal or social deviance threatens public security and the government cannot protect its citizens (Bamidele, 2016).

The Combat Support Role of Civilian JTF in Borno State

In the beginning, CJTF wasn't a combatant group, but with time, it turned into an armed militia. This metamorphose was also the child of necessity. The government's military JTF comprises the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Navy, the Police, and the State Security Service (SSS). The personnel are from all over Nigeria. They don't know the local languages of the northeast region or understand the local culture, religion, or geography. They didn't know the leaders of the local communities either (Bamidele, 2016). The support of the CJTF is priceless for them. A good illustration of the importance of local knowledge e.g. is that linguistics classify twenty-six of the Chadic languages spoken in Borno state (About Borno – Borno State Government, 2021).

A small part of the volunteers was given military training and weapons then taken to combatant missions where their knowledge helped to find the insurgents even when they were in their hideouts or pretended to be local residents. The militia takes part in the defense of police stations, military barracks, or military arsenals. Under the command of the security forces, the CJTF units successfully fight against the insurgents (The Economist, 2016).

Effectiveness of the CJTF

Civilians credit the CJTF for bringing some stability and safety to Borno state. Nevertheless, it is a cumbersome task to measure the effectiveness of the CJTF as an organization. The reasons are the following:

- the organizational units are loosely connected, they have a relatively significant autonomy;
- for propaganda reasons, neither party publishes real numbers connected to the injured or victims; rather they magnify their victory;
- in the rural areas, there is no satisfactory control, and no chance to authenticate the reports;
- because of the reasons mentioned above, the international, independent databases can't record accurate data, although they seek to do so.

The researcher can't rely on the press or social media reports or posts because strict Internet censorship has been introduced in the country. According to Reporters Without Borders, the press is partly under governmental influence. Nigeria ranks 120th out of 180 countries on the press freedom list (2020 World Press Freedom Index | Reporters Without Borders, 2021).

Despite the difficulties, there is a chance to form an overall picture of the effectiveness of the CJTF.

The ACLED database records 5,514 Boko Haram-related incidents between November 6, 2009 and June 5, 2021 including those committed by the Islamic State West Africa Province

(ISWAP). Namely, ACLED considered the groups as one organization after they had announced their merger in 2015. The insurgent group is responsible for the death of more than 40,000 people, including losses in the security forces (unfortunately, the exact numbers by category are not available because ACLED in some cases doesn't make a distinction) and the displacement of more than 2.3 million people in Nigeria alone. Jubril Gunda, the spokesman of the CJTF, told in an interview with the Chinese Xinhua News Agency that the total loss from the beginning is more than 1,000 volunteers. Unfortunately, the numbers don't show the injured or paralyzed volunteers (Today.NG, 2021). The effectiveness of the CJTF is proved by the fact that since the beginning, they handed over more than 5,000 insurgents to the security forces without any help. Considering that the total number of the insurgents according to US intelligence estimation is somewhere between 4,000-6,000 people, this is a remarkable result (The Economist, 2016). Their achievement is more valuable in the light of their poor equipment. In an interview with the Irish Times, the members complained about their poor equipment, the lack of binoculars, guns, and garments (Hayden, 2017).

All in all, it is widely accepted in Nigeria that the CJTF played a significant role in improving the security in Borno state. People could get back on track with their everyday life. The volutneers' sacrifice sets an example for the rest of the population.

The dark side of the CJTF

Umar Lawal Yusuf in his study made interviews with residents of Borno state. According to his survey, the judgment of the CJTF is rather positive than negative. The subjects agreed that there are some harmful members of the organization but the good ones outweigh them.

Unfortunately, the organization's members were often blamed for engaging in sexual violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse. In 2019, as presented in the Nigerian Premium Times, 1,300 displaced women from IDP camps in Maiduguri turned to the country's president because allegedly, the military soldiers and the members of the CJTF sexually abused them in exchange for food. They complained that their husbands have been in captivity for more than five years and blamed for being Boko Haram members without any trial (Haruna, 2018).

> "We were starved and forced to give our bodies in exchange for food. We saw our children die and there was nothing we could do. Hundreds of people lost their lives in Bama Hospital camp – we in our group alone know 799 people who died. We were the silent witnesses of immense suffering." (Haruna, 2018)

According to Onyema Nwachukwu, the military spokesman at the Theater Command headquarters of Operation Lafiya Dole, the allegations are unfounded and intentionally try to undermine the connection between the soldiers and the residents and the morale of the soldiers.

The connection between the Nigerian government and Amnesty International deteriorated as the agency in 2018 published a report on the sexual abuses and exploitation committed by the members of the CJTF in the IDP camps and the rural areas. The government officially denied the charges and called for the agency to restrain itself from the unfounded allegations.

One of the often cited problem is the sexual abuse related crimes in connection with the CJTF, but the torture and extrajudicial killings also pop up from time to time. The hunting for the insurgents together with the security forces in some cases ends up in forced interrogation, torture, or extrajudicial killings.

In Figure 2, the riot is induced by the killing of a rikshaw driver who didn't stop at the CJTF checkpoint and got shot by the CJTF. The residents called for the ban of the CJTF. According to some residents, that was the last drop.

Figure 2. Protesters burn tires as they block the main road in Maiduguri on 30 June 2019, during a demonstration calling for a ban on the anti-Boko Haram CJTF militia they accuse of abuses after the killing of a rickshaw driver. (Source: AFP)

Unfortunately, the organization's name popped up in connection with the commission of extortion and theft, or looting, drug trading, and consumption, including the diversion of humanitarian aid. As the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukor Burati admitted in a Press Conference in 2017, the Nigerian military has detected some members of the CJTF as drug users and has recommended that their service be terminated. He also admitted that using drugs may spur the abusers to commit war crimes (Ozden and Kwabe, 2021).

The victims don't report these atrocities to the police or the military because they think they have a close connection with the CJTF and the report is hopeless (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2019).

> *"The government gives nothing to their family," said CJTF Sector 10 member Bashir Mohammed (22). "No compensation to their wife or children, no schooling. They'll just give your body back"* (Hayden, 2017).

In connection with stealing, extortion, and looting or the diversion of food supplies, the perpetrators said in their defense that they have no salary or supply. They and their families are starving while they work for the community. The international organizations supply the residents in the camps, but they get nothing although they are responsible for the security of the camps. They work for free and put their life at risk every day (Hayden, 2017).

The United Nations noted the problem connected with the abuses committed by the vigilantes and started a new training program for the CJTF and the vigilante groups in the Northern region in Nigeria in 2019. The program aimed to teach human rights and leadership to the group members. A further aim was to teach better crisis situation management and how to find suspected criminals in cooperation with legitimate state agents without abusing human rights (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2019).

Conclusion – The future vision of CJTF

With the death of Abubakar Shekau the so far unattainable aim is at the horizon. Boko Haram is undoubtedly weakened, even if we know that its fighters took an oath of allegiance to the ISWAP on 20 June 2021, and announced that their new leader is Abba Ibrahim Al Khuraishi (RFI, 2021). This renewed treaty brought changes. First, the attacks against innocent civilians were lowered in number (these attacks were the main reason why the earlier treaty failed). Second, there are daily reports on capitulated Boko Haram insurgents in the Nigerian press. Only in August 2021, hundreds of insurgents surrendered with their family members to the security forces.

It seems that this phenomenon surprised even the legal system. This is a new situation and is a source of many problems. The forgiveness for the insurgents makes the people and the vigilantes angry. These terrorists killed their relatives, family members, and comrades while the government plans a rehabilitation program to drive them back to everyday life. At the same time, the CJTF members put their life at risk and get nothing in exchange. It sowed the seeds of dissatisfaction among CJTF members as well.

Of course, the end of the war against insurgents is far away from its end, and the ISWAP is still strong. In its announcements and video messages, they try to convince the people of their strength.

Nevertheless, this new situation is interpretable as a rehearsal for the peace, the end of the war with the insurgents.

Chika Oduah in "Nigeria Vigilantes Ponder Future After Fighting Boko Haram", and Umar Lawal Yusuf in "Community Perception of the Role of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Resisting Boko Haram Culture of Violence in Borno State, Nigeria," interviewed residents and CJTF members about the future of the organization after the war against the insurgents.

The CJTF members are mostly worried about unemployment, and they fear integration because they lived a different lifestyle. Many dropped out of school or left it intentionally to serve the community. Today they have no profession, and they are undereducated. Some of them would like to join the military or the police, but they are not eligible to be soldiers because of their low level of education and health conditions.

They need governmental rehabilitation programs to get new chances to integrate into everyday life, but they haven't gotten any plan or promise yet.

As for the civilian people, they are mostly worried about the close connection of the CJTF with the politicians. Namely, in the last few years, the politicians started to exploit the organization for their own interests. Their second worry is the connection between the CJTF and the other vigilantes' organizations. There is more support for the CJTF than others. This imbalance may lead to armed conflicts among the organizations. The third worry comes from the unemployed but armed and trained in the art of warfare members in case of governmental neglect. The civilians think that after the war the CJTF volunteers without any vision of the future may migrate into or create criminal gangs (Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), 2019).

Today these worries are not yet actual: it seems that the fight against the insurgents is a long-lasting process, and no one can tell when it reaches its end. Until then, there is a chance to elaborate a multi-faceted program and system for the rehabilitation of CJTF members.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Attila Gulyás ret. Lt. Colonel graduated from the Kossuth Lajos Military college as an infantry officer in 1988. After serving four years as a troop officer, he was transferred to the Military Security Office, where he served in different positions. He retired from the service as a head of a department and in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in 2010. He has been interested in IT for a quarter-century. His hobby is computer programming (VB.net, Visual C++, and Python) and computer forensics on personal computers on MS Windows and Linux operating systems. He is a doctoral student at the Óbuda University Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences, researching the connection between terrorism and the Dark Web. His research subject is terrorist activity in cyberspace: from social media to the Dark Web.

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Constructive Simulation System Developments in Hungary

Attila Zsitnyányi[1]

Abstract:

In Hungary, the Zrínyi 2026 Home defence and force development program, and the Irinyi industry development plan defined the defence industry as one of the national strategic industries.

In Africa, the management of local and inter-country conflicts, economic problems, livelihood crises caused by climate change, terrorism and migration require prepared military, law enforcement and disaster management organizations. The efficiency of training could be significantly increased by the introduction of modern simulation tools, these countries are just at the beginning of this transformation. Hungary has significant national capabilities in the field of constructive and virtual simulation training solutions. Over the past 30 years, new, cost-effective solutions have been developed, the Hungarian solution becoming even more economical and flexible, available for more price sensitive customers too. The present study summarizes the current work on the Hungarian constructive simulation system, as well as the requirements expressed by current and potential users (even from the African continent) and the development plans.

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Introduction

In Africa, local and inter-country conflicts, economic problems, livelihood crises caused by climate change, terrorism and migration constitute a major challenge to national governments, international organizations and some of the countries concerned. Managing these problems would require prepared military, law enforcement and disaster management organizations. The efficiency of training of the responsible personnel could be significantly increased by the introduction of modern simulation tools. International trends clearly point to the further expansion of simulation training, for both financial and professional reasons. The African continent is apparently only just at the beginning of this transformation, only two countries known to have a constructive simulation system in place. However, recognition has taken place in several countries, in Hungary the developer faced several enquiries in recent years about the Hungarian-developed system.

In Hungary, due to the ongoing procurements, the acquisition, commissioning and integration of additional simulation systems are expected. Hungary has significant national capabilities in the field of constructive and virtual simulation training. The MARCUS[2] constructive simulation operates in the Simulation Centre of the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) in Várpalota and in several garrisons, which ensures the full service of staff training. Over the past 30 years, more than 20 domestic developments have supported training, cost-effective solutions have been developed, operation, maintenance and further development have become even more economical and flexible. The present study summarizes the current work on the Hungarian constructive simulation system (MARCUS), as well as the requirements expressed by current and potential users and the development plans.

Requirements for the operation of a modern CAX[3] system nowadays

The simulators can be divided into 3 main groups: live, virtual and constructive. (Cayirci and Marincic, 2009) HDF uses all three main simulator types for training.

Live simulators support real-world and field-based exercises, e.g. MILES[4].

Virtual simulators are tools for individual or small subunit training. A very wide range of such training simulators, flight, driving and tactical simulators can be found among the international training systems. Examples in Hungary include the Gripen pilot training simulator, JTAC[5], which also performs international training tasks, the recently installed Thales helicopter crew training simulator, and the KRONOS[6] platoon level virtual tactical simulator deployed in several garrisons and has been used for many years.

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[2] MARCUS: Constructive CAX simulation
[3] CAX: Computer Assisted Exercise
[4] MILES: Multiple integrated laser engagement system
[5] JTAC: Joint Terminal Attack Controller simulator
[6] KRONOS: Platoon level reconfigurable virtual simulator

Constructive simulation systems are used for commander and staff training, typically for company, battalion or brigade levels, and for military education. For that purpose, the MARCUS simulation system has been deployed in Hungary. The centre was set up in Várpalota, in the Simulation Training Centre of the Bakony Training Centre of the Hungarian Defence Forces, while smaller simulation systems (MARS[7] / MARCUS battalion) operate in several garrisons of HDF and the National Civil Service University (NKE). These systems are able to operate separately or in a networked mode using a unified virtual battlefield.

In Hungary, the development tasks and schedule of the national constructive simulation system (and the modernization of simulation training in general) must be aligned with the goals set by the Zrínyi 2026[8] force development program.[9] This requires the formulation of general requirements for constructive simulation systems.

The following main requirements can be established against a state-of-the-art CAX system:

For the training audience, role player and exercise controller staff:

- The simulation should ensure that CAX exercises are held for practicing commanders and their staff, including preparation, planning, execution, and after-action reviews.
- Even multi-level exercises could be executed featuring companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions.
- The simulation environment should ensure the preparation of the training audience for the practice of NATO[10] procedures and the development of interoperability.
- The simulation should support the execution of multinational exercises.

In relation to units and subunits included in the simulation:

- Corps / division level simulation should be performed mainly by handling company level aggregated subunits in the entire area of operation.
- Being able to handle (display and model in detail) selected units of simulated forces at the elementary unit (entity) level.
- Being able to work with mixed resolution entities (elementary units and aggregated subunits can be present at the same time, in one scenario).

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[7] MARS (Marcus/b): Battalion level constructive simulation

[8] Zrínyi 2026: Home defence and force development program

[9] Other European countries have launched similar programs due to various threats and challenges. More about these: Ilchenko, O., Brusakova, O., Burchenko, Y., Yaroshenko, A., Bagan, Y. 2021. The role of a defence industry in the system of national security: a case study. Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, 8(3), 438-454. http://doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2021.8.3(28) and Dubauskas, G., 2021. Conditions influencing the change of defense budgets - the case of Lithuania. Insights into Regional Development, 3(2), 282-288. http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2021.3.2(8)

[10] NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

- Tactical situations should be allowed to include any organizational structure, vehicle and weapon characteristics, deployment positions on the battlefield, both for own forces and for the opponent and other participants, and these could be easily and freely modified by the scenario planner according to training needs.

Regarding the modelled activities:

- A state-of-the-art constructive simulation should model traditional and urban combat, combat support, fire support, air support and air defence, naval warfare, reconnaissance, logistics, CBRN[11], electronic and cyber warfare, operation other than war/OOTW[12], peace support, stability operation, disaster management, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism and border management in high detail. As can be seen, a state-of-the-art constructive simulation system is capable of fully modelling the African problems mentioned in the introduction, and can support the preparation and training effectively.

Regarding the tactical database:

- The tactical / technical database should contain detailed technical data and capabilities of the most commonly used military equipment in NATO and non-NATO countries.
- The tactical / technical database should be modifiable and expandable by the user.
- Non-combatants and civilians should be able to appear in the simulation.

Regarding the modelled battlefield:

- The basic model of the virtual battlefield is the digital terrain database, which consists of a raster terrain model and a detailed, high-resolution vector overlay of terrain features / maps. The terrain database can be extended from various types of standard (NATO and non-NATO) format databases from anywhere in the world to be suitable for modelling any area of operations. Being able to use the OpenStreetMap[13] database for training. A huge advantage of the free OSM is its almost complete coverage of the globe, even for Africa.
- The digital terrain database can be supplemented with additional standard format raster layers, aerial photographs, satellite images, scanned maps.
- The modelling should take into account the characteristics of the battlefield and the terrain features on it, the environmental effects: light conditions, wind, rain, snow, temperature, including extreme conditions (desert, high mountain), the latter being particularly important for an application in Africa,
- The properties of the modelled terrain may change as a result of events in the simulation execution (dynamic terrain).

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[11] CBRN: Chemical, Bacteriological, Radiological, Nuclear
[12] OOTW: Operation Other Than War
[13] OpenStreetMap is a world map database available under a free license.

- Different types of engineering obstacles should be modelled.
- Modelling should be based primarily on physical algorithms.
- The model should deal with human factors (e.g. qualifications, suppression, recovery, fatigue, training level, etc.)
- The modelling should take into account random errors, failures, standard deviations.

Regarding the design, execution and management of the simulation:

- The simulation should have a familiar, user-friendly user interface (based on the Windows operating system in Hungary).
- APP-6[14] Military Symbology on the high-resolution, digitised, vector and raster maps should be used; and the layers created by the training audience could be freely turned on and off.
- The user interface could be customized to each operator's task (displaying only the necessary interface elements and functions) for easier training and operation.
- The user interface should include intuitive functions that support the work of the role players / operators by offering possible user operations.
- Help should be provided with developing training scenarios with its extensive features. Assist the planning by displaying the results of computer-assisted terrain assessments (visibility, trafficability, terrain coverage, terrain section, etc.).
- Assistance with implementation using simple automatisms (e.g., route tracking for marching columns, performing planned activities, etc.).
- Inclusion of an extendable task archive.
- The simulation should be able to handle pre-planned events (MEL/MIL[15]) that affect the execution of exercises automatically or with the help of the directing staff/exercise controllers.
- Workstation user interfaces can be set to different languages individually.
- Being able to handle any user-defined workstation subunit binding, allow it to be changed dynamically during the simulation execution.
- It should be possible to create pre-planned activities, activity chains, their automatic execution and timing.
- It should be possible to request a simple 3D display of the terrain and the terrain features and tactical equipment on it from any point of view depending on the role of the operators, or the simulator should be able to connect to a different special 3D display device via a standard interface.

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[14] APP-6 - Allied Procedural Publication 6, NATO Joint *Military* Symbology
[15] MEL/MIL: Master Events List/Master Incidents List

Figure 1. A terrain assessment in MARCUS simulation (one from many: Cross-Country-Movement). (Source: http://www.artifex.hu/hu Accessed 19 February 2021.)

Regarding the Evaluation of the Simulation Execution (AAR[16]):

- The simulator should have a built-in AAR system that provides detailed backup of exercises, its replay, and event search.
- It should be possible to query various statistics (e.g. stock changes, losses) from the saved data in the AAR system in tabular and graph format.
- The exercise could be restarted or a new exercise could be started from any saved state of a previously performed exercise

Regarding the connection to own systems:

- The simulation system should be suitable for distribution, can be installed in national dispersed locations.
- Systems installed in garrisons or other locations should be able to operate independently, without a central system, or in any combination, and perform exercises in a common virtual space. The connections should not require more than the standard internet bandwidth.
- There should be a configuration support function for connecting several systems, e.g. pre-planned workstation allocations.

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[16] AAR - After Action Review

- If several systems are connected, the status of the connections can be monitored on the central system.

Regarding the exchange of data with other systems:

- Being able to connect to other simulation or control systems via standard NATO data protocols (HLA, ADatP-3[17], C2SIM[18]).
- Being able to connect to classified networks or systems.
- Enabling data exchange with perhaps the two most common NATO IT systems: LOGFAS[19] and TOPFAS[20].

Figure 2. MARCUS-KRONOS connection using HLA interface. (Source: http://www.artifex.hu/hu Accessed 19 February 2021.)

Regarding training necessary to operate the simulation system:

- Operator-level handling of the simulation should be taught to military users with relatively short training so that they can effectively use the user interface independently. To this end, the user interface should be customizable for each workstation.
- Enhancing the effectiveness of training operators, the system should include educational support functions and connect to an e-learning system (at least to the framework used in NATO).

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[17]ADatP-3 - Allied Data Publication 3, NATO Message Text Formatting System, technical standard about the construction of the messages.
[18] C2SIM: Standard for Command and Control Systems - Simulation Systems Interoperation, SISO-STD-019-2020
[19] LOGFAS - NATO Logistics Functional Area Services (Logistics Systems)
[20] TOPFAS - Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Services, NATO NC3A

Regarding the operation of the simulation system:

- The design of the system should ensure that the independent end-user could create, modify tasks, execute and evaluate exercises.
- The end user should be able to modify and extend the terrain and tactical database.
- The headcount of the fixed group supporting the execution of the exercises should not exceed 30 people.
- In preparation for a particular exercise, learning the role player / operator tasks should not take more than 1 week and should basically be feasible in the garrisons. Refresher training should take a maximum of 3 days.

Regarding the cost-effective operation of CAX systems:

- Due to labour market trends in recent years and declining resources / growing needs, the militaries of most countries operating modern CAX systems have to modernize existing systems. An important element of that is that their existing systems should be operated at well-planned cost and human resource levels, and should even be operated using internal resources.

To achieve this, three levels need to be established and collaborated:

- Manufacturing / software development companies
- Development companies provide continuous updates and background support to address technical issues that arise during an exercise.
- Central operating staff
- Their task is to operate the systems, to train garrison personnel.
- Garrison role player / operator staff
- A group of 2-3 people must be trained for this task.

Of course, not all of the listed requirements can be fully met, in several cases neither the legal situation or the economy makes it possible. However, it can definitely be a good starting point when formulating a set of requirements.

Constructive simulation systems (CAX) in Hungary

During the last decade, the use of simulation tools has become decisive in modern training in all militaries of the world, mainly due to lack of resources. With their help, military exercises and training can be carried out in a risk-free environment, cost-effectively, taking into account environmental aspects as well, in conditions close to reality.

With the appearance of new equipment to be procured within the Zrínyi 2026 force development program, it is necessary to review the operational / tactical requirements of the

simulation capabilities available at the Hungarian Armed Forces. Due to the technical modernization of the Hungarian Armed Forces, new tasks are emerging, but they are also new opportunities for the Hungarian defence industry. Building on existing live, virtual and constructive (CAX) simulation systems, they can get involved in international circulation, while helping interoperability ambitions. Hungary has joined the EU BattleLab[21] and CBRN SaaS[22] PESCO projects and is the leader of the EUROSIM[23] PESCO project.


Figure 3. The Hungarian distributed simulation network, integrated MARCUS-KRONOS-ZEUS-MTR environment.
(Source: http://www.artifex.hu/hu Accessed 19 February 2021.)

Since its introduction in 2000, the MARCUS simulation has been continuously adapted to the changed geopolitical situation and doctrines, the application areas have been expanded and further developed in the latest versions. Currently, MARCUS v 14 is the latest available version that can be connected to other simulation systems (e.g., KRONOS) and other nations'

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[21] The EU-Battle Lab (EDIDP) project aims to develop a distributive simulation capability that is an open, modular, scalable IT system and, in addition, capable of connecting to simulation systems already in use in NATO. Areas of application: education and training, decision support, research. HM EI Zrt. Participates in the project from the Hungarian side. Upon successful implementation, a prototype, "demo" kit and its documentation will be completed.

[22] GAMMA Zrt and BHE Bonn Kft are participating in the PESCO-launched EDA project on behalf of Hungary.

[23] The aim of the Integrated European Joint Forces Multi-Purpose Training and Simulation Center (EUROSIM) project is to develop a system for the simulation of multinational joint operations in the European Union for the joint training and exercise of the forces of the member states. The main element of the simulation system will be a data link that meets information security requirements, ensuring that the countries participating in the project connect their existing simulation centers in real time, creating the possibility of an international, joint force training. The project is to be developed by 2025 under the leadership of Hungary, within the framework of international industrial cooperation. Artifex Simulation and Training Systems Ltd, HM EI Zrt., CAE Hungary and 4iG Nyrt. participate in the project from the Hungarian side.

simulation systems (e.g., JCATS) via a standard HLA[24] Evolved interface. The MARCUS-C2[25] connection is also possible.

The MARCUS simulation is a joint integrated model that is suitable for modelling not only military operations, but also disaster management, terrorism, peacekeeping and other areas.

Paradigm change in the field of operation

In the past year, the development of the next generation of MARCUS software (MARCUS v20) related to CAX systems has started which will not only have new capabilities, but also contains the possibility of even more cost-effective operation.

During scenario executions, the simulation systems are handled by professional military role players, not civilian operators. The professional staff providing the background for the operation is limited to planners, OPFOR[26], DISTAFF[27] and AAR operators and technicians. With the new operating rules, users can now use standard procedures in NATO to conduct CAX exercises. Officers learn to operate the simulation system, come into contact with the technology, and learn a skill they can also utilize during exercises abroad.

In 2016, during the Brave Warrior exercise, the MARCUS v12 simulation was installed in Slovenia and Croatia. At the Croatian site, after a few days of training, the Croatian officers were already handling the MARCUS simulation.

Figure 4. Brave Warrior 2016 Deployment site of Marcus simulation. (Source: https://caxsupport.wordpress.com/2016/10/04/brave-warrior-2016/ Accessed 19 February 2021.)

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[24] HLA Evolved: IEEE 1516-2010 - IEEE Standard for Modelling and Simulation (M&S) High Level Architecture (HLA)-- Framework and Rules, NATO STANAG 5603 / IEEE
[25] C2: Command and Control
[26] OPFOR - Opposition Force
[27] DISTAFF - Directing Staff

MARCUS simulation can be customized for users, the user interface can be simplified according to the application area (e. g. artillery, air force, tank, etc.), which significantly helps both training and execution.

Tasks related to the transformation of CAX operating technology and their expected results

Due to the reduction in the number of civilian personnel and the redeployment of tasks, the existing operation and practice implementation technology needs to be reworked to adapt to the new division of tasks.

The topics for the training of professional military personnel participating as trainees in practice and the terms of the training (number of personnel, required practice and knowledge, etc.) should be developed. During the planning of exercises, the preparation of military role players should also be planned.

In order for the professional staff to be able to prepare for the use of the MARCUS simulator in a short time, it is advisable to implement the following improvements:

- extension of intuitive functions
- further simplification of the user interface
- built-in education support features
- expansion of automations

Significant headcount savings:

The transformations will drastically reduce the number of civilian personnel currently providing the operation of simulation systems. From 4 months after implementation 35, and from month 6, 20 people will be able to prepare the system for the exercises and support the professional staff during the exercises. Experience has shown that further redundancies may be envisaged.

Exercise name	BLUEFOR	OPFOR	3rdparticipant	Mars	Mars	Mars	total	gain
Bocskaifokos 2010	23/5	10/9					33/13	-20
Decon 2011	24/5	6/5					30/10	-20
Acélpenge 2012	12/3	8/6	4/2	5/2			29/13	-16
Pegazus	6/1	2/2		5/2			13/5	-8
Decon2012		12/9		9/2	7/2	6/2	34/15	-19
Jeges Tisza	14/4						14/4	-10
Bocskaifokos 2012		11/8		9/2	7/2	6/2	33/14	-19
Logistical exercise 2009	28/5	2/2	1/1				31/8	-23
Sötétfelhő 2012	9/3	7/6					16/9	-7
Black Horse	18/4	1/1	1/1				20/6	-14

Figure 5. Envisaged headcount of operators/pucksters, based on previous exercises (current number/expected numbers in the new system). (Source: made by the author.)

Overall, with the new version, the system can be operated with a central staff of about 32.

Ongoing developments related to the MARCUS system

MARCUS short-term development tasks (2020-2022):

International cooperation with other organizations and systems (SIM[28]-SIM and SIM-C2 connection) will continue along the results achieved so far in the field of Interoperability.

The development continues to focus on further simplifying the handling and operation of the simulation. Both in Hungary and abroad, it is important to be able to carry out as many exercises as possible with as few operators as possible. In the interest of cost-effective operation, further improvements can be implemented, which will further increase the possibility of economical operation in a very short time. The new MARCUS version has already been designed in accordance with the above operating principles.

NATO supports and even expects national systems to work together in a number of areas. Within this, the solution of simulation-simulation and simulation-management system relationships is essential, as the implementation of simulation exercises only creates a realistic environment when these IT systems are connected.

The aim is to connect the already interconnected nationally developed simulation systems (MARCUS, MARS, KRONOS) with other simulations/simulators used in Hungary (e.g. FABV

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[28] SIM – Simulation

Trainer[29], Electronic Warfare Simulator[30]) and in NATO (e.g. JCATS[31], WARSIM[32]) developed for military or disaster protection purposes (e.g. Building EXODUS[33]). To this end, the application of the NETN FOM[34] developed by the HLA Working Group and the search for additional partners for further interoperability tests and the development of HLA capability will be an ongoing task.

Figure 6. FABV Trainer simulator room in HDF 93rd Petőfi Sándor CBRN battalion. (Source: http://www.gammatech.hu Accessed 19 February 2021.)

Based on the results obtained so far in CWIX[35] exercises (CWIX capability tests with other NATO nations' C2 systems), the technology is available to perform data exchange between MARCUS simulation and C2 systems and to stimulate C2 / C4I[36] systems. After the international data exchange, the connection of the Hungarian-developed C2 system and the simulation must also be implemented.

To support the execution of the simulation exercises, NCIA[37] launched the EXIS[38] project, which was renamed NISE[39]. The work is coordinated by the JFTC[40].

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[29] The training system developed for the operator of the VS BTR 80 chemical reconnaissance vehicles of the Hungarian Defense Forces. It is developed by GAMMA Műszaki Zrt, Hungary's leading defense company, currently with the widest Hungarian defense product portfolio.

[30] As part of the Electronic Warfare development launched within the framework of the Defense and Armed Forces Development Program, the methods of radio electronic detection and interference can be mastered on modern equipment in the laboratory established at the Department of Electronic Warfare of the NKE HHK [16].

[31] JCATS: Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

[32] WARSIM: Warfighter's Simulation, Lockheed Martin

[33] The evacuation simulation program (EXODUS) developed by the Fire Safety Engineering Group (The Faculty of Architecture, Computing & Humanities UNIVERSITY of GREENWICH) can be used for evacuation simulation of buildings, dynamic pedestrian behaviour and traffic analysis. https://fseg.gre.ac.uk/fire/EXODUS_animations.asp (Accessed 19 February 2021).

[34] NETN FOM - NATO Education and Training Network Federate Object Model, NATO MSG-068 Working Group

[35] CWIX - Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, eXamination, eXercise[12][13]

[36] C2/C4I: Command and Control / Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence

[37] NCIA: NATO Communications and Information Agency

[38] EXIS: NATO Exercise Information System

[39] NISE: NATO Information Service for Exercises, NCIA

[40] JFTC - Joint Forces Training Centre, Bydgoszcz, Poland

The Hungarian company developing MARCUS was also invited to work on this project.

The efficiency of the training service can be increased by practicing not only on fixed-installation workstations, but also at mobile simulator points deployed in addition to specific military exercises. One of the most effective solutions for this purpose is the Defence Mobile Simulator Centre (VMSzK). With the help of the Industrial Strategy Support Programme of the Irinyi Plan, funded by the Irinyi Plan Industrial Strategy Grants appropriation, GAMMA Zrt has developed a multi-purpose container family with an expandable floor area. The new version of MARCUS is designed to be optimally operated in a mobile environment on a scalable scale. The demonstration tool is implemented in one of the elements of this multi-purpose container family with expandable floor space.


Figure 7. Visual design of a multi-purpose, expandable container system. (Source: http://www.gammatech.hu Accessed 19 February 2021.)

For simulation training, mobile systems are required in the following areas:

- constructive simulation: mainly in the fields of non-military training, such as law enforcement, disaster management, terrorism and critical infrastructure protection. Operation can obviously be done with military assistance;
- virtual simulation: support for voluntary reserve training at national level. Tactical training of small subunits, even at the individual warrior level;
- shooting training: voluntary reserve training, mobile shooting range.

Due to its nature, the utilization of the tool can be maximized, the cost of each exercise can be significantly reduced, and the rate of return is very high. Additional training systems can be implemented on the basis of the container simulation system to be developed.

MARCUS long-term development tasks (2022-2026):

The constant threat of migration, the civil war situations around the world, mission tasks, relentless terrorism, cybercrime and the epidemic that appears from time to time also justify the further development of training for these tasks. In order to prepare more effectively, existing simulation models need to be further expanded (e.g. operation of camps, assembly and management of teams, border control, special counter-terrorism equipment, explosives, explosion effects on humans and the environment, mass screening, blasting, chemical attack in metros or confined spaces).

In the current geopolitical situation, virtually all NATO operations take place in a civilian environment, which must also be reflected in training. MARCUS simulation is currently suitable for displaying / inserting limited civilian actions in the scenarios, but an intensive civilian environment (movement of civilian aircraft, ships, vehicles and people) can only be realized if artificial intelligence automatically generates it in the virtual space without operator intervention or with little intervention.

During commander and staff training, the supportive simulation system should be able to represent cyber-attacks as well, manage their consequences, and thus force the training audience to recognize them and make decisions.

New opportunities in the field of simulation center, national simulation capability as a result of these developments

In addition to the recommendation of the national simulation center and training capability, it is possible to set up a mobile simulation training group. The group would have the aforementioned 3x20-foot container, equipped with the infrastructure needed to carry out the exercise (servers, OPFOR and DISTAFF workstations, network elements). At the installation site, the role players' workstations are provided by the party using the service and are connected to the mobile system. The training team also performs the pretraining of the role players and the training audience.

A visible strategic direction is for nations to use their own tools to create a complex training tool (LVC SIM[41]) that can be considered an integrated system. The USA is the leader in this area, but several other NATO members have already reported their successes. The LVC design is not only an infrastructure, thus the associated training system needs to be developed. The creation of this kind of system allows multi-level simulation exercises to be carried out.

Of the systems currently in use, MARCUS, KRONOS, and TRACKS[42] (prototype) are currently able to work together in a common simulation exercise.

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[41] LVC SIM - Live-Virtual-Constructive Simulation

[42]TRACKS peacekeeping reconnaissance simulator prototype suitable for patrol training, was completed as part of the ITM tender, developed specifically to prepare for UN missions in Africa. The system is very similar to the FABV training simulator

The example of other nations shows that simultaneously with the interconnection of simulation systems, the interconnection of command-and-control systems with the simulations also takes place.

Communication interfaces:

- Among simulators: HLA Evolved, DIS[43]
- Towards C2 / C4I systems: ADatP-3, MIP[44], C-BML[45]

New opportunities created as a result of the developments in the field of international relations and cooperation

Recommendation of the Simulation Center for international usage:

Although all NATO members have simulation training capabilities, only Hungary, Germany and France have a CAX training background that is nationally developed. Other nations use predominantly USA systems, which pose serious technical, material, and administrative problems for both operation and customization and further development.

Moreover, according to an official NATO announcement the very widespread JCATS and JTLS[46] systems have no future, and will need to be replaced within a few years.

For 15 years, NATO has held the CWIX exercise once a year, which tests the interoperability of various command and control systems, simulation and other IT systems and capabilities used by NATO nations, see http://www.act.nato.int/cwix. The aim of this work is to effectively develop cooperation between NATO systems.

The tests take place in subgroups (Focus Area) that participants can join. During the preparation, it is decided who wants to test what and participants find partners.

Hungary currently works in 4 Focus Areas:

- FMN47 (general networking, infrastructure tests)
- Cyber Defence
- Modelling and Simulation (ARTIFEX)
- Land (HM EI, C2)

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developed by GAMMA. 1 workstation dedicated to driver and vehicle / patrol commander. With the help of 3D and digital maps, several patrols can practice their mission in a network, in addition, a "command" workplace has been created. Communication takes place on a simulated radio network.

[43] DIS - Distributed Interactive Simulation (*DIS*) is an IEEE standard (IEEE 1278-1993, DIS 7: IEEE 1278.1-2012)

[44] MIP - Multilateral Interoperability Programme

[45] C-BML - SISO-STD-011, "Standard for Coalition Battle Management Language Phase 1"

[46] JTLS - Joint Theater Level Simulation, Rolands& Associates Corp.

[47] FMN- Federal Mission Network

In the simulation working group, the HDF offered the MARCUS capability. The developers have performed a number of interoperability tests for both simulations and C2 / C4 control systems.

Summary

In the field of military simulations, Hungary also has excellent products in international comparison. The world-class MARCUS constructive simulation operates in the Simulation Center of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) in Várpalota and in several garrisons, which ensures the full service of the staff training. The MARCUS system is suitable not only for military but also for civilian use in the training of disaster management, critical infrastructure protection, terrorism and the fight against drug trafficking. Unlike competing systems, MARCUS simulation is extremely flexible, can be quickly adapted to individual needs, and can even be easily expanded by the user.

Figure 8: Cutting edge simulation, training and test environment, (Source: picture made by the author, 25 June 2021.)

Last year, the development of the next generation of MARCUS software was also launched, which will not only have new capabilities based on user needs, but also comes with the possibility of more cost-effective operation. An important element of the improvements is that the system can be operated at well-planned cost and human resources levels, so that it can be operated with a lower number of operators (even the employer's own operation) who perform the task on a case-by-case basis.

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Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Turkey and Africa Connections Focused on the Military Industry

Tibor Babos[1], Jordán Petrőcz[2]

Abstract:

The connection between Turkey and North Africa has historical roots, that is why it is understandable that the current Turkish government puts emphasis on the region. Moreover, the AKP-led Turkey has opened the scale and has built connections all over Africa, including the Sub-Saharan part to the southern end of the continent and even the Horn of Africa.

Turkey's expansion into Africa is centred around three pillars: 1) economic policies, 2) expansion of diplomatic missions, 3) and humanitarian assistance. The military assistance and Turkish made military products can be part of more of these pillars but can also be seen as a fourth territory which is really important to Turkey in connection with Africa. For military connections between Turkey and Africa, we can list the following areas: 1) selling of Turkish defence products to African countries, 2) building army bases on African land, like in Somalia or in Sudan, 3) training African troops and giving them products and know-how, like in Libya. In this study, we would like to give a picture of the recent military connections between Turkey and Africa.

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[2] PhD student at Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences of Óbuda University, Budapest, Hungary.

1. Overview

The current situation is that Turkey has been strengthening its connection with the African continent in the last years.

We are looking for the answer how the connections between Turkey and Africa have strengthened, focusing on the military aspect.

Turkey's cooperation and connection with African countries have multiplied in the last two decades, and the military connections especially has become strong.

To have an insight into the Turkish-African military connections, we should consider these areas: 1) selling of Turkish defense products to African countries, 2) building army bases in African land, like in Somalia or in Sudan, 3) training African troops and give them products and know-how, like in Libya.

In this study first of all we will look through in general the strengthening connections between Turkey and Africa, such as the diplomatic visits, embassies, cultural and economic connections. After that we would like to detail the military connections of Turkey and Africa, as listed above, such as: what kind of military products Turkey has sold to African countries, which African countries are buyers of Turkish products, and what kind of military presence Turkey has on the African continent.

2. Turkey and Africa – strengthening connections

Historically, North Africa can be seen as part of the "traditional sphere of influence" of Turkey, since it was part of the Ottoman Empire. But after 1923, Turkey isolated itself from such former spheres of influence, and oriented itself to the West. Although since 2003, with the leadership of the AKP, Turkey has put emphasis on North Africa again, and Turkish influence is growing in countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya (Saddiki 2020). But nowadays, Turkey has become a major partner not only in North African countries but also south of the Sahara and in the whole continent.

Turkey became an observer member of the African Union in 2005, and strategic partner in 2008, although the country has started its "African Initiative Policy" in 1998 and was guest member of the African Union since 2002. After that, 2005 was also declared as the "Year of Africa" in Turkey. (Torpak 2021) AKP-led Turkey adopted the "Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with African Countries" in 2003 to increase economic relations with Africa. (Siradag 2018) Since then, there is a visible progress in several fields between Turkey and Africa, such as trade, investment, cultural projects, security and military cooperation, and development projects. Turkey also made its "Africa Partnership Policy" in 2013. (MFA n.d.) "With our Africa Partnership Policy, which is the product of an integrated understanding that includes the activities of public institutions, private sector, non-governmental organizations and humanitarian aid organizations, we aim to contribute to the peace, stability, economic

and social development of the Continent, and develop our bilateral relations on the basis of equal partnership and mutual benefit" stated on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Turkey (MFA n.d.).

The connections between Turkey and Africa strengthened during the leadership of the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. One data shows how important the African continent is for Ankara: President Erdoğan visited more than half of the African countries personally since he came to power. (Durmaz 2021) We can see on the picture and the chart below that the leader of the Republic of Turkey visited 30 African countries.

Figure 1. President Erdogan's visits to Africa (Source: African Business)

The List of the countries President Erdoğan already visited in Africa: Algeria, Angola, (Daily Sabah 2021a) Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya. Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger,

Nigeria, Republic of South Africa, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, (Daily Sabah 2021b) Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia.

In fact, Erdoğan visited more African countries than any other non-African national leader. (Mitchell 2021) President Barack Obama only visited seven African countries during eight years of his presidency. (BBC 2017) President Trump never visited personally the continent for four years but his daughter Ivanka Trump and the first lady, Melanie Trump visited several African country representing Trump. (Signé 2019) Vladimir Putin only visited five African country since 2000, he rather hosted African leaders in Russia. (France24 2019) China takes the African visit also very seriously, China's leaders have also been regular guests on the continent in the last decades. (O'Connor 2020) In fact, there is a ritual of Beijing visiting Africa at the beginning of every year. The current foreign minister of China, Wang Yi, since 2014 has visited 35 African countries during his annual visits.

The Turkish first lady Emine Erdoğan is strongly committed to humanitarian aid in Africa and published a book in 2020 titled *Afrika Seyahatlerim* ("My travels in Africa"), which has been translated into French, English, and Arabic. (Mashharawi 2021) Turkey is really active in humanitarian actions on the continent: Turkey was the largest humanitarian aid provider in Africa in 2017. (Siradag 2018)

Another important information that shows the strengthening connections is that the number of Turkish embassies in Africa was only 12 in 2002, but it is 43 in 2021. (Aydogan 2021) Soon it will be 44 embassies as one embassy is being prepared in Bissau Guinea, as Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey already said. (Daily Sabah 2021c) Also, the number of the African embassies has increased since 2008, when there were only 10 African embassies in Ankara, now there are 37 African countries who has embassies in the capital of Turkey. (MFA n.d.) The increased number of embassies shows that both sides see each other as an important partner.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) also operates 22 Program Coordination Offices across Africa currently. There are more Turkish Institutes that are active in the continent: Yunus Emre Institute, Turkish Diyanet Foundation, Anadolu Agency (AA), and Turkish Airlines (THY). Total value of the projects conducted by Turkish companies in Africa exceeds 70 billion USD. (Daily Sabah 2021c)

Figure 2. The number of Turkish embassies in Africa has increased from 12 in 2003 43 in 2021.
(Source: African Business)

Another important indicator to show the strengthening connections between Turkey and the African countries is the economy. Turkey's trade with the African continent is nowadays more than 4 times bigger than in 2003. In 2003, it was 5.4 billion USD, and in 2020, it was 25.3 USD. The goal of Turkey to even double this number to 50 billion USD in the coming years. For example, in Ethiopia, Turkey is the second biggest investor. (Mitchell 2021) Turkey has become the third largest importer of Algerian products, and the two countries aim to boost trade to 4.1 billion euros a year. (France24 2021) Turkish Airlines has more and more destinations in Africa, becoming an important company for people to reach Africa and for Africans to reach the world. There were already two Turkey-Africa Partnership Summits (2008, 2014) and the Third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit was organized under the auspices of Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan. (MFA n. d.) The Summit took place in Istanbul on 17 and 18 of December 2021, after it was postponed in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Dedet 2021)

Turkey has better reputation in Africa since many western countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, or France had a long history of promoting dictatorships, secret arms shipments, and business interests through financial assistance, and had divisive policies, which did more harm than good to Africa. (Toprak 2021) The strengthening ties to Africa is part of the remodeling of Turkey as an "Afro-Eurasian state", as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan plans, so that the country can be a model for the Islamic world and an alternative to the West. (Mitchell 2021) This direction can be seen as a great change since Turkey tried to be accepted as a European Union member for decades, but as the EU "was with a wait-and-see attitude to sanction the Turkish behavior if it does not match the EU's interests" and therefore postponed Turkey's membership for years, (Toprak 2021) it seems Turkey started its independent system building of allies.

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, emphasized that Turkey's approach to Africa is based on the principle of "African solutions for African problems". (Hurriyet 2021) That means: "external or foreign solutions were not viable in Africa since they were either 'imported' or 'dictated' to Africans. Therefore, Africans would not own those solutions. In a nutshell the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' implies that this is the time for Africans to take things into their own hands and make use of their resources to solve Africa's troubles." (ISS 2008)

Turkey's expansion into Africa is centered around three pillars:

1. economic policies,
2. expansion of diplomatic missions,
3. and humanitarian assistance. (Toprak 2021)

But in reality, it is not easy to separate these fields, as Ali Bilgic, an expert in Turkish foreign policy at Loughborough University in the UK stated: "it is not possible or advisable to separate Turkish economic, political, humanitarian, and military objectives." (Mitchell 2021) So in a way we can list a fourth pillar as military connections or this field is connected to all the three other pillars.

Today, Turkish fingerprints are all over Africa. See some examples:

- east Africa's biggest stadium, the Kigali Arena in Rwanda built by a Turkish construction firm,
- an Olympic swimming pool in Senegal built by a Turkish construction firm,
- a colossal mosque in Djibouti built by a Turkish construction firm,
- on Libya's battlefields they use Turkish military hardware. (Mitchell 2021)

As we can see, Ali Bilgic also listed the military objectives as 4th objective, and I would like to deal with more about this question.

3. Turkish-African military connections

3.1. Selling Turkish defense products to Africa

One of the greatest problems that African countries face is security as traditional partnerships between Africa and Europe, or African countries and their former colonial masters have failed to sustain peace and stability on the continent. Huge conflicts emerged through Africa and often Western allies failed to help. We can see that these conflicts "ranging from tribal warfare to international skirmishes, military assets range from very primitive to state-of-the-art weapons", (Babos 2007) and some terror organizations or rebellious militias also get somehow better and better weapons.

Therefore, it has been a strategic goal for African countries to purchase high quality defense products and to develop a new type of security relationship with non-Western countries. Turkey have been seen as an experienced country in the fields of defense as Turkey is an important member of NATO and has been fighting against terrorist groups inside and outside the country. African countries have seen Turkey as a reliable actor in the security field and they seek to benefit from the experience and Turkey aims to share its defense and technological experience with African countries. (Siradag 2018) Turkish military products have an important economic and defense role but also symbolize the country's independence in a way. After historical traumas, Turkey aims to be self-sufficient in the field of military and defense industry. The country has a goal to increase the defense industry export. So, Africa can be a new market, and Turkey does not want to miss out.

As a matter of fact, Turkey is building connections all over the African continent and in the Sub-Saharan region and is making business of military products in these countries too. In recent years, there were military-related business treaties worth hundreds of millions of USD. (Besenyő 2012) What is more, several countries in the African continent are purchasers of Turkish military equipment. In 2018, Turkey made an 84.35 million US dollar income from the selling of these products to: South Africa, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, and Senegal. (Besenyő 2021)

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly released a report in 2019 on conventional arms trades that provides data on exports to African countries. From that we know that Turkey's defense industry in 2018 exported 40 wheeled armored personnel carriers to Burkina Faso, 20 to Chad, three to Ghana, six to Mauritania, and 25 to Senegal. These were Otokar Cobras. Turkey also exported 183 pieces of 7.65 mm handguns and 400 semi-automatic pistols to Burkina Faso, 100 semi-automatic small and light pistols to Cameroon, six 9 mm handguns to Ghana, 100 handguns and 30 semi-automatic pistols to Kenya, 180 semi-automatic pistols to Mozambique, 30 semi-automatic pistols to Nigeria, and 719 handguns, two 45 caliber Zig M1911s and 4 semi-automatic small and light pistols to South Africa. Zambia imported 25 handguns and 110 semi-automatic small and light pistols from Turkey and Zimbabwe imported 77 handguns and 20 semi-automatic pistols. Turkey exported 100 9 mm ZIG 14s to Ethiopia and 17 9 mm Zigana M16s to South Africa. Turkey also exported ten MP5 MTS A3 submachine

guns to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 208 assault rifles to Senegal. (Cronjé 2019) Apart from these, Turkey mainly sells electronic and technical equipment and armored transport vehicles, ships for African countries. (Besenyő 2021) As we can see from the products, the main Turkish manufacturers that export military products to Africa are: TİSAŞ, Katmerciler, SSB, Otokar.

The following African states are the main recipients/purchasers of Turkish military products: South Africa, Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, and Senegal. (Sünnetcí 2019)

For Turkish military companies, the African presence is so important that they organized the 1st Turkey-Africa Defense, Security and Space Forum on 7-9 November 2018, which became so successful that the 2nd Turkey-Africa Defense, Security and Space Forum was organized only one year later between 6 and 8 November 2019. Since then, now it is the 4th Turkey-Africa Defense, Security and Space Forum being organized. Another successful event is the Turkish-African Congress which has been organized 11 times since 2005. (TASAM n.d.)

In 2019, Tanzania agreed with Ankara to buy Turkish weapons for its army. (Bakeer 2019) Kenya spent 91.4 million US dollar on armored vehicles from Katmerciler, a Turkish manufacturer, to deploy them against al-Shabaab militants. (Daily Sabah 2021d) The contract is about 118 armored vehicles to Kenya. In 2019 Katmerciler, received an export order of $20 million USD from an "unidentified African country," as it was made known. (Torpak 2021)

3.2. Turkish military presence in Africa

Turkey already built some connection in Africa and military is needed to secure the projects. Federico Donelli, a scholar at the University of Genoa specializing on Turkey's Africa policy said: "Middle Eastern political rivalry and security dynamics have been exported to Africa, especially the Horn of Africa. As a result, Turkey, like other regional actors, increased its military presence in the area." (Mitchell 2021) Turkey has been establishing a security partnership with Africa in order to maximize its own national interest. (Siradag 2018)

Turkey contributes to the UN peacekeeping operations. Between 1993-2018, Turkey contributed to 12 UN peacekeeping operation in Africa, most of them was under the AKP leadership. (Ibid) Since the AKP leadership, Turkey entered nine UN peacekeeping operation on African soil in Liberia, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali. Also, three other UN peacekeeping operation were continued since the AKP was elected. (US Peacekeeping n.d.)

3.2.1 Army base in Somalia

Turkey opened a military base in Somalia. The base cost 50 million USD and was built in two years. It has the capacity of 1500 soldiers at a time, so this is Turkey's largest base outside of Turkey, which is near Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Besides Turkey, the United States of America and the United Arab Emirates has also military presence in Somalia. (Al Jazeera 2017)

As it is well-known, Somalia is a target of the pirates because the country is on the strategic way of shipping trade. The strategic importance of trade routes on the ocean and sea, such as near to Somalia, has multiplied in the last years and the pirates take advantage of it, which already caused millions of dollars in loss. (Babos 2011)

So it is not without any purpose that Turkey spent more than 1 billion USD in Somalia, and Turkey invested in the country's transport infrastructure, roads, hospitals, and schools. Turkish companies operate Mogadishu's seaport and airport. And the Turkish Airlines was the first international carrier to fly to Mogadishu in 20 years. (Mitchell 2021) An interesting hint about the Turkish army base in Somalia is that it trains Turkish-speaking Somali soldiers that experts says Ankara expects to contribute to a new geopolitical reality in the Horn of Africa. The Somali soldiers first get a Turkish language course, and they even take their oath in Turkish and Somali language. The Somali troops also follow the same ceremonial rituals as the Turkish Armed Forces, including singing the Turkish Military Academy's traditional anthem. (Kasapoglu 2020)

Turkey signed a special security and defense deal with the Republic of Sudan in 2018, which could result, according to many experts, in establishing a military base in the latter in the foreseeable future." (Siradag 2018) Turkey planned to restore the strategically important Suakin Island located on Sudan's Red Sea and to establish a dock for the restoration of military and civilian vessels on the island. According to the Sudanese Foreign Minister, the country would continue to deepen its security and defense relations with Turkey. (Sabah 2017)

Turkey signed military, security, and defense pacts with more than 25 African countries. Those countries which have defense and security deals with Turkey are:

Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia. As a part of these agreements, Turkey has provided training to hundreds of soldiers and police officers from many countries in Africa. (Siradag 2018)

Figure 3. Turkish defence cooperation in Africa (Source: Besenyő 2021)

3.2.2. Turkish training of the Libyan army

Turkey provided military equipment to the Libyan government who fights against rebels. The conflict was not like a "powerful leader against little group of rebels" situation: although the UN recognized the government of Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Russia supported Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the rebels. So, behind the scenes it was a conflict of greater powers. (Mitchell 2021) In support of the Libyan Government of National Accord, Turkey deployed hundreds of soldiers and thousands of Syrian fighters in its battle against forces of Libya's General Khalifa Haftar. (Jones 2021)

Turkish-made drones helped the Libyan government to win battles against rebels. In 2020 Turkey also took a step further by a direct intervention in Libya, putting Turkish soldiers and mercenaries on the borders of Algeria and Tunisia. In the end of 2020, Turkey's parliament authorized an 18-month extension of its Libya troop deployment. "Turkey has the largest military base on the Tunisian border, a naval base, [and] camps populated by Syrian mercenaries," said Jalel Harchaoui of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague. (France24 2021) Also, the Turkish military constructed an airbase and wants to establish a naval base in Libya, a plan opposed by Egypt and France. (Jones 2021) Turkey in the last three years ratified a maritime memorandum between Tripoli and Ankara, which declared a 16-nautical mile-wide

corridor from southwest Turkey to northeast Libya as an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that ignores the rights of Greece. (Harchaoui 2020)

4. Conclusion

The AKP-led Turkey has opened the scale and has built connections all over Africa now, including the Sub-Saharan part to the southern end of the continent and even the Horn of Africa.

Turkey's expansion into Africa is centered around three pillars: 1) economic policies, 2) expansion of diplomatic missions, 3) and humanitarian assistance. The military assistance and Turkish-made military products can be considered a part of these pillars but can also be seen as a fourth territory which is really important to Turkey in connection with Africa. For military connections between Turkey and Africa, we can list the following areas: 1) selling of Turkish defense products to African countries, 2) building army base on African land, like in Somalia, 3) training African troops and giving them products and know-how, like in Libya.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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The History of the Darfur Conflict and Its Recent Developments

Zsolt Szabó[1]

Abstract:

The present article describes the situation unfolding in Darfur, West Sudan, where a conflict has been taking place since 2003. The author tries to examine all aspects of the crisis and the history of the problem. Beginning with the geography and the historical introduction of the issue, the text continues with the enumeration of the events that have unfolded in the region, beginning with 2003 up until the 2010s. Then the author reflects on the international peacekeeping mission established in the area (UNAMID), which was active between 2007-2020. The article goes on to describe the role of the Hungarian peacekeeping in the operation, and it concludes with the listing of the tasks that the peacekeepers had to accomplish on a short notice. After that, it explains the subsequent events that happened after the end of the 2000s. Detailing the most important factors which contributed to the ill-fated decade, it takes into consideration the features of the conflict that has formed in the 2010s. At the end, the author writes about the latest events that happened in the region including a failed coup attempt on the actual leadership of the country. Finally, he concludes the events end expresses his views about future expectations.

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Short history and geography of Darfur

For a brief ethimology, it can be stated that the term 'Darfur' comes from the Arabic expression Dar and the ethnological name Fur. In Arabic, Dar means house or land, while Fur refers to the tribe of an ethnically diverse group, consisting mainly of Black people living in the region, who dominated the area. So literally it means the 'Land of the Fur' (de Waal, 2005, p. 181). The distribution of ethnicities is somewhat hard to delineate, although it can be said that the northern area of Darfur is inhabited mostly by Arabic population, while the southern part of the land is the home of the Fur and Zaghawa tribes (Totten and Markusen, 2013, p. 252).

Darfur has a unique geography: it is composed mainly of plains that are about 440,000 km², and at its heart there are the Marrah Mountains which have the average height of 2,200 metres. The land is mostly arid and desert area, except for the highlands where the rain is more abundant than elsewhere. There is a difference in lifestyle between the two regions: in the northern areas people are engaged in camel and sheep herding, while the southern part consists of sedentary people, who grow crops and other types of vegetables (Besenyő, 2013. pp. 16-19.).

The Darfur region has its own history which stretches back to ancient times. From 1600 to 1916 it was a part of the Keira sultanate, which islamised the region and organized the administrative, political and cultural entity of the area. Beyond Islam, the Arabic language was important as it was the lingua franca of the sub-Saharan territory. It also provided the Darfurians with education, as the religion had its teachers to educate the minds of the local population. The three most important tribes were the Zaghawa, the Fur and the Masalit communities. Soon afterwards, the Ottoman influence came but after a short period of Turkish rule (1821-84) an interesting movement arose (de Waal, 2005, pp. 184-187). The so-called mahdiyya represented a religious system in which the Mahdi was the role model for his followers, and they were defeated only in 1898 (Daly and Daly, 2010, pp. 62-83).

The country gained independence in 1956. Until then, there were no major problems between the Arabic nomad and the Black sedentary communities. However, in the 1980s, several types of conflicts arose, and tensions erupted. The Black people, the Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa tribes of the Darfur area started to feel that they have been neglected by the Sudanese government. Because of the activity of the Popular Defence Forces – who ravished the Black population of the area at the time – there were serious issues at hand for the Darfurians to solve (de Waal, 2005 Jan., pp. 127-128).

The other cause of the conflict was the entrance of President Omar el-Bashir to the political scene, who organized a coup as a high ranking military officer in 1989. With the help of his advisor, Hasan al-Turabi – who was a well-known conservative Sudanese Islamist at the time – he started to islamise the people of Sudan and began to implement Islamic law (the sharia) (Childress, 2012, p. 141).

The beginning of the conflict

After a long-standing conflict between the Darfurians and the government forces – composed mainly of soldiers of Arabic descent – a tense situation developed. Back from the colonial times, the Black people of the Darfur region felt that they are neglected, and the Sudanese Arabic policy is dominant over them. The fact that they were both Muslim didn't bother any of the sides, so the conflict was not a religious issue. However, it is too simplifying to differentiate between the Darfur region and Khartoum as to call the conflict region only Black. Arabs lived there as well, who were looked down on by the Khartoum leadership and were even called 'zurug', meaning 'Blacks' and 'abid', meaning 'slave' in Arabic regardless of their ethnical similarity (de Waal, 2005, p. 199.). There was another issue at hand which caused differences between the tribes. The so called 'hakurat' which refers to the ownership of lands was one of the most important sources of tension between the opposing sides (Copnall, 2013).

It is a complex setting in which the disagreement between the two sides is very uptight. From the late 20th century onwards, the conflict has escalated into a bloody massacre. By 2003, the Black minority of the area couldn't take the suppressing resolutions of the government and of al-Bashir anymore. The Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit tribes of the region started a revolt against the Khartoum government, and they attacked el-Fasher, the capital of Darfur (Besenyő, 2021, pp. 39-41). In response to the uprising, the Sudanese government created a special force comprised of Arabic tribes to encounter the dangers that were posed by the Darfurian rebels. This army was called the Janjaweed. They were a unit of Arabic soldiers (surprisingly some of them were of Darfurian Arabic descent) riding on horsebacks and fighting against the Darfurian community. They were in close alliance with the government of Sudan and al-Bashir and their task was to carry out the Arabization of the province and the oppression of the Darfurian Black and Arabic minority, the Zaghawa, the Fur and the Masalait tribes, who were fighting for their freedom in alliance with the Sudanese government (Leclair and Pahlavi, 2012, pp. 389-393).

Figure 1. Sudan-Darfur. (Source: UNHCR, April 2011).

The rebel groups were primarily Black in their ethnicity, and they formed two movements which executed the revolt against the oppressing Sudanese government. These were called the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The Janjaweed didn't waste any time and started to harass the Black population of the Darfur region. They pillaged their villages, looted their belongings, raped their women, murdered civilians, and assaulted the elderly and the weak in their communities, while during the conflict, millions of Darfurians were displaced (2.5 million people to be exact), among whom 200,000 emigrated to Chad where they found refuge. The Janjaweed committed horrific crimes against humanity as they continuously harass the innocent civilians of the ill-fated region and they always got away with it because the Sudanese government was granting them impunity, so they are not held accountable for their misdeeds (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Not only has the number of refugees reached horrific numbers, but the number of deaths as terrible as well: at least 300,000 persons were killed in the campaign against the minorities.

The events of the conflict

There were efforts to settle the problems in Darfur through peace accords which usually proven to be futile. In 2006, the sides made a peace agreement which was however ignored. Then in 2011, some of the rebels contributed to the creation of another attempt to achieve peace in the region, the so-called Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Again, this was not so effective as the abuse of the weaker Darfurians continues until today and the international community is helpless in finding a solution to this conflict-ridden part of the world (Copnall, 2013).

The conflict looks hopeless because the government and the Janjaweed forces won't stop bothering humanitarian workers. They unceasingly attack aid convoys that try to carry with them the necessary humanitarian relief, providing food and shelter to the otherwise poor and helpless Darfurian civilians in need of international support. (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

Another problem is caused by the fact that the Darfurian militias continue to harass international journalists, they hijack aid workers, and they strictly control the media and the news of the country, thus there is no freedom of speech in the area. In 2006 for example, Western journalists were held hostage by Sudanese government forces for a long period (Human Rights Watch, 2013).

The international community had to react to the events sooner or later, because the genocide dragged on. Soon after the initial horrendous acts and the terrorizing deeds of the Janjaweed militia, the United Nations Security Council (referring to the Rome Statute) intrusted the International Criminal Court (ICC) to proceed in the matter of the Darfur conflict and the organization accordingly started to indict several Sudanese governmental officials on the basis of committing war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity in 2005 (ICC-

02/05, 2021). In 2009 and then in 2010, the president Omar al-Bashir was also indicted with genocide and war crimes committed against the Black minority of Darfur during the past years of the conflict. According to the indictment, the genocide was carried out by Bashir against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa communities of the Darfur region. At first, he was accused of war crimes, but in 2010, the ICC stated that Bashir committed three cases of genocide as well (Childress, 2012, p. 144). It is interesting to observe the words of Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC prosecutor who wrote in an article in The Guardian that Bashir committed several cases of war crimes and genocide against the Black minority of the country in the Darfur region, and he suggested that Bashir committed these horrendous acts through his right hand, Ahmed Harun (Minister of Interior). Ocampo thinks that Bashir's crimes also expand to the situation of the displaced refugees, who are in a dreadful situation, suffering from the lack of proper living conditions. To quote his words: „No more excuses. … Bashir's forces continue to use different weapons to commit genocide: bullets, rape and hunger." (Moreno-Ocampo, 15 July 2010).

Observing the reactions of the world, it is interesting to note that the Obama-administration wasn't very keen to react to the genocidal acts that were going on at the time in the suffering region. United States president Barack Obama gave a speech in January 2011 about Sudan, but he was mainly talking about its government and the South Sudan issue and omitted the question of the Darfurian crisis. However, according to Reuters, U.S. correspondents don't think that this means a negative view of the situation in Darfur by the country (Charbonneau, 2011).

Thus, it can be suggested that the situation in Darfur, Sudan is hardly but frustrating. The Black minority continues to be abused and offended by the Janjaweed militia, which has no remorse but to pillage and loot the areas of the Darfurians while raping their women and taking their belongings. The Khartoum government provides them with support, and it doesn't intend to stop aiding these militias who make the life of the Darfurians a nightmare. The humanitarian situation in the area is horrific, millions of people have fled to refugee camps and to the West in Chad where they live under bad circumstances. The international community started to take notice of the genocide taking place in Darfur, therefore they began to make assessments to hold the perpetrators accountable. The ICC indicted several officials in the Bashir-government who they think personally contributed to the genocidal acts of the Janjaweed militia and the government forces. In 2010, the situation was dire because – despite the serious efforts of the international community to broker a peace deal with the opposing parties – the conflict escalated, and the attacks became more and more frequent. The aggressive acts continued and the international community had to react to this not only by the means of international law, but also by force. This led to the creation of the international peacekeeping force, UNAMID (United Nations – African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur). UNAMID was a hybrid operation as it was comprised of African forces well. In the following paragraphs, the role and the nature of the mission will be clarified.

The UNAMID and its duties

Before analysing UNAMID, it is interesting to take a look at the AMIS operations that started before the UN mission and were initiated by the African Union in order to ease the situation unfolding in Darfur. Hungarian peacekeepers also served in the mission. In July 2005, AMIS-II was initiated in which EU observers and logistics advisers got a place too. On this occasion had the Hungarian government the opportunity to send peacekeepers to the mission among whom then Major (now ret. Colonel) János Besenyő served as a logistics officer. He was one of the peacekeepers who continuously wrote about the topic, and he described his experiences in several articles about the Darfur conflict and the work of the peacekeepers, which is an important source for the scholars who want to research the topic (Besenyő, 2006, pp.41-42). Besenyő had interesting experiences in the camps he served in. His job title was Field Support Service deputy commander, and he mainly carried out logistic duties. Here is a small entry from his unpublished diary to describe the liveliness and the weariness of the situation that awaited the Hungarian peacekeeping officer: "… During the week, in the second sector (Nyala), one of our patrols was attacked. One Nigerian soldier got shot in the leg. … Overall, the activities of the armed rebel groups seem to intensify…Moreover, the Janjaweed groups and sometimes also the government's military and police departments carry out attacks against the residents of the refugee camps, raping girls and women who are heading to get water…" (Besenyő, 2021, pp.155-156)

The UNAMID was a consequence of the events that have been unfolding in the course of the 2000s. As it was discussed above, from 2003 on, a tragic genocide has been taking place which affected not only the country's stability but also that of neighbouring Chad. From the beginning of the 2010s, nearly 500,000 people had taken refuge from the campaign of the Janjaweed, most of them emigrating into neighbouring Chad (Herr, 2020, p. 79). But let's not hasten that much forward, as it is first interesting to take a look at the mission that was orchestrated in order to regulate and form a normal environment for the displaced and suffering people of the Sudanese population in Darfur.

UNAMID was created according to UN resolution 1769 in which the hybrid force was established on 31 July 2007 to augment the then existing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The African Union joined forces with the United Nations-deployed mission by which the international community wished to ensure the equality and normal livelihood of the Darfurian Black minorities. UNAMID was implemented on 31 December 2007. The main tasks of the operation were the following:

- To help the humanitarian work of the already existing health aid organizations and other NGOs;
- Use the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) as a basis for talks and negotiations between the opposing parties;
- Try to solve the roots of the conflict, the tribal and ethnical differences highlighted.

There are numerous aspects of the conflict in which the UNAMID peacekeeping force is taking part. It has several camps or centers from where it functions. The main headquarters is in El-Fasher in North Darfur, while there are several other sectoral headquarters, for example El-Geneia in West Darfur, Nyala in South Darfur, Zalingei in central Darfur and El Daein in East Darfur. The staff of the mission is abundant compared to other UN operations. In the beginning, it was comprised of 25,987 men, of which there were 19,555 soldiers, 360 military observers, 3,772 police advisers and 2,660 formed police units (FPU). After a while, however, the UN decided to decrease the number of troops serving in the mission, and by July 2012, the total number of soldiers serving in the mission was 23,743 persons. The mission is in a difficult situation, as the Sudanese government is not always willing to assist to the work of the peacekeepers. While the ruling class of the country is inimical to the leaders of the mission as they don't welcome very much the UNAMID force in their country. There are other issues as well, as the climate and the area of the mission is situated in a very harsh zone, where the soil is rigid and there are not a lot of resources at hand to live a comfortable life in the mission due to the poor conditions. The equipment is also insufficient, often vehicles or other means of transport are missing, the infrastructure of the country is unorganized, and it is hard to transport supply items from one place to another. The aerial support is weak as well, sometimes it is hard to overcome transportation and infrastructure problems to reach the proper number of aeroplanes and helicopters in the mission. However, the operation tries its best to encounter the harsh measures which they face in the conflict-ridden area. They have to meet the standards set by the mandate of the mission described above. They have to support civilian life, help the aid workers and try to convince the parties to sit down to a common negotiating table where they could discuss the ongoing problems and try to find a solution that could benefit both parties. UNAMID also appointed a joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, who is changed regularly, and his role was to enable the discussion between the opposing sides and to develop a proper environment for talks to be held between the Sudanese government and several opposing movements (UNAMID homepage, 2021).

A few times there were complaints about the nature and success of the operation, as some mediums criticized the effectiveness of the mission. UNAMID was at times questioned, its mandate was taken into consideration from time to time and it was continuously checked based on its efficiency. For example, there were some questions raised about the troops of the mission. According to some sources, the operation was terribly understaffed, and thus it was unable to conduct sufficient peacekeeping work in the area where UNAMID faces several climatic, political, and other kinds of difficulties. It was also criticized that the mission didn't have enough equipment or supply to complement the existing resources of the peacekeeping operation (Brosché and Rothbart, 2013, pp. 117-122). Other sources complained about the inefficiency of the political-diplomatic machinery of the mission. According some researcher, the mission's leadership was so far too weak with the Sudanese government and they miss the proper strength to encounter the heads of the state to achieve at least a mediocre result in implementing the provisions of the peace agreements and acquiring the rights of the civilian population (Brosché and Rothbart, 2013, p. 121; Besenyő, 2021, p. 99).

The recent developments of the conflict

Turning back to the conflict, one can observe the changing of the situation. Before 2010, the attacks have diminished, and the security was becoming somewhat stable, however, in the course of 2011 there have been repeated attempts of killings and the conflict escalated more. This can be contributed to the fact that the parties didn't take seriously the DDPD (Charbonneau, 2011). The hostilities therefore emerged again, and the international peacekeeping forces were unable to handle the situation properly regardless of their huge number in comparison to other United Nations missions. The intentional genocide, killings, rape murder and abuse of the civilians continued well into the 2010s and they didn't stop despite the efforts of the politicians and the soldiers on the ground. The Black minority continued to be harassed by government troops and other forces (i.e., militias), which were ruthless and committed serious crimes against humanity.

To describe the situation in the early 2010s it is useful to take a look at the report of the United Nations in 2014. According to the document, UNAMID observed that the rights of the civilians are further assaulted by the state forces called the Sudan's Armed Forces (SAF) and the militia Rapid Support Forces (RSF). There are several other organizations of the government who took part in the genocidal acts including Sudanese police organizations and border patrol. There were also inter-communal clashes among the tribes of the Darfur area, thus the conflict seems to be complicated. According to the document there were several cases when civilians were deprived of their rights, and they were injured during the attack of the government forces and militias. Two examples can illustrate the harsh environment in which they continue to exist. On 31 May 2014, there was an incident between a SAF soldier and a local Sheikh. He was allegedly murdered by the military forces of the government. What is usual regarding the document is that the SAF didn't take responsibility for its actions, in fact, it didn't even investigate the killing of an innocent civilian in the Western area of Darfur. The other example involves two young boys in Nyala, who were peacefully returning home but were attacked by RSF forces who caused serious injuries to them and one of them died in the perpetrated attack. It is a typical feature of these acts, that when UNAMID investigated the case, it was discovered that the boy didn't even report the situation. Consequently – and typically one might add – the Sudanese forces withstanded further investigation into the case and it was covered up by the government's armed forces and police. There were other types of abuses as well. One regular type of war crimes was the repeated sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against civilians. According to the report, most of the sexual attacks happened in the Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps. The main problem is that the Darfurian society looks down on the victims of these terrible assaults and they become differentiated by the local townsfolk. Two example here can show the seriousness of the problem in the area. For example, on 22 August 2014 in South Darfur 15 women, some of them still underage were assaulted and they were mishandled by soldiers. It is typical of the Sudanese justice system that no further action was taken, and the impunity of the perpetrators remains a real problem in the territory. In July 2014, two minors were raped by the government forces as they were

travelling by car, and their companions were attacked as well – their property was stolen. There were also inimical attacks on villages by the government forces. One example is the usual feature of the 'Operation Decisive Summer' that was initiated by the government and carried out by SAF and RSF forces: on 19 May 2014 the Khartoum regime conducted a serious offensive against the rebels of Darfur in which three persons were murdered and there could have been other casualties as well. The market was demolished, and the area was looted. The new effort from the government to oppress the Darfurian civilians has taken another level and the innocent people and displaced are at risk because of the continuous abuse of the Khartoum regime. Not only civilians, but UNAMID personnel can't sleep at night anymore. On 30 August in El Geneia in West Darfur a peacekeeper and a Sudanese soldier got into a fight, and consequently the government forces shot dead the UNAMID soldier. Interestingly, the Sudanese authorities didn't even react to these events and the death of the soldier remains covered up by the Bashir-leadership. These acts show that the life of the civilians and the rebels including the peacekeepers is in danger and they need serious assistance in order to evade such assaults on their life and their property (Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014).

Moving forward in time, other atrocities were recorded as well allegedly committed by the government forces against the civilian population in Darfur. According to some sources, the Khartoum regime applied chemical weapons on innocent Darfurians in the course of January 2016. The weapons caused dire aches for the individuals: it inflicted strong pain, vomiting, diarrhoea and blindness on the persons who were exposed to such chemicals (McDougall, 2021, p. 255).

At the end of the 2010s another remarkable event happened. As of 19 December 2019, a popular revolt began in Sudan as the government significantly raised the price of bread. Amidst growing discontent because of the inefficiency of the Khartoum regime and the reign of Omar al-Bashir, who terrorized the Black minorities of the country, inflicted harm upon its citizens and managed to ruin the economy of the country, the Sudanese people started to voice their concerns regarding the head of the state and his rule. In consequence of the protests, on 8 April 2019 several people went to one of the important military installations of the Sudanese government, in which the presidential suite can be found. The demonstrators called for the resignation of el-Bashir, who – as mentioned above – was indicted by the ICC for committing horrendous crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. However, until that point, he remained in office which ought to have been changed by the course of a week. Interestingly it seems that there were clashes between the Sudanese security forces and inside the military, thus it could be observed that Bashir has lost control over his military machinery and suggested his demise soon (Burke, 8 April 2019).

This was to happen anyway, as the military intervened, and by a coup, they arrested Omar al-Bashir and detained him in a Sudanese prison. The armed forces announced that they would be in power for two years, and after they have consolidated the country's situation, they would give the opportunity to the people of Sudan to decide on the future of the state. The

correspondent of the Sudanese forces declared that state emergency would continue, and a curfew would be implemented. The Sudanese people were impressed with the arrest of el-Bashir, but they expressed their grave fears that the following military government would continue to pursue harsh politics and the situation of the Darfurians, and the Sudanese would not improve very much. Therefore, violent protest broke out in several villages in the rural areas and in Khartoum at the same time in order to demonstrate against an oppressive regime that could have followed the Bashir-era. An interesting fact can be that these massive uprisings against the old government followed only by a week the demise of the 20-year long rule of the Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Burke, 11 April 2019).

Along these political events another case was beginning to settle. The more or less successful UNAMID hybrid operation in Darfur was ordered to dissolve itself in July 2018. The decision came despite several clashes between ethnic groups and the usual enemies in the region, and it can be attributed to the inertia of the peacekeeping forces to ensure a peaceful way of life for the oppressed Black minorities. Despite the big size of their contingent, they were not always able to control the situation, thus the leadership decided to end the mission on 30 June 2020. Meanwhile, the political unrest has unfolded, and after the arrest of el-Bashir the organization chose to implement a transition process during its withdrawal from the scene. They developed a draft named Joint Transition Action Plan in which they designated three themes important for transition: land rights, intercommunal conflicts and the situation of IDP persons and refugees. This plan comprised of areas that should be important in a transition for UNAMID, therefore state liaison functions (SLF) were named:

- The rule of law
- Human rights
- The development of the situation of the displaced people and refugees
- The accommodation of the above-mentioned populace and their supply

These areas got a 99-men strong UNAMID support, which was responsible for the peaceful implementation of the concerns highlighted in the draft. Their main plan was not to involve the peacekeeping mission in the transition of the socio-political situation in Sudan, thus they could have ensured the right of the Darfurians to develop an independent system that would have been appropriate for them. Notwithstanding the transitional plans, there have been violent assaults in the area, 34 deaths and 180 injured were reported in the course of April-May 2019. An important fact was that on 17 August 2019 the government forces and the rebels reached a common understanding and agreement on the peaceful transition of the government and the relocation of the forces important for both sides. Thus, a democratic process was initiated and started to have effect on the country's livelihood. However, peace didn't last long in the country. The UNAMID's mandate was prolonged due to the events as of 31 October 2020 (Center of International Cooperation, 2019, pp. 15-17). Finally, after several years of faithful service and devoted work in the interest of the Darfur region, the huge-numbered operation ended on 31 December 2020 (United Nations Peacekeeping. UNAMID, 2021). The work of the mission was sometimes successful but there have been several

problems that remain to be solved and the peacekeeping activities of the area should not stop in order to develop a better country and to help the struggling Darfurian civilians to achieve their goals and the IDPs to return to their homeland.

As UNAMID was pulling out of Sudan, the situation remained dire. The main problem was that the military government, which ousted ex-president al-Bashir is comprised of former generals who served in the Bashir-regime, and they are complicit in the illegal activities of the former leadership. The civilians thus fear that the transitional government that was created would not take into consideration their rights and simply ignore the fact that they are in need of serious assistance in order to implement peace not only in the Darfur region but in entire Sudan as well. The transitional process however reached a milestone, as a peace deal was struck in October 2020 in Juba (South Sudan) between the government and the rebel forces. However, this deal has several difficulties, as for example the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul-Wahid (SLA-AW) is not willing to participate in the peace process. Thus, the peace agreement remains incomplete with fractions left out of the picture. Another problem is posed by the refugees and expulsed rebels returning home (Kleinfield and Amin, 6 April 2021).

Concerning the UNAMID operation, there are sources that are in favour of the mission, and conclude that the it has served well in the previous years to establish confidence between the Khartoum regime and the rebels living in Darfur province. According to these sources, the genocide was at least halted, and the civilians can feel a little bit safer now as the mission has partly completed its task in delivering peace to the area. However, they were unable to stop the violent rifts between the various fractions of the tribes in the area and they are still fighting for land rights among each other. The government accordingly has a duty to uphold: it shouldn't 't go hard on the population of the Darfur region, and during the disarmament process it should rather entrust the local Sheiks and other leaders to ensure the safe transition of the populace and the proper implementation of the peace deal. If the government uses excessive force during the process, many of the tribal violence will be unavoidable. Another factor will be the ethnic background of the tribes: what will be the connection between African and Arab tribes, who will the government favour? These are questions of the future to be answered (Essawi, 8 Januar 2021).

The unfolding events of the 2020s

Since the peace deal, however, violence has emerged again. In June 2021, Arabs and the African minority have started to fight among each other, so the aggression continues. According to local sources, circa 36 people have died during the attacks. The source of the conflict was the ownership of land rights, which have already caused a lot of trouble for the Darfurian community and the innocent civilians exposed to the deadly issues concerning the region (Africanews, 07 July 2021).

However, that was not the end of violence in the region. This time it was not mainly Darfur, but instead the whole country became the center of international attention, and of course, this will have effect on the Darfur conflict as well. On 21 September 2021, a military coup attempt was carried out in the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum. Sources say that the plotters were pro-Bashir militants or soldiers who attempted to overthrow the fragile civilian-military government that was based on the October 2020 peace treaty. According to Sudanese officials, 21 officers were held accountable and there was an attempt to find those remaining at large. In reaction, the military deployed its forces on the bridges between Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri. The coup was organized by the military – according to officials – and it targeted government facilities as well, without any success (Human Rights Watch, 2022, p. 625). Other news agencies reported that in the rural areas as well as in Khartoum there were several demonstrations against the military coup, for example in Port Sudan, and there were signs of students protesting against the possible takeover of the pro-Bashir military generals (Africanews, 21 September 2021).

Conclusion

The situation in Darfur is dire. Despite several peace attempts, negotiations and UN peacekeeping forces, the ethno-political division between the central area and the Western Darfur lands has increased. The inter-communal clashes remained frequent, only the end of the 2010s brought about some relaxation. The peace deals struck in 2006, 2011 and 2019 were not implemented well enough to ensure the safety of the locals. The Darfur conflict escalates more and more. Although the UNAMID international hybrid peacekeeping mission helped to ease tensions between the government forces, the rebels and the civilians, there is still an inter-communal rift between the two sides which remains to be solved either by the country or by another international force. The displaced Darfurians are still living in refugee camps and despite the provisions of the peace accords that they can return to their homeland, it is still impossible to repatriate them, since the situation in the area is not appropriate for the return. In the future it will be the job of the international community and the government to try to implement the peace deals and their provisions better and to give hope for the Darfurians to fight for their cause and achieve some recognition not only in their country but globally as well.

Conflict of interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on contributor

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Tigray Crisis

A Case Study of Geopolitical Competition in the Horn of Africa

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Abstract:

Promoting economic and political interests, maintaining balance of power at the global level, and influencing others to protect state and regime security are some of the reasons why global powers contend with each other internationally. By using the Tigray crisis in northern Ethiopia as a case study and analysing it based on neo-realism principles, this article explores the competition between global and regional powers and their political, economic and security ramifications for the Horn of Africa. The article argues that by framing the Tigray crisis in a contradictory way and responding to it differently, global powers are competing each other to project their power by embracing either a defensive or offensive realistic strategy. The findings also demonstrate that the contradictory strategy adopted by the major global powers and their conflicting behaviour are driven by their competing geostrategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the article explores the consequences of these geostrategic political rivalries and power competition on matters of sovereignty, security, and power dynamics in the region and beyond.

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Introduction

Post-cold war era has been marked by a diverse array of diplomatic relations, democratic diffusion in many contexts, rise of regional blocs, as well as access to free markets across international borders. Globalization has, however, also brought not only transnational relations, but also geopolitical rivalries between states and non-state actors around the world. With the intent of advancing economic and political benefits, maintaining balance of power at the international order, and influencing others to maximize state and regime security, states contest each other on the global stage even though they have differences in power capability. Despite rising nationalist and populist tendencies, especially in the western world in recent years (e.g., Trump's protectionist policy and Britain's separation from the EU), the world is still experiencing unprecedented geopolitical and economic rivalries in varying forms and in different geographical settings. The rise of vaccination nationalism against COVID-19, the emergence of new centres of power in the global south, and untapped opportunities in emerging economies have become hotspots for global superpowers to engage in proxy wars or to compete for resources towards securing their geostrategic interests.

Ethiopia, as one of the oldest civilizations, also has a long history of diplomatic ties with other countries around the world and has long been a point of competition among major world powers for millennia. The history of modern diplomacy in Ethiopia is generally linked with the rise of Emperor Tewodros in the 1850s, however, historical records show that European explorers and missionaries were in close contact with ancient Ethiopian rulers even before the 14th century. Even though Ethiopia's diplomatic relationship has been changing over the years due to internal and external factors like regime behaviours, political ideologies, and ever-changing regional and global patterns, it has always been an important partner of both the Western and Eastern civilizations. In part, this is due to its geographical location in the volatile Horn of Africa region and its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, where the major trade routes of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden converge. The contemporary relation between Ethiopia and the major global powers is also a continuation of this age-old Red Sea geo-strategic perspective. As the seat of the African Union and a variety of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, a strong ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism in Somalia, being the largest contributor to peacekeeping forces in Sudan and South Sudan conflicts and as one of the relatively stable states in the Horn of Africa with an enormous economic potential, Ethiopia is viewed as a key strategic partner of the major world powers.

This 'key strategic partnership' with the West and East has, however, turned into a well-spring of geopolitical competition among the major superpowers, particularly following the flare-up of the Tigray crisis in northern Ethiopia a year prior. The conflict erupted in November 2020 after the federal government accused the Tigray People Liberation Front, an ethno-nationalist party that oversaw the autonomous region of Tigray, of assaulting Ethiopian National Defence Forces stationed in the region. As the escalation extended to adjoining Eritrea in the north, Sudan in the west and to other regions within Ethiopia explicitly to the

Afar in the east and Amhara in the south, the global community had repeatedly called for tranquillity and cessation of hostilities as there had been a growing trepidation that the conflict might be transformed into a full-blown regional war that would destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

This unanticipated security crisis has pitted western global powers like the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union against emerging powers like China, Russia, India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates for political clout, economic gains, and security assurances in the Horn of Africa. It has also compelled these powers to pay close attention to their foreign policies in the region and make daring decisions according to their geo-strategic interests in the area. A press articulation by Antony J. Blinken upon his appointment of Jeffery Heltman as the U.S. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa shows how seriously the US approached the matter. According to the foreign secretary, the main priority of the emissary is to address ''the volatile situationin Ethiopia including the conflict in Tigray'' (US Department of State, 2021). In the assertion, Blinken portrayed the Horn of Africa as a 'strategic region' in which the US must engage at a higher level to 'mitigate the risks posed by escalating conflict' in the region. (Ibid). Similarly, before departing for the Horn of Africa, Feltman himself described the region as ''a complex part of the world with a lot of overlapping crises happening at the same time'' (Gramer, 2021, p. 8). He also mentioned that the region ''is extremely important strategically for the U.S., for our allies, forthe region'' (Ibid). The envoy, on the other hand, stated that the deadly conflict is threatening US's interests in the region by wreaking havoc on both Ethiopia and neighbouring countries. The major concern of the Biden administration is not only the humanitarian and security crisis in the region but also the increasing competition from other emerging powers such as China and Russia that could take advantage of the crisis to expand their political and economic clout in the region.

Global security researchers Ann FitzGerald and Hugh Segal wrote in their recent piece *'Ethiopia: A New Proxy Battle'* that the Tigray conflict has become "a proxy battleground for external powers" and a way of influencing the Ethiopian government towards their strategic aims. They also claimed that while "the geopolitical interests of various major powers in the Horn of Africa, such as the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and France, remain largely hidden," their security diplomacy toward Ethiopia, and the decisions they make, will determine the region's political, economic, and security dynamics (FitzGerald & Segal, 2021). They further noted that as the US-China rivalry grows at a worldwide level, particularly since the Biden administration assumed office, the US is attempting to 'catch up' to China's leadership role in the economic relationship with African countries. And it demonstrates that the Tigray situation in northern Ethiopia has served as a springboard for the new US administration's efforts to contain China's and other emerging powers' influence in the Horn of Africa.

The great superpowers' reactions and measurements to the Tigray crisis, however, are staggeringly varied due to their competing interests. As the crisis in the region worsened, diplomatic tensions between Ethiopia and western superpowers such as the US, UK, and EU

have grown, and there is an increasing perception among Ethiopian elites and the general public that the country is becoming a diplomatic pariah in the eyes of the West. The western major powers have voiced their concerns and harsh critiques of Ethiopia's administration since the crisis began. They've also taken harsh measures, including political and economic sanctions, in order to bring the hostilities to a halt. Economic sanctions have been implemented by the US with the intention of faltering Ethiopia's security sector. It has also imposed visa restrictions on the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, who are suspected of being responsible for the crisis. The European Union also halted a €90 million fiscal aid package and threatened to take further forceful measures until the crisis is resolved. Likewise, a rising number of legislative members and lobbying groups in the United Kingdom have been urging Boris' administration to take similar steps.

In contrast, emerging global powers such as Russia and China, as well as developing regional economic actors including India, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are strengthening diplomatic connections with Ethiopia. While western powers unanimously condemn the humanitarian and security crisis in Tigray and agree that diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia to end the conflict is necessary, emerging economies and political powers have resisted any punitive measures, viewing the conflict as an "internal matter" that should be addressed by Ethiopia itself. At a series of meetings among UN Security Council members on the humanitarian situation in the region, this divergent view of the conflict and the manner the two contending factions are dealing with it was clearly demonstrated. For instance, there was a UNSC meeting which was conducted on March 4, 2021. The meeting was summoned by Ireland with the support of permanent members such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as non-permanent members such as Estonia and Norway. Despite the fact that many parties, including the Ethiopian government, had sought for a strong statement from the Security Council, there was no consensus among the member states, and the outcome was zero. Associated Press later reported, citing diplomats close to the session, that the council had scrapped its plan to issue a statement "following concerns from India, Russia, and especially China." (Lederer, p. 1, 2021)

Indeed, the UN Security Council had indicated prior to the meeting that "members have had divergent views on the crisis," making it difficult for the session to reach a consensus on the measures to be undertaken (Security Council Report, p. 7). Some council members have been challenging the UN's position on Ethiopia's sovereignty, as per the council. According to the report, when dealing with internal issues, Russia (one of the permanent members) stressed the need of upholding the UN charter's principle of "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity of States." As a result, the major global powers have so far been unable to reach an agreement on how to respond to the crisis and have been compelled to act on their own. While the western superpowers have imposed maximum diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia's government, including a series of urgent calls to end the conflict, requesting the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from the conflict region, withholding budgetary support, imposing visa restrictions, and rescinding the deployment of observers for the previous June

national election, Russia and China, as well as other rising regional powers, are bolstering their diplomatic ties through various bilateral agreements such as forming intra-party political alliances, signing nuclear power installation pacts, selling armaments, and supporting budgetary deficits.

Why different perspectives and reactions to the Tigray crisis emerged is an issue that has sparked heated debate among academics, policymakers, and commentators. There is a hypothesis here that the divergent views and responses given by the western great powers and emerging powers regarding the Tigray conflict stemmed from their competing geo-strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and the desire to dominate the global order. As a result, it is the objective of this article to explore these geo-strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and to demonstrate the African continent's position in the global system. To attain this objective, the article will begin by defining geo-political competition as a conceptual framework and neorealism theory as an analytical tool. Second, it will place the Tigray crisis in context by highlighting the historical and contemporary political factors that have contributed to the ongoing conflict. Thirdly, the major superpowers' differing responses and actions in response to the conflict will be examined in light of their geostrategic goals. Finally, a summary of the significant findings will be reviewed, along with their ramifications.

Theoretical Foundations

Geo-political competition – A conceptual briefing

We reside in an unpredictable world. We can examine how COVID-19 has destabilized human life, how it has caused millions of deaths, brought economic crisis, conflict, and instability, and how it has drawn global powers to compete against each other for political and economic gains and a shift in the global power balance. In this chaotic international order, great power struggles along geopolitical lines are adding to the risks and unpredictability of the disordered world. Scholars agree that geopolitics as a conceptual discourse arose at the turn of the twentieth century, particularly after Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen coined the word "geopolitik" in 1899 to characterize the effects of geographic features on state politics, using Sweden as an example. Since then, numerous scholars have described the term in a multitude of ways, all of which have interconnected contextual boundaries. Zbigniew Brzezinski is one of the experts who provided us with a classical conception of geopolitics. He defined the terminology as ''the combination of geographic and political factors determining the condition of a state or region and emphasizing the impact of geography on politics'' (Brzezinski, 1986, p. IV). Karl Haushofer, on the other hand, stressed the importance of geography in deciding cross-border political decisions. He described the concept as "a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes," (Cohen, 2003, p.11). Geographic patterns, on the other hand, were linked to world politics by Geoffrey Parker and John Agnew. Parker defines geopolitics as "the study of international relations from a spatial or geographic perspective," while Agnew defines it as "the examination of the geographical assumptions, designations,

and understanding that enter into the making of world politics." (Cohen, 2003, pp. 11-12). These definitions incorporate two key aspects of geopolitical analysis: the existence of political processes and the spatial contexts in which they occur.

Sahul, B. Cohen, an emeritus professor of human geography who has written numerous books and articles on the subject and its associated notions, provides a robust definition of the term geopolitics. Cohen, in his book 'Geopolitics of the World System', defines the term in the following way:

"Geopolitics is…. the analysis of the interaction between, on one hand, geographical settings, and perspectives and, on the other, political processes. The settings are composed of geographical features and patterns and the multi-layered regions that they form. The political processes include forces that operate at the international level and those on the domestic scene that influence international behaviour. Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction''. (Cohen, 2003, p.12)

Cohen's comprehensive explanation has provided a broader understanding of the term geopolitics and its fundamental characteristics. The first distinguishing feature is the presence of 'geographical settings' and 'political processes,' which are essential in defining the concept. While geographical settings include a variety of regions, political processes contain the power and influence of states. The second feature is the interaction and situational friction of these two elements, as well as their outcomes in determining global order, as we are seeing rivalries rise in various geographical contexts at the present time. Evidently, Fint and Taylor (2018) described this situational hostility in more precise terms, claiming that "geopolitics has become a popular term for describing global rivalries in world politics" (p.76). They also noted that geopolitics is a crucial facet in great power competition analysis since governments conceptualize the distribution of political power beyond their geographic boundaries as a prerequisite for formulating foreign policy.

Geopolitical competition is a global rivalry for political influence, economic gains, or military dominance between two or more protagonist states. Though the classical explanation of geopolitical competition revolved primarily around military might, contemporary definitions of the term extend beyond that boundary to include a variety of issues such as economics, innovation and technology, security issues, and public policy. Scholars define geopolitical competition in a variety of formats, but with similar conceptual constituents. Bortsov et al. (2017), for example, defined geopolitical competition as "the result of interests' collision of several states (the state blocs, supranational organizations, etc.) due to the unwillingness or inability to resolve contradictions based on cooperation and partnership" (p, 507). This definition encapsulates some of the fundamental characteristics of geopolitical competition, such as the existence of diverse interests among several actors in a given competitive environment, the possibility of collision among them, and the lack of peaceful

means of resolving their differences. Empirical research done by Fariss and Markowitz (2018), on the other hand, emphasized the role of power projection in geopolitical competition. The authors defined the term as "the potential for coercive bargaining interactions between each state and the other states in its geopolitical environment" (p.79). By coercive bargaining, they mean that competing nations exert diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, or military force to pursue their strategic interests, economic sanctions, or military force.

Flint (2006)'s seminal book provides a comprehensive understanding of what geopolitical competition in the modern world entails by outlining its various characteristics. The first is that states compete for control of territories and/or resources, which is one of the factors that drives global powers to become involved in global politics. Second, states compete not only for territories and resources, but also with a sense of knowing everything about the competitive environment and acting accordingly. Thus, according to classical geopolitical theorists, the entire world is a "transparent space" that is "seeable" and "knowable" (p.16). Flint, on the other hand, contends that such unsubstantiated imagination of the competitive environment leads policymakers to "rely on the assumption and arrogance of being able to see and know the entire world and the essence of its historical development" (Ibid). In practice, this is one of the fundamental characteristics of great power competition as it has manifested in the modern world. The most egregious example would be the United States' dubious rationale for invading Iraq and its catastrophic consequences. The invasion has remained a contentious issue in American politics, with critics pointing to US policymakers' unsubstantiated assumption that weapons of mass destruction were present in Iraq.

The existence of various state and non-state actors in a diverse competitive environment is the third feature of geopolitical competition. Flint contends that geopolitics is more than just a battle between states for resources and territories. It is the interaction of "multiple practices and multiple representations of a wide variety of territories" (Ibid). This could include racial tensions, gender issues, and environmental concerns, which could lead to interactions between state and non-state actors (individuals, indigenous peoples, lobbyists, NGOs, associations, private institutes, or companies). The final feature of a geopolitical environment is the power dynamics between competitors. Though classical geopolitical theorists argue that states are the primary actors, contemporary theorists on the subject emphasize the role of powerful non-state actors and structural issues in determining the balance of power during competition. Flint suggests that researchers engaged in geopolitical study broaden their understanding of the "complexity of the world, and the particular situations of people across the world, as opposed to the simplistic models of classic geopolitics and their simple explanations" by quoting feminist geopolitical theorists such as Mary and Eleonore (p.17). This is especially crucial for scholars and policymakers focused on conducting a comprehensive theoretical and epistemological analysis of geopolitical rivalries in underprivileged societies and geographical regions such as Africa.

Understanding geo-political competition in the realm of international relations

For the past three or four decades, international relations theorists have devised a variety of conceptual explanations to understand great powers' competition on a global stage. Realists described geopolitical competition in terms of states' desire to increase their political and military power on a global scale. Liberals emphasized the role of free market and democratic expansionism as a means of projecting power through vigorous competition and cooperation among sovereign states. Constructivists on the other hand departed from material interests and focused on social, cultural, and historical factors that determine state's behaviour and action at the global stage. Functionalists on their part attributed the role of shared interests among states in forming alliances or integrating and challenging the global system. Marxists and feminists emphasize on the role of social classes and gender differences in explaining global politics. Despite conceptual differences, the majority of IR theories regard power as a defining factor of the global system because it creates structural settings in which decisions are made and aspirations are defined. There is also scholarly agreement that human and state desires are infinite. Desire, on the other hand, breeds competition and conflict by definition. As a result, states always strive to maximize their capabilities in order to meet competing national interests (both material and normative powers).

Another common scholarly tendency in international relations studies is to associate power with a realistic approach. Scholars used a variety of classical and neo-realistic sub paradigms to explain state behaviour in the international system and the motivations that drive them to act, such as security dilemmas, power balances, hegemonic stability, subversion, and so on. This article utilizes neo-realism theory as an analytical tool to understand global powers' competition in the Horn of Africa in relation to the Tigray crisis. Neorealism was chosen for its multifaceted ability to comprehend global politics in the post-Cold War era. Over the last four decades, neorealism and its subunits of analysis (defensive and offensive realism) have been among the most influential IR theories used by scholars to analyse the behaviours and motivations that drive states to engage in global affairs. Big props to Kenneth Waltz [the prominent apologist of defensive realism] and John Mearsheimer [the leading advocate of offensive realism] for firmly establishing neo-influential realism's power in explaining great power competition on the global stage.

Why neo-realism is more relevant than other theories such as classical realism, in explaining global powers' competition in a certain environment is an issue that needs to be thoroughly discussed. While classical realism emphasizes leaders' egoism and desire for power (human nature) to describe state behaviour on the global stage, neorealist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz (defensive realism) and John Mearsheimer (offensive realism) argue that states' behaviours in international politics are determined by their survival motives and the structure of the system. Kenneth Waltz, one of the founding fathers of neo-realism, for example, developed a tripartite model with three basic features: ordering principles, the character of the units, and the distribution of capabilities in the international system. Even though, like all IR theories, Waltz's neorealism and its conceptual foundations have been

criticized from theoretical and epistemological perspectives, it has remained an influential analytical tool in the study of international politics.

Ordering Principles – anarchic nature of the global system

Waltz used a binary distinction between domestic and international political systems to describe the behaviour of states from a structural standpoint. He noted that, in contrast to domestic politics, which has a centralist and hierarchical structure, international politics is anarchic and chaotic:

> *''parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super- and subordination. Someare entitled to command; others are required to obey. Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic.''* (Waltz, 1979, p.88).

And, as previously stated, the first core principle of neo-realism is the existence of a decentralized and anarchic system in which states act independently to ensure their survival in the absence of a command of central authority. Waltz added that international-political systems are the by-product of 'self-regarding units', which are ''individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended…Whether those units live, prosper, or die depends on their own efforts'' (Waltz, 1979, p. p.91). According to him, the main realm of the global system that drives states to act independently or in coordination with their kin is the 'survival motive' in search of security assurance. Despite their agreement on the anarchic nature of the global system, however, defensive and offensive realists take different approaches to dictate state behavioural motives in international politics. In defensive realism, states pursue power in order to maintain their position in the global system, whereas in offensive realism states pursue power in order to maximize their position. Because survivalism is the driving force of international politics in defensive realism, "the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system," according to Waltz (p.126). As a result, hegemonic states strive to maintain the status quo in order to prevent their adversaries from gaining power at their expense. According to John Mearsheimer's offensive realism, the ultimate goal of states in the global system is to maximize their relative power, seize opportunities, and claim hegemony at the expense of others. According to him, ''great powers are primed for offense. But not only does a great power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also tries to thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense'' (2003, p.3). Thus, the anarchic behaviour of the global system and states' pursuit of power are the common denominators of the two realistic approaches.

The Character of the Units – Sameness of functionality

The functionalism similarity of each independent state in the international system is the second feature of defensive realism. Waltz observed that ''states that are the units of international- political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform. Anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system's units, and that implies their sameness…so long as anarchy endures, states remain like units'' (Waltz, 1979, p. 94). This principle asserts that, in the face of decentralized order, states behave similarly, with variations depending on their power capability. That is, states, regardless of their power, carry out the same activities as other states, and there is no difference in terms of functionalism. This principle, however, does not apply in national politics. Domestically, various institutions and government units perform pre-defined functions through their hierarchical duties, but in international politics, ''units duplicate one another's activities. and distinctions among them arise principally from their varied capabilities'' (Waltz, 1979, p.97). The same analogy holds true in offensive realism. In the anarchic world order, the presence of insecurity, fear, suspicion, war, and resource competition drives states to maximize their power and engage in a self-help cycle.

The distribution of capabilities – power variation

The power distribution among system units is the final feature of neo-realism. Kenneth Waltz pointed out in his three-part neorealism model that, while the global order's anarchic character and the functionality of its units remain independent, the distribution of political and economic capabilities among units is a dependent variable that can be affected when systems oscillate due to units' behavioural changes and actions. He said that ''the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system's units. And changes in structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce.''. (p.97). This theoretical explanation is quite pertinent because it adds a new dimension to the relationship between power and stability in an anarchic global system. Waltz contends that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity due to the uneven distribution of power capabilities in multipolar systems. In multipolar polities, stability would be jeopardized, and conflict would be unavoidable in the absence of a legitimate coercive power at the central level. He goes on to say that the interdependence of units, risk diffusion, and intermixed responses to a specific security threat are all peculiar characteristics of great power politics in a multipolar system that could lead to a crisis. Similarly, Mearsheimer contends that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity for three reasons: superpowers have balanced power, bipolarity eliminates the incentive for war, and power miscalculation between them is reduced.

Rationality vs. Critics for choosing neorealism as an analytical tool

Despite its popularity in describing the global system, as a Western-centric discourse, neorealism was not without scholarly critics. The theory's critics focus on its inability to provide an overarching understanding of the political structures of the global South, such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America. To address the issue, global south scholars have developed various theories to make IR theories more inclusive and pragmatic. In the 1990s, for example, 'peripheral realism' emerged in Argentina, claiming that existing major IR theories are Eurocentric by default and cannot adequately represent Latin America. Similarly, Pan-African IR theorists such as Assis Malaquias have been critical of such shortcomings, arguing that major IR theories, including neo-realism, lack the conceptual capability to explain the role of non-state actors in defining domestic orders in the global south. In his book, 'Reformulating International Relations Theory: African Insights and Challenges,' Professor Malaquias exposes the flaws of classical IR theories by demonstrating the role of non-state actors such as insurgency groups and national movements in determining the structure of African domestic politics. He notes that

> *''in the African context, nations and armed nationalist movements are important units of analysis. By ignoring such important analytical unites while concentrating mainly on the state, traditional IR theory has not been able to explain, let alone predict, the behaviour of African political actors on the world stage''. (Malaquias, 2001, p. 11).*

This appears plausible, especially when we consider the various nationalist movements that sought to establish their own independent states while also significantly challenging power hierarchies in various African nations. Examples include Nigeria (the Biafra movement), Cameroon (Ambazonians' struggle for statehood), Somalia (the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland), Mali (the Tuareg independence movement), and others.

Though realistic theories, including neorealism, have been challenged by emerging scholars for their neglect of the peculiar state structures in the global South, including Africa, they have undeniably provided a great understanding of states' behaviours and how interstate politics works on a global scale. Thus, the rationale for using neo-realism as a conceptual discourse to analyse the competition of the great powers in the Horn of Africa rests on three fundamental premises. Firstly, neorealism generates a new dimension of conceptual understanding of the contemporary decentralized, segmented, and anarchic world order much better than the other classical theories in explaining and predicting the likelihood of conflict and war among great powers. And the Horn of Africa, as one of the world's volatile regions with a chaotic environment, ideally fits into this category. Secondly, it sees powerful states as the primary actors in global politics, owing to their dominance and influence over the international system. This is a significant departure from classical realist paradigms that are human-centric. The state and structural-centric arguments of neorealism enable us to understand the broad picture of states' behaviour in the international system by emphasizing power as an important factor. When it comes to the Tigray crisis, both traditional global powers and emerging powers are key players in shaping the region's political, economic, and security landscape, in addition

to the domestic politics of Horn of Africa member states. Third, neo-realism contends that great states compete for power and resources in order to survive or maximize utility. The desire for political influence, security assurance, economic exploitation, and international prestige is a driving force behind the global power competition in the Horn of Africa.

Discussion

Global Power Competition in the Horn of Africa in the realm of neo-realism

Contextualizing the Tigray crisis

Tigray regional state is located in northern Ethiopia, bordering Sudan to the west, Eritrea to the north, Afar to the east, and Amhara to the south. The region, which has a population of about 6 million people, is one of the ten autonomous regional states and two self-administrative cities that comprise the current Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. While Tigrigna is the regional state's official language, Amharic, the federal government's working language, and a few indigenous languages are also rarely spoken in the region. Tigray is dominated by Orthodox Christianity, which accounts for approximately 96 percent of the population, with Muslims accounting for the remaining one (Central Statistical Agency, 2007). Tigray also has many historical sites, including the Axumite obelisks, Emperor Yohannes IV's Palace, Al Nejashi mosque, the Arch of the Covenant in Axum Saint Marry church, and numerous ancient monasteries. Being the birthplace of the ancient Aksumite kingdom, the region has been a centre of civilization and political gravity in Ethiopian political history. Though Amharic-speaking rulers from the Amhara, Oromo, and Gurage ethnic groups dominated the Ethiopian political space, particularly after the reign of King Minilik II in 1899, Tigrian rulers also played an important role in forming and shaping ancient Ethiopia. As notable examples, Ezana of Aksum (320s – c. 360), King Yohannes IV (who ruled Ethiopia between 1871-1889), and Ras Alula Engida (an influential military general and politician who lived between 1827 – 1897) can be mentioned.

In modern times, the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) has played an unrivalled role in shaping contemporary Ethiopia. The former ruling party of the Tigray regional state, which is currently leading an insurgency war against the federal government, dominated Ethiopian political, economic, and military spaces for nearly 30 years after it played a majority role in deposing the former socialist Derg regime in 1991. Between 1991 and 2018, the TPLF was the architect of Ethiopia's remarkable economic growth while also being the mastermind behind the major pitfalls in the political arena, as the regime used to rule the country with an iron fist. However, the authoritarian rule and dominance of ethnic Tigrians (6 percent of the total population) over other ethnic groups in major political and economic sectors created a sense of inequality and injustice. As a result, nationwide discontent and discriminatory sentiments among other ethnic groups began to rise, and the first major public protest against the TPLF-dominated regime erupted in the Oromia region in October 2015. Since then, both violent and

nonviolent public protests have wreaked havoc on the country, claiming thousands of lives and causing a severe economic downturn. And, after three years of concerted public opposition, particularly in the Oromia and Amhara regions (the two largest regional states with a combined population of 70 million people), the ethno-nationalist front TPLF was driven from federal political power and confined to the Tigray region. As a result, political tensions between the federal government, led by reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, and the leaders of the TPLF began almost immediately after the latter's removal in March 2018.

In defiance of the central government, the TPLF began objecting to all administrative orders issued by federal institutions, claiming that the federal government lacks the authority to impose its rule on autonomous regional states. In response, the federal government decided to suspend budgetary support that was supposed to be distributed to the Tigray regional state, claiming that the region's ruling party was hijacking the democratic transition process by coordinating ethnic-based conflicts across the country. In the midst of the two parties' hostile relationship, the TPLF decided to hold a regional election on September 9, 2020. This was in objection to the federal government's decision to postpone the 6th national election due to the Covid-19 pandemic. While the regional electoral commission declared the TPLF as the winner of the election, the federal government and the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia rejected the result, claiming that the election had no legal basis and should be considered 'null and void.' To make matters worse, the TPLF launched an unexpected but well-coordinated attack on the Northern Command army of the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) stationed in the Tigray region in early November 2020. The attack's goal was to seize control of the ENDF's weapons and depose PM Abiy from power.

In response, Prime Minister Abiy declared extensive counter-offensive measures by mobilizing the majority of the ENDF's army units dispersed across the country. After three weeks of heavy fighting between federal troops (backed up by other regional armies) and Tigray forces, the ENDF was able to capture Mekelle, the Tigray region's capital city. Later, the federal government declared the end of the war because the majority of the region was under the control of ENDF troops, but an insurgency movement reversed the result, and the federal army was finally ordered to leave Tigray region after a significant victory by Tigrian forces, particularly after June 2020. The TPLF has also managed to extend the war to neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions, and the conflict is still ongoing which brought enormous security crises and humanitarian calamities in the Tigray, Amhara and Afar regions. Official figures have not been released, but various reports indicate thousands of civilians and military personnel have been killed or severely injured. More than 63,000 people have fled to Sudan for safety, and 7 million people need humanitarian aid. There are also reports of mass atrocities, sexual violence, internal communal displacement, and food scarcity in all three regions.

In addition to the humanitarian crisis, the conflict has exacerbated regional insecurity in the Horn of Africa. The involvement of Eritrean forces in the conflict, the border clash between Sudan and Ethiopia that erupted following the conflict, and the conflict's spill over into neighbouring Amhara and Afar regions, combined with the emergence of Gulf rivalries in the

Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula, as well as the geopolitical competition of the region's major global powers, are profoundly changing the Horn of Africa's political, economic, and security dynamics.

Geo-political competition in the Horn of Africa: An in-depth analysis

There are two major groups of global powers competing in the Horn of Africa. The first group consists of Western superpowers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. The second group consists of emerging global and regional powers such as Russia, China, India, Turkey, and Gulf countries, particularly the United Arab Emirates. As the Horn of Africa undergoes major political, economic, and security transformations, geostrategic rivalry among these powers is intensifying, particularly in light of the Tigray crisis. Since then, Western powers have been unequivocally calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities between the federal government and the TPLF, the withdrawal of "alien' forces such as the Eritrean army and neighbouring Amhara regional forces, the launch of an independent investigation into human rights violations, and the opening of unrestricted access for humanitarian organizations to provide lifesaving aid to people in need due to the conflict. The emerging powers, on the other hand, did not oppose the federal government's military actions, claiming that the Tigray conflict is an internal matter that should be resolved by the Ethiopian government without outside interference. While the western powers' main geostrategic interests are primarily political and security issues, the emerging powers' main priorities are primarily economic and, to a lesser extent, security issues.

The Western Powers and their geo-strategic interests in the Horn of Africa

United States

During his first speech as US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken hinted at the resumption of great power competitions among global powers in the current anarchic order. His speech also asserts a return of the United States' foreign policy to a globalist approach after experiencing protectionism during Trump's administration, which primarily focused on domestic affairs with its "American First" premise. Blinken emphasized the importance of globalization in maintaining America's geostrategic interests on the global stage in his speech. "Not a single global challenge that affects your lives can be met by any single nation acting alone – not even one as powerful as the United States," he said. (Department of State, 2021). This is in stark contrast to Trump's administration's foreign policy approach, which has categorically rejected the essence of globalization in favour of a nationalistic protectionist viewpoint. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2019, Trump stated unequivocally that "the future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots" (Shehadi, 2020, p. 2) The withdrawal of the United States from the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Accords, the trade war with China and the closure of its consulate in Houston, the intention

to withdraw US troops from Somalia, Iraq, and Germany, as well as its restrictive immigration policies against Muslim-majority countries, could all be cited as evidence of Trump's administration's proclivity for a protective foreign policy approach.

The current US administration is attempting to reverse this trend and restore the US's leadership role in global affairs. While discussing "the eight top foreign policy priorities of the Biden administration," Blinken stated that the fight against China would be the "biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century" (US Department of State, 2021). He has also identified Russia, Iran, and North Korea as nations that pose "serious challenges" to US geostrategic interests around the world. The 2017 US National Security Strategy also reinforces the secretary's statement that China and Russia are challenging "American power, influence, and interests" and "attempting to erode American security and prosperity" (The White House, 2017, p. 2). The document also mentioned North Korea and Iran as countries that "are determined to destabilize regions, threaten Americans and our allies, and brutalize their own people" (Ibid). Given the region's history of Islamic terrorism, maritime piracy, intra- and interstate conflicts, and frequent border disputes, it is obvious that the United States' geostrategic interests on the global stage and in the Horn of Africa are derived from these fundamental security concerns. Prior to his first trip to Ethiopia, Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea, the new US envoy to the Horn of Africa, Jeffrey Heltman, described the region as "a complex part of the world with a lot of overlapping crises happening at the same time." He also emphasized that the region is "extremely important strategically" not only for the US but also for its "allies" (Gramer, 2021, p. 8).

The West, including the United States, considers the Horn of Africa an important strategic location due to its economic and geographical significance, as it is located along one of the major global trade routes of the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula. Of course, the region is riddled with contradictions: on the one hand, it is an extremely important strategic location, but on the other, it is known for recurring conflicts and instability. Since the September 11, 2011attacks, the United States has formed diplomatic alliances with strategic partners all over the world, calling for coordinated action against global terrorism. Since Ethiopia had already deployed thousands of troops in Somalia to fight Al-Shabaab and other Islamic jihadists in 2006, the New York attack provided an incentive for the US to support the then TPLF-dominated regime in order to maintain its security interests in the region. During his 2015 visit to Ethiopia, Barack Obama praised Ethiopia as an important partner in the fight against terrorism in the African continent. He said that *"part of the reasons we've seen this shrinkage of Shebab in East Africa is that we've had our regional teams… We don't need to send our own Marines in to do the fighting: the Ethiopians are tough fighters,"* (France 24, 2015, p. 2-3). Not only has Ethiopia been praised for its role in regional stability in the Horn of Africa by contributing large numbers of peacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, but it has also been praised for its role in the fight against terrorism in Somalia under the leadership of the TPLF. Prior to 2018, Addis Ababa had also played an important role in isolating the Eritrean regime, which is perceived to be hostile to the West, from the international community.

However, the regime praised by Obama and his successors was deposed in 2018 and replaced by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's current government. And, once in power, Abiy broke the Ethio-Eritrean deadlock, which helped him win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. He has also formed an alliance with Isayas and Framajo, prompting accusations that Abiy Ahmed has deliberately weakened IGAD, the regional bloc that has played a significant role in regional stability, contributing to the rise of authoritarianism in the region. All of these political and security factors, combined with China's, Russia's, Turkey's, India's, the UAE's, and other Gulf states' involvement in regional security and economic maximization, have caused the US to lose faith in the current administration, prompting it to act aggressively against it.

Since the Tigray conflict began, the US has advocated for a ceasefire, political dialogue, the cessation of hostilities, an investigation into human rights violations, unrestricted access to humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara forces from the Tigray region. Though the Ethiopian government has attempted to address some of these concerns, such as establishing an independent body to investigate alleged human rights violations, it has also categorically denied many of the Biden administration's requests, claiming that the Tigray conflict is an internal matter. As a result, diplomatic tensions between Washington and Addis Ababa are soaring. The Ethiopian government was enraged in February 2021 when President Biden called Uhuru Kenytta instead of directly calling Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to discuss the Tigray conflict and its regional implications in the Horn of Africa. In addition to diplomatic pressure, the US has halted millions of dollars that were supposed to be given to the regime in Addis Ababa to strengthen the security sector as a coercive measure. State Department spokesperson Ned Price stated in a March 2021 news briefing that "given the current environment in Ethiopia, we have decided not to lift the assistance pause for other programs, including most programs in the security sector" (Psaledakis, 2021, p. 2). In addition to diplomatic pressures, the Biden administration has barred Ethiopia from participating in the United States' tariff-free African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a lucrative trade agreement designed to benefit African exporters to the US market. As Ethiopia's security situation has deteriorated in recent months, the United States has urged its citizens to leave the country.

In addition to the economic and financial sanctions, the White House announced that the Biden administration has imposed visa restrictions on Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders deemed "responsible for, or complicit in, undermining Tigray's resolution" (White House, 2021, p. 2). In response to the sanctions, the Ethiopian government accuses the US of interfering in its internal affairs, claiming that "the attempt by the US administration to meddle in its internal affairs is not only inappropriate, but also completely unacceptable" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021, p. 7). It has also threatened diplomatic retaliation if the US continues to interfere. The statement said that Ethiopia *"will be forced to reassess its relations with the United States, which might have implications beyond our bilateral relationship"* (p. 11). Several nationwide pro-government rallies have also taken place in various parts of Ethiopia, as well as in other western major cities, to protest the US's continued interference in Ethiopia's

internal affairs. The United States' aggressive responses to the Tigray crisis can be interpreted in terms of both defensive and offensive realism. Great powers typically use punitive measures such as military interventions, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressures on weaker states to comply with their geostrategic interests in order to maintain and maximize their influence. The United States' punitive measures against the Ethiopian government indicate that it is determined to maintain and expand its political and security hegemony in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia. France is doing exactly this in West Africa, and the US is attempting to replicate that experience in the Horn of Africa.

The European Union

Among global powers, the European Union, as a unified polity, has been the most vocal critic of the federal government's military action against the TPLF. The Union's mood swings from expressing "grave concerns" about the humanitarian crisis in Tigray to calling for a cease-fire, political dialogue, and the withdrawal of Eritrean forces. Other measures taken by the union include the postponement of development aid, the cancellation of election observers, and the call for sanctions against the Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders. One of the Union's coercive measures is the budgetary deferment of more than €90 million that was supposed to be disbursed at the end of 2020. The European Union made this audacious decision, claiming an "absence of full humanitarian access" in Tigray. For a country that is heavily reliant on foreign aid, particularly from the Western world, the news of the European Union suspending budgetary support continues to have enormous ramifications for shaping Ethiopian domestic politics as well as regional dynamics in the region. Following the decision, European Commission Vice President Joseph Borrell stated, "we are ready to help, but unless there is access for humanitarian aid operators, the EU cannot disburse the planned budget support to the Ethiopian government" (EU External Action Service, 2021, p. 1). In addition to the budgetary deferment and diplomatic pressures, the EU has also threatened to impose additional economic sanctions and visa restrictions. The Ethiopian government, for its part, accused the European Union of making such decisions based on unfounded allegations. After the EU decided to cancel the deployment of its election observers in June 2021, Dina Mufti, spokesperson for Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accused the union of attempting to undermine Ethiopia's sovereignty by interfering in the election process.

The European Union has stated unequivocally that "Ethiopia is a strategic partner for the EU in the Horn of Africa and the wider region, as well as an important multilateral actor." (Council of the European Union, 2021, p.1). But, if the union claims Ethiopia is an important strategic partner in the Horn, why is it embroiled in a diplomatic spat and enacting coercive measures against it? The answer appears to be uncontentious: the union's motives and actions are heavily influenced by the overall political and security dynamics of the Horn of Africa. The EU Council recently announced the establishment of a new geostrategic policy toward the Horn of Africa, as well as its desire to expand its strategic relationship with member

states. The Union declares that ''with this new strategy, the EU's intention is to further strengthen and deepen its strategic relationship and partnership with the Horn of Africa and its countries, notably with a view to reduce instability, promote democracy and sustainable growth'' (EU Council, 2021, p. 3). The union also asserts that the new strategy ''aims at strengthening the partnership with the broader region, notably the Red Sea, the Western Indian Ocean, and the Nile.'' (Ibid). However, in order to achieve these objectives, the union needs a stable and peaceful Horn of Africa, and the Tigray crisis poses a security threat to this ambition. And the council has clearly underlined that the ''regional implications of the situation in the Ethiopian region of Tigray, as well as the risk of further spill over in an already fragile region, are of great concern. Further military escalation and long-term instability in Ethiopia and in the wider region must be avoided'' (Council of the European Union, 2021, p. p.4).

It should be noted that Djibouti is home to military bases for two of the European Union's most powerful members, France and Germany. The primary function of these bases is to oversee the EU's security concerns in the Horn of Africa. The security crises in Somalia as a result of Islamic jihadists, the Darfur crisis and Sudan's fragile transition, the ongoing armed conflict in South Sudan, and now the Tigray crisis in Ethiopia all indicate that the Horn of Africa is in a precarious position that could jeopardize global security. Other security concerns for the European Union, which imports petroleum from the Gulf States, include maritime piracy and armed robbery along Red Sea trade routes. In addition to its extensive geostrategic interests in the region, the European Union is also concerned about a potential migration crisis. The European Union and the United Kingdom are vulnerable to refugee crises because of their proximity to North-eastern Africa. Ethiopia is already the world's largest refugee recipient country, hosting over 900,000 refugees, the majority of whom are from Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan. If political insecurity and conflict persist in the region, thousands, if not millions, of refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan are likely to cross the Mediterranean Sea on their way to Europe. As a result, in order to avoid the economic and security risks that refugees may pose to Europe, the EU needed to take a proactive approach to addressing any security issues in the region.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has similar geostrategic interests to the EU in the Horn of Africa. Some of the UK's major interests in the region include fighting terrorism in Somalia, protecting its military bases in Kenya and Djibouti, managing a potential refugee crisis, and ensuring the smooth flow of trade with Kenya and other neighbouring states. Britain regards Ethiopia as a strategic partner in the region, and it is one of the largest aid donors, having provided billions of pounds in development and humanitarian aid over the last decades. For example, Ethiopia received £800 million in aid between 2018 and 2021, making it the largest recipient, followed by Pakistan and Nigeria (DFID, 2021). The Department for International Development (DFID)

stated in its budgetary support for 2019/2020 that "Ethiopia is a strategically important partner for the UK in tackling poverty, regional instability, and irregular migration" (DFID, 2021, p.2). It has also emphasized the following:

> *''The UK relies on a stable Ethiopia that is supportive of our foreign policy priorities in the Horn of Africa, particularly in relation to Somalia and South Sudan. Ethiopia is the largest contributor of peacekeeping forces in the world and particularly in its neighbourhood. Ethiopia hosts the second largest refugee population in Africa (890,000 refugees) from South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea. It is also a transit country for Eritrean and Somali refugees migrating to Europe: 40,000-50,000 take the "central Mediterranean" route each year. Ethiopia therefore has a critical role to play in deterring irregular migration.'' (Ibid)*

Thus, with a population of 120 million and nearly one million refugees, instability in Ethiopia spells disaster for the rest of the Horn of Africa and beyond. The UK's economic and security concerns in the region have also been influenced by this quandary. Prior to his visit to Ethiopia in January 2021, UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab told the Financial Times that the Tigray crisis is causing Ethiopia to lose its reputation as a model of stability and an economic powerhouse. He said that ''until this conflagration, [Ethiopia] has had, if you like, a reputation as a beacon, and of course it is being tarnished. There is no doubt, there is no escaping it'' (Schipani, A.2021). However, unlike the United States and the European Union, the United Kingdom has yet to impose coercive measures on the Ethiopian government, despite mounting pressure from members of its parliament, lobbying groups, and analysts. Dominic Raab tweeted after meeting with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed during his tour of Ethiopia and Sudan that he had "constructive discussions on the situation in Tigray, humanitarian access to the region, and the need for political dialogue to bring about a lasting peace." (Raab, 2021) Despite the fact that the UK has repeatedly expressed grave concerns and the need for diplomatic pressure during G7 summits and UN Security Council meetings, it has yet to take unilateral coercive measures against the Ethiopian government. The US has repeatedly urged its international partners, including the United Kingdom, to impose the same economic sanctions and visa restrictions on Addis Ababa. It remains to be seen whether the United Kingdom will follow suit.

In general, the Western powers' geostrategic interests and the measures they have taken in response to the Tigray crisis indicate that these powers prefer a submissive Ethiopia and are determined to maintain the status quo. Their actions also demonstrated that they are struggling to align their foreign policies in the Horn of Africa with the new global order, which is heavily influenced by China, Russia, Turkey, and the oil-rich Gulf States. The Western global powers are attempting to maintain their hegemonic status in the region, but the Ethiopian government, backed by emerging global and regional powers, is defying their pressure. As a result, it would be reasonable to label Western powers' behaviour and response to the Tigray crisis as defensive realism.

Emerging powers and their geo-strategic interests in the Horn of Africa

The image below depicts the emerging global order in the Horn of Africa following the eruption of the Tigray crisis. The picture was taken from the capital Addis Ababa, during an anti-US rallyin which thousands of demonstrators denounced the Biden administration for its economic sanctionsand unnecessary meddling in Ethiopian internal affairs. Demonstrators have also waved images of Putin, Xi and Erdogan in an attempt to show respect for Russia, China, and Turkey fortheir solidarity with Ethiopia and the role they have played in challenging the western great powers at the global stage.

A picture taken by the Ethiopian Press Agency at the anti-US rally in Addis Ababa, May 30, 2021.

When discussing global rifts in the Horn of Africa, it is critical to note that Western diplomatic pressure and punitive measures are forcing Ethiopia to seek out reliable global partners such as China and Russia. This may not be in Ethiopia's best interests, but the hostile relationship with the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom that emerged following the Tigray crisis left Ethiopia with no choice but to forge diplomatic relationships with these global and regional powers that have no political conditions. In this context, emerging powers refer to rising political and economic powers that, through their economic and political capabilities, are significantly shaping the international order. Russian, Chinese, Turkish, Indian, and Gulf states are among these powers. The section that follows will explain the role of these key players in shaping the regional dynamics of the Horn of Africa.

Russia

Despite the fact that the former Soviet Union was one of the most powerful powers with significant political clout in Africa, its diplomatic engagement was severely curtailed after the collapse of the USSR. However, Russia's presence in Africa has grown significantly in the last

few decades, particularly in the economic and security sectors. The first Russia-Africa summit, held in Sochi in 2019, was one of the most important milestones that allowed Russia to re-establish its influence in Africa.

During the summit's closing remarks, President Vladimir Putin applauded African leaders claiming that the summit opened ''a new page in the history of Russia's relations with African countries'' (Presidential Press Office, 2019, p. 1). He also vowed that ''expanding and simplifying mutually beneficial ties with African states are among Russia's foreign policy priorities'' (Para,8). Since the 2000s, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has steadily expanded its African influence through expanding its arms sales and growing its trade volume that reaches around US$ 20 billion in 2020. In addition, since 2015, Russia has signed military cooperation agreements with 21 African countries, including six for the construction of military bases. Other approaches Russia is taking to increase its influence in Africa include forging regional and global political alliances, as well as exchanging interparliamentary delegates. On May 5, 2021, the Russian leading news agency, TASS, published a story with the headline: "African Union prioritizes Russia's role in ensuring African stability." Dr. Levi Uche Madueke, the head of the African Union Strategic Partnerships, was interviewed for the report, and he stated that "the issue of peace and security is where Russia can play a key role." (p. 2). He has also mentioned industrialization, energy, and cyber security as areas in which Russia could play an important role in African economic development. Russia's foreign policy toward Africa also demonstrates that its geostrategic interests in the African continent are primarily focused on four major areas: projecting power and challenging the western great powers on the global stage through alliances with African states, accessing raw materials and natural resources, expanding arms exports, and investing in energy infrastructure through its multinational corporations.

According to Samuel Ramani, a Russian foreign policy expert, "the Russian Federation's geopolitical presence in the Horn of Africa is experiencing a resurgence" in recent years (Ramani, 2020, p.1). However, Ramani claims that Moscow's influence in the Horn of Africa is based on 'engaged opportunism,' referring to its neutrality on polarized conflicts and inconsistent stance on major pressing issues that shape the continent's political and economic dynamics. One of the fundamental factors allowing Russia to strengthen its presence on the continent is its non-interference policy in the internal affairs of African states. At the international inter-party conference organized by the United Russian Party and held in Moscow between March 24-25, 2021, under the theme 'Russia-Africa: Reviving Traditions,' Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the agendas of the conference include "such important issues as ensuring peace and regional security as well as countering interference in the sovereign states' domestic affairs." (Russian News Agency, 2021). Similarly, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed stated during the conference that "the Russian Federation and African countries have a rich tradition of resisting counterproductive interference." The Russian Federation was a key ally in the continental independence movement against oppression, colonialism, and slavery, both domestic and foreign." (Russian Embassy Addis Ababa, 2021, min. 01:03-01:27).

Maintaining regime security is the most important factor for an African leader, and it is a matter of survival.

Russia's non-interference foreign policy, as well as its enormous role on the global stage in challenging the western-centric international system, are increasing its influence on the African continent. Russia has publicly supported the federal government's military action in Ethiopia, stating that it is an internal matter and an important measure to maintain Ethiopia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Following a phone conversation between the foreign ministers of the two countries in December 2020, the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:

> *"Demeke Mekonnen informed Sergey Lavrov about the developments in Ethiopia and the government's measures to restore constitutional order in the Tigray Region. Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's unwavering commitment to the principles of respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FDRE." (p. 3)*

Similarly, during his diplomatic visit to Addis Ababa, Russian Federation Senator Andrey A. Klimov reaffirmed Russia's non-interference principle, stating that "Russia recognizes that the situation in northern Ethiopia in Tigray state a purely internal matter. Therefore, the interference of third parties is unacceptable, whatever pretexts they may use. In accordance with the UN Charter, Russia has advocated and still advocates the territorial integrity of States and respect for each country's national sovereignty" (Ethiopian Press Agency, 2021, p.11). Aside from maintaining a non-interference policy in the Tigray crisis, Russia has sent several diplomatic delegations to Addis Ababa over the last several months to strengthen economic and security cooperation with Ethiopia. The diplomatic delegations include parliamentary members, representatives of the United Russia Party [the Russian Federation's ruling party], and business groups specializing in the energy and automotive industries. In addition, on April 14, 2021, Russia and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding to develop nuclear energy and improve public perception of the sector in Moscow. Representatives of Russian civil society were also among the international observers for Ethiopia's national election on June 21, 2021. Taking those patterns and developments into account, one can undoubtedly conclude that the Tigray crisis has become a source of 'diplomatic boom' between Russia and Ethiopia.

Russia, led by Vladimir Putin, is determined to increase its economic, political, and security influence on the global stage, including in the Horn of Africa, by challenging the US and other great powers. Russia's economic interests in the Horn of Africa revolve primarily around the arms industry. Russia is the world's second largest arms exporter, trailing only the United States, and the continent's largest arms supplier. Ethiopia, as a trustworthy partner, has benefited from Russia's massive defence trade by importing small and large military weapons. Prior to the Tigray crisis, Ethiopia had already received four Pantsir-S1s worth more than $70 million to modernize its air defence system. In addition to the Tigray crisis, Ethiopia is currently

dealing with other security issues, such as a border conflict with Sudan and a Nile dam dispute with Egypt and Sudan. As a result, Ethiopia is likely to continue spending millions, if not billions, of dollars on Russian arms imports in order to strengthen its defence system. Aside from arms sales, Moscow is expanding its security presence in the Horn of Africa to assert its influence. Various unconfirmed reports indicate that Russia intends to build military bases in Eritrea, Sudan (Port Sudan), and Somaliland (Berbera). And Russia sees Ethiopia [a rising regional power in the Horn of Africa] as a critical partner in achieving its goals.

Mearsheimer argues that *''great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony as their final goal''* (Mearsheimer, 2003, p.16). Russia's revisionist and aggressive behaviour in the current global order can be examined in terms of this offensive realistic yardstick. While the US imposed economic and financial sanctions on Ethiopia, Russia has chosen Addis Ababa to host the upcoming Russia-African summit in 2022. Similarly, while the Biden administration imposes visa restrictions on Abiy Ahmed leadership, Putin sent a congratulatory message to the PM on the annual anniversary commemorating the downfall of the Derg regime. By manipulating the diplomatic row between the US and Ethiopia, one can conclude that Russia is maximizing its influence and asserting its presence significantly in the Horn of Africa because in this anarchic global order *''great powers seek to maximize their share of world power''*. (Ibid).

China

China is the largest investor and finance creditor in the Africa continent. Despite the fact that its presence in Africa is a contentious issue, China has firmly established massive economic and political influence in the continent over the last two decades. According to data from the China-Africa Research Initiative (2021), China provided US$ 153 billion in loans for various development projects across the African continent through its Belt and Road Initiative project between 2000 and 2009. Ethiopia is the largest recipient of this massive economic figure, receiving US$ 13.7 billion, followed by Zambia and Kenya, which received US$ 9.9 and US$ 9.2 billion, respectively. According to the report, this credit commitment is given to African governments and their state-owned institutions, excluding private foreign direct investments. China has also built a US$ 200 million African headquarters in Addis Ababa and handed it over 'for free' to cement its ties with the continent. Aside from loans, China is Africa's largest trading partner. It is also Ethiopia's largest import and export partner. The Chinese government has fully or partially funded the majority of megaprojects in Ethiopia, which has resulted in one of the fastest growing economies in the Sub-Saharan region. Some of China's mega projects include the US$ 3.4 billion Sub-Saharan electrified railway that connects Ethiopia and Djibouti, the US$ 1.8 billion electric grid expansion, the US$ 350 million Addis Ababa-Adama expressway, the US$ 475 million Addis Ababa Light Railway, the US$ 345 million Bole airport expansion project, the US$ 116 million new Addis Ababa Stadium Construction, and the US$ 300 million Adama industrial park and others

Economic and financial assistance from Western nations are frequently accompanied by stringent political and legal conditions, making them unpopular among African leaders. On the other hand, in addition to the substantial economic incentives that China has provided to Africa, the East Asian nation's non-interference principle and neutrality in dealing with various forms of political regimes have made it a trustworthy partner. Its response to the Tigray crisis exemplifies this. China, like Russia and other emerging powers, has backed the federal government's military campaign against the TPLF. During a United Nations Security Council meeting in March 2021, China, Russia, and India expressed their support for the Abiy administration by rejecting a proposal made by the council's western members to condemn the federal government's military action. According to AFP, who cited council diplomats who attended the meeting, "*China wanted the statement to focus only on the humanitarian situation, with no reference to the violence in Tigray. India only wanted a minor change, and Russia reportedly supported its ally China at the last minute''* (Lederer, 2021, p. 7). Surprisingly, China's objection to the proposed UNSC statement came despite the fact that its 600 nationals, who were working at Chinese funded mega projects in the Tigray region, were forced to be evacuated as the conflict escalated. In a rare statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China has also recently demonstrated its non-interference policy towards other sovereign states' internal affairs. The ministry's spokesperson, Wang Wenbin told Beijing Media Network that China recognizes the Ethiopian government's efforts in rebuilding the Tigray region and has urged the international community to support those efforts. He said that *''as a good friend to Ethiopia, China hopes that all Ethiopian people including those in Tigray enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity. We support the Ethiopian government's effort in providing help and assistance to people in Tigray and restoring local life and production.''* (Olander, 2021, p. 4).

To demonstrate its support and cooperation with its Ethiopian counterpart, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese government's regular armed forces, also donated Covid-19 vaccines and provided financial support to the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF). China has also vehemently opposed the United States' unilateral sanctions against Ethiopia. In a press conference in September 2021, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian stated that "we oppose the wanton exertion of pressure through sanctions or the threat of imposing sanctions to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries," adding that "the US should handle relevant issues prudently and play a constructive role in restoring peace and stability in the country." (Gebre, S, 2021, p. 2). Given the fact that China regards Ethiopia as a reliable partner and a major gateway for its expansionist policy in Africa, it should come as no surprise that the Chinese government would support the current regime in order to maximize its economic and security interests in the country.

China's behaviour in the Horn of Africa, like Russia's, can be analysed through the lens of offensive realism. Beijing has recently completed the construction of a pier near the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea. According to reports, the pier will serve as a gateway to the Red Sea for China, and it can accommodate aircraft carriers from

the country's military base in Djibouti. However, China's growing maritime assertiveness in the Horn of Africa has created uncertainty and insecurity for the United States. The assumption that great powers are usually suspicious of each other because their intentions are unpredictable is one of the fundamental principles of offensive realism. According to Mearsheimer *''great powers fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worrythat war might be in the offing. They anticipate danger''* (2003, p. 17). That is exactly what is happening in the Horn of Africa between the United States and China. Gen. Stephen Townsend, head of US Africa Command, told the House Armed Services Committee that *"China is of great concern. They are literally everywhere on the continent"* adding that Beijing has plans to use the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait pier as a "*platform to project power across the continent and its waters…and this is the most significant threat from China''* (Pickrell, 2021, p. 3). In this context, the US's behaviour can be explained primarily through a defensive realism approach as it seeks to maintain the status quo, whereas China exhibits aggressive and revisionist behaviour in order to maximize its power, which can be interpreted through offensive realism principles.

Turkey, India, the United Arab Emirates

Turkey, India, the United Arab Emirates, and other emerging Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have primarily economic and security interests in the Horn of Africa due to their proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital trade route connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. These emerging regional powers are not acting aggressively and do not compete directly with the region's other global powers. However, by supporting the Abiy administration's short- and long-term economic goals, they are implicitly challenging the region's geo-political dynamics, alongside China and Russia.

Turkey

Over the last two decades, Turkey's influence in Ethiopia has steadily grown. According to Yaprak Alp, the Turkish ambassador to Ethiopia, Ankara regards Addis Ababa as the "door to the continent," referring to Ethiopia's political influence and vibrant economic growth in the Horn of Africa. A report from the Ethiopian Investment Commission indicates that Turkey has invested approximately US$ 2.5 billion in Ethiopia so far, primarily in the textile, construction, and manufacturing sectors. According to the newspaper, Ankara is the "third biggest investor of   operational capital in the African country after China and Saudi Arabia" (Schipani & Pitel, 2021, para, 11). The two countries' trade exchange is also worth US$ 650 million, with the goal of increasing it to US$ 1 billion. Turk Exim Bank has also financed the 390km Awash-Kombolcha-Hara Gebeya modern railway project, which aims to connect the economic zones of north-eastern Ethiopia with central Ethiopia and the Djibouti corridor. The project is expected to cost $1.7 billion. Aside from trade and economic sectors, there is also a growing relationship between the two states in terms of tourism, educational, and cultural exchanges. Turkish films are also playing an important role

in boosting public diplomacy between the two countries. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 's picture was displayed alongside his Russian and Chinese counterparts during an anti-US rally in Addis Ababa, which speaks volumes about Turkey's growing influence in Ethiopia and the wider African continent.

However, Turkey, like the other emerging powers, favours the federal government in the Tigray crisis. Back in November 2020, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonenn spoke with his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt avuşolu about the federal government's 'legal measures' in Tigray region, and the Turkish foreign minister had no reservations about the military campaign, according to Anadolu Agency. "The government of Turkey understands the federal government of Ethiopia's decision to take action to maintain law and order in the region," the minister said. According to the report, the minister also ''expressed his confidence that the operation would end soon and not compromise the safety of civilians," (Geatchew, 2020, p. 8-9). Demeke Mekonenn paid a two-day official visit to Turkey's capital Ankara after the federal government announced the end of the 'law enforcement' operation in Tigray region. In addition to discussing current issues, the two foreign ministries also inaugurated a newly built embassy in the capital, demonstrating the two countries' growing diplomatic cooperation. Following the official visit, social media rumours circulated about the Ethiopian government's intention to purchase Turkish drones, which played a significant role in shifting the balance of power during the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. A one-day visit to Ankara by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on August 18, 2021, was warmly welcomed by President Erdogan. Following the reception there was a signing of Memorandum of Understanding on various economic and security sectors. Given the Western powers' opposition to the federal government's military offensive, it is not surprising that the federal government would seek military assistance from other partners, including Turkey.

India. India is one of Ethiopia's most important trading partners, and its primary interests in the Horn of Africa are primarily in trade and investment. According to the Indian embassy in Addis Ababa, approximately 600 Indian companies have received investment licenses totalling US$ 6 billion, mostly in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In 2020, the two countries' trade exchange was also US$ 1.17 billion. Medical tourism, higher education exchange programs, ICT, and health care are some of the other major areas in which India and Ethiopia have collaborated. (Indian Embassy in Addis Ababa, 2021). Because of its economic and commercial interests in Ethiopia, India has remained largely silent on the Tigray crisis. However, when the United Nations Security Council met in March 2021, it showed its support for the federal government by categorically rejecting a proposal made by western members aimed at condemning the humanitarian and security crisis in the Tigray region. Prior to the meeting, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonnen paid an official diplomatic visit to India, where he inaugurated the newly constructed chancery building and residence of the Ethiopian Embassy in New Delhi. During the visit, officials from both states declared that their relationship to be "mutual and sisterly."

According to the Indian embassy in Addis Ababa, ''*India Ethiopia relations have been traditionally close and friendly. Ethiopia has been appreciative of the fact that India has never been hostile to Ethiopian interests. Ethiopia has been consistent in their support for India in the international fora on various issues*.'' (Ibid)

The United Arab Emirates and other Gulf States – The presence of the Gulf states in the Horn of Africa is rapidly expanding. These rising Middle Eastern powers are vying for a foothold in the region due to their geographical proximity. Qatar and Turkey back the Somali federal government, while the United Arab Emirates back Somaliland and other autonomous regions. Saudi Arabia recently dispatched military and intelligence officers to Eritrea in order to form an alliance in its involvement in the Yemeni civil war. In exchange, the kingdom promised to financially support the Eritrean government. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia played a significant role in resolving the long-standing security stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The UAE is also attempting to mediate the Nile dam dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. Its ongoing efforts to resolve the Ethiop-Sudanese border conflict have also highlighted the region's growing influence.

Since the Abiy administration took power, the UAE has been one of Ethiopia's most reliable partners. Its huge financial support to the regime, amounting to US$ 3 billion, has played a significant role in stabilizing the foreign exchange shortage Ethiopia faced during the three-year political crisis. Aside from financial assistance, the UAE is expanding its influence in Ethiopia through political alliances and massive investment in agriculture, construction, and transportation sectors. It also intends to sign an agreement with Ethiopia and Eritrea to build an oil pipeline connecting the two countries. The Tigray crisis exemplifies the UAE's growing influence in Ethiopia. One of the allegations levelled by TPLF supporters against the UAE is that it is involved in the conflict by providing drones and other area artillery from its Assab military base in Eritrea, though the Ethiopian government denies this. In February, the Ethiopian National Intelligence Security claimed to have foiled a terrorist plot against the UAE embassy in Addis Ababa. According to the report, a second group of suspects was planning to carry out the same attack on the UAE embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. Regardless of their credibility, these reports demonstrate the UAE's growing influence in the region.

One important point to note here is that the behaviour of Turkey, India, the UAE, and other Gulf states in the Horn of Africa can be explained in terms of offensive realism, as they strive to maximize their economic and security presence in the region. However, their behaviour differs from that of Russia and China due to differences in power capability. These rising regional powers meet at least four of the five principles of offensive realism. To begin, because there is no authoritative power that governs the competitive actors in the Horn of Africa, they are attempting to maximize their power in an anarchic system. Second, because states can never be certain of other states' intentions, they act independently. They can be aggressive at times and soft at others. Third, because survivalism is the ultimate goal of each state, these regional powers seeking to expand their influence in the Horn of Africa seek to maximize their power in order to secure their territorial integrity and domestic political autonomy through

economic and security incentives. Finally, because states are rational actors, Turkey, India, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states in the Horn of Africa make decisions and behave in accordance with the current dynamics in the region. The only basic principle of offensive realism that these rising regional powers may fail to fulfil is the second: ''great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other'' (Mearsheimer, 2003, p.16). Despite spending billions of dollars to develop and modernize their military forces, Turkey, India, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states are not yet capable of challenging the military might of the United States, Russia, and China. Indeed, regional rising powers import their weapons from global powers.

Conclusion

The primary goal of this article is to demonstrate Africa's position in the global system using the Tigray crisis as an example. While the theoretical part of the article discusses the two fundamental concepts of neo-realism, namely the anarchical behaviour of the global system and states' desire to survive, the evidence-based analysis shows how competing strategic interests of global powers in the Horn of Africa brought geopolitical competition in the region. The analysis also shows that the overarching goal of the global and emerging powers competing in the Horn of Africa is to maximize and maintain their political, economic, and security clout in the region. However, because there is no authoritative power that dictates and controls the anarchic global system, western states and emerging powers make independent decisions and act in accordance with their geostrategic interests in the region. The objections of Russia, China, and India to the proposed UN Security Council statement on the Tigray crisis, as well as the US decision to impose economic sanctions and visa restrictions on Ethiopian and Eritrean leaders, demonstrate that when there is no central power at the global system, states act independently, either to maintain their existing hegemonic status quo or to maximize their influence. There is also one noteworthy point to mention here. Waltz emphasized that as long as the great powers are the main actors, the structure of global politics is determined by them. That is exactly what is going on in the Horn of Africa right now. The desire of western global powers to maintain their hegemonic political influence, combined with the desire of emerging powers to maximize their economic and security gains, is transforming the Horn of Africa into a new geopolitical landscape.

What is more interesting to note here is the issue of polarity and system stability, which is one of the core conceptual components of neorealism theory. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer contend that as the number of global actors grows, so does uncertainty, suspicion, and conflict. Waltz contends that in multipolar systems, there is greater uncertainty, allowing competitors to make erroneous decisions based on their adversaries' intentions and actions. During the cold war, the Horn of Africa was one of the focal points of an ideological proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Ethiopia-Somalia war, the Soviet

Union supported the socialist Derg regime, while the United States supported the Somali government. As a result of the balance of power between the two superpowers, it is unavoidable to state that the global system's structure at the time was bipolar. However, the region is currently a place where multiple global and regional actors are competing with each other not on ideological grounds, but on the desire to maximize their political-economic gains. As a result, the Horn of Africa has become a multipolar battlefield. Furthermore, the dominant US-led Western powers' political influence in the region is currently under threat due to the rapidly expanding presence of emerging powers such as China and Russia. Because the anarchical nature of the multipolar world system does not allow states to maintain power for long, great powers are always suspicious of one another. Suspicion causes friction, which leads to increased instability, fragility, and an increase in violence in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. Thus, in order to mitigate the looming global security crisis that could arise from the Horn of Africa, the article recommends that scholars and policymakers work to raise awareness about the disastrous consequences of destructive competition among the region's great powers. There is a classic proverb that could sum up my point here: 'No one will be safe until everyone is safe.' That principle applies everywhere in the world.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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State, Religion and Muridism in Senegal

The Role of Islam and Islamic Movements in Africa since 1883

Chongo Terun Dese[1]

Abstract:

Africa's social and political movements are very diverse especially because of the nature of their emergence in different parts of the continent and the peculiarities of the conditions that informed their emergence which also differs. Even though they all emerged in opposition to colonial rule and domination, often these movements provide links for exploring the nature of the relationship between local and national movements that culminates into the independence of African states. This is a study on the role of Islam and Islamic movements in Africa, it explores the dynamics of religion and its impact in state affairs. The paper examines the role of religion in organizing people for liberation struggles and the development of states in Africa and Senegal in particular. It maintains that religion was a fundamental tool in the development of social and political movement in Senegal. The paper uses Muridism as one of the most influential religious groups in Senegal to demonstrate the strength of religious institution in mobilizing people against colonial state. Murid's philosophy of work, worship and service inspired the zeal to human, social and political development. These religious principles provided an alternative system of social, political economic and spiritual control to colonial rule whose imperialistic drive was to dominate and suppress the people. Thus, at independence, the philosophy of Murids found expression among the people and contributed to the formation of nationalist ideology and state-politics in colonial and post-colonial Senegal.

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Introduction

One of the early modern religious and social movements in 19th century Africa to contribute to the advancement of the Islamic religion and the development of the state has been the rise and growth of Muridism especially in the West African state of Senegal. This was carried out at the level of the social order of Sufi Islamic development which sought advanced spiritual knowledge and enlightenment for its adherents. Muridism was another aspect of a revolutionary movement which can also be referred to as part of the Reformation of Islamic Movement in Africa which began in 1883 (Basil, 1974). The movement therefore developed in the late decades of the 19th century in various forms and culminated in the middle and later part of the 20th century when the principle and practice of Muridism became more pronounced (Brill, 1993).

The Muridist Islamic movement was to a large extent influence by the state building aspirations of the Jihadist movements and were fittingly most notably evident in West Africa especially in Senegal, where they were forged, expanded and developed. The period of the growth and development of Muridism coincided with the period of the European quest for imperialist expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa, but particularly in West Africa and other areas in the continent. Indeed, there are pointers that the central character of this movement was the reform and purification of Islam and the advancement of the spiritual knowledge base of its adherents who could contribute to the social and cultural development of modern Senegal (Donald, 1971). This paper is about the significance of the role of Muridism and its movement in Senegal and how the nature and character of these movements have affected the development of the state and religion across Africa. It examines this significance generally in terms of the movement as an example of spiritual growth and individual Muslims and their promotion and advancement of the African renaissance in the 19th century and even in the contemporary period (Donald, 1971, Oloruntimehin, 1998).

Framework of Analysis

The paper conceives State from the Weberian sense. According to early scholars such as Marx Weber, "the state is a human community which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." This implies that the state is responsible for the enforcement of law and order and the maintenance of administration and equitable distribution resources for the well-being of the people within its boundaries. The state achieves this development in the major areas of accountability to the people, the administration of justice, and the overall administration of its territory for the common good of all. Scholars such as Hobbes, Plato, and others, have over the years debated nature and character, its relevance to the galvanisation of forces for the progress and development of society within given territories (Francis, 1992). Religion is described as a community of people who are joined by spiritual or religious beliefs in a Supreme Being or deity. Furthermore, these people devote their energies to supporting their members' spiritual, social, and cultural

requirements. Religion, once again, refers to the activities of faith-based organizations that are affiliated with a solid spiritual community and are concerned with personal or societal development (Francis, 2004). Woldehanna sees religious groups as "religious and religious-based organisations, places of religious worship or commissions." (Sarah, 2005). Religion can also be seen as the practice and adherence to values that are based on faith and or belief in the future promises of a supreme being. As religious actors, the practitioners have played an increasingly relevant historical role in state building in several African countries such as Senegal. Over the years therefore, religious institutions such as those of the Islamic sects across Africa have worked or served as educators, advocates, intermediaries, and mediators, and have helped in the promotion of good behaviour among Muslims, they also provide a framework for building peace and as well as provide other humanitarian services. But most importantly, the dissemination of knowledge of traditional democratic practices that safe-guard the rights of the individual, encouragement of peace and disarmament (Jacob, 2009). Muridism is an Islamic movement with roots in the Sufi Islamic order in Senegal with profound influences in the African sub-region. Believers under this order, known as Murids in this Islamic movement traversed the path of knowledge and enlightenment under a tutor or guide known as a Murshid. They are also called Murids as they are the seekers of spiritual enlightenment who have taken a clearly marked path for them under the Islamic religion (Brill, 1993). Muridism was a social and political movement in Senegal which aspired to attain these values through the banner of religion and faith, specifically, the Islamic religion (O'Brian, Donald, 1971).

Origins and Development of Muridism in Senegal

Sheik Amadou Bamba of Senegal—an Islamic scholar who lived between 1850-1927 is credited to have founded the Murid Brotherhood. The movement spread to the Gambia but recognition was given to its headquarters in Touba, Senegal as the holy city for all adherents of Muridism. It is estimated that the Murids constitute a significant population in Senegal. Politically and economic wise, Murids influence the politics, economically and society of Senegal, this is not only in the country but throughout the West African sub-region. Sheikh Bamba's mystical works on religious issues such as mediation, rituals, work and worship, enterprise and industriousness, became the touchstone for the movement (Mbacke, 2019).

Sheikh Bamba belonged to the Islamic intellectual movement, the Qudiriya, which was not really as militant and aggressive in approach to issues of state and national affairs. This was evident where the deep learning, piousness, and enterprise and industriousness of the Murids became a great asset to the interests of French colonialism in Senegal. Moreover, Bamba and others saw their mission as the creation, development and expansion of a greater Jihad known as the Jihad Akbar, or 'greater struggle' for Islam in the areas of learning, worship for Allah, submission to the Mujahidin or renewal of Islam, and commitment to social work for the uplift of the people. Thus, the emphasis on faith and hard work became the driving forces of a new

religious movement of Muridism in Senegal within this period. During the colonial period, the movement struggled as a result of French officials' distrust of the Murids who were seen as potential nationalists and rivals for power against European imperial interests in Senegal. However, Bamba and his movement thrived and work began on the Murids' main mosque, known as the Great Mosque at Toubaby 1926 (Mbacke, 2019).

Since the Murid Islamic movement's founding, attraction had been laid by the people of Senegal upon the structure and organisational hierarchy of the faith. Many of its adherents believed that becoming a working organisational structure remained steps towards attainment of the rank of elitism in Senegal. But the Murids after the demise of Sheikh Bamba, known as the Caliph or the Grand Marabout, have remained hereditary and have maintained absolute authority and control over the followers. Within the lower ranking adherents of Marabouts that other hierarchical roles have been assigned to other followers other than to members of the grand family or descendants of Sheikh Bamba. These lower ranking hierarchical structures include the Dahiras, Daaras, and other sects that make up the structural organisation of the Murid Movement. The membership of the Murid brotherhood therefore has followed this hierarchical structure religiously and faithfully fulfils the duties and obligations of their calling.

The Dahiras' structure of the Murid brotherhood relates to the associates of the descendants of the Marabout who may share certain allegiances or commonality by belonging to the same village group or geographical region. The Dahiras mostly live in the urban or township centres where they are recognised as religious leaders in their own right serving under the leadership and direction of the collective body of Marabouts, who themselves serve under the Caliph or Grand Marabout (Mbacke, 2019). Another important structure of Muridism is the Daaras. These are also Madrassas, or the Qur'anic Schools for instruction in Islam, but specifically focusing upon the assumptions and tenets of the Murid brotherhood concerning or with regard to Islam. Since they were initially founded by the Sheikh himself, it became a tradition among his descendants to continually initiate and found such Madrassas throughout the strongholds of Muridism in Senegal. These Sheikh Bamba's descendants and disciples have also been responsible for teaching and instruction in these Qur'anic schools which add the Khassida or poems in remembrance and honour of Prophet Mohammed to the general curriculum of Muridic Islam. Among the Daaras, the first aspect of self-development taught to them was agriculture and the cultivation of land for their sustenance. Thus, many of them continued to live as agriculturists and peasants in Senegal, Gambia and in other strongholds of the Murid brotherhood (O'Brian, 1995).

One of the close followers of Sheikh Amadou Bamba, Ibrahim Fall, further added to the historical development of Muridism in Senegal by forging a sect and structure which later became Baye Fall. Ibrahim Fall's development of this sect was based upon training for personal hard work and dedication to a life of religion and to the Marabouts, regarded as the Holy among the Faithful. This development in Muridism regarded as the Dieuf Dieuel, also known as 'with hard work, one reaps what he sows,' has remained the creed and article of faith

among members of the sect. This structure of Muridism has helped the brotherhood to acquire ready labour force in fields of general work and construction, personal safety and security of the higher rungs of the religion during its services, including at pilgrimages, the Grand Magal, at Touba. With the success of this movement and sect within Muridism, Ibrahim Fall has been recognised as 'the Light of Muridism,' and the Bab al-Muridina or Gate of the Murids'. The influence of the Murids has continued to grow in the state of Senegal and Gambia and other immediate environs of the West African sub-region (Christian, 1999).

As a religious practice, members of the Murid Brotherhood consider the following; prayer, ablution, fasting, pilgrimage and alms giving as their core principle that should be imbibed as part of individual obligation. The achievement of Imani, or faith is through six articles such as: the belief in God, his angels, his prophets, the holy books, judgement day and divinely decrees. These beliefs are grouped under the three pillars of Muridism. In these three pillars of Muridism, adherents follow what has been regarded as the Murid Triangle, which is encapsulated in love for Allah and his Sheikhs, work and service for Allah and to all humanity, and knowledge and the divine light of Almighty Allah (Christian, 1999).

Muridism, the Role of Islamic Movements in Senegal since 1883

Muridism was influenced by Islamic intellectual and social movements, the Quadiriyya, Tijanniya and the Jihads in Western and Central Sudan in the 19th century. All these movements were aimed at the reform and purification of Islam and the creation of a society of fairness and justice. This was also the premise upon which Muridism based its growth of Senegalese society even during the period of European imperialism and colonialism in the country (Roland, 1972). The great significance and influences of Muridism in Senegal were in areas like the political, economic, social and cultural realms. Sheikh Bamba's Muridism saw himself as the central figure in a reform movement and united front first against European imperialism which he did not support, and for his religion and movement's political renaissance of Senegal and most parts of West Africa.It is to be acknowledged that Sheikh Bamba's efforts were certainly an inspirational example for similar movements elsewhere (Roland, 1972).

Muridism encouraged the Senegalese, Gambians and other West Africans to look to Islam as the rallying point and the ideal system for the revitalisation of the society through work and service and to resist the secular systems imposed by alien powers. In the western Sudan for example, about 40 percent looked up to the Sheikh and his descendant Caliphs as the father figure of nationalism, a brand-new Islamic religion, independence, and political development. The Muridist movements galvanised moral and religious aspirations and their fulfilment as the decisive factors for the country's political development. A fine example was the growth of the Baye Fall movement in Senegal which was established in the post-Bamba period and was an effective movement for organisation and achievement in the political life and development of Senegal. Thus, although the Murid brotherhood did not fully participate actively in the politics

of Senegal and Gambia, systematically, the character of its influence continued into the 20th century and beyond in many areas (Roland, 1972).

Scholars have shown that the significant political achievement of the Muridist movements in Senegal and beyond was creeds and the carving out of their own religious and political spheres of influence which provided an indigenous alternative first to colonial rule and then to the measures for the advancement of the society in the post-independence era. A major significance of the Muridist movements' contribution to state building in Senegal has been the tenacity and legacy of work, worship and service that it has imparted to its 40 percent adherents which in turn, has contributed significantly to human social development. Thus, history has recorded that Amadou Bamba--the Muslim leader established the Muridism, which resisted all forms of imperialist and colonial intervention and its influence was felt up to Tunisia as it protected Islamic values from European colonial politics. Although the French attempted to break his resolve by forced exile from 1895-1907, he left an enduring legacy of resistance and struggle for freedom.

The religious philosophy and ideology of Muridism has been a major influence on modern Senegalese nationalism and political development as the nationalists were inspired and fired by the zeal of the earlier quest for social works and human advancement and drew inspiration from the life and times of the Sheikhs and Caliphs and other disciples' courage and valour which was deployed in the religion and society. Beginning from Sheikh Amadou Bamba, the Sheikhs and Caliphs of Muridism have worked for the modernisation of the political space and have influenced similar like-minded movements. Murids have contributed to the struggle for universal suffrage and the right to vote and participate freely in the political process throughout Senegal and beyond (Mbacke, 2019).

In the course of development of modern politics and mobilisation, the Murids have proven the ideal partnership struck by political leaders in Senegal beginning from French rule. In the period of the entrenchment of universal suffrage in 1956, this development quickly galvanised into a crescendo and became truly a national movement with the Murid brotherhood. Following the footsteps of their leaders who were Clerics, Sheikhs and the Ulama, the majority of people were reached in campaigns of mass mobilisation and political education for the soul of Senegal. Thus, the Murid brotherhood has proven its mettle as state builders even beginning from the period of French colonial rule. As the movement increased in membership and continually refined in doctrine and ideology, many aristocrats and royalty sympathetically won over to their cause. Therefore, the Murids became gradually integrated as the masses and found shelter in various villages, communities and urban centres of Senegal (Catherine, 2003).

The influence of the Murids in contemporary Senegal has been great indeed. For many believe that political support and the attainment of power cannot be entirely successful without the impact of the Murid brotherhood. For, the politicians have courted the support and partnership of the Murid brotherhood for their success in general elections through the

mass mobilisation, spread and reach by the Marabouts of the religion. At the social and political level too, the religious leaders of Muridism are believed to possess power and influence through their adoption of Islamic sciences and magic. This has also led to a large and influential following cutting across various sections and classes in Senegal and Gambia. It is known that several private citizens, government officials and politicians seek their partnership and friendship in demand for magical and fetish power in political struggles, government service and the private business sectors. Therefore, the Murids, especially their Marabouts, have used this influence in acting as intermediaries in the development of Senegal. But their influence has also continued to be felt in the highest office of the land as the former President Abdoulaye Wade was a member of the Murid Islamic movement (Tim, 2011).

The Murids' influence in the economic life of Senegal has been felt in their production and cultivation of groundnuts and other agricultural products. Thus, since the cash crops era of French colonial rule, the Murids agricultural output has led to an advantageous position in the market economy and the national scheme of things of Senegal. Between the religious leaders and the followers of the order, land and cultivation of groundnuts have led to certain aspects of feudalism which has in turn led to mass production and monopoly held by the Murid brotherhood. This development has generally placed the Murid brotherhood at the centre of Senegal's national economy and has also placed its members at a well-established position in Senegal and the Gambia. In addition, at the cultural level, there has been great bondage and cooperation through common brotherhood and support of the secular state and social order in all ramifications. Through artists such as Youssou N'Dour, the brotherhood also has representation in popular culture that has been recognised internationally (Cheik, 2005).

Islamic Movements in Africa since 1883

Apart from Muridism, various Islamic movements such as Mahdism with influences in Sammaniya, Wahabiya, the Sadisiya of Morocco, the Quadiriyya and the Sannusiya in North Africa, the Tijanniya, and many others, have influenced developments in Africa. These have forged and shaped developments in nationalism, community development, socio-economic and political development and cooperation, and various state building efforts, not only in Senegal and the Gambia, but throughout Africa. Ultimately, these Islamic movements in their militant resistance and struggle for self-determination in the face of violent European imperialist conquest of the African continent especially in the 19[th]centurywere instrumental to the spread of early forms of nationalism in the Muslim-dominated pre-colonial and colonial states of Africa (Basil, 1974).

The influence and inspiration of these Islamic movements have also laid the foundations and established the militant traditions upon which the modern nationalist movements and liberation struggles were built, nurtured and solidified across the African continent. In the independence era, these movements also contributed to various sectors of the entities and polities of African states. Thus, as Ali Mazrui has asserted, in the gallery of Africa's resistance

to imperial conquest, domination and control, and the capacities for independent state building, the Islamic movements' successful struggle for recognition has occupied a privileged position in the various processes for the development of the African continent.But as Basil Davidson has noted, the time of their emergence and the level of development of the African continent within the period, diminished this impact in the light of imperialism and the varied ideological struggles for modernity in the post-independence era of African history (Ali, 1987).

Conclusion

The Islamic movements in Africa such as Muridism in Senegal and the Gambia and others are many responses that the Africans made towards their indigenous development and international interactions within and outside the continent. These particular responses laid a pattern and the structures for future liberation struggles in those countries particularly, and the rest of the continent in general. This paper presented the general ideology of these movements, their strategies for the development of their immediate communities and the state at large. It has presented these movements as significant in the latter indigenous African struggles for freedom and self-determination in leadership and statecraft in both colonial and the post-colonial periods. The paper finally dwelt upon the significance of these movements in Africa's long history of religion, faith and the forging of nations, with Islamic standard bearers in the struggle for an indigenous knowledge system for the independent development of the continent.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Hand-made Austro-Hungarian Maps of the Rio de Oro Coast

János Besenyö[1], Sándor Fülöp

Abstract:

The two authors undertook an unusual task as part of a research – on Hungary and the Western Sahara issue – to reproduce manuscript maps known so far to only a few researchers. One of the authors of the study provided service as peacekeeper in Africa. However, when he was serving in the UN MINURSO peacekeeping mission, a Spanish colleague informed him that in 1899 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had almost bought Rio de Oro – present-day Western Sahara. He found useful material meeting with historian Mihály Krámli. He learned from him that in 1898 the Spanish had actually offered to buy the territory of Rio de Oro to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Although negotiations took place between the two powers, the deal failed. The author obtained handwritten German, French, and Spanish material. The handwritten material was difficult to read in some places, and the drawn maps were naturally burdened with geographical inaccuracies. There was a need for a GIS-based reproduction of the cartographic drawings in German by the author of the study. In this study, the two authors present the course and then the failure of the Spanish and Austrian negotiations and the process of the reproduction of cartographic drawings.

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Introduction

After the first democratic elections of 1994, the South African state still had a well-equipped, well-organized and well-trained police inherited from the era of the apartheid. Notwithstanding the change in the South African politics, the police was an organisation connected to the previous oppressive regime, which was based on racial segregation and policies that favoured the white minority.

The structure and the mission of the South African Police Service changed radically: people of colour could become officers and advance to high ranks, and the duties were not related to oppression of dark-skinned people anymore. This meant a transition, which contained a type of obscurity, as it is a feature of every major political change.

On the one hand, the South African Police Service became insecure about what they could do instead of reacting harshly, as they used to before 1994. On the other hand, South Africa became a member of the Commonwealth again, and the British policies turned trendy: privatisation meant higher quality and more efficient services and saving money for the state. Private ownership shifted responsibility onto the supplier; therefore, the NPM (New Public Management) reforms were seen as a solution for the problems of the public sector. (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011, p. 173)

NPM reforms were typically implemented in English-speaking countries. The preferred methods were privatisation and outsourcing, but the goals could vary. Ewan Ferlie, Lynn Ashburner, Louise Fitzgerald and Andrew Pettigrew classified the NPM-models into four groups: 1) The 'Efficiency Drive' that made the public sector similar to the private one; 2) 'Downsizing and Centralization' that created a strongly centralized, more democratic system; 3) 'Search for Excellence' that emphasized the work ethics and the role of the members of organization, and 4) 'Public Service Orientation' that implemented of the methods of the private sector in the public sector. (Ferlie et al. (1996) pp. 10-15) As it is going to be demonstrated in this paper, the privatisation of law enforcement in Cape Town is a mix of the second and fourth method.

Negotiations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Spain on the acquisition of Rio de Oro

In 1898, after Spain had lost the war for Cuba, several of their colonies were forced to surrender to the victorious United States, and more were sold to be able to pay the cost of the lost war. Thus began negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on the possible sale of their African colony, Rio de Oro, acquired in 1884. The colony was offered for rent or purchase to the Austro-Hungarian Colonial Society (Österreich-Ungarische Kolonial-

Gesellschaft), founded in 1895 (Loidl 2012)[2]. However, the Society alone was unable to take over the area, so it contacted the Ministry of Commerce of the Monarchy and also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HU… 211). The ministries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy found the offer tempting and started collecting information about the area almost immediately. On 20 March 1899, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed its Ambassador to Spain, Count Victor Dubsky, and head of the Tangier mission, Count Glibert von Hohenwart to obtain further information (HU… 0004). And the two diplomats immediately began work, which lasted for several months.

From the archive materials found, it can be seen that the two diplomats had very different views on the success of the process. Not only did Hohenwart begin to be extremely agile in gathering information, but he embraced the entire project, specifically urging an agreement with the Spanish. His positive attitude is well reflected in the letter he wrote to his superiors in Vienna on 23 December 1899, "I will not leave the crumbs falling off the tables of the great ones." (HU… 0142) and (Kolm 2011). However, Ambassador Dubsky did not share his enthusiasm, and in several cases even drew the attention of decision-makers to the possible unfoundedness and failure of the project. This was probably due to the fact that the two diplomats tried to obtain information from different sources, so their conclusions and opinions differed in several cases. Dubsky obtained his information mainly from Spanish government agencies, members of diplomatic corps, and the Madrid press, which did not always support the Spanish government's policy at the time, most often criticizing the country for wanting to sell out „ancient" Spanish land. Dubsky considered the chances of a lease backed by the Monarchy to be minimal. He said the Spanish would not withdraw their troops from Rio de Oro for domestic political reasons, as this would mean giving up the right to dispose of the area. Dubsky asked the ambassador to Madrid about renting the area, who indicated that his country had pre-emptive rights to the Spanish colonies in Africa, but did not confirm whether they were specifically interested in Rio de Oro.[3] At the station in Tangier, however, Hohenwart not only gathered his information through diplomatic circles, but also visited Spanish and foreign traders, missionaries in the area, and even gathered a great deal

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[2] The Austro-Hungarian Colonial Society was founded in 1894, and its members included several people with significant influence such as e.g. Stanislaus Schanzer, Ernst Franz Weisl, Eduard Lippmann, Friedrich J. Bieber, Emeric Boyer von Berghof, Jacques Jaeger, and countless others who had significant influence because of their political position. The Society issued the Österreich-ungarische Kolonialzeitung, in which all issues related to „colonization issues" were discussed: migration, the status of the Austrian navy, trade policy issues, and of course specifically the acquisition of overseas territories. Since its establishment, the Company has changed its position on certain key issues several times, always adapting to existing political conditions. At the time of its foundation, the Society's program was initiated by the colonial intent of the Monarchy. This changed by the end of the 1890s: emigration became more and more the focus and at the same time colonization became less and less important. However, the exact process of change is hardly known due to the limited data available. In one of the 1915 issues of the Kolonialzeitung, a jubilee article was published on the history of the Colonial Society. The Society was established in 1894 based on the model of a company founded by the Germans with the main aim of acquiring overseas territories and thus reviving the economy. The plan to acquire Rio de Oro, which failed, is spoken of by the authors of the Kolonialzeitung as an opportunity, the fulfilment of which could have given the course of world history a whole new basin. (Loidl 2012).

[3] Dubsky established a relationship of trust with the Spanish prime minister Francisco Silvela, as well as shared confidential information with him several times with the German ambassador to Madrid, Joseph Maria von Radowitz. (HU…0023, HU…0070, HU…0129, HU…0136, HU…0138, HU…0139, HU…0148, HU…0170, and HU…0182)

of information about the coast from fishermen from the Canary Islands. In his summary report on the area, he stated the following about the sources of information:

"On the basis of my reports issued on 5, 10, 12 and 13 of this month, allow me to enclose with Your Excellency a compilation of all the data due here on the Spanish estate, Rio de Oro…In Rio de Oro, only fishermen from the Canary Islands enjoyed some protection from the capital. Rio de Oro is unknown in Spain and the little written work published in this area is extremely incomplete. Most of them are travel guides prepared with semi-scientific details, and it is almost impossible to obtain reliable data from them. The sea depth measurements are rare and took place only at certain points, the constant level rise on the shore did not arouse the interest of Spanish shipping… Data from Canary Islands fishermen therefore provide the only source of information on coastal and area conditions. The Spanish military mission is not in a position to provide any information on the conditions in areas remote from supervised ports (Tangier, Tetouan). The Franciscan mission in Morocco is still in a position to provide relative information, the helpfulness of these priests is outstanding, and although they do not require scientific justification, we are grateful to them for at least, as far as possible, contributing to some information about the area." (HU…0028, HU…0029, HU…0030, HU…0035, HU…0036).

According to Hohenwart, a colonial policy different from that of the Spanish would allow the area to flourish rapidly and bring significant benefits to the Monarchy. He saw a particularly good opportunity in fishing and related activities. He envisioned this by developing existing ports, building new ones, and setting up a fish processing plant. In addition, it wanted to develop the previously limited trade. According to Hohenwart, the emergence of the Monarchy could benefit everyone, as the territory would not fall into the hands of "large colonizing countries" who would exclude everyone else from the use of the territory, but under Austro-Hungarian patronage trade opportunities are available to smaller countries – virtually everyone. Thus, the Monarchy should not compete for Moroccan ports not yet occupied by other European powers, or even bring its disadvantage by colonizing the southern territories. According to him, the Spanish would be happy to hand over the surcharge area to them, as Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena (Ifni) will retain their African colony even in the event of a Moroccan turnaround that may be unfavourable to them. Hohenwart's report also shows that copper, manganese, and sulphate are present in greater quantities in the area. Finally, he summarized his report as follows: "*It is a fact that the Spanish between Cap Bajador and Cap Blanco is currently of relatively less value, but due to its location, the richly exploitable interior areas, which are still difficult for European trade to access…hide metal-rich, fertile soils. The territory of Morocco is of great importance even if the port of Arksis is opened to the English by the sultan…Rio de Oro would not lose its importance but could function as a center of the neighbourhood centralizing all trade to the east and south. This will require careful, energetic,*

consistent and not too costly work, which is not to be expected from Spain today." (HU…0054, HU…0055).

Much of the data collection was completed by the diplomats by July 1899, and then on July 29, the reports they sent were received by the State Department. Although the leadership of the ministry was divided on the feasibility of the project due to differing reports and opinions, it still agreed with the other ministries as well as the Austro-Hungarian Colonial Society on how to obtain Rio de Oro. The vice-president of the company, Ernst Franz Weisl, and his well-connected foreign minister, count Agenor Goluchowsky, and some other foreign ministry officials began negotiations with the Spanish who then wanted to get rid of their colony at all costs. The port of Vilaa Crisneros (Dakhla) in the colony, where the ships of the Austro-Hungarian fleet could have been safely stationed, would have been an incredibly good opportunity for the Monarchy from both a commercial and a military (naval) point of view.[4]

The Spanish took the sale of the recently acquired Saharan lands so seriously that the necessary legislative amendment was prepared, and a working group worked out the conditions for leasing the land. The Spanish company operating the site, until 31 December 1899, transferred the exploitation right to a consortium whose task was to carry out the sale. The consortium was led by Juan Bautista Somogy, a Member of Parliament of Hungarian descent who wanted to sell the area but „lease" it to a foreign trading company so that the Spanish crown would retain control over the area. A letter of intent to this effect was also sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Monarchy (HU…0158, HU…0159, HU…0160, HU…0161) The Ministry, with the involvement of members of the Colonial Society, prepared a budget plan for a possible new colony. According to the calculations, the acquisition of the area by the Monarchy, the purchase of the infrastructure developed by the Spanish, would have cost approximately HUF 150,000 and the development and operation of the commercial site would have cost another HUF 100,000. Seeing the abundance of fish in the coastal waters, the Company planned to establish, operate and possibly lease a fish processing plant (HU…212, HU…213). Trusting in the favourable economic opportunities, the slow and bureaucratic state machinery of the Monarchy seemed to start. But not only members of the state administration began to see opportunities in the Rio de Oro business, but also various economic circles. The Austro-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce itself was thinking of raising the financial base of an estimated project of HUF 250,000 to HUF 300,000 to create a syndicate. However, in the opinion of the vice-president of the chamber, the sure success would have been guaranteed by investing at least HUF 1,000,000. Finally, there are already plans to set up an international company based in Paris, which, however, is not realistic (Klein 1984).

However, the success of the business, which promised significant profits, was hindered by the Monarchy's unwillingness to invest public funds, or negotiate with the Spanish as the only

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[4] This was also supported by the British major Albert Gybbon Spilsbury, who led an expedition to the area in 1897 to assess the possibilities of British colonization. His journey is described in detail in his book, "The Tourmaline Expedition". In his view, the Spanish considered the west coast of Africa too dangerous, so their colony was controlled from the Canary Islands, and Rio de Oro was their only point of connection with the mainland. The major himself described the Gulf of Rio de Oro as a great port (Spilsbury 1906).

partner. He wanted to leave the material matters to various economic groupings, among whom there was no agreement on who should negotiate with the Spanish consortium led by Juan Somogy. It was also suggested that the Austro-Hungarian Colonial Society lead the negotiations, but this was not supported by the government due to the dubious deals of some of the leaders of the Society. Rather, the person of the Austro-Hungarian Trade Minister, baron Josef de Paoli, or the successful Austrian businessman, Arthur Krupp, seemed acceptable to the government. In the end, however, none of them undertook to lead the negotiations (HU…0194, HU…0195).

The idea of relocating Austrian settlers to an area where they would have established a „national" colony was also unsuccessful. It is planned that 60,000 settlers would have been lured to the area, who would have flourished the desert. The government hoped to receive the HUF8,000,000 cost of the eviction program from the Austrian company Lloyd, but the Company did not see the return on the amount to be invested as assured, so it withdrew from the business opportunity. Although both government and business circles saw a serious opportunity in the project, none of the groupings was willing to start it with their own money. Therefore, the area did not pay the rent of HUF20,000 in 1899, not even the deposit of HUF50,000 negotiated by the end of 1899, which was a basic condition for the continuation of the negotiations[5] (HU…223, HU…224).

Finally, the consortium in charge of selling the Spanish colony tried to find reliable negotiators as well as a grouping to financially support the project. Not with much success[6] (HU…0181, HU…0182, HU…0183).

This is because the government still expected the economic groups to fully cover and implement the project, while in the absence of clear government support, they were unwilling to risk their own financial assets in a potentially unsuccessful business. Eventually, getting bored of waiting, the Spanish began negotiations with the French, who would have liked to acquire Rio de Oro to create a cohesive colonial empire in North Africa. In the meantime, the public mood in Spain has changed, so the Spanish government has permanently abandoned its plans to sell the area (HU…0148), which was thus maintained until their withdrawal in 1975 (Besenyő 2010).

Defining a task for map reproduction

A hand-down sketch of the 3 coasts between Cap Bojador and Cap Blanco (Figure 1,2 and 3) can be dated to 1899, and its preparation can be linked to Count Gilbert Hohenwart-Gerlachstein, Consul General of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Tangier (HU…0032, HU…0034, HU…0031). The map sketches were prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

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[5] The area was leased from the Spanish crown for the same amount by Compania Mercatil Hispano Africana, which had since become economically bankrupt and was liquidated, and then by Compania Transatlantica.
[6] It was even suggested that the Spanish would form a joint consortium with the British, but this failed due to protests from the French and Germans.

the Monarchy as part of the German-language marketing material presenting the Rio de Oro coastline. The drawing was based on the travel reports of Spanish soldiers, Franciscan monks and fishermen from the Canary Island passing through the countryside. In the absence of accurate Spanish hydrographic maps, it was mainly the latter that provided the most reliable information on the fishing and hydrographic situation of the coast. The drawings show the main objects of the coast between Cap Bojador and Cap Blanco, indicating the location of the desert wells, the accommodation of the surrounding Kabul tribes, the caravan routes and the points on the coast about which the Consul General had information.

Due to its purpose, the map outlines were made in German, and as the coast was under Spanish rule, the geographical nomenclature was mostly in Spanish, sometimes in Portuguese. As handwritten nomenclature is difficult to read in some places and the drawn maps were naturally burdened with geographical inaccuracies, we undertook a GIS-based[7] German-language reproduction of the map drawings on an A2 map and for the present study on an A4 map. In the course of this, Sándor Fülöp placed the identified, named objects in the drawing in a geographical environment, reflecting the current conditions, which allowed a more illustrative, plastic and accurate representation of the geographical space but also indicated the made, but now excavated reefs (10. picture).

Materials and methods

Of the three sketches, the main map (Figure 1) depicts the coastal strip between Cape Bojador and Cap Blanco, called Rio de Oro, which largely covers the area of present-day Western Sahara (HU…0032).

This map drawing does not have scale or scale line, but it does have a grid and data to help with spatial orientation. In the geographical coordinate system used, the latitudes are naturally the same as those used today, but the meridians do not follow the Greenwich initial meridian,[8] but the San Fernando[9] or Cadiz international meridian. During the reproduction, we used the starting Greenwich longitude circle used today. One of the other two maps is from the Rio de Oro peninsula (Figure 2) (HU…0034) and the other from the Cintra Bay (Figure 3) (HU…0031) showing their immediate geographical surroundings. Each of these include a

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[7] GIS (Geographical Information System). This is not a simple digital transformation, but a cartographic reworking.

[8] The longitude circle passing through the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, was defined in 1884 by the International Meridian Conference in Washington as the only uniform initial meridian. Its use became common throughout the world in the 20th century (Tímár-Molnár 2013).

[9] The initial meridian of San Fernando (St. Francis) or Cadiz was one of the defining reference systems in Spanish cartography from the second half of the 18th century until 1901, when a formal decision was made to align the Spanish system with the Greenwich meridian. In April 1907, the Spanish Navy accepted Greenwich as the starting meridian. Subsequently, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs ordered the Hydrographic Directorate to prepare all maritime maps in accordance with it. The new system has been appearing in shipping manuals since 1910. The distance of the San Fernando initial meridian from Greenwich is 6° 17' 15'' west (González 2011).

scale (*the former 1: 160000, the latter 1: 125000*) and a linear scale, but the coordinate data is missing.

Figure 1. Hohenwart's map drawing of the coastline between Cap Bojador and Cap Blanco

*Figure 2. Hohenwart's map of the Rio de Oro peninsula*

Figure 3. Hohenwart's map of the Czintra Bay area

To identify the handwritten geographical nomenclature and other parts of the of the text, a palaeographic aid (Germanic…without year) containing old German handwriting style was needed, as well as digital versions of some contemporary maps (Mapas… without year) provided significant help.

The mapping processing software tool was provided by ArcGIS Desktop 10.5. In order to make the maps more accurate, we used the SRTM surface model[10] included in the latter software, which is part of the basic data file, the shaded relief[11] data file derived from it, which is part of the basic data file, primarily for aesthetic purposes, and a vector database of *bathymetry[12]* of the world's seas made available free of charge by OpenDemEurope for research and educational purposes.

Data for the Rio de Oro coastline were generated based on 2017 Google satellite imagery, using the GPS Visualizer interactive website for online digitalization (*vectorization*) and download of generated data (Schneider 2002).

The process of map reproduction, the difficulties encountered during processing

The analogue, hand-drawn map sketches were converted to digital form, and then, in preparation for further processing we cut out the map mirrors, which can also be done with the built-in Windows tool Paint. The digital map drawings cut out were then processed on the ArcGIS platform.

A major sub-task was the production of the Rio de Oro coastline (including islands). Although the digital master data file included with ArcGIS Desktop contains data on such topics, it was advisable to re-create it, because with digitalization it is possible to create data of virtually any accuracy based on the current 2017 satellite recordings. The workflow was performed using the drawing tools of the GPSVisualizer interactive website. Track points were placed on the zoomed satellite image, and a track (line object) was composed of the lines connecting them. Trackpoints were deposited every 200-300 meters on average, which corresponds to the data density of a 1:150000 scale map (*the large-scale cut-out showing the Czintra-bay area*) (Figure 3) (HU…0031). A continuous track formed the continuous shoreline, with additional tracks for each island (Figure 4.). Those tracks were downloaded in KML format, which files can be converted to ArcGIS platform using the KML to Layer tool of the ArcToolbox Conversion Tools, in this case a so-called polylines feature class, which can be displayed in ArcMap, for further processing.

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[10] SRTM – Shuttle Radar Topography Mission. It was created by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to represent the Earth's surface digitally. The data system is available free of charge almost all over the Earth with a pixel size of 3" x 3" (~ 90m x 90m) (SRTM… 2011).

[11] Shaded relief - topography shading. In addition to the SRTM interface model, this is also part of ESRI's core data but can be generated independently with any parameter using ArcGIS Hillshade.

[12] The resolution of data system is 30 angular second (Download… 2014).

Figure 4. Digitalization of the shoreline on the GPSVisualizer interactive website

Since the usable interfaces in the relevant area were available in an uneven distribution and with differentiated accuracy, we used an approximate transformation in the work phase of georeferencing, which can thus be considered as quasi-georeferencing. The 3 map drawings were inserted into the WGS'84 geographical coordinate system, which was the reference system used to create the reproduction maps. The generated shoreline data were used as a reference file, however, the coordinate grid shown on the main map sketch proved to be useful, as in some places the hand-drawn shoreline showed significant differences compared to reality.

The referenced contemporary maps also helped to clarify the position of the geographical objects, especially the inland accommodation and the desert wells, but they could not be used to reconstruct the contemporary coastline, as they were quite rough and showed significant differences in some places. To substantiate this statement, in the following figures, we used the largest-scale or relatively contemporary maps we found. The excerpts show the geographical conditions of the Czintra Bay area, one of Hohenwart's map drawings (HU…0031). The maps in Figures 5 and 6 are from 1896-1900, while Figure 7 shows the conditions in 1945 and Figure 8 shows the conditions in 1951, the latter at 1: 50000, on a significantly larger scale than the others. It can be observed that even comparing 1945 and 1951 the differences are significant (Carta..., 1896), (Mapa..., 1900), (Mapa..., 1945), (Mapa…, 1951).

Figure 5. Cut-out 1896 Spanish hydrographic map

Figure 6. Cut out of a 1900s map of the Spanish Rio de Oro

Figure 7. 1945, cut out of a map of the United States Army

Figure 8. 1951 Spanish military map

An important factor in the change of the image of the coast, in this geomorphologically short period of time, may be the ability of the rivers flowing into the sea to deposit sediment. As much as the area in question is the Sahara Desert, there are no wide-water rivers or even permanent watercourses, only intermittent ones. This factor cannot, therefore, have a significant effect on the appearance of an otherwise largely undivided coastline.

It is worth looking at the sea level rise. Between 1880 and 2014, world seas rose by an average of 23 cm (average 1,7 mm/year) (Legresy, Benoit 2017). Between 1900 and 2017, this number may have been about 22 cm, considering that the rate of rise appears to have accelerated in the last two decades, currently ~3 ±0,4 mm/year (Nerem et al. 2017). Based on these data, global sea level rise can be characterized by a marked trend, but of course the process fluctuates over time (Legresy, Benoit 2017), however, it should be noted that the differences are significant locally (Figure 9) (Elkins et al. 2015).

Figure 9. Cut-out of a NASA map showing sea level changes between 1992 and 2014

From this figure above, it is striking that the sea level of the Western Saharan coast increased between 1992 and 2014 at a rate roughly in line with the global sea level rise, i.e., around 3 mm/year. In the absence of specific data, by extrapolating global data to the last nearly 120 years, we can assume that, locally, sea level rise may have fallen in the 15-30 cm range, which could not have caused large-scale changes in coastal image.

In view of all this, we considered it expedient to place the named objects of cartographies in today's geographical environment in the possession of clear and sufficiently accurate data, noting that the invention of new contemporary maps depicting the studied area on a much larger scale could significantly change the preference conditions.

In the phase of processing the data of the map drawings, we created a GIS database, which contains both the geographical location of the object and the associated nomenclature.

There were a number of difficulties in identifying the handwritten passages. Much of the geographical nomenclature could be found, but in several cases it was possible to decipher a piece of German, Spanish, or even Portuguese text by studying the old German handwritten styles of the palaeographic aid (Germanic…without year).

From a practical point of view, in the working phase of the map display, the 3 separate map sketches for the present study are presented on one A4 map, which map is easy to see, on the right the coastal area between Cap Bojador and Cap Blanco is 1:3000000 (main map), while on the left the Rio de Oro peninsula at a scale of 1:580000 and the Gulf of Czintra at a scale of 1:350000 (side maps) (Figure 10). To facilitate geographical orientation, the coordinate, north mark, scale, and line ratio containing the coordinate writing have been placed on both the former main map and the latter sub-maps.

Figure 10. Reproduction map created using GIS

The original maps do not contain a signatory explanation, so it was not included in the reproduced maps either. To eliminate the disadvantages of the omitted explanation, the map content had to be clarified. In this sense, the titles of the maps (but only the titles) are

underlined, the most important caravan routes are represented by a solid black characteristic of the roads, the less important ones by a dashed line. The former reefs named by the author were visualized with outlined, coloured, hatched polygons.

Summary

An interesting and instructive episode in the relationship between Hungary and the Western Sahara was the possible acquisition of the Rio de Oro region by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Exploring the course of the Spanish and Austrian negotiations, presenting three hitherto unknown hand-drawn map sketches of the area purchased as part of the information background material and in terms of the interpretability of the map content, their reproduction is an important addition to the research on the topic. In connection with the latter task, it can be said that by using GIS, a compact, illustrative map presenting three maps at the same time can be obtained as a reproduction of antique, hand-drawn map sketches. This preserves the character of the original map drawings and its content to be communicated, while it also satisfies the spatial representation needs of the modern age through greater accuracy and manner of representation. Another option for extracting the reference data needed for reproduction would be to try to reconstruct the spatial conditions of the Rio de Oro coastline around 1899. This would require the use of additional research resources and contemporary maps on as large a scale as possible. Nevertheless, we can conclude that with due care, this method of combining past and modern information can also be a viable way to reproduce contemporary maps.

The purchase of the Rio de Oro area from the side of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was an instructive and interesting episode in the relationship between Hungary and the Western Sahara. The three pieces of, so far unknown, hand-drawn sketch maps are an important part of the information background. The reproduction of the original maps is an essential element in the research process and in studying the details of the Spanish and Austrian negotiation process.

The latter task could be executed with GIS and result in a compact, graphically expressive projection, which includes all three charts. This process conserves the character of the original sketches; besides it satisfies the accuracy requirements of the modern age.

The other option to retrieve reference data is that we attempt to reconstruct the coast of Rio de Oro around 1899. To achieve this goal, more investigational resources and bigger-scale maps of the current age are needed. However, we can state that with sufficient care the process of combining older and modern information could be an efficient way in reprography of maps from that age.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Sándor Fülöp is a cartographer.

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A Review of: "War of Intervention in Angola
Vol. 3: Angolan and Cuban Air Forces, 1975-1985"

by Adrien Fontanellaz, Tom Cooper and Jose Augusto Matos[1]

Éva Hegedűs[2]

"(…) *Cadets that came back to Angola [from USSR training] knew only how to take-off and land: they lacked even the knowledge necessary for us to then take over and further improve their skills. However, we had no time: we had to work them up and send them into combat operations against the guerrillas – under challenging geographic and climatic conditions, and in aircraft not designed for counter-insurgency warfare. Unsurprisingly, losses in pilots, aircraft and helicopters – most caused by pilot-errors, loss of orientation, and similar – were too much frequent.*"

This is just one of the striking personal observations – this one from the Cuban Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Rojas Garcia (p. 33.) – pointing to the major and systemic issues that characterized the Angolan Air Force and Air Defense Force (FAPA/DAA – Força Aérea Popular de Angola/Defesa Anti-Aérea) from its establishment until the mid-80s. These and other deficiencies led to several reorganization and build-up efforts of air defence capacities between 1983-1985, rendering the Armed Forces of Angola (FAPLA – Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola) one of the biggest in Africa, and its air defence system considered the most advanced in the continent by South African military intelligence by 1988.

The book *War of Intervention in Angola, Vol. 3: Angolan and Cuban Air Forces, 1975-1985* traces this journey of evolvement from the colonial beginnings in the late 1930s up to the mid-80s, building on the earlier Vol. 1 and 2. and presenting a great array of new insights. The reader can gain an overview of how FAPA/DAA was gradually set up and the myriads of challenges it faced along that way. The authors closely analyse the role, influence and changing – and very often conflicting – positions driven by political machinery of the main actors involved in this process, namely the USSR, Cuba and Angola. They also go a step further and provide a brief insight into the evolvement of the capacities of the enemy South African Defence Force and UNITA's armed wing FALA (Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola – Angola Liberation Armed Forces) to paint the whole picture.

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The book spares no efforts to also give very detailed accounts of the major battles – including technical details of the military tactics, aircrafts and other ground-based air defence weapons used –, the outcome of which have proven the capability or, on the contrary, incapability of the FAPA/DAA. Personal accounts and anecdotes complement pure facts, corroborating the desk analysis and making it an easy and enjoyable read for both specialist military and non-military, ordinary readers.

The study reveals numerous little known or elsewhere little detailed facts. Among them, for instance, is that the FAPA/DAA dates back to the 60s (not 1975 as many claim) with a number of native and foreign pilots and ground crew already operating a sizeable fleet of transport aircraft at that time. *Chapter 2* is dedicated to the in-depth description of the follow-on developments between 1976 and 1979. As of early 1976, "*even two Angolan air forces came into being*", one staffed by Portuguese and Angolans operating transport and light aircraft; and another one staffed by Cubans and operating Angolan-owned MiGs, Alouette II/IIIs and Mi-8 helicopters. A 'fun fact' from these early times included by the authors is that FAPA air strikes on UNITA camps by lighter aircrafts and helicopters were using 10-kilogram bombs made out of beer bottles (filled by the Cubans with home-made Napalm, p. 17.).

Less of an 'entertaining' (set of) fact(s) is the detailed account of how the 1983-1985 expansion, undertaken in response to the various problems caused by the outdated and inapt Soviet-manufactured aerial assets as well as training system, has proven to be a "mixed blessing". The authors describe, among others, the forcible recruitment, rushed training and deployment to combat of infantry troops; the growing gap between officers versus lower ranks together with the mishandling of and lack of respect for the latter; the overstretched supply chains including for feeding the troops; the widespread corruption; and the large-scale defections. The hot and humid Angolan climate and bush terrain also took its toll on the condition of the already-limited truck fleet that was supposed to carry heavy weapons, ammunition and supplies. As the authors put, the FAPLA was an "*extremely fragile giant*", and its "*sheer size (…) denied the force of quality, capacity, and capability, while becoming unsustainable for an already fragile economy, which was chronically short on skilled manpower*" (p. 57.). In the mid-80s, the Angolan government used up to 47% of the annual national budget for defence purposes only.

For expert readers (but equally for the interested, non-military ones), the book's dedicated sections on some of the outstanding air- or ground-based air defence assets might be of particular value. Among others, the technical overview of the Soviet's highly mobile novelty air defence system 9K33M Osa-AKM (SA-8b "venomous" Gecko), or the big, fast, heavily armed Mi-25 helicopter gunship for close-air support that impressed both the Cubans and Angolans. On the SADF's side, the mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles, a trademark of their infantry formations during the "Bush war" or "Border war" (with Angola), as well as the Ratel (Honey Badger) infantry fighting vehicle, that had a new unique design with wheels, robust in size yet fast, mobile and easy to maintain. A similarly intriguing two-

pager are the closer study of the Soviet's threat perception vis-à-vis that of the West and how this has driven Soviet design philosophy in relation to combat aircraft over the years (p. 62.)

The great amount of rare (black-and-white) photos well illustrate some of the aircrafts and other weapons (some even in action) enhancing reader's experience. The text and photos are also complemented by maps and tables as well as a useful abbreviation list and notes section at the end for further details.

Upon reading, the book is, by no doubt, a unique source on the topic, based on multiple – Angolan, Cuban, Russian and South African –and rich sources. Both for the wealth of information and the concise and clear presentation, one can only recommend the volume especially for those interested in African and, more specifically, Angolan (and South African) military history.

A Review of: "For God and the CIA – Cuban Exile Forces in the Congo and Beyond, 1959-1967" by Stephen Rookes[1]

Dávid Vogel[2]

"For God and the CIA" published by Helion is the 52nd volume of a series that guides its readers through various episodes of the war-torn African history. Being subtitled *"Cuban exile forces in the Congo and beyond"* already gives an idea that this time, it is going to be something extra, a significantly less-discussed topic from the history of the African continent.

The author, Dr. Stephen Edward Rookes is originally from Exeter (UK), Dr. Rookes is a French writer and academic who earned his PhD from the University of Toulouse Jean-Jaurès, France. He specialises in the history of Cuban exiles and takes a particular interest in the CIA's covert operations in Central America and in Africa. The fact that Rookes is not American, but European, turns out to be a very positive circumstance when reading the volume, since this way the study is more reflexive and reflects more on the mistakes and double standards of the decision makers in Washington.

Regarding the content, the book starts with a very brief introduction to the world of US intelligence and underground operations to provide background knowledge for the readers about how covert operations started both domestically and abroad. The author then cites Truman's promise *"to support free peoples who [were] resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"*, meaning to pave the way for open and secret operations abroad. Soon after, the CIA was authorized *"to perform such additional services of common concern"* and to "*perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence"*, referring – of course – to covert and clandestine operations. Rookes then continues to offer an actual example, a case study in the chapter *"How to overthrow a foreign leader: Guatemala, 1954"*. However, this chapter just like the previous one is only for the purpose to have a better understanding of the big picture, to see where and how the Congolese mission had its roots. *"From Guatemala to Cuba, 1961"* is the title of the next chapter where readers are given even more insight about programs and operations such as 'Operation 40', 'Brigade 2506' or 'CIA Station codenamed JM/WAVE'. The chapter sheds light on some less-known details of the anecdotical saying that the CIA was busily working on taking Fidel Castro out of picture. By introducing the Guatemalan example of how the Arbenz government was overthrown, readers get the closer feeling of how covert operations became popular for the US government.

After this long but rewarding introduction of the background, we finally reach the actual topic of the book in the chapter *"From the Caribbean to the Congo"*. The section starts with Rookes writing about how Washington has drawn its own "map" of strategic minerals and resources entirely or partially from outside the US, where the Congo plays an important role (interesting enough, we also learn that two-thirds of the uranium used in the bombs that hit Hiroshima and Nagasaki came from the Congo). The rest of the chapter deals with the fact that "Africa's Castro", Patrice Lumumba, Congolese independence leader and the first Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was getting closer to socialism, which raisedfears in Washington, not to mention the Domino Theory in Africa.

The next two chapters guide us into the details of the actual operations from Alpha to Omega. *"The tools of Counterinsurgency"* talks about why Cuban exiles were picked for the mission, how the Grupo Voluntario Cubano, aka. 'Makasi' (meaning something with power, vigour and vitality in Lingala language) were organized, trained and equipped, with interesting background information about how the airplanes – FA-662, T-6, B-26K, T-28C, FG-292, C-46 etc. – were gathered from all parts of the world, often with names and nicknames of the pilots and their airplanes. In the well-illustrated section, the author even guides us through the changes of paintings and insignia used on the aircrafts, followed by the Makasi Commando Unit, with its members and their biographical information. In contrast, the *"Cubans versus Cubans in the Congo"* chapter deals more with Cubans on the other side: sharing exciting details about Guevara's trips for achieving his goal, the formation of a "Tricontinental Alliance"; the Cuban radio communications to various African countries and within certain African countries; or the reason why Guevara's deep-rooted hatred of "Yankee imperialism" offered a perfect opportunity in the Congo; and interesting insights about the challenges of fighting alongside with the Congolese troops, secretly.

The second part of the chapter deals with the Cuban Exile Naval Force on Lake Tanganyika and how an unfortunate event of CIA-financed armed boats attacking a Spanish cargo ship instead of a Cuban merchant vessel in the Caribbean led to the termination of the project. This event redirected it towards the African continent and Lake Tanganyika, where a figure familiar from the Cuban revolution was heavily involved, making it easier for the CIA to recruit Cubans for Operation White Giant. Even smaller but important logistical details appear on the pages such as how previous knowledge from the Great War helped two 50-foot Swift boats reach the inside of Central Africa from the Caribbean.

Reading the book, we learn that even though both sides were mentally and ideologically "well-armed", they were not on the same level when talking about resources, planning and equipment. On one side stood the Cuban exiles, who saw the operation in Africa as an opportunity where they do not only fight for the Congo but also against Communism and their archenemy, 'Che' Guevara, in a way avenging the failed Bay of Pigs operation. While on the other, the Cuban revolutionaries led by Guevarra fighting for Communism and against Western dependency and imperialism. This unbalanced situation doomed the Cuban revolutionary endeavour in Central Africa resulting in Guevarra admitting defeat in a letter to

Cuba on 14 November 1965, *"indispensable that [the boats carrying supplies] come today: we are starving and encircled".* In six days, he would leave the Congo returning to Latin America.

The closing chapter, *"Mobutu, the Mercenary Revolt and the Makasi"* gives details about the future of the CIA operation: the technical equipment and the aircrew of the Makasi Air Force being transferred to under direct Congolese control. Though aircrafts stayed and served Mobutu, the destinies of Cuban pilots and other personnel were more complex: many joined the regular US forces and fought in Vietnam, some joined the CIA and got involved in various operations in Nicaragua or Angola or *"wherever Fidel Castro attempted to spread his ideology"*, making their legacy a long-lasting one.

The 80-page publication offers finely detailed insights to a fairly short but very interesting episode of the history of the Congo where Cuban forces were present on both of the warring sides. Pieces of information are collected from various sources including never published, newly declassified documents, government archives, and personal testimonies gained from 15 interviews with participants. The book contains a list of the abbreviations used and four pages of appendices, such as the names of the more than 100 Cuban individuals who served in the operation's "air force, ground forces and the naval force". In the back of the book, readers can find the long list of the resources used.

The written information is enhanced by a very generous set of illustrations made up of more than 100 original pictures both colour and black & white, including never published personal photos of the author and participants of the mission, as well as facsimiles and maps.

Besides the depth and the detailedness, the uniqueness of the book is the fact that it uses documents and information largely unknown to not just the general public but to historians and military historians as well. The book is a real must-read for all those who are interested in either Latin American history or African history or even US history where in an episode, non-US, but Cuban citizens were fighting for an American ideology and for the CIA on the African continent.

The volume can also be observed as the continuation of Africa@War's previous volume, *'Ripe of Rebellion – Political and military insurgency in the Congo, 1946-1964'*.

A Review of: "Bitskrieg: The New Challenge of Cyberwarfare" by John Arquilla[1]

Attila Gulyás[2]

For the new aspects of cyber and traditional warfare, one can hardly find a more credible expert than John Arquilla, who is one of the leading national security thinkers of our time, and whose career and expertise are a guarantee for valuable analysis for both cyber experts and the general audience[3]. In this book the author reveals the challenges of the cyber security of our era and connections between cyberwarfare and traditional warfare, which result in a new type of warfare.

Not long before the Second World War the Germans created a new form of warfare which is based on the artistic combination of tanks- planes- and radio communication. This was called "Blitzkrieg" and in the wake of the war it helped the Nazis subjugate a part of Europe. Fortunately, the allies learned from the lesson and in a short period of time they built the new methods in their military strategy. These methods are present even today in the military way of thinking.

But the world has changed dramatically, especially in the last few decades. Due to new inventions and the revolution in information technology a new domain has been born, which is called "cyber world", where new players demand roles. Countries like Russia, China or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea) developed new cyber capabilities which can be used to undermine the faith in the accuracy of the voting process, steal the cutting-edge intellectual property of international firms, or support their country by stealing fiat and crypto currency in addition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Even the earlier looked-down, third world African countries like Zimbabwe or Sudan with the help of Iran and China are working on the improvement of their cyber capabilities. As for cybercrime, there is Nigeria where the "Yahoo boys" - the large-scale scammers - are playing their filthy games on behalf of "African princes" or sons of oil tycoons who want to

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[3] John Arquilla is an American analyst and academic of international relations. He worked for the RAND (American nonprofit global policy institute) for decades and he has been teaching courses in national security affairs and defense analysis at the NAVAL Postgraduate School. Arquilla worked as a consultant to General Norman Schwarzkopf during the Operation Desert Storm (1991), and the Kosovo War (1998-1999) he assisted United States Deputy Secretary of Defense on international information strategy. He also was one of the advisors to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2001-2006). Arquilla developed the concept of netwar, or "swarm-tactics" which is a particular fighting style of network organized groups. He is a promoter of the new idea of adapting the military structure to a network based model to be able to defeat terrorist networks.

evacuate their heritage from their cruel country or hunting for women to extort money from them.

Besides the State Actors there are many Non State Actors around such as terrorists, cybercrime organizations and different hacker groups - just to name a few - that are able to attack and paralyze critical infrastructure, steal money, etc. The new invention of our era is the IoTs (Internet of Things), the interconnected household appliances that can be organized into a multi millions zombie army, which can be weapon in the hands of hackers with malevolent intentions.

Today there is no balance between the offensive and the defensive capabilities. The attackers will keep their advances until the defenders can only rely on brick-wall like firewalls and anti-viral software solutions, because they are always a step behind advanced malicious software. It is obvious that the most important challenge is the improvement of security. The heavy encryption and the Cloudstorage where data is divided into pieces and distributed seem to be the only solution. Even the best remote cloud storage system is worth nothing if the encryption is weak because it lures the aggressors to attack our systems.

Apart from civilian society that can be the target of attackers in political and economic aspects the new warfare has military risks. New wars will be fast paced and the weapons and coordinated strikes of the swarms AI supported, where net and web-based communication is a vital component the interruption or slowdown of which by viruses or worms can lead to catastrophe in battle time. This kind of cyberwar that focuses on the "battle" is the successor of the Second World War "Blitzkrieg" which is called "Bitskrieg" by the author. The cyberwar will change warfare in many areas e.g. from the large formations to smaller, highly networked units which instead of mass on mass engagements to swarm battle tactics where the swarms and the members of the swarms are interconnected with heavily encrypted network based communications systems. The strategic goal is to know more than the enemy in other words to get the information edge. The basic concept is that an information edge is best exploited by "dislocating" enemy forces through the disruption of their communication, instead of confrontational direct or indirect flank assaults.

The consequences of political hacking or a cybercriminal act in the civilian sphere are negligible to the fatal effects of the military operations undermined by information insecurity. That is the reason why the armed-conflicts relations of cyberwar should be the subject of studies.

Unfortunately the varieties of the possible cyber threats are so wide that it is impossible to prepare for all of them. That is why, besides the improvement of cyber security and preparation for "Bitskrieg" like operations, there is one more challenge and it is arms control. But in this case the cold war nuclear bomb counting model based arms control does not work because the fruits of the advanced technology are multipurpose, which means they can be used either in civilian or military area. The idea of cyber weapon control at first seems meaningless, but as Arquilla argues it has a point. The behavior-based arms control has been

working for decades in case of biological and chemical weapons.

This kind of cyber arms control would provide the security of individuals, intellectual properties, and critical infrastructure in times of peace.

The above mentioned issues are only a part of topics discussed in details seasoned with colorful interesting historical examples taken from the military history of the world, ranging from ancient to present times. The author also introduces new expressions like "cool war", or "Bitskrieg", and interprets their meanings by putting them in context. The comparison of traditional war interpretation by Clausewitz is very interesting with the features of the new type of war as Arquilla refutes the principles that had ruled the military thinking for centuries. The author explores and presents the reasons for the vulnerability of the American cyber defense system with relentless sincerity, and at the same time, he gives possible remedies for this malady. Arquilla dedicates a chapter to cyber terrorism in which he logically explains why terrorists restricted their cyber activity to waging political warfare and propagandizing in ways that discomfit the enemy and aid in gaining popular support, and recruits, from among its target audiences. Not less intriguing is how Arquilla unveils the reasons and new - so far unknown - details of the failure of negotiations between the USA and Russia on cyber weapons control. In the light of recent events in Afghanistan, he emphasizes the mistakes of the military leadership in the war of Iraq and Afghanistan with undisguised honesty.

The author touched on many more exciting and thought-provoking topics in this book like the possible role of the AI in the military of the future on the battlefield and in strategic planning, not to mention the responsibility of the AI in decision-making.

The front cover image refers to the main thought of the book as the tank-mouse is the symbol where the tank is the representative of old-fashioned warfare while the mouse is the symbol of cyberwarfare that differentiates "Bitskrieg" from the "Blitzkrieg".

The book is a must have for cyber experts and military thinkers who are interested in the actual issues of cyberwarfare and its effects on traditional warfare, and want to get a glimpse into the future, but even the general public may find it interesting and useful. My suggestion is to read the book more than once, as one can acquire new information and much more details by re-reading it.

A Review of: "Western Sahara: Reasons for Extemporaneous Colonization and Decolonization 1885-1975"

by Jesús Martínez-Milán and Claudia Barona Castañeda[1]

János Besenyő[2]

In late 2020, a conflict known as the Guerguerat crisis erupted with Sahrawis protesting against the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara. The Sahrawis blocked the movement of trucks from Morocco to Mauritania and south on National Route 1, preventing them from proceeding. On 13 November 2020, the protesters were driven away by the Moroccans with armed force and were also shot at. The nearby Polisario gunmen reciprocated the fire. Fortunately, there were no fatalities in the short-lived clash, yet the Polisario Front denounced the ceasefire since 1991 and launched attacks on a fortification system built by Moroccans to protect the occupied territories from the displaced natives. (UNSC 2021) In the period since then, there have been low-intensity clashes in the area, in which Moroccans have also deployed drones. (Lebovich 2021) The clashes have once again drawn attention to the world's last colonial territory, where indigenous people are still unable to exercise their right to self-determination and decide to live in their own independent country or autonomously within Morocco. Unfortunately, the peacekeeping operation set up by the United Nations, MINURSO, is unable to achieve the goal of organising and conducting a referendum for indigenous peoples for which it was set up, so its activities are limited to maintaining the status quo that has existed since 1991. Perhaps thanks to this, the issue of Western Sahara has once again been addressed at several conferences and several publications have been published on the fate of the area. These include the book "Western Sahara, Reasons for Extemporaneous Colonization and Decolonization 1885-1975" published by Nova Science Publishers at the end of 2021 and noted by Jesús Martínez-Milán[3] és Claudia Barona Castañeda[4].

The well-structured and detailed book deals with the Spanish colonisation of Western

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Sahara and the Spanish period, followed by the withdrawal of the Spaniards, which is essential to understanding the current conflict. The authors present in a short introduction the reason for the choice of topic, the research they have carried out and the structure of the book. From this, it turns out that a lot of material has been kept in Spanish archives that could not be researched until now. Furthermore, several people who were themselves active shapers of the daily life of the former Spanish Sahara and then the organisers and executors of the Spanish departure were interviewed. The book is already a curiosity for that reason alone, and because the Spanish archival material researched on this topic has not been published in English yet.

In the first chapter, we get to know the region, the period before the arrival of the Europeans, the society of the people living there, the activities of the different tribes, and the operation of trans-Saharan trade. In the second chapter, the authors present the processes leading to the Spanish colonisation and the occupation of the area, as well as the relations between the Spaniards and the natives between 1885 and 1933. They make it clear that the Kingdom of Spain, which had already gone far beyond its peak at the time, occupied the Río de Oro peninsula in what is now Western Sahara. This was only to give the Canary Islands greater security against other European powers ready to colonise and to protect the interests of the Spanish fishermen operating there (p. 22). Therefore, the Spaniards preferred to occupy the shores of Western Sahara for economic reasons and did not wish to expand inland. However, the new colony did not live up to expectations and only made a loss to the treasury. Moreover, in 1898, the Spaniards were defeated in the war for Cuba by the United States, resulting in the loss of a significant portion of their colonies. (Nunez 2015, pp. 195-196) The authors mentioned that both the British and the French wanted to annex the territory to their own colonial empires (p. 28-30), but this did not happen, and the territory remained in the hands of the Spaniards until 1975. Interestingly, the authors do not mention that Compania Transatlantica, which used the commercial station Villa Cisneros in 1899, with the approval of the Spanish leadership, offered to lease the area to the Austro-Hungarian Colonial Society (Österreichisch-Ungarische Kolonialgesellschaft), founded in 1895, for 30 or 90 years. The issue reached the highest level of the Austro-Hungarian state formation, and after the approval of the political leadership, negotiations began on the lease of the area. The Foreign Minister of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy instructed the Consul in Tangier, Count Gilbert von Hohenwart, to gather as much information as possible about the area, which he did conscientiously. His report confirmed that Río de Oro was only making a loss for the Spaniards, but nevertheless believed the Monarchy could make the area profitable. According to one paragraph of the report, "*the Spanish colony consists of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 non-commissioned officer, 2 corporals, 27 soldiers, 1 physician, 1 engineer, 1 fireman, and 5 employees of the Spanish naval artillery, a total of 40 people. The indigenous colony consists of 54 to 60 fishermen in 12 families and 7 Sudanese Negroes*". (HU_MNL_OL_W253_N_0028 and HU_MNL_OL_W253_N_0029) These data coincide with those in the table prepared by the authors, which shows the evolution of the population of Villa Cisneros between 1897 and 1909 (p. 33). The count saw a good opportunity in the development of ports and fishing, and also

wanted to play a more active role in the trans-Saharan trade. The Monarchy was so excited by the possibility of a possible colonial acquisition that even an expedition was launched into the area to learn as much as possible about it. Meanwhile, the Spaniards prepared an amendment to the law to hand over the area, and a working group worked out the conditions for leasing the area. The Spanish company, which operated the site, transferred the exploitation rights to a consortium until 31 December 1899, which was responsible for the sale. The consortium was led by Juan Bautista Somogy, a representative of Hungarian origin, who wanted to sell, but rather "lease", the area to a foreign trading company so that the Spanish crown would retain control over the area. However, the negotiations stalled due to the differences between the political and economic leadership of the Monarchy, and at the end of 1899 the Monarchy withdrew from the business that had been very important to it until then. (Besenyő 2020a, pp. 71-78) After this, the Spaniards decided to keep the area, although in the following years there was still a motion to "trade" it with the French. This did not happen, however, and they even began to slowly develop the area (pp. 31-39). In this chapter, we can also trace the Spanish-French negotiations and border agreements that form the borders of Western Sahara today. The policy of the Spaniards towards the Sahrawis, whom they were trying to win over with regular annuities and gifts within the policy of "peaceful penetration" or "sugar pylon", is very interesting. This practice confirmed in the natives that the Spaniards came to the Río de Oro not to colonise but to trade (p. 40-46, 141).

In the next, third chapter, we learn about the French and Spanish interests and counter-interests, how the two colonial powers competed and, if necessary, cooperated against the natives who carried out attacks on French forces stationed in Mauritania from Spanish territory (p. 52). As a result, several conflicts arose between the colonial powers, which led to the Spaniards being forced to cooperate with the French and to make certain improvements in their colonies. However, spectacular developments took place during the period marked by the reign of Franco (1940-1973), which are dealt with in the fourth chapter. It can be seen from this that the area became more valuable to the Spanish leadership, under which the administration has been restructured and economic developments have been carried out, leading to an increase in the population (p. 66-71, 79-83). Meanwhile, independence aspirations in the surrounding states also emerged in Spanish-Saharan Africa, moreover, neighbouring Morocco claimed the territory. The Spaniards therefore sought to get the natives on their side and to placate the Moroccans by handing over the Tarfaya zone (p. 75). However, this yielded only temporary results, which led to the idea of the creation of an independent Sahrawi state under Spanish patronage (p. 78-79). Some indigenous peoples were dissatisfied with this and established their own liberation organisations, the Advanced Organisation for the Liberation of the Sahara (AOLS) and the Polisario Front (p. 83-94). The authors documented what was happening very thoroughly at the time, but when they write about the fate of Bassiri Muhammad wuld Hach Brahim wuld Lebser, the head of AOLS, they write: "*According to the provincial government version, Bassiri was released on the border with Morocco (Barbulo 2002, 68-72). To date, there is no data confirming either hypothesis.*" (p. 89). This is contradicted by the fact that several Spanish soldiers, (León 2019, p. 71.; de

Riquelme 1991, p. 610) and even then-governor Pérez de Lerma, claimed that the Sahrawi political leader was executed by soldiers of the Legion and then buried in the desert outside El-Aaiún. (Besenyő 2020b) In the fifth chapter, we can see how the Spanish government sought to exploit the area's natural resources. What developments were made in the fisheries sector (p. 96-102), how phosphate fields and other valuable minerals were discovered and how they benefited from them. However, they succeeded in achieving this only to a limited extent (p. 102-118). In the sixth chapter, readers can learn about the last two years of Spanish colonial rule, when Franco, who ruled Spain with an iron fist, is pushed back by his illness.Those who wanted to inherit did not really know what to do with the Sahrawi colony. They first wanted to give autonomy to the natives (p. 120) and then asked the Arab League to make decisions about the fate of the area (p. 121-122). However, none of these materialised, as Morocco's demands for the area were supported by the United States and France. The Polisario Front, representing an increasing number of indigenous peoples, launched an armed struggle against the Spaniards to force them to leave the area (p. 123-124, 136-137). However, this led the Spaniards not to carry out the decolonisation of their former colony, but to hand it over to Morocco and Mauritania (p. 144), who occupied Western Sahara with arms against the will of the natives, resulting in a 16-year war.

In addition to the well-written chapters, the index created by the authors and the various tables and diagrams help the readers to find their way. Unfortunately, this is less true of maps, the size and quality of some of which leave something to be desired in several cases (p. 2, 28, 34, 50, 106, 110). It would also have been useful to publish a list of the maps and other figures and diagrams at the beginning of the book. The literature used by the authors is very impressive, but I miss from the English literature John Mercer's book *Spanish Sahara*, which is one of the most basic sources on Spanish-Sahara alongside Tony Hodges' book. However, these do not detract from the value of this gap-filling volume that I recommend to anyone who is studying African studies, political history, security policy, and history, or to those interested in the Maghreb region.

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