Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

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Dear Readers,

Dear Fellow Scholars,

I warmly welcome the readers of the second issue of the Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies (JCEEAS). Unlike the previous thematic issue, this publication covers a wide spectrum of different scientific fields and topics.

Our authors are from all over the world and delivered excellent studies to our editors, using their different approaches in various fields of science to expand attention to Africa. This holistic approach is also manifested in the fact that the focus of the studies ranges from very specific local problems to general topics concerning on the whole continent, placing Africa in a global context.

The opening studies of the publication deal with the issue of counter-terrorism, from the investigation of the socio-demographic and cultural background of the perpetrators of violent acts, to the description of the dynamics of some conflict zones, to the issue of peace-making and reconstruction.

Another large group of studies in this issue appearing in the publication deals with the Africa policy of various global and regional powers, as well as the driving forces behind their intervention in specific conflict situations and the impact of the interventions.

The dynamics of the economy and economic integration of individual African states and regions is also a current theme - and the volume appears in several studies, and the issue of migration also appears in the issue.

I wish you all a great reading experience and plenty of fresh ideas and new approaches offered by these papers!

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Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies

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Women as Perpetrators of Violence and Crimes in Africa

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Abstract:

Women as victims of genocide, terrorism or war crimes are the traditional topics of studies. But this situation necessarily changed in the last decades as number of female combatants increased all over the world. If we examine the case of female attackers in different parts of the world, we can get different shapes and form of intention behind these combats. Africa gives the various forms of cruelty caused in society by women or to women. But the line between the two sides in many cases are not clear. In this study I examine the categories of attacks committed by women in Africa, and the situation of women who decided to destroy – mainly – their own society.

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Introduction

When examining the relationship between women and violence in Africa, women appear primarily as victims of violence and crimes, both in the common knowledge and in the reports of violence organizations. Numerous studies deal with their scientific implications, and in addition to it, there are a negligible number of reports that portray women as perpetrators of rape. Africa, as a diverse arena of war, genocide, terrorism and political violence, can once again provide us with many examples.

However, in the case of women, it is also important to examine the role or intention of the perpetrator in relation to the current act. In my study, I will set up categories according to the intent, which will help to understand why women will be not only victims but also perpetrators of violence in Africa.

It is difficult to put these crimes into clear categories especially in the case of the African continent. On the one hand, when an organization of political groups emerging when African countries became independent, the political environment and context changed. In some cases members of armed militias became known as freedom fighters. On the other hand, female perpetrators often do not choose this role by themselves but are forced to commit an act that can be linked to violence.

So, one of the biggest problems with terrorism is the identification of terrorist acts, organizations and actors. Not only do terrorists not identify themselves with this word — as their ideologies call themselves rebels, revolutionaries, liberators, freedom fighters, or defenders of the faith, servants of God, but surviving victims in interviews also refer to them as rebels (Kaplan, 2010).

I examine three major groups and their characteristics or prominent personalities that can be linked to Gonzalez-Perez's notion of terrorism (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008). The first of these deals with genocides in Africa, where women are presumed to commit acts of violence voluntarily, politically motivated or from hatred. The second group includes women who have committed acts of violence and/or attacks on behalf of terrorist groups with extremist ideologies organized in the 21st century. While in the last group, I deal with women who support or commit politically motivated acts of violence, who have been primarily involved in the struggle for independence of those African countries.

A detailed presentation of these groups and a case-by-case examination can therefore help to understand why and what role African women play in committing acts of violence throughout history and the present period.

African Genocide and Women as Preparators

The participation of women in nationalist struggles or acts of violence is always – with few exceptions – is an act of free will. In these cases, they are involved in the commission of the murders as actors in the existing political system, for example the many Nazi murderers who were particularly notorious for their cruelty. Ideas about the Aryan race professed in World War II do not appear in Africa, of course, although there are neo-Nazi groups where women are also active participants, such as Cornelia Wet from South Africa, who committed assassination in Griquatown (Griekwastad), in 2013 as a member of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. (Wildenboer, 2013)

Women who commit murder or genocide in the name of African nationalism are not only followers of nationalist political ideologies, although by their actions and methods they should be included in this trend, but their ideas are based on social problems such as social injustice or resource distribution, and their aim is the complete restructuring of society.

Among the African nationalist-type groups, organizations, parties, or governments that have many female members, several profess left-wing Marxist ideas such as the South West African People's Organization (SWATO) or the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) (Wood&Thomas, 2017). As these groups can be sharply distinguished from their violent counterparts and have primarily served the independence aspirations of the region, I examine them separately from nationalist organizations accused of genocide.

Sudan's People's Liberation Army (SPLA), whose members have wreaked havoc on the civilian population, can be classified as an organization accused of genocide. According to WARD data (Wood&Thomas, 2019), the SPLA fielded approximately 5-20% female participants. In 2016, even elite SPLA units were involved in acts against humanity that go beyond warfare and approach the concept of genocide. Sexual crime against women, which were typical of the conflict in Sudan, and the loss of control of the units also made the command accountable. As a result of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on Conflict Resolution in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), Sudanese women have established independent SPLA units with the support of United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (Andersson, 2018).

If we look at the violent conflicts in individual countries, most of the experts refer to what acts of violence were committed by men on their male counterparts or women, yet a closer look at these cases may reveal that women were equally active participants in these acts of violence. Traditionally, the inclusion of women in the military would serve the purpose of reducing violence, including sexual violence, against women, but this effort has not proved effective in the light of past experience. Although basically male combatants are ashamed of their female fighter comrades when they commit sexual crimes, we still have a number of examples where, although the number of male perpetrators is declining, female perpetrators are worsening the statistics of sexual crimes committed during wars (Besenyő, 2017).

Although the number of women victims is always much higher, in the field of sexual violence, women also make up a high proportion of perpetrators, and even female fighters have an extremely high rate of sexual violence (UNGA). If we look at the data from surveys in the Democratic Republic of Congo, it can be seen that 40% of female victims and 10% of male victims stated that they had suffered sexual abuse from female gunmen. In Liberia, female fighters also committed sexual assaults on women and men, with reports of women raping women with some object, e.g. may be a weapon or have mutilated their male or female victims. The same kind of sexual violence was also characteristic of the genocide in Rwanda.

In the Sierra Leone civil war of 1991-2002, 'population-based survey data show that groups that included women perpetrated nearly one in four incidents of the reported gang rape'. According to Cohen, female fighters disrupt male bonding, they can serve as sexual partners and "rape substitutes" for male fighters, but she describes that both male and female fighters seek groups to commit violence which results in the case of gang rape. During the Sierra Leonean civil war, gang rape was mainly reported. After the examination of cases and studies, Cohen concluded that, contrary to the traditional assumption, female warriors were much more prone to a kind of particular evil and cruelty in committing violence and encouraging male fellow soldiers to commit excessive violence. Interviewees testified to the immeasurable, anger-motivated violence of female fighters. According to the results of surveys, 76% of perpetrators of violence were engaged in gang rape, of which 75% were male gangs and 25% were mixed gangs (Cohen, 2013).

During the Mozambique civil war, there were also female fighters in RENAMO's ranks, but among the organization's recruitment methods, there was also a recruitment pattern which is typical among terrorist groups, with young boys and occasionally girls being kidnapped into their ranks. Both RENAMO male and female fighters were exiled for their war crimes despite their forced enlistment after the signing of the 1992 peace agreement (Wiegink, 2013). In the formations of RENAMO, however, the organization of women's formations is still typical today (Frey, 2020).

One of the main African war criminals where it was possible to identify and convict a female perpetrator is the Rwandan genocide which were the organized murder of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan in 1994. The genocide was mainly committed by Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi Hutu militias between the 6th of April till 15th of July during the Rwandan Civil War. the number of victims were around 800 000 and 1 000 000, mostly Tutsi and partly moderate Hutu.

This case was unique in the history of modern and independent Africa, because of the huge number of victims in a relatively short time and because of the method of the militias supported by the government. In spite of this, international response to events in Rwanda was very slow and mainly made by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch which reported around 250,000-500,000 cases of rape while the exact number of victims still cannot be determined. The UN stayed passive for long time and did not interfere in the events for a long time. This

was because, after shooting down the plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana, people in the presidential guard killed the moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana (who wanted to call for peace on the radio) so that she could not take control of extreme violence and killings over the whole country. In addition to the prime minister, her husband, the president of the Constitutional Court, and four government ministers were shot dead. Fifteen UN soldiers guarding Agathe Uwilingiyimana were disarmed, five Ghanaians soldiers were released, and ten Belgian soldiers were brutally mutilated and then killed by Rwandan presidential guards. Thus, the case had international involvement relatively early, before the genocide began.

According to official statistics almost 2000 women remain in Rwandan prisons on genocide-related offences. "Ranging from illiterate farmers to former political, religious and military leaders, judges, journalists and teachers. Their stories attest to the fact that women were not only victims of atrocities, but also committed them." (Hogg, 2010) Among them women with socially high rank and high educational background also played an outstanding role in the murders. Educated women got a special role in the genocide as organizers and were given a power to manage the militias and the method of murders.

One of them is Agathe Kazinga Habyarimana, the former first lady of Rwanda who were arrested in Paris in 2009 for genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, creation of a criminal gang, murder and conspiracy to commit murder, extermination, and public incitement to commit genocide. *Le Clan de Madame Agathe*, her court within the court, was known as the *akazu* – little house.

> The members of the *akazu* were the masterminds of the extermination campaign, and before, during, and after the killing they enjoyed the patronage and protection of France, whose role in the genocide was as unambiguous as its official denials over the years have been unconvincing. (Gourevitch, 2010)

Rwandan female leaders were always famous of their cruelty. Despite the relatively small number of women politicians involved in Rwandan politics in 1994, most of them played an important role in the genocide. Besides Agathe, also known as *Kanjogera* which was the name of a Rwandan queen known for her cruel rule, two ministers: Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Minister of Family Affairs and Women's Development and Agnes Ntamabyaliro, Minister of Justice were involved.

Nyiramasuhuko and her son, Arsene Shalom Ntahobali, were accused and convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions in 2011. They were part of a six-defendant trial, accused of orchestrating or overseeing genocide in the Butare region. Nyiramasuhuko, however, was the first woman to be tried by the ICTR. She told Interahamwe militiamen, led by her 24-year-old son, that they must rape women before killing them as they were seeking refuge at the Red Cross in the city stadium. At her command, they surrounded the stadium building, where thousands of Tutsis received food and safety. The gunmen raped, tortured and killed them and then set their bodies on fire. In another incident,

she ordered her men to take diesel fuel from her car and set it on fire by a group of living raped women, leaving one of them alive as an eyewitness. Nyiramasuhuko was arrested in Nairobi, in 1997.

Agnes Ntamabyaliro had a Tutsi mother, she was accused of arranging Jean-Baptiste Habyalimana's murder in addition to inciting and planning the genocide. She was sentenced in 2009 to life imprisonment by the Rwandan government.

Women as the Participant of Terrorism Attacks

As I mentioned in Introduction, this study examines terrorist attacks committed in the 21st century. These attacks are directed against both the current government and society, although these organizations often describe themselves as liberation movements. Thus their actions are not directed solely against the government or its supporters, and their activities are driven by extreme ideology or religious fanaticism. For this reason we can clearly call them terrorist groups. Nationalist perspectives rarely appear among the ideas of these organizations, while they are not characterized by specific ethnic cleansing either.

Environment and circumstances in Africa made it a hothouse for terrorism. There are many such groups, and they are prevalent across the whole continent. Their roles are various: there are local or international organizations operating specifically within a state (MLF), a country (UNITA) or a region (al-Shabab, Boko Haram, or the African allies of al-Qaida).

> The map of terrorism in Africa is constantly changing and the terrorist groups' activities usually extend to neighboring countries to create new groups and encourage others to pledge allegiance to umbrella organizations, such as in Cameroon, Kenya and Niger. Contributing to their widespread are the marriage between extremist ideologies and the ethnic, tribal, and historical complexities of the region, coupled with the failure of social integration policies, the unsuccessful attempts on the part of the political leadership at managing human diversity and economic resources, and the regional security void. (Sundi, 2020)

There are numerous organization we can only esteem their number because not all terror attack can be connected to known terrorist groups. In 2020 there were sixty-four terrorist organizations reside in the continent according to Global Terrorism Database (GTD) reports. Among these, the largest groups include Nigerian Boko Haram (operation fields: Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon,) and its branch Ansaru (Nigeria); Somalian al-Shabab (Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda), Lord's Resistant Army (Uganda); West African Movement for Oneness and Jihad (Mali, Algeria – originally the part of al-Qaeda); Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia, Libya); and al-Qaeda (transcontinental).

Each terrorist organization follows different ideologies but work with similar tactics. Most of the groups listed above operate under the veil of Islam, interpreting the teachings of Quran and Sunnah according to their own interests. In any case, at first glance, we would think that

due to an extreme misinterpretation of the teachings of Islam, women are given less role in the preparation or execution of terrorist acts. Even the Christian Lord's Resistant Army (LRA) is feared primarily because of their use of child soldiers, not women. Yet the number of female perpetrators in terrorist acts has increased in recent years in Africa and all over the world. Whereas previously the number of female suicide bombers was a quarter of all assassinations, it has now risen to a third (Bloom, 2017).

The use of women to carry out or assist in terrorist acts has also become popular because, due to Islamic cultural rules, women are less checked during security controls respecting religious ethical codes. However, while it could be easily done by using female security guards, government are not ready for this step. There are a very few women soldiers in the army who fight against Boko Haram (Durosomo, 2019). If the male-based security personnel are too aggressively searching for female perpetrators, it can provoke resentment in society, thus providing new sympathizers for terrorist organizations. In addition, the recruitment of women allows for the continuous growth of organizations. While in the past the main goal was to involve men, the forcible or demagogic recruitment of women (or children in some organizations) has increased the number of potential recruits.

In recent years, therefore, the idea that women can participate in *jihad* in the same way as men has become more and more talked about, although it is not duty for them. Even according to the general Sunni view, women can participate in *jihad*, but it is still not obligatory for them. Nevertheless, *jihad* means actual warfare in the sense that hostile forces enter Islamic territory and commit acts of violence. In this case, all men and women can take part in the defense, and women must take part in the fight only if they are appointed to it. The general Sunni conception instructs the Muslim community to go to war only on the occasion of an attack against the community, only on the instructions of the leaders, and with the possibility of avoiding fighting. (In this case Muslims clearly must not attack Muslims.) Applying Islamic doctrines to their own social situation and according to their own interpretation and interest, terrorist groups employ more and more women in their troops, although in Africa the victims are mainly Muslims (Cook, 2005).

Women's relationships to these terrorist groups can be remarkably diverse. Of these, three major categories can be distinguished in terms of intent: as victim; as external supporter and helper of the organization; or as a member of the organization. It is also important to examine the conditions for joining, which may be voluntary or forced by violence. Between these two options there is a typical form when women join under psychological influence (e. g. converted victims).

Women can play various roles in these terrorist organizations: as financiers, recruiters, spies, suicide bombers; but they can be also as helpers in hiding, aiding terrorists. (Goldberg, 2018) Yet it is important to note that neither in al-Qaeda nor in African jihadist organizations have women been given leadership roles. Although these organizations are therefore primarily known as patriarchal ones, they have many female supporters who do not commit

violence directly. There are even some cases where female weapon smugglers or combatants were captured. In addition to the listed organizational activities, women are primarily involved in ideological rather than physical struggles, so their additional responsibilities include conversion, fundraising, training, and administrative or translation/interpretation activities. Outside of Africa, women linked to terrorism have a major role to play in managing Internet interfaces, spreading radical ideologies online.

Women enter the battlefield primarily if they are single or wives after their husbands are lost or imprisoned. Single women who are pushed to the margins of society, live in deep poverty, who are homeless, or have no male family members to take care of or protect them can easily fall into the net of terrorist organizations. If a woman loses her husband, children, family members, etc. and if the enemies of a terrorist organization are to blame, women are much more likely to become voluntary members of an organization and the group in an attempt to turn this personal tragedy to advantage. Recruiters also prefer to take advantage of women's poverty, illiteracy, despair, resentment and enthusiasm to take revenge. Ethnicity or financial pressure may be additional considerations in the exploitation of women according to the interviews made during rehabilitation.

Although the appearance of women in the commission of terrorist acts is seen by some feminist thinkers as an improvement in the situation of women, as a sign of the achievement of equality (Abdel-Latif&Ottaway, 2007), as long as women are sacrificed in one such action, by no means can we seriously think that this would bring any improvement in women's lives.

On September 11, 2016, at the 15th anniversary of the New York terrorist attack, there happened the first terrorist combat in Kenya where the perpetrators were women and there was evidence of intent on their part. In this case Al-Shabab used a female suicide bomber for the first time, at the Mombasa Police Building. The attack was unsuccessful, and the three women lost their lives.

Police said the perpetrators used a knife and a bomb during the attack, and one of the assassins wore a suicide vest that did not explode. Women wearing hijabs entered the station, saying they wanted to report a stolen phone, reported Peterson Maelo, Mombasa County Police Chief, to the media. One woman used a knife and another threw a gasoline bomb, launching a fire. Two officers were injured (BBC, 2016). The suicide bomber was shot down before the bomb was activated. After the attack, "we have managed to identify two of the three terrorist suspects who were killed in Mombasa, they are Kenyans," police spokesman Charles Owino told AFP, "Fatuma Omar and Tasmin Yakub Abdullahi Farah, both from Mombasa." (Akwiri, 2016) The leader could have been Farah, who could not arm the vest. During the investigation, three more companions were found, all of them were Somali refugees.

However, a year before al-Shabab's terrorist action, in 2014, Boko Haram had already used women or girls in suicide bombings, which brought with it the practice of abducting school girls as in the famous case of kidnapping the Chiboki girls. The system of suicide bombings

itself has not been used by African organizations for a long time because suicide is a culturally despised act in Africa. However, the new method quickly became popular in Boko Haram strategy. The first such incident was reported on June 8, 2014, when a bomb exploded at the Nigerian Army barracks in Gombe, the female combatant and one soldier died while another was wounded by the explosion. After that there were six such attacks in six weeks when Boko Haram used women and girls as suicide bombers. The number of such cases has increased since November 2014, with the youngest perpetrator being a 7-year-old girl who blew herself up in the Potiskum market, where seven people died, and several were injured. Globally, female suicide bombers were most often deployed in Nigeria, and all attacks were connected to the Boko Haram.

> The organization exploited women to the extreme, kidnapping and recruiting them to conduct suicidal attacks. Boko Haram executed 434 suicidal operations between April 2011 and June 2017. Of the 338 bodies that were identified of the suicidal attackers, at least 244 were women, which means that at least 56 per cent of Boko Haram's suicidal operations are conducted by women. This percentage makes the group the first in history to depend primarily on women in its suicide operations. (Sundi, 2018)

Examining the cases in Kenya and Nigeria, we can see that among African perpetrators there are those who intentionally take part in assassinations. When considering the first cases in Nigeria, we can also clearly state that the perpetrators most of the time did not even know what will happen to them. The methods of Boko Haram are much more characterized by the abduction of women and girls, and thus the forcible recruitment of women. In the case of girls, schoolgirls in particular are abducted, as Boko Haram also want to combat the Western-type education for women (Besenyő&Mayer, 2015).

In the case of abducted women, several interviews (Gidda, 2019) revealed the exact method by which members of the organization work. One characteristic is that they separate Christians and Muslims and treat them differently, although violence can be demonstrated in both cases. Leah Sharibu and 110 other Dapchi female students were abducted in 2018, and while the other girls were later released, Leah was held because she refused to convert to Islam (WWM, 2020). This is exactly what the terrorists want to do, set Muslims against Christians. In the most common cases, Christians are forcibly converted to Islam - threatened with death if refused. And several abducted Muslim women are forced to be married and/or raped by Boko Haram members. Numerous reports cite of women being sexually assaulted by Boko Haram militants; some were raped within context of a forced marriage, others for being Christian, another was attacked for a perceived slight against the militants. However, the group's leaders make some effort to protect kidnapped girls from random sexual abuses outside the context of "marriage".

Some are used to carry ammunition magazines with them, others are forced to watch the killings or commit them themselves, although in these cases women often turn the gun on themselves to end their suffering because they find no other way out. Although the escape most often ends in death, we know of several lucky cases in which the abducted woman

escaped from her abductors by some trick. There was a case when someone complained of abdominal pain when the terrorists wanted to rape her, so she was taken to the hospital to check for AIDS. At the hospital, she was helped to make the escape. Some girls are selected and forced to serve other women who stand out for their beauty.

> One woman who was raped in 2013 in a Boko Haram camp told Human Rights Watch that other women (specifically wives of Boko Haram leaders) were often complicit in sexual abuse of female prisoners. "I was lying down in the cave pretending to be ill because I did not want the marriage," the woman told the researchers. "When the insurgent who had paid my dowry came in to force himself on me, the commander's wife blocked the cave entrance and watched as the man raped me. (Alter, 2014)

This also proves that not only the female wing of al-Qaeda has emerged, but also active female members appear in African organizations. It is enough to look at the history of women associated with the organization, such as Aisha Wakil or better known as Mama Boko Haram, who can be closely associated with founder members of Boko Haram. She is currently among the number one enemies of the terrorist organization due to a radical change in the organization's ideology (Focus Nigeria, 2019). But these women are mostly anonymous, the origins of their relationship with terrorist organizations cannot be clearly described.

Female Fighters in the Wars for the Independence of African Countries

Historically, one of the oldest forms of violence in Africa is military warfare. The first documented cases in which women were also involved appeared specifically during the independence movements, when the peoples of Africa revolted against the colonizing great powers. Although women's participation in politics and military movements is rare in Africa, women who joined anti-colonial nationalist uprisings, such as in Kenya, Eritrea, or Zimbabwe, typically did so solely of their own volition and chose to fight colonial oppressors on their own – despite restrictive gender roles in their society.

Although relatively few studies emphasize the key role of Kikuyu women in the Mau Mau movement, they have played a key role in all areas of the struggle for independence; in the formation of the movement, in forest struggles, in serving participants (providing food, weapons, hiding, etc.), in mediation between troops, and for espionage against British troops (Presley, 2019). According to the rules of Mau Mau, women were respected due to their outstanding, sometimes leading position Rape against them resulted in the death of the perpetrator. Kikuyu women excelled in disguising their activities in support of the movement; taking action primarily at night, while taking care of their families during the day and maintaining the appearance of a normal life. The female wing of the Mau Mau movement was extremely effective, which is why in the eyes of the enemy, the Kikuyu women were treated much as were the male soldiers. The British held the female prisoners in camps, forcing them to do hard physical work, beating them and raping them.

The largest number of female members in the struggle for independence were in the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Like the Mau Mau movement, women in fact worked in all areas like men. "EPLF, moreover, was far more than simply a military organization." (Bernal, 2001) In the system offered by the EPLF, in the light of left-wing nationalist ideas, women and men were equal, so fighting together brought with it respect for each other. However, after gaining independence, these roles became unbalanced again. After the conflict, women clustered into feminist organizations, and even outside the borders — e. g. in refugee camps in Europe, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia — they maintained these women's organizations (Zerai, 1994).

In the struggle for Zimbabwe's independence, women were members of both the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), although they were mostly employed in fewer areas due to their poor physique (Sadomba&Dzinesa, 2004). Yet in some cases, women have been placed in leadership positions, such as Joice Runaida Mugari Mujuru, who became a commander at Chimoi camp in 1976. In 1977, she became a member of the Central Committee of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and secretary for women's affairs. In 1978, when her camp came under attack, Muruji — nine months pregnant at the time — was still an active combatant and thought the colonial military.

In military organizations such as in Zimbabwe, Uganda or Algeria, women had to make serious sacrifices in their struggle for the independence of their country. In many cases, the young women could not have families and were brutally treated in captivity by the colonizing troops because of their social symbol of their gender and effectiveness in fight.

Algerian women have fallen victim to both the Islamic patriarchal system and the means of the violent emancipation of the French army. Their role was similar to the female warriors of the above presented countries. They disguised themselves, if it was necessary, as Europeans to obtain information from the French for their compatriots. As a symbol of punishment for Algerian men, the French severely treated and raped or executed them.

As the examples above show, in many African countries, women, at the risk of their lives and the safety of their families, took part in the struggles for militias organized for the independence of their country, bearing an equal burden with men.

Conclusion

Women's participation in violence-related events appears in a variety of roles in Africa. They represent themselves in all areas of the battlefield as opposed to their traditional female social roles. They also appear as cruel killers and hero warriors, victims, and assailants in different or nonetheless similar roles compared to men according to their gender characteristics. Although they are relatively rare in leadership roles, in areas where they can achieve

outstanding results — whether in a negative or positive sense, they always appear of their own free will.

They are forcibly recruited primarily into militias linked to terrorism, where in fact they can rarely get a responsible position and in most cases only become tools and objects in the fight for the ideologies of these groups. As described above, the deployment of women against these terrorist organizations can be particularly important and effective, as they can easily highlight that few volunteers in these organizations have no opportunity to advance.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Dr. Marianna Kármán holds PhD in African Literary and Cultural Studies, has been researching the oral and written traditions, cultural and religious system and practices of the region for about 20 years - primarily in Nigeria. Her specialization includes Islamic studies, intercultural discourse, African migration, process and social context of African neology. From 2012 she led researches about African migration in Hungary, founded educational programs about Africa and Islamic world, from 2017 she is a researcher, trainer and member of African Hungarian Union, and currently works as a senior researcher at African Research Institute, Doctoral School of Safety and Security Sciences, Óbuda University and as a refugee program coordinator at Hungarian Red Cross.

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Terrorism, Banditry and Separatism

Is Nigeria at the Brink of Collapse?

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Abstract:

This paper discusses the tripodal menace of terrorism, banditry and separatism as the centrifugal forces that threatened the existence of Nigerian State; and seeks to assuage the fear of morselization of Nigerian state by identifying six resiliencies that guard against the collapse of Nigeria. It concludes that the tripodal security challenges can be transformed into instruments for nation and state building. The paper therefore recommends the provision of homeland for nomadic Fulanis, an election of an Igbo President, as well as the restructuring of the polity as recommended in the 2014 National Conference Report. It also recommends the promotion of the Rule of Law, Justice, Equity and Fairness in the polity, especially in the handling of repentant terrorists and the rehabilitation of victims of these security challenges.

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Introduction

Within the past two decades which coincides with the dawn of the Fourth Republic, Nigeria has experienced severe political and social convulsion. These outbursts manifested in terrorism, banditry and separatism. Terrorism within this era in Nigeria is traced to the activities of Yusuf Mohammed whose Islamic Salafism in the North Eastern State of Borno, led to violent confrontation with the Nigerian state and the subsequent concretization of Boko Haram sect. The spread of the terrorist group to Yobe, Adamawa and other parts of the Lake Chad region generate destructive ripples across the country and indeed, West and Central Africa subregions. Banditry has its epicentre in Zamfara and has spread to other parts of the Northern region, such as Kaduna, Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger and Nasarawa. The continuous raiding and sacking of communities in these states as well as mass abduction/kidnapping for ransom have threatened ethno-religious harmony in the country in an unprecedented dimension. The social distrust between ethnic Fulanis and other ethnic groups in the North has increased due to the herdsmen clashes with and sacking of sedentary communities by bandits disguised as herdsmen. Thus the threat and perception of ethnic cleansing are common in southern Kaduna, Plateau, Taraba, and Benue states; and the indigenes of the affected states are taking up arms to defend themselves, in spite of opposition by the Federal Government against proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the country. Separatism has also emerged with violent outbursts in the Fourth Republic. The agitation for the actualization of the Biafran state was led by Ralph Nwazurike, however, the state burial accorded late Dim Emeka Ojukwu in 2011 doused the tension and temporary dampened the agitation by the Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The renewed separatism is led by Nnamdi Kanu, who founded the indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) earlier on in this decade. His violent verbal outburst and propaganda against the Nigerian state led to a series of sit-at -home protests in Igboland against the Nigerian state. He was arrested and tried in 2017, he however jumped bail granted by the Court and fled to the UK. His violent messages on Radio Biafra and subsequent attack of state's institutions in the Eastern part of the country by IPOB members and the Eastern Security Network (ESN) –the military wing of IPOB have led to numerous loss of life and destruction of Police stations, Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) offices, amongst others in the region. The incessant kidnapping, killing and abduction by suspected Fulani herdsmen in the South West Region prompted the formation of *Amotekun* as a regional security outfit for the people of the region. This was an indictment on the Federal Government over its inability to secure life and property of the people in the region. For similar reason one Sunday Igboho led the agitation for the Yoruba Nation as a separate state. The mass support enjoyed by Igboho's movement and its violent attacks on suspected and perceived criminals and enemies of Yoruba Race drew the attention of the Federal Government. Thus, Nigeria is dragged by centrifugal forces from many directions. The aggregation of these forces has raised many questions about the fortune of the Nigerian state, and is the basis for this study. The objective of the paper is to answer the question: Is Nigeria at the brink of collapse? It is divided into five parts: the introduction, literature review, methodology discussion of findings and conclusion.

Literature Review

Terrorism in Nigeria

Terrorism has been variously defined by scholars over time and space to mean the application of unconventional violent methods to harass and force state entities to negotiation or a making of an outright statement over issues of public concern. It involves unleashing violent attacks on chosen targets, resulting in loss of life and property. The objective may go beyond the destructive acts, but include the creation of fear and despair among the population of the affected areas (DHS 2019; USIP 2017). Terrorist tactics include: suicide bombing, mass spontaneous killings, abduction and beheading of victims, gunmen attacks on public places, and the bashing of cars and other fast moving machines such as aircraft into the targets. The attacks on the twin tower of the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, raised global awareness on the sophistication of terrorist tactics in the new millennium and set the pace on the discourse of the dynamic nature of the menace (Basedau 2017; Cetin 23013; Ipe, Cockayne and Millar 2010).

Terrorism was a strange phenomenon in Nigeria until the dawn of the new millennium. Nigeria has historically experienced mass protest in the aftermaths of elections and census between 1960 and 2000, but the deployment of terrorist tactics as a protest was very rare. The Maitasine and other Islamic induced protest in the North were done without terrorism, but outright confrontation with the Nigerian state. The conventional methods of earlier violent protests made them easier to handle by the governments and the issues were resolved or managed momentarily. However, the end of the Cold War in a decade to the new millennium and the exponential spread of globalization accelerated by the revolution in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) change the dynamic of terrorism globally and Nigeria was not exempted from it. The clash of western and Islamic cultures which was hitherto checked by the imperatives of the Cold War emerged from it shadow, and this was exacerbated by Islamic revisionist in the Middle East who sought to reinvent Islamic Salafism across the world. The impact of these developments on Nigeria was enormous, since the country has the highest Muslim population in Africa. Indeed, every development in the Muslim World has reverberation effect on Nigeria. For instance, the 'satanic verses controversy' generated by Salman Rushdie's novel was also topical in Nigeria, as some Muslims called for the enforcement of the *fatwa*, issued by late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran. Similarly, there was mass protest in Northern Nigeria over the 'western coalition' invasion of Iraq in early 1990s and in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, as well as the similar invasion of Afghanistan as a counterterrorism strategy of the President George Bush administration in 2001 (Cornish 2010; Huntington 1993; Kose 2009; Rashid 2020).

Paradoxically, it was not a Muslim protest but the poor handling of agitation against oil pollution in the oil bearing Nigeria Delta that witnessed the deployment of terrorist tactics in

Nigeria. With the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 by the Nigerian State, agitation in the Niger Delta became more violent, and by the dawn of the Fourth Republic, Nigeria Delta militants took to terrorism and blew oil pipelines across the region. The kidnapping of foreign oil workers was daily decimal and military response was counterproductive. The destruction of the Odi community by the military as a reprisal attack against the militant further worsened the security in the area, as the militants, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Egbesu Boys of Africa, amongst others was resorted to guerrilla war against the state and oil installations. The perceived balance of terror between the belligerents and the negative impacts of their activities on Nigerian economy and Human rights credential led to a truce and the introduction of the Amnesty Program by President Yar' Adua Administration in 2009. The implementation of the amnesty program has been the basis for the relative peace in the region in recent years. It must be understood that terrorism in Nigeria Delta was home-grown and had the objective of drawing the Nigerian state into negotiation over perceived marginalization in the sharing of the oil revenue, as well as the harmful impacts of oil pollution on the livelihood of the people of the region. The manifestation of Islamist extremism and the radicalization of Nigerians emerged with the birth of Boko haram sect in Borno State around 2008. Mohammed Yusuf used to preach in the central mosque in Maiduguri and had a huge followership. He was said to be influential due to his radical message against public ills committed by the ruling class. However, the dynamics of Bornu politics in 2003 led former Governor Modu Sheriff to approach him for support in exchange for the implementation of Sharia legal system as introduced by former Governor Yerima in Zamfara state. Sheriff won the election with the support of Mohammed Yusuf, but refused to implement the Sharia legal system as promised (a narrative denied by Sheriff). Reneging on the agreement led to conflict between Sheriff and Mohammed, who publicly criticized and preached against the perceived corruption in governmental institutions in the state, late Buji Foi – an ally of Yusuf left the Sheriff government where he was the Commissioner for Religious Affairs. Borno state government brought the Federal Government attention to the sect's activities which were seen as threat to state's security; by late July, 2009, a five day confrontation between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram sect broke out in Bauchi, Kano, Borno and Yobe states. The sect leader was killed in the process by security operatives, purportedly in police custody (Okon, Williams&Okeke 2021; Onuoha 2014). The leadership was passed to Abubakar Shekau, who led a Jihad against the Nigerian State. Between 2009 and 2021 more than 50,000 women have lost their husbands, thousands of women and children have been abducted, held captive, raped, forced into marriage with the sect's fighters and subjected to other forms of violence such as forced labour, physical and psychological torture (International Alert, 2019). The abduction of Chibok and Dapchi school girls in 2014 and 2017 celebrated the mass abduction tactics of the sect. These amongst others have led to the closure of schools in the affected Northern states. Indeed, the actual data of casualty of Boko Haram is unclear due to poor data collection and bureaucratic bottleneck associated with governmental institutions. The reported ascendancy of Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) over Boko Haram and the purported killing of the legendary Abubakar Shekau have opened up a vista of uncertainty

on the nature of terrorists operations in Nigeria. Although, the government is reporting of mass surrender of sect fighters with their families, in the North East, scores of attack on military and soft targets indicate that terrorism remains a threat to the national security of the country. Apart from the escalation of the Boko Haram menace, 2009 also marked the appearance of Nigeria on global terrorism watch list. The attempt by a 22 years Old Nigerian, Umar Abdulmutallab on board of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 to detonate plastic bomb during the flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Charismas Day of 2009, sent a chilling sensation across the globe. The event signalled the high level of radicalization of Nigerian youths. Indeed the car bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja and some other suicide bombings in Abuja were done by Nigerian Youths with considerable education and global exposure (U.S Government, 2011). Above all, at the height of Boko Haram activities, Abubakar Shekau declared the Islamic Caliphate over Borno and other parts of the North East, and indeed consistently rejected the sect's subordination to a secular Nigerian state (Economist, as cited in Paden 2015, p.4).

Banditry in Nigeria

Banditry involves violent raiding of settlements, caravans, and communities by armed men with the objective of stealing from, maiming and killing of victims and destruction of their belongings. It focuses on the use of force or threats to intimidate and perpetuate kidnapping, cattle rusting, village, and market raids, as well as robbing, raping and killing if individual or groups (Okoli&Okpaleke, 2014). Okoli and Ugwu (2019) attempt at typologies of banditry is very interesting. They classified banditry according to intent or motive, location, agency and autonomous, form and formation, and operational mode. Banditry type under intent or motive include social banditry which is intended to be a protest against social inequality and a call for a redistribution of wealth; and political and economic banditry is meant to serve such ends. Location banditry specifies where the banditry takes place and includes rural vs. urban, frontier vs. countryside, and maritime, coastal vs mainland. Agency and autonomy banditry is defined by how the principal / agency manifest; while mercenary banditry is executed by paid mercenaries who carry out the attack on behalf of their principal; autonomous banditry is conceived and executed by self-motivated individuals. Form and formation banditry identifies if the banditry involves a network of actors, highly coordinated, or it is a petty act done by individual or disorganized group(s), operational mode banditry refer to the nature of operations – either the bandits are mobile and roam around or they are sedentary and stationary at a particular location. All these typologies are manifestly visible in Nigeria. For instance, in terms of location, maritime and coastal banditry have been on an increase in the Gulf of Guinea which Nigeria shares with other West and Central African States. Rural and countryside banditry are the major typologies in the Northern Western states of Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna, Zamfara, Kebbi, Jigawa, and Kano. Besides, roving banditry has spread over the same Northwest in a highly organized manner; many of them are mercenaries, since they have recognized kingpins and commanders (ICG 2020; Okoli and Al Chukwuma 2014; Olaniyan and Yahaya 2016).

The causative and sustenance factors of banditry in Nigeria are numerous and self-complementary. They are rooted in the historical and socio-economic and political foundation of the Nigerian State. North Western Nigeria is part of the historical Trans-Saharan trade route which linked the forest belt of present day Nigeria to North Africa. This trade route was intermittently attacked by bandits. According to Jafaar (2018, p.2):

In those days, wayfarers and merchants traveling along our local economic roads usually faced the threats and damages of ambush from nondescript bandits. Armed bandits and criminals were known to be targeting goods ferried on the back of donkeys, camels and oxcarts. These bandits on our trade routes would forcefully take those goods and disappear into the bush. That is just one dimension of the problem then. In order instances the bandits would sometimes raid farming communities and villages with the intent of wilful killing and wanton destruction of property. During such raids, the bandits would destroy virtually everything in their path, including valuables, farm produce, etc. this subculture has been in existence even before the coming of colonialists to the territories of Northern Nigeria.

The seeming reality is that the subculture of banditry continued in low key and was stifled by the harsh law enforcement apparatus of the Northern Region and subsequent series of military rule which lasted till 1999. However, the return to Civil Rule in 1999 and the activities of the political class in terms of patronizing thugs for electoral purposes promoted impunity and weakened the state's security apparatuses. This encouraged some youths to re-invent banditry as a good business, since small arms and light weapons (SALW) used by thugs during elections are hardly accounted for. Besides, many bandits rely on their political godfathers for protection from lawful arrest and prosecution by the state (Agba, Coker and Agabo 2010; Moses and Ngoma 2017; Samuel 2020). Indeed, banditry is not new to region, but the volume, spread and sophistication in organization, as well as the calibre of the weaponry and resilience deployed by actors supersedes any era in history and therefore threatened the security of Nigerian State and wellbeing of Nigerians. These may not be unconnected with the impact of small arms proliferation traced to the fall of Muamar Gaddafi in Libya and the spread of criminal entrepreneurs in the Sahel region.

Another factor fuelling rural banditry in Nigeria is the high level of unemployment in the country. The youth unemployment in the country is a security liability because it provides foot soldiers for radicalization and other criminal activities, such as banditry. Besides, the Almajiri education system in the Northern Nigeria has spawned army of youths without basic life-skills and therefore take to street life and other violent crime as a vocation; and a punishment against the society which neglected them (Lawretta 2021; Mohammed 2015). Related here is the porous nature of colonial boundaries in Africa, where ethnic nationalities are divided into two or more states, the boundary between Nigeria and Niger Republic is blur as inhabitants of the borders crisscross the borders, so do criminal from both sides of the border. Moreso, there are huge swath of ungoverned space at the borders of Northern Nigeria, where state penetration is very low. These areas become safe haven for bandits and other criminals. They occupy these spaces as their bases and launch violent attacks on targeted areas

(Onwuzuruigbo 2021; Ojo 2020). Again the mammoth corruption in Nigeria has affected the state capacity to prudently utilize its resources in providing human security for its people. It has also weakened security institutions' capacity to nip banditry and other security challenges in the bud (Adegoke, 2021, p.19). Endemic corruption has increased the poverty rate in Nigeria, especially in the North, where desertification induced by climate change has led to poor harvest and crop failure. Funding of the real sector of the economy which would have generated multiplier effects in the economy is minimized by corrupt practices. The net implication is that, increase in poverty leads to increase in crime, including banditry in the North West of Nigeria (Adegbami and Uche 2016; Adagbabiri and Okolie 2018).

Worth mentioning is the political dimension of the banditry. Most of the bandits are nomadic Fulanis. Many of them do not have a distinctive homeland in the Nigerian state. Attempts at settling on the farmland of sedentary communities lead to clashes and reprisal attacks by the nomads. This is very common in the Benue, Plateau, Southern, Kaduna and Taraba. The political question of creating a homeland for the nomads has remained unanswered. Attempts at creating cattle colonies across the country by President Buhari's administration have been checked by component states in the federation, as many sedentary communities see it as a grand plan for land-grab and eventual Islamization of their domains, since those colonies are designed as permanent settlements for the nomads. Banditry therefore may be part of the protest and a means of putting pressure on the government to define a homeland for nomad Fulani in the country (Ojo 2020).

Separatism in Nigeria

Separatism as a concept is grounded on the Atlantic Charter which became an integral part of the United Nations Charter in 1945. This concept is captured in the Principle of Self-determination – the right of a people to have their own government and a state to live in. Self-determination was a major concept of discourse during the two world wars. It sought to justify the reason for containing the expansionist aggressors and ensuring the freedom of nations from foreign rules. It was also bedrock of the campaign against colonialism and the eventual attainment of independence by Third World countries in the post-World War II era (Akinboye & Ottoh 2005; Chukwudi, Gberebvie, Abasilim and Imhonopo 2019, p.630). Separatism, when conceived and peacefully implemented, leads to the birth of new nations, such as was done in Sudan which gave birth to South Sudan in 2011. Separatist agitation is not new in Nigeria. It has been part of political development in the country. This is due to the structure and process of Nigerian state formation, which is ridden with contradictions; and the failure of successive governments to resolve these contradictions (Suleiman and Agoha 2013; Sklar 1965; Okon, Williams and Okeke 2021). The first separatists agitation was led by Isaac Adaka Boro, who attempted to carve out the Niger Delta region from the Old Eastern Region in 1965 due to the activities of oil companies and the Regional government. This was followed by Colonel Emeka Ojukwu declaration of the state of Biafra over the same Eastern Region in 1967. The bitter Civil War was fought to contain the Igbo ambition of seceding from the Nigerian

state; and the post war years have also witnessed the agitation for Oduduwa state after the annulment of June, 12, 1993, believed to have been won by MKO, Abiola, a Yoruba man. However, the Fourth Republic has witnessed more separatist agitations than any era in the history of Nigeria. The Nigeria Delta insurgency between 2001-2010; Boko Haram declaration of Islamic state over Borno state and other parts of North East, the resurrection of Biafra agitation by Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereignty state of Biafra (MASSOB), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Biafra Zion Movement, amongst others between 2003-2021; and the recent upsurge in the agitation for Yoruba Nation led by Mr. Sunday Igboho in 2021 (Chukwudi, Gberebvie, Abasilim and Imhonopi 2019; Duruji 2012; Ikegbunam and Agudosy 2021). As noted earlier, the root of separatism in Nigeria is traced to the process of state creation by the British colonialists. The non-negotiated nature of relationship between the ethnic nations and the skewed structure of the state itself continue to breed fear of domination and marginalization. This fear was expressed by minority ethnic groups and it led to Willink's Commission and its report at the eve of independence. However, the euphoria of ending British rule by the political elites made them play down on its significance. In less than a decade of independence, the bubble of separation busted in violent manners, as the fear of internal colonialism emerged in many component units of the federation. The Niger Delta region consistently seek for separate state due to the lopsided sharing of the oil revenue derived from its domain and the poor response to oil pollution in the region by the twin conspirators: the Nigerian state and oil companies (Izuagie 2016; Ering, Bassey and Odike 2013). The Igbo of the South East based their guest for separation on perceived marginalization of the region by the central/federal government. The late 1960s' agitation was founded on the negligence of the central and Northern regional governments to check the genocide against the Igbos in the North after the July 1967 coups, the perceived tacit acquiescence of northerners informed the decision of Emeka Ojukwu to separate from the Federation and use the resources of the Eastern region (including the newly discovered oil revenue) to take care of the people of the region. The current separatist fervour is grounded on the perceived marginalization and exclusion from sensitive appointments by successive governments after the Civil War. Such exclusion is manifestly visible in every government except the tenure of President Jonathan (2011-2015). More importantly, Nigeria has not produced an Igbo Head of State or president in the aftermath of the Civil War, in spite of the general perception of its membership of the tripodal ethnic hegemons that make up the Nigerian state. This exclusion from the apex leadership of the country is the major reason for the current agitation led by Nnamdi Kanu and his cohorts. The agitation in the last ten years has enjoyed mass followership as a result of social media and the elusive Radio Biafra – reminiscent of the Civil War propaganda machine of the secessionists.

The Yoruba, secessionist fervor arose from the annulment of June 12, 1993 elections won by MKO Abiola. It lasted till 1999, when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated with Olusegun Obasanjo as the President. The current agitation is founded on the poor management of security in Yorubaland where bandits infested forests in the region and operated unrestrained. The activities of Miyeti Allah (a Pan-Fulani Cattle dealer) in defending the

activities of the bandits increase the suspicion that the banditry across Yorubaland was a conspiracy of the Fulanis to dominate and colonize the Yorubas. This assertion seems more credible when the Federal Government led by President Buhari (a Fulani) did very little to check the menace of the banditry in the region, as it is across the country.

The mass support of the agitation as illustrated by attendance to rallies in Ondo state and other parts of the Southwest demonstrates the desire of the current generation of the Yoruba people to pull out of the Union (Ajanlekoko 2021; Babatola 2020). The declaration of Islamic Caliphate by Abubakar Shekau marked the height of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East. This was orchestrated by the desire of terrorists group to establish an entity where its beliefs would be practice, without hindrance from the Nigerian state. The group took inspiration from the *Daesh* and hoped to replicate it in Nigeria with the support of similar entities from other parts of the globe. Although it did not enjoy the support of Northerners; it marked the first time that a northern group sought secession from the Nigerian state (Okon, Williams, and Okeke 2021; USIP 2017).

Methodology

Historical research design is the choice methodology for this study; since it objectively and systematically evaluates occurrences of the past, their impact on the present, and makes predictions on the future (Obasi 1999). The usefulness of this methodology to this study is embedded in its capacity to present and analyse resilient factors which sustained Nigeria's unity over centrifugal forces since October 1, 1960; as they could keep the country together, in spite of the tripodal challenges. The study relies on secondary data, sourced from scholarly journals, textbooks, and the Internet amongst others. These data are qualitatively presented; and analysed with content analysis techniques.

Is Nigeria at the Brink of Collapse? An Analysis

The aggregation of the centrifugal forces highlighted in the proceeding sections suggest that Nigeria is at the brink of collapse under these forces. This section analyses the resilience factors in the Nigerian state that sustain it through periodic pressure; and asserts that the centrifugal forces are instruments of state and nation building if effectively managed by the government. This assertion is derived from the resilience of the structural and ethno-religious mix of Nigeria, the consensus of Nigerian elites on the unity of the country, socio-political re-engineering capacity of Nigerians, resilience of Nigerian security forces, the size and redistribution structure of Nigerian economy, and Nigeria's foreign relations.

1.   The structure and ethno-religious mix of Nigeria

The resilience of the Nigerian state against the wears and tears of centrifugal forces over the years is rooted in the structure and ethno-religious mix of the country. There is nothing like a monolithic ethnic hegemon in the Nigerian state. The 'North' perceived as a giant structure has numerous ethnic groups apart from the Hausa/Fulani. The Kauri has a large population in the North East, as do Tiv, Idoma, Birom and others in the North Central. Indeed every geopolitical zone in the country is a federation of different ethnic groups with different aspirations and fears. Most of the component ethnic groups or nationalities believe that the overarching structure labelled as Nigeria, saves them from domination and colonization by their immediate neighbours. Besides, ethnic groups in Nigeria had enjoyed autonomous status before colonialism and as such detest every form of foreign rule. This was illustrated by the resistance of the Middle Belt elements and the Kanuris' against the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, Benin Kingdom against the British and other similar resistance against foreign and imposed rules are rooted in the consciousness of freedom in the minds of the people, hence the preference for a form of commonwealth state which ensure the equality of component groups, and check the emergence of a ravaging neighbour(s) with the capacity to dominate (Ikime 1980; Dike 1956). Related is the religious mix. It is believed that Nigeria has a balanced population of Muslims and Christians. It is also common belief that the majority of Nigerians professing the Judeo –Christian and Arabic religions do pay homage to their traditional religion and culture during local festivals or ceremonies (Awolowo 1966). The import of this amongst others is that it became very difficult for a particular religion to dominate the psyche of the people of a particular region in a manner to generate collective action without discernment from others. For instance, there is a huge Muslim population in Borno state, but not all the Muslims in the state subscribed to Salafist Islam; some are Sunni-Muslims, while others are Christians and traditional religion worshippers. The resistance of other subsets of denominations and religions contributed to stifling the expansion of Boko Haram activities beyond certain parts of the North East and Nigeria in general. Similarly, enlightenment and religious tolerance in the Southwest prevent religious fundamentalism in Yorubaland and promote a cosmopolitan view of the Nigerian state in the region. These factors also play out in Niger-Delta where several ethnic nationalities are lumped together in a pool. Almost every community in the region has its own deity of worship for its people, but allows everyone to follow his or her conscience. The absence of monolithic religion and unchecked ethnic hegemony have resulted in a loose federation within communities and promote the consciousness of the inherent benefit associated with the maintenance of the Nigerian state, as it provides a relative check against internal colonialism and domination. In relation to Biafra separatism, the structure of the Nigerian state places Igboland in the South East heartland of Nigeria, and the separatist movements are laying claim to unrealistic and bogus boundaries of the proposed Biafran state. For instance, the inclusion of the Niger Delta states is faulty, since these states were the theatre of the Civil war of 1967 and have vowed never to be part of Biafra; the inclusion of parts of Benue and Kogi states in North Central are also problematic since these populations hardly share in the Biafran dream. If the boundary of the proposed

state is restricted to the five Igbo speaking states of Anambra, Imo, Abia, Enugu and Ebonyi, Biafra would be a landlocked state. Such development may not occur well with most of the businessmen from the region, who are noted for import and export businesses. Besides; many prominent Igbos have their businesses and industries in other parts of the country with enormous benefits and advantages as citizens of the Nigerian state; losing citizenship status overnight as a result of regional session may place enormous burden on their businesses. This and other factors may account for poor support given to the Biafran agitators by Igbo socio-economic and political elites (Akinyetun 2018; Ezemeneka and Prouza 2016; Ibeanu, Orji and Iwuamadi 2016).

2.   The consensus of Nigerian elites on a united country

Elite theory attest to the inherent characters of elite in every society and these include the 3Cs – Coherence, Conspire, and Consciousness (Onah 2010). Nigerian politico-military and socio-economic elites exhibit these characteristics. More importantly, these are done at critical times in the country. For instance, Nigerian elites cooperate with one another irrespective of tribe or religion to salvage and keep the country together as one during the Civil War, some elite elements within the Igbo refused to support the Biafra project, while others from other region spoke against the evolving genocide in the conflict and were even imprisoned by the Federal Government (Achebe 2012; Okonta 2008). The objective analysis of issues by Nigerian elites were also instrumental to the resolution of Yoruba separatist fervour in 1990s through a compromised electoral process which ensured that candidates of the two leading political parties were from the South west. This was done to produce Yoruba president at all cost in order to assuage the Yoruba's over the annulment of June 12, 1993 election and the death of Chief MKO Abiola, the winner of the annulled election. Similarly, the adoption of the 'doctrine of necessity' to give Goodluck Jonathan the status of Acting President when late President Yar'Adua left for medical treatment, without constitutional transmission of power to his vice was a grand coherence and compromise to save the country from imminent chaos and collapse. Indeed successive political leadership in the country has held on to the indivisibility of the Nigerian state and emphasized 'unity in diversity'. Some have gone to the extreme of declaring that Nigeria's unity is non-negotiable. This rhetoric and the non-violent nature of the Nigerian elite, in terms of the readiness to become a warlord and sponsor insurgency against the state are part of the factors that keep the country together in spite of the tears. These were illustrated in the June 12 crisis, when elites across board directed their energy towards negotiation and peaceful resolution of the impasse, instead of importing arms and training foot-soldiers for violent confrontation with the state (Enemuo 1999; Yagboyaju2015). Above all, the consensus of Nigerian elites has been demonstrated in the designation and proscription of three of the centrifugal entitles in recent times, namely, the Boko Haram and its terrorist affiliates, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and the bandits terrorizing the North West and elsewhere in the country. The consistency in the proscription of centrifugal and violent groups in the country has helped the state to invent

solutions to their menace. It is meant to deter potential recruits from joining these groups (Addeh 2021; Alumona, Azoma and Iloh 2019; Onuha 2014).

3.   Socio-political engineering capacity of Nigeria

Nigeria's political history has records of numerous impasses, but creative socio-political engineering has been instrumental to their solutions. The creation of twelve states by General Gowon during the Civil War broke the monolith North, West and Eastern Regions. This reduced the capacity of the tripod regions to generate consensus antithetical to the unity of the country. The new states mobilized themselves to break the shackle of servitude, imposed by regional arrangement. This was evidenced in the defunct Eastern Region, where the creation of Rivers and South Eastern States amongst others, weakened Biafra's grip on the region (Ota, Ecoma, and Wambu 2020; Onimisi 2014; Terzungwe 2012). Similarly, the division of the country into six geo-political zones has aggregated the affected zones, and enhanced integration within the zones, it has also promoted brotherhood in a manner that issues that would have left for individual states to handle and attract geopolitical attention. For instance, the Boko Haram menace has it root in Borno / Yobe States, but the entire North East zone are working hard with the Federal Government to resolve it; every state in the North West are working assiduously on resolving the bandit crises; the southwest have established *Amotekun* to compliment the police in the region; and the South-South or Niger Delta is the process of establishing similar security outfit. The socio-political engineering of aggregation and disaggregation of groups and regions have facilitated relative stability of the polity (Alumona, Azom, and Iloh 2019; Drama, Sani and Kankara 2016; Wayne 2013). Another instance worth mentioning is the conventional rotation of presidency between the North and the South of the country; this is also replicated at state level, where the governorship position is deliberately rotated between the three senatorial districts. Such ingenuity has brought stability to local politics and has made candidates from minority to lever on party zoning arrangement to become governors and other elected positions. This has assuaged the fear of domination and gives a sense of belonging to minorities within minorities in the country. Moreso, the insistence on Christian/Muslim tickets for executive positions at federal level and those states with considerable mix of the two religions have reduced religious tension in the country, as mosques and churches are built in some government houses for worship. (Akinola 1996; Eborka 2016). Thus, Nigerians have the capacity to invent the needed socio-political re-engineering to keep the country together in spite of the current security challenges generated by terrorism, banditry and separatism.

4.   The resilience of Nigerian Security Forces

The Nigerian security force is one of the central institutions that keep Nigeria as a united entity. The engagements of the armed forces in Nigerian politics started with the first military coup in January 1966. The armed forces eventually bore the burden of fighting the Civil War and running the state. It has been credited with a lot of structural reforms of the Nigerian state, as well as blame for some institutional decay in the history of the country (Ota, Ecoma,

and Wambu 2020; Etebom 2021). However, the security forces have helped the country to repel the centrifugal forces. Sacrifices are made daily in the fight against terrorism in the North East. The result is evidenced as the terrorists' territorial expansion has been contained. Moreso repentant terrorists are reportedly surrendering to the Nigerian state. Similarly, the greatest obstacle to the operations of the bandits in the North West is the security forces. Different operations with code names are ongoing in the region. The synergized kinetic operations between the air and ground forces are paying off, as illustrated by intermittent rescue of those kidnapped and the liquidation of the bandits. Moreso, interagency sharing of intelligence by these services have led to several arrests of non-combatant accomplices to the tripodal threats. Notably, 'Operation Python Dance in the South East was instrumental to the quelling of IPOB divisive activities and the arrest of Nnamdi Kanu in 2017. Joint operations by the security forces accounted for the success of Anambra State Governorship Elections in November, 2021 when the IPOB threatened to stop it and delegitimized Nigerian State sovereignty over the region. State security also raided Sunday Igboho's house in Ibadan and declared him wanted. These measures have momentarily doused the agitation for the Yoruba Nations. Those feats are commendable, in spite of perceived failures by citizens. Nevertheless, fighting guerrilla war in challenging terrains such as Nigeria, where myriad of creeks in the swampy Niger Delta, hills and caves in the North East, opened savannah in the North West, tropical rainforest in the South East, and urban warfare in parts of the South West may be very demanding even to best security force in the world. The U.S led counterterrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East in general is instructive. Besides, U.S experience in Vietnam also proves that asymmetric warfare in a challenging terrain is not a tea party (CRS 2021; USIP 2017; Simko2019). Above all, succeeding in security operations in a political terrain, deeply divided along primordial lines is challenging, and could only be done with a lot of resilience.

5. The resilience of Nigeria economy

Nigeria is said to be the biggest economy in Africa with a gross Domestic product (GDP) of 432.3 billion USD, GDP per capita of 2,097.09 USD, Gross national Income (GNI) 1.103 trillion PPP USD and GNI per capita of 5,000 PPP USD (World Bank, 2020).The size of the economy grounded on oil resources has led to fluctuation of the country's economic performance over the years, but is has been providing funding to critical sector of the national life which facilities the provision of infrastructural facilities and other public goods. Economy indices of the country is responsible for funding of security forces and the purchase of the military platforms and air assets deployed against the tripod centrifugal forces focused in this study; it has also facilitated the funding of the rehabilitation and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, as well as repentant militants and terrorists (Aderonke 2015; Ikwuyatum2016; Ladan-Baki 2016). Furthermore, the redistribution of resources in the Nigerian state has ensured that Northern States get fair share from the national pool, in spite of their minimal contributions to the pool (Akeem 2011; Onuigbo and Okechukwu 2015). The net effect of the redistribution framework is that poverty and underdevelopment in the North

is checked, otherwise, the whole North could have been at bar with Niger Republic and other landlocked states of the Sahel in terms of poverty and other development indices. By reducing poverty and underdevelopment through the fair redistribution of national resources, the system has creatively reduced poverty and other negative indices that promote conflicts and instability in the North and in extension, the entire country. Indeed, the strength of the Nigerian economy and its dynamics has helped and would continue to support the stability of the state if effectively managed by the operators.

6.   The resilience of Nigerian foreign relations

Although Nigeria is a created product of colonial impunity. It has over the years defined its foreign policies and relations with the rest of the world in a positive and creative manner. The concentric of its foreign policy has enhanced its relationship with others. The first concentric circle is its neighbours. A friendly relationship with its francophone neighbours and its construction of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have helped in relative security of its borders and subregion. Accepting the International Court of Justice's verdict on the disputed Bakassi Peninsula has assuaged the fear of domination, hitherto nursed by its smaller neighbours (Ali 2020; Okon 2020). Nigeria's activities on the continent of Africa have engendered peace and security, especially the crafting of the continent as the centrepiece of its foreign policy. These commitments have endeared Nigeria to actors on the continent (Stremlau1981; Landsberg2012). Besides, its non-align rhetoric during the Cold War and beyond increasingly make it accessible to all the divides of global politics. These and other factors, such as the respect for conventional international laws and upholding of democratic values have also increased its legitimacy and acceptance within the global system, as a responsible actor (Imam and Nuru 2018; Ali 2012; Stremlau 1981). The net impact of these foreign policy strategies is the relative support and goodwill it enjoys from the global community. Besides, many countries in Africa and beyond are interested in supporting Nigeria to overcome its current security challenges. This is demonstrated by the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to fight the Boko Haram insurgency. Besides, western powers have been instrumental to successive Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in Nigeria, as well as sales of military hardware and platforms to the security forces in the country. Nigeria also sources and procures military assets from Russia, China and across the globe. Moreover, Nigeria's prosperity is derived from its volume of international trade with the rest of the world. Thus, functional and stable foreign relationship is one of the resiliencies that sustain Nigeria and could remain so, since many actors believe in the survival of Nigeria as key to stability in the West African sub-region and the continent at large (Ani and Mahmood 2018; Atelhe, Anyambe and Abumiye 2016; Okon and Ojakorotu 2019).

Conclusion

The paper highlighted the tripodal menace of terrorism, banditry and separatism in Nigeria and sought to assuage the fear that these security challenges were signs of the collapse of the country The optimism is based on six resilience features of the Nigerian states, namely: the structural and ethno-religious mix of Nigeria, the consensus of Nigerian elite to preserve the unity of country, socio-political re-engineering capacity of Nigerians, the resilience of Nigerian security forces, the size and redistribution pattern of Nigerian economy and the resilience of Nigeria's foreign relations. These resiliencies show that the Nigerian state has all it takes to overcome the challenges of state and nation building as played out by the tripodal menace. However, it is important for the state to devolve its powers from the centre to the component units and restructure the polity in a way that would engender equity, justice and fairness, above and over rentier and 'kleptocracy'. An Igbo president should be produced as was done in the late 1990s for the Yorubas, since there are several democratic institutions to check the excesses of any sitting president in the country. The consensus reached in 2014 National Conference may be the reference point for socio-political and economic reengineering in the country. Efforts must also be made to resolve the homeland question for the Fulani nomads, as well as address the socio-political and economic variables which promote the centrifugal forces under discussion. State secularism and rule of law need to be promoted in a manner that enhances justice for the victims of terrorism, banditry and separatism.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Enoch Ndem Okon holds a PhD in International Relations and Strategic Studies, and a MSc in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Calabar and Lagos respectively in Nigeria. His research interest includes: African Regional Security and Governance, Peace and Conflict Studies, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, and Politics of Energy and Environmental Resources.

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The Proliferation of Armed Non-State Actors in the Sahel

Drivers, Ramifications and the Way Forward

Tope Shola Akinyetun[1]

Abstract:

The increase in the spate of insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel has assumed colossal proportions. Insecurity in the region is largely perpetuated by non-state actors that continue to rise in numbers and evolve in operations. Indeed, armed non-state actors pervade Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Nigeria. The proliferation of these armed non-state actors constitutes a bane to the development of the region as it further subjects the region to extreme poverty, unprecedented humanitarian crisis and state fragility. This paper, therefore, examines how the mutually reinforcing challenges of climate change, bad governance, local militias, ungoverned space and poverty have necessitated the polarization of terror networks. This is done through the adoption of a qualitative approach and reliance on secondary sources of data such as textbooks, peer-reviewed journal articles, government reports, newspaper articles, online newspapers etc. The paper finds that governance is a critical driver and predictive element in the understanding of the proliferation of ANSAs. It concludes that ANSAs take advantage of poor governance to establish an informal governance system that adopts violence to maintain control whilst encouraging a shadow economy characterized by terrorism, kidnap for ransom, rivalry attacks and illegal activities. The paper, therefore, recommends the adoption of a framework of local governance characterized by responsive institutions, inclusive politics and resilient society.

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Introduction

The proliferation of armed non-state actors [hereafter ANSAs] in the Sahel portends grave danger for human and national security. The phenomenon has assumed colossal proportions with knock-on effects on the spate of poverty, ethnic animosity, insurgency and insecurity in the region. In addition to undermining peace and progress, the menace has exacerbated carnage evidenced in the destruction of life and properties of thousands of people. It has further led to an increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing the affected regions thus creating a serious humanitarian crisis in the Sahel. The Sahel is a region in Africa that stretches across ten countries[2] and spans from the west to the east of Africa; from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. However, the use of the Sahel (or the region) in this paper is with particular reference to Niger, Mali, Chad, Nigeria and Burkina Faso where security situations continue to deteriorate.

Nigeria is threatened by the Boko Haram sect and its splinter group, Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP). The group has been responsible for the death of thousands and the displacement of millions of people. It has also turned thousands into refugees, forced millions to flee their communities and increased the incidence of out-of-school children (Mohammed and Mohammed, 2015). The group has since its creation changed its tactics and scope by spreading to Niger, Mali, Chad and Cameroon. Meanwhile, other ANSAs in Nigeria include bandits, unknown gunmen and militant herders. Niger is endangered by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The ISGS was responsible for the death of over 560 civilians in 2021 alone. The group's attack on civilians has sparked outrage in the affected communities and has led to the formation of militias for self-defence; a move capable of encouraging communal war. The JNIM on the other hand is responsible for sponsoring attacks against security forces, government facilities and schools close to the nation's capital (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2019). In Burkina Faso, JNIM; an affiliate of Al Qaeda whose attacks increased in 2021 to overtake Mali as the epicentre of conflict in the region, is responsible for the militant attack on state forces and civilians leading to high death tolls and destruction of government facilities.

The above-mentioned ANSAs continue to expand in scale and scope while the governments of the states in the region and other actors continuously decry the growing insufficient capacity and paucity of funds required to tackle the humanitarian crisis. This suggests a challenge to governance and internal security in these states. According to the World Internal Security and Police Index Report (2016), Africa, home to seven of the ten worst-ranked countries, performed worst in internal security. The index which 'measure the ability of the security apparatus within a country to respond to internal security challenges, both now and in the future' (p.6), takes a broader look at security issues such as insurgency, violent

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[2] The composition of states in the Sahel vary but it generally includes Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. The region stretches from Senegal through the aforementioned countries to the Red Sea Coast. It represents the site of interaction between the north and the south [see for example Suleiman, 2017; UN (n.d.)].

organized crime, climate change, civil unrest, terrorism and natural disasters. In the report, Nigeria scored 0.255 over 10 thus ranked 127 out of the 127 countries surveyed. Mali scored 0.489 while Burkina Faso scored 0.514.

This is supported by the report on internal security by the Legatum Institute (2021) which reveals that the region ranks low in terms of safety and security. Out of 167 countries surveyed for the prosperity index (safety, freedom, governance, living conditions, health etc.), Mali ranks 151 on the index and 158 in safety and security; Niger 148 and 143; Nigeria 143 and 153; Chad 164 and 141; Burkina Faso 134 and 142. The report further shows that except for Burkina Faso which had the same score in 2020 and 2021 (134), other countries in the region recorded a fall in rank between 2020 and 2021. Observably, the region not only performs poorly on the overall index rank but occupies the lower stratum in the safety and security band. Meanwhile, some of the world's poorest countries (Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria) are in sub-Saharan Africa and are found in the region. Of course, these poor governance indices have been linked to the security imbroglio in the region (Baudais, 2020). As Gorman (2019, p.1) puts it, "these development concerns add to the region's already precarious stability and, at times, compete with state-level security and economic issues".

The above view is corroborated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2020) that increased abductions, forced recruitment and terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces in the region reveal an area challenged by internal security. Although the reports present slight variations in the rankings of the countries of the region, this is not unexpected considering the different indices of analysis. Worthy of note nonetheless, is that the countries of the region are challenged by a governance crisis evidenced in poor internal security which gives impetus to the rise of ANSAs. Indeed, the proliferation of ANSAs has been attributed to several factors including government legitimacy, state-society relationship, weak states, weak security apparatus, arms proliferation, porous borders, poverty, colonial legacy, unemployment, illegal migration, climate change and most importantly, bad governance (Forest and Idler, 2015; Skretteberg, 2019). It is believed that ungoverned spaces in Africa create a power vacuum that is exploited by non-state actors to exert influence and authority. This is evidenced by the rise of the Berabiche and Tuareg groups which control a vast space of the Sahel (Forest and Idler, 2015). This has equally enabled the polarization of terror networks, an increase in attacks by ANSAs, arms proliferation, social fragility, extreme poverty and underdevelopment.

Arising from the above, this paper investigates the proliferation of armed non-state actors in the Sahel. It focuses on the issues necessitating the rise of ANSAs within the framework of bad governance. The paper also appraises the various ANSAs in the selected regions and the mutually reinforcing factors necessitating their proliferation and sustenance. In addition, the paper proffers policy recommendations as to the way forward from the quagmire. To address these central themes, this paper adopts a qualitative methodological approach based on the documentary review of secondary data available in textbooks, peer-reviewed journal articles, policy briefs, newspaper articles, government reports, internet sources etc. The paper is

therefore discussed under six distinct sub-headings. The first section presents an introductory overview of the phenomenon of armed non-state actors while the second part discusses the theoretical perspectives of the paper using bad governance as the frame of analysis. The third part presents an overview of ANSAs in the Sahel while the fourth part examines the mutually reinforcing factors that propel the proliferation of ANSAs and the resultant effects of the rise on the region and the continent. Thus, the fifth section recommends local governance as the panacea to discouraging the rise of ANSAs and helping the region to promote inclusiveness and resilience, while the conclusion of the paper is presented in the last part.

Theoretical Perspectives

The end of the Cold War has seen the notion of the state monopoly of power being weakened by the proliferation of ANSAs around the world (Darwich, 2021; Moderan, 2021). The state is becoming challenged in its sphere of governance due to limited attention paid to specific areas. The exclusive role of the government; governance, is being overtaken by non-state actors, who, through the provision of essential services, have taken over ungoverned spaces and areas with limited governance and rebranded themselves as local administrators. This paper argues that Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) are mostly products of bad governance and have in often cases secured their legitimacy by acting as [informal] governance providers to the local population. Thus, the central theme here is that governance is a critical driver and predictive element in the understanding of the proliferation of ANSAs. This is properly expressed in the words of Asaduzzaman and Virtanen (2016, p.2) that "the ground realities or country-specific contextual realities play a vital role in order to theorizing governance' and 'in order to cope with the challenges of the twenty-first century, to understand the relationship in-between the state and non-state agencies is thus important" (p.3).

Governance is defined as the instrument of governing which integrates the relationship between government, citizens and the role of the state (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 1995). Asaduzzaman and Virtanen (2016, p.2) refer to governance as the responsibility of every government which includes the 'creation, execution, and implementation of activities backed by the shared goals of citizens and organizations, who may or may not have formal authority or policing power'. For Harmonie (2019, p. 4), governance is a 'set of practices and norms that govern daily life in a specific territory.' That is, governance is a space-bound activity that determines the course of action governing people's actions and way of life. The requisites of governance include the legitimacy of territorial control and the enforcement of rules guiding the affairs of the population in such a territory. Through governance, a legitimate armed actor exercises territorial control, regulates the population and provides essential goods and services. Governance, therefore, describes the model of the ruling, regulating and administering the affairs of people or a nation by the law. It is the interaction between power and responsibility and the ability to make decisions thereof.

Rockman and Hahm (2011) differentiate between good and bad governance and note that what distinguishes them is the quality of decisions and actions taken by government officials to gain people's trust; the failure of which creates a governance crisis. Governance crisis, inter alia, is not restricted to poor countries alone, but can also be found in economically advanced countries and precludes public trust in government and engenders instability. In this regard, fairness is an important element in the governance process. It emphasizes order, control, free choice, equity and the protection of human rights (Rockman and Hahm, 2011). For context, the Sahel performs poorly in terms of governance. Using the World Bank (2021) governance indicators, regarding the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations, Burkina Faso ranks 37 over 100; Mali 30; Niger 23; Nigeria 14; and Chad 11 in the year 2020 with an estimate of governance of less than -2.5 each. This indicates the prevalence of weak governance in the region.

The above submission is supported by the Chandler Good Government Index (2021) which includes only three of the countries in the region. The index, which measures indicators like leadership, strong institutions, laws and policies, among others, ranks Burkina Faso at 96 out of 104 countries with an index score of 0.347; Mali at 99 with a score of 0.329; and Nigeria at 102 with a score of 0.319. These rankings are an indication of the poor state of governance in the region and as this paper argues, this has necessitated the proliferation of ANSAs whose behaviour over the years can be described as dynamic and subject to evolvement.

Regardless of the change in tactic or aims, ANSAs have consistently been involved in governance, and recently, foreign policy (Darwich, 2021). The reasons for this, as argued by Harmonie (2019) are rooted in three factors: economic, political and institutional. The rewards of taxation and other levies are more satisfying economically just as ANSAs with secessionist plans often see themselves as shadow governments waiting to take over from the state actors. In the same manner, ANSAs may use governance as a means for securing legitimacy among the people or strengthening their organizational capability. According to Ruaudel (2013), when ANSAs sense the absence of government presence in an area, they assume the de facto role of shadow governance. Meaning, the presence of weak governance gives room for ANSAs to operate. They strive to fill a power vacuum, assume protective and governance roles and provide social services which earn them the communities' respect. Harmonie (2019) adds that some of the methods of providing governance services by ANSAs include violence and inducement. Of these, violence is the most preferred and could take the form of coercion, surveillance, threat or participation. Meanwhile, the use of violence is dependent on the prior governance structure in the area before the incursion of ANSAs; this determines the level of resistance or negotiation by the population, and the goals of the group which may [or not] require violence.

The guiding principle of ANSAs is less about replacing the state and more about creating a defying and contradictive political order against the state. This explains why ANSAs opt for replacing specific aspects of governance than attempting to undertake state functions or replicate themselves as state authority. The specific parts are either strategic or technical. The

strategic services offered by ANSAs include the provision of a judicial mechanism or security apparatus, while the technical services involve providing education and health services (Mampilly, 2007). By taking over these specific elements of governance, ANSAs create a shadow [or informal] form of governance that controls security, justice, economic resources and essential services of the local community. This view was substantiated by Harmonie (2019), who divided the governance activities of ANSAs into four parts: security, justice, political and economic administration; and social support and rules. Concerning security, ANSAs often maintain internal and external control. Their internal control is defined by their engagement in policing (informal, local and state) activities while their external control is characterized by territorial control (full or partial) and unrestricted access to travel routes. It is also not uncommon to have ANSAs establish a formal or informal justice system. The formal establishment involves the setting up of courts headed by a judge who is responsible for the adjudication of rules and settlement of disputes while the informal set-up does not give recourse to rules but enacts judgements based on sentiments. In the area of political and economic administration, ANSAs can enforce tax and provide humanitarian services (aid) such as cash, water, food and other developmental projects. Finally, as it concerns social support and rules, ANSAs also provide social services (education, health) and enforce social rules (culture).

Idler and Forest (2015, p.4) aver that "some forms of complementary governance among non-state actors – even violent ones – can result in higher levels of security than a government can provide". Meanwhile, the extent to which the government of a state is deemed illegitimate presents ANSAs with the opportunity to express grievance against the government and protest its bad governance. For example, government negligence in Mali led to the emergence of ANSAs in the country (Skretteberg, 2019). The lack of state legitimacy areas coupled with widespread poverty made the people vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. As a result, the groups have multiplied and continue to recruit rebels in various parts of the country and the region. Scholars claim that the relative deprivation and disparity between the north and south in Nigeria in terms of education, health care services and economic opportunities, fuels aggression and armed conflict (Mohammed and Mohammed, 2015). The north currently ranks low in the development index and is confronted with high levels of illiteracy, poverty and unemployment – which are indicators of bad governance. As a result, this perceived governance vacuum has given impetus to ANSAs. This is particularly true regarding the Niger Delta militant groups and the Independent People of Biafra of Nigeria that attribute their militancy and violence to perceived deprivation, marginalization and exclusion from governance.

Armed Non-State Actors in the Sahel: An Overview

ANSAs are defined as "organized armed entities that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside effective State control, and lack legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties" (Ruaudel, 2013, p.5). They are "armed organizations motivated by

political or economic goals using violence either against the state, other armed groups, or civilians. They can include state- or internationally-designated terrorist groups, paramilitary groups in support of the state, and organized criminal gangs" (Harmonie, 2019, p.4). These definitions broaden the understanding of the composition of ANSAs according to their motivating factors. It suggests that ANSAs are motivated by different reasons which could be political or economic. When politically motivated, reference is often made to violent extremist groups, rebels, militias, or ethnic groups, while financially motivated ANSAs include bandits (Moderan, 2021). ANSAs have also been differentiated by objectives (clear-cut or not); territory control (structured or loose administration); location (rural or urban); composition (children, men or women); and membership (voluntary or forced recruitment). However, the dominant characteristics that differentiate them are territory control, identity/resources and relationship to the wider society (Sjöberg & Warner, 2015). Regardless of the distinction, ANSAs are generally rebellious groups whose agendas are at variance with the state and its citizens.

ANSAs are complex actors whose activities are characterized by violence, coercion and multilayered identities. Their activities have become recurring in the Sahel. Increased attention has been paid to this region in the last decade due to recurrent unrest and epidemic rise in insecurity, which has transnational consequences for neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Benin and Ivory Coast.

The insecurity in Mali and other parts of the region has since festered given the prevailing structural challenges of underdevelopment and fragility in the region. This was alluded to by Gorman & Chauzal (2018, p.1) that "the Sahel is a region that has historically been troubled by weak governance, high levels of youth unemployment, porous borders, frequent drought, high levels of food insecurity and paltry development progress". Generally characterized by ungoverned spaces, the region is susceptible to insecurity. Gorman (2019) alludes that the Sahel countries are challenged by natural hazards, food insecurity, extreme poverty, lack of educational opportunities and high unemployment – all of which complicate stability and security. The activities of the armed groups in the region include trafficking, recruiting and using child soldiers, abduction, misusing small arms and light weapons, bombing, planting landmines, terrorism, and obstructing humanitarian activities (Sjöberg and Warner, 2015). According to Adama Dieng (2022), the former Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Senegal, the conflict in the Sahel led to 4660 casualties of terrorist attacks in the second half of 2020 while between February 2021 and February 2022, over 2000 civilians had lost their lives in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

ANSAs have been in the Sahel since the collapse of the colonial system and have existed throughout the post-colonial state formation epoch. The limited government presence and governance that characterizes rural areas and remote cities have further given way to its rise. However, the security threat in the region became intensified following the regime change in Libya and unrest in northern Mali in 2012 and tensions in Algeria and Sudan. More so, the mutual suspicion that typifies the relationship between the Tuareg leaders and other ethnic

groups in the South has also necessitated resistance (Darwich, 2021; Harmonie, 2019; Skretteberg, 2019). According to Baudai (2020) and Cold-Ravnkilde & Ba (2022), the fall of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011 triggered a security crisis in Mali in 2012 when a loose alliance of Jihad fighters with ties to al-Qaeda and Tuareg separatist rebels seized control of Mali's three northern districts of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. The Jihadists who were concentrated in the north moved to the south of Mali – neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger – due to the military onslaught that began in 2013.

To be sure, the security threat in the Sahel is sponsored by different categories of groups including violent extremist groups, militias, self-defence groups and local vigilantes (Moderan, 2021). However, two separate groups have been identified in the Sahel: Tuareg rebels and violent extremist groups. The growth of the Tuareg rebels can be traced to the period following Mali's independence from France in 1960 and then to the period of establishing the Azawad state in 2012. Meanwhile, the inability to control the Tuareg rebels led to the proliferation of violent extremist groups with established links to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al Qaeda. More so, the failed peace agreement between the Algerian government and its fighters led to an invasion of militants to the region, leading to the formation of al Qaeda in Islamic Magreb (AQIM) in Mali and the Sahel. The operations of ANSAs have no doubt been characterized by feuds and alliances – an element that has entrenched an asymmetrical war and doubts over who is fighting whom (Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018).

These alliances have led to the recent formation of different groups: Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) – formed by the coalition of AQIM, al Murabitoun, Macina Liberation Front and Ansar Dine; responsible for about half of the violent incidents recorded in the Sahel in 2018. JNIM, founded in 2017 by Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine, consists of five groups: Ansar Dine – by Iyad Ag Ghaly; Katiba Serma – by Abu Jalil al Fulani; Al Mourabitoun – by Hasan al Ansari; Macina Liberation Front (FLM) – by Amadou Koufa; and AQIM Sahara – by Djamel Okacha. Each of these groups has its respective areas of operation. When the Ansar Dine operates around Kidal, Katiba Serma; Serma region, Al Mourabitoun; region surrounding Gao, FLM; Mopti region, and AQIM; Mali and southwest of Niger. Other groups include Ansaroul Islam – by Malaam Ibrahim Dicko and operating in the Soum Province of Burkina Faso; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara by Abu Walid al Sahrawi operating in the shared borders of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso; and Katiba Salaheddine – by Sultan Ould Badi (The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019).

Meanwhile, the counterterrorist operations in Burkina Faso have led to an increase in the attacks by JNIM and ISGS. The clash between these groups and the Burkinabe armed forces led to the death of 70 militants on March 10 in Tasmakatt, Oudalan Province. On February 16, 2020, there were attacks on herders in the north region of the state by unknown armed groups leading to the death of 24 civilians in Pansi while on February 25, 39 civilians were killed in Silgadji and another 43 civilians in Barga and Dinguila. Also, on March 28, 15 civilians were

killed in Zitenga while the French military announced on March 12 that scores of attackers were killed in northern Burkina Faso in Operation Barkhane. To address these incessant attacks, the government of Burkina Faso on January 21, 2020 enacted a law to bolster the security forces by recruiting, training and arming civilians. Although, this action has been criticized as negatively impacting human rights practices and capable of engendering inter-communal violence (UNSC, 2020).

There is also the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) – based in Niger and responsible for 15 per cent of the violent incidents in the Sahel, and Ansar al Islam – based in Burkina Faso and responsible for 26 per cent of the violent incidents in the region. Meanwhile, these alliances have led to a dramatic increase in the number of violent incidents since 2016. The report shows that the number of violent incidents recorded between 2016 and 2018 far exceed those recorded between 2009 and 2015. These incidents have not only been linked to violent extremist groups, but they continue to increase and have also had a spillover effect on neighbouring countries such as Togo and Benin (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019). The security imbroglio in Tillaberi, Tahoua and Diffa regions of Niger is intractable as terrorist groups attack the Nigerien security forces and the Nigerien army leading to an increase in the number of offensive military operations by the latter – causing the death of 620 terrorists. The Nigerien army lost 174 soldiers between December 2019 and January 2020, while in one attack on January 9, 2020, the Nigerien army recorded 89 casualties in Tillaberi. Although this attack led to the death of 77 terrorists and another 120 lost to the Nigerien-French joint operation on February 21, 2020, the ISGS attacked the army on April 2 and killed 4 officers. In a counteroffensive, the army killed 63 attackers while another 50 Boko Haram fighters were killed on March 16 in Toumour (UNSC, 2020).

On the other side, the JNIM continues to ravage Mali and threaten its peace and security. The attacks by JNIM in Mali have continued despite President Keita's attempt at negotiating with the terrorists. The group however demanded that the government sacked the French troops. Also, there have been clashes between the JNIM and ISGS which led to the death of over 100 people on April 5, 2020. As a result, Operation Barkhane has received more international support (UNSC, 2020). The Malian government was forced to reduce its counterinsurgency and joint military operations due to the military coups it experienced in August 2020 and May 2021. As a result, the state lost control to JNIM which intensified its onslaught on the communities in Dan Na Ambassagou and Donso. Also, there is the issue of the strained relationship between the Malian government and the French forces. The relationship was severed by anti-French demonstrations against France's presence in the Sahel and the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso. The reasons to worry also include the expansion of armed groups into other parts of West Africa such as the Ivory Coast and Benin. Multiple attacks on military forces were recorded in 2021 and in Benin and Togo. This is because some of these West African littoral states are often used as illegal trading routes by the JNIM to smuggle gold, supplies and arms (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project [ACLED], 2022).

In Nigeria, the security threat experienced is multipronged as the country contends with various ANSAs including ISWAP, Boko Haram, banditry attacks, farmer-herder crisis, communal violence and an upsurge in kidnap for ransom. Concerning Boko Haram, there was a clash over supremacy and territory control between Boko Haram and ISWAP in 2021, which led to the death of the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau. As a result, many Boko Haram fighters joined ISWAP while thousands surrendered to the Nigerian Army. ISWAP continues to grow its influence in the state and now controls Lake Chad. The terrorist attacks in the Northeast claimed the lives of 47 Nigerian soldiers and 98 Chadian soldiers in Gorgi, Borno and Boma, Lake Chad respectively on March 23 2020. The Chadian army claimed it had pushed Boko Haram factions in Chad across the border towards Borno state thus leading to an increase in the offensive by the Nigerian military – leading to the death of 1,609 terrorists and 375 security forces between February and April. In addition to the 240 civilian deaths attributed to the Boko Haram factions, there have also been deaths resulting from recurring banditry attacks and farmer-herder clashes, which led to the death of 431 civilians between January and April 2020 (UNSC, 2020).

Nigeria experienced a 30 per cent increase in violence in 2021 compared to the year before with insurgent attacks claiming 18 per cent. This increase in violence is attributable to the attacks by several ANSAs including bandits and the Independent People of Biafra. A surge in communal militia activity otherwise referred to as banditry has also increased drastically from 30 per cent in 2020 to 50 per cent in 2021. This group presently overtakes Boko Haram and ISWAP in the number of civilian fatalities caused by over 2,600 civilian deaths in 2021. Militant herders have also been warring against farmers over farmlands to feed their cattle. This attack and reprisal attacks have claimed the lives of many and led to the destruction of property. This militia continues to grow and evolve in tactics whilst enhancing its capability. The militia, which was responsible for shooting down a military jet in 2021, also has networks in other states which enables it to evade capture by the military (ACLED, 2022). ANSAs continue to take advantage of Nigeria's porous borders, vast ungoverned spaces and weak security apparatus and engage in kidnap for ransom, cattle rustling, arson, abduction and sporadic attacks (ACLED, 2022).

This view finds vivid expression in the submission of Akinyetun (2022) that Nigeria's porous borders play host to an array of criminal syndicates who use the forests of the country to promote terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, abduction, cattle rustling, illegal mining and banditry. The reasons for this are explained in Idler and Forest's (2015) expression that ANSAs are popular in border regions for three reasons "first, their tendency for weak state governance systems; second, their low-risk/high opportunity environment arising out of their trans-nationality making illegal cross-border activities extremely profitable; and third, a proneness to impunity because they operate in spaces where two different jurisdictions and security systems meet" (p.6).

Although attempts have been made to counter the activities of ANSAs in the Sahel, these have proven ineffective. The Sahel is occupied by national armed forces (60,000), personnel of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (15,000) French troops (4,500) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force drawn from Niger, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (5,000) (Harmonie, 2019). Despite the presence of this estimated 84,500 armed personnel, the region is still challenged by the activities of ANSAs.

ANSAs in the Sahel: Drivers

This sector appraises the prominent factors that drive the proliferation of ANSAs in the Sahel.

Bad governance

As earlier put forward, a dominant factor necessitating the proliferation of ANSAs in the region is bad governance. In an interview with Boubacar Ba, an expert on governance and security in the Sahel, Gernigon & Cold-Ravnkilde (2022, p.1) report that "it is the bad governance, the poor application of laws and the unequal development of the agricultural and the pastoral production systems in the already existing conditions of economic inequality that have created the conflicts" in the Sahel.

An understanding of the proliferation of ANSAs can be aided by examining their role in governance as they have in recent times become collaborators and providers of public goods in a model described by the authors as complementary governance. This idea is rooted in the structure of authority distribution between states and ANSAs around the world. This is aptly captured in the Nigerian pre-colonial and colonial epochs. Local administration in pre-colonial Nigeria was centred on the traditional rulers (Emir, Shehu and Oba) while the advent of colonial rule altered this arrangement but ceded some level of power of cooperation to these rulers through the infamous indirect rule system. This led to the emergence of a mixed government in the post-independent era as the traditional rulers retained their influence and power whilst coexisting with the state (Idler & Forest, 2015). They are responsible for conflict resolution between warring identity groups, settling communal and family disputes, and acting as advisers to the government on several matters. This is also true of the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya groups of Islamic West Africa whose leaders command respect and wield influence over their members. These cases are evidence of how authority is shared between state and non-state actors in society. ANSAs also seek to increase their international acceptance by communicating with other states and armed groups using rebel diplomacy (strategic communication with foreign agents or governments), protodiplomacy (gaining recognition, credibility and visibility at the international level), public diplomacy (targeting external public opinions) and rebel marketing (using social media for international branding) (Darwich, 2021).

Bad governance is a root cause of armed conflict as people who are left out of the dividends of governance are easily provoked into violence. This is exemplified in Africa where the general absence of good governance has birthed incessant conflicts (Yiew et al., 2016). For instance,

the politicization of the security architecture in Mali, coupled with bad governance has led to instability and pushed the state towards fragility. More so, the economic and political exclusion of significant parts of Mali necessitated grievances and became a crack that Islamist extremists exploited. This view is supported by Akinyetun (2020) that bad governance is at the core of intractable conflicts in Nigeria. In the words of the author:

> 'The challenges of identity politics, ethnic crisis, marginalisation, civil war, coups, countercoups, assassination, political instability, mutual suspicion, threats of secession, and national disintegration, as previously identified, are partly as a result of bad governance. A country enmeshed in bad governance is a breeding ground for poverty, armed robbery, kidnapping, militancy, insurgency, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism, as is currently being experienced in Nigeria' (p.123).

Ungoverned space

An equally motivating factor for the increase in ANSAs in the region is the ungoverned space that pervades it. An ungoverned space could refer to a physical territory or a non-physical policy space (Raleigh & Dowd, 2013). This territory or space is characterized by vast ungoverned areas that serve as a haven for criminal activities such as terrorism, insurgency, banditry, illegal mining and other emerging security threats. The term has attracted the attention of policy experts, security experts and researchers, and has become linked with insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Against popular opinion, Raleigh and Dowd (2013) argue that attributing the rise in ANSAs in the region to ungoverned space is 'theoretically thin, based largely on conjecture, and does not reflect the logistical realities and strategies of violent actors' (p. 2). Their argument rests on the notion that space can only be useful at a particular stage of conflict and that the region is effectively governed by multiple agents. They also agree that the states in the region are among the poorest in Africa and as such are bound to experience limited state presence. This view appears incoherent as admitting that multiple agents exercise governance is tantamount to agreeing that the state's authority is challenged by a group that provides informal governance.

Also rejecting the notion of 'terrorist haven' and 'ungoverned spaces', Harmonie (2019) argues that the areas captured by ANSAs are best described as "spaces of contested governance or shared governance between representatives of the state, local tribal leaders, self-defence militias, criminal gangs, and politically-motivated non-state armed groups" (p. 8). Idler & Forest (2015) also suggest that ungoverned spaces may not necessarily be a motivation for crime but agree that they play a major role as evidenced in the Berabiche and Tuareg groups that control a vast space of the Sahel. Akinyetun (2022) on the other hand argues that because vast ungoverned spaces in the north of Nigeria are secluded, under-governed and lack state presence, they present an opportunity for crime. Due to limited government authority, the forests have become a hideout for criminal gangs. More so, such space is often used to sustain an informal economy and acquire some form of legitimacy. In the words of the author, "in an ungoverned space, governance is outside the state's established authority. The illegal governance that brands an ungoverned space engenders non-state actors who claim to

provide succour and protection for the people or the provision of other services". Thus, because it sustains crime as a result of the opportunity presented by limited governance, an ungoverned space becomes an essential element in the crime of opportunity.

Local militias

There are also indications that some of the violent incidents in the Sahel are attributable to the existence of local militias, criminal gangs, illegal traffickers and ethnic-based armed groups who often work in synergy [for or] against the state on different occasions. Examples include Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) and Plateforme. There is also the challenge of drug and weapons trafficking, terrorism, insurgency, drought, illegal migration, violent extremism, weak security forces, arms proliferation and climate change (Harmonie, 2019). As Cold-Ravnkilde & Ba (2022) claim, 'the widespread availability of weapons has intensified violence against civilians and left communities more exposed to inter- and intra-communal conflicts and relentless criminality'. Scholars opine that easy access to weapons also fuels the rise of ANSAs in the region. That is, the proliferation of arms makes it easy for aggrieved groups to lay hands on them and foment trouble (Moderan, 2021). Meanwhile, it has been established that security threats are common in authoritarian and hybrid regimes with smaller or challenged police forces in Africa (WISPI, 2016). This was supported by Akinyetun (2022) that despite having the monopoly of force, the often overstretched, weak and underfunded security forces in African states are unable to respond adequately to the security challenges in the state.

Climate change

There is a growing debate on the role of climate change in exacerbating armed conflicts in Africa. Cold-Ravnkilde & Ba (2022) argue that climate change is not necessarily responsible for an increase in conflicts in the region. In their words:

> "…violence and conflict in the Sahel are caused by the presence of armed groups with divergent political and ideological agendas, not climate change per se. In these circumstances, the absence of effective natural resource management has become a key conflict driver in the face of increased pressure on land and water, and of the aggravating factor of climate change." (p. 8)

As the authors would have us believe, the incidence of climate change alone does not account for armed conflicts in the region. Rather, it is the strain posed by the lack of adequate management of resources that stokes conflict and violence. However, considering that 'climate change remains one of the major challenges that Sahel's countries face' and that the 'UN estimates that 80 per cent of the agricultural areas in the Sahel belt are already affected by climate change' (Skretteberg, 2019, p.4), it is important to examine the role it plays in conflict escalation. This is imperative given that about 70% of Sahelians depend on pastoralism and agriculture for survival (Dieng, 2022) and considering the rising temperature; presently 35 ˚C and estimated to reach 38 ˚C by 2050, climate change will adversely impact cattle rearing and add to existing problems.

The phenomenon adds to the protracted conflict between herders and farmers on one end, and between competing herders on the other end. As Dieng (2022, p.1) submits, the resulting "farmer-herder violence has led to over 15,000 casualties, with half that number reported in the past three years alone". This has increased the spate of food shortage, food insecurity and led to decline in food production in the region. Scholars also opine that climate change increases the chances of fragility. In the year 2020 – one of the three warmest years so far (since 1850) – there were reported cases of bushfires, ice caps, floods and melting glaciers around the world, while the Sahel experienced an increase in temperature higher than the global average (Hartog, 2021). This has grave implications for the poor regions where the people are left further impoverished due to the decimation of their means of livelihood through environmental degradation. The result is a surge in hunger, poverty and unemployment which increases vulnerability to crime. It also increases the competition for scarce resources. For instance, the floods and droughts in Nigeria and Mali have contributed to the conflict between herders and farmers over resources.

The above was aptly captured in the literature that the conflict between Fulani herders and farmers in Nigeria is centred on economic resources. The pastoralist Fulanis, due to climate change are often forced to rove in search of water and farmlands to graze thus coming into confrontation with farmers who are protecting their crops and farmlands from encroachment. This clash of interest has led to dastardly attacks by the Fulanis in Zamfara, Plateau, Taraba, Benue etc. and has left thousands dead and many properties destroyed. The Fulanis were responsible for killing 200 people in a single attack in Zamfara in 2014 and the attacks have continued unabated while spreading to other parts of the country (Akinyetun, 2022). In addition, prevailing economic conditions have also been described as motivation for ANSAs seeing that poverty necessitates a shadow economy characterized by activities unregulated by the government. Thus, while catering to the needs of the people through a shadow economy, an ANSA can take advantage of the situation to expand its reach, grow its power, enjoy authority and command resources.

Poverty

Poverty is a serious socioeconomic challenge in the Sahel. According to the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Reports (2021), the multidimensional poverty index of Mali is 0.376, Chad 0.517, Nigeria 0.254, Niger 0.601 and Burkina Faso 0.574. To be sure, many African countries have medium human development while countries in the region have low human development. For instance, Mali scores 0.434 on the human development index, Chad; 0.398, Nigeria; 0.539, Niger; 0.394 and Burkina Faso; 0.452. There is therefore no gainsaying that using the indices of multidimensional poverty and human development as the basis of analysis, the Sahelian states are challenged in health, education achievements, human security, work and employment, human and capital mobility, well-being and fundamental human rights. Meanwhile, the multidimensional nature of poverty means that it affects different areas of society including security; particularly in the Sahel. This finds better

expression in Garrigue (2016, p.8) that the "majority of the world's poverty [is] concentrated in conflict-affected countries". Poverty in Africa is a complicated phenomenon that is linked to vulnerability, lack of social protection, gender issues, health challenges, poor government policies, poor standard of living, social exclusion, inequality, illiteracy, corruption, unemployment, bad governance and insecurity (Danaan, 2018). Poverty forces people to seek alternatives outside the acceptable societal precepts including forming or joining armed groups.

ANSAs in the Sahel: Ramifications

There is no gainsaying that the proliferation of ANSAs constitutes a bane to the development of the region and increases the incidence of humanitarian crises and state fragility. This section examines these reinforcing aftereffects of the proliferation of ANSAs in the Sahel.

Humanitarian crisis

The security conundrum in the region has led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the form of displacement. Gorman & Chauzal (2018, p.1) maintain that 'the violence has had overall negative effects on the movement of people and illegal goods throughout the Sahel, and many of the human security concerns are shared across state borders'. Although ANSAs are linked to displacement, the relationship between the two phenomena is intricate. Two trends are discernible:

a) displacement as an intentional outcome by ANSAs – whereby displacement is provoked by ANSAs to uproot and punish a population; control and maintain a support base in a population; control territory, and protect a population; and

b) displacement as a by-product of conflict and other drivers, such as natural disasters.

Nonetheless, there has been an internal displacement of over 4.2 million people in the region in 2019. Of this figure, over 133,000 people fled their homes in Mali in Q2 2019 alone (Ruaudel, 2013). This is also the case in Nigeria and Burkina Faso where insecurity has led to internal displacement.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram and its splinter group, IS West African Province (ISWAP) continue to attack civilians and security forces. The conflict which has persisted for over a decade has degenerated into a sub-regional crisis that has spread to Chad, Cameroon and Niger. While in Burkina Faso, the northern provinces have been faced with recurring attacks that have increased the incidence of displacement in the country. This humanitarian crisis has also led to an increase in the incidence of food insecurity, gender-based violence and sexual and reproductive health issues. As the UNSC (2020) notes, over 24 million in the region will need humanitarian assistance; 4.9 million are displaced, 870,000 are refugees; 6.5 million young people and women require sexual and gender-related humanitarian support; while 19.1 are food insecure – "a 77 per cent increase compared to 2019 and the highest in a decade" (p.7).

The crisis in the region has no doubt increased food insecurity, exacerbating the chances of poverty, hunger and starvation.

In Burkina Faso, 848,000 people had fled their homes as of April 2020 – a sharp 67 per cent increase compared to 2019. Schools (2,500) and health centres (135) have been shut due to the crisis – denying millions of people and 338, 000 children access to health services and education respectively. The case is similar in Mali where over 220, 000 displaced persons have been recorded with over 11,000 newly displaced from Mopti region. It is estimated that due to food insecurity, 1.3 million people will starve while over 4.3 million require humanitarian assistance. Niger has the same experience. Here, 441,000 people have fled their homes; 103,000, 109,000 and 12,000 are internally displaced in Diffa, Tillaberi and Tahoua and Maradi respectively; while 126,000, 55,000 and 36,000 have become refugees in the same respective regions. Unfortunately, humanitarian services in these regions have been limited by the state of emergency and military operations in the areas. Like the other countries in the region, Nigeria also experiences a worsening humanitarian crisis with an estimated 7.7 million people in need of assistance. A majority of the affected persons are women clustered in camps in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states. The number of displaced persons; estimated to be 2.4 million at present, and refugees; 292,000, continue to increase as does the attacks by ANSAs (UNSC, 2020). Meanwhile, the conflict in the Sahel also limits access to humanitarian assistance with an estimated 1.5 million people living in areas inaccessible for provision of humanitarian aid and essential services (Dieng, 2022).

State fragility

The protracted conflict in the region also has serious implications for state fragility. Baudais (2020, p.1) avers that the Sahelian states "share common fragilities including increased tensions within the security apparatus, lack of means and equipment, and difficulties in controlling their territory". Hartog (2021), who examines how climate change leads to conflict and fragility observes that extreme weather destroys people's livelihood, threatens food insecurity and engenders social tension. The variability in weather leads to social mobility which upsets the social order of the new community by burdening its economy and limiting access to and increasing the competition for resources (water, land and forest) thereby creating conflicts. When the government is unable to respond swiftly to the local conflicts caused by competition for scarce resources, ANSAs take advantage of such a power gap to foster informal governance. This can sometimes be met with resistance by the defence or vigilante groups, leading to more conflict and loss of life.

For emphasis, a review of the Fragile State Index Report shows that out of the 179 countries surveyed, Chad is the 7th most fragile state in the world followed by Nigeria (12th), Mali (19th), Niger (21st) and Burkina Faso (36th) (Fund for Peace, 2021). The index was computed using several indicators which include security, group grievance, state legitimacy, refugees and internally displaced persons, among others. How badly the states in the region perform is a testament to the level of fragility arising from poor security and state legitimacy. For

instance, when using security as an indicator, the report shows that Chad scored 8.9 out of 10, Nigeria 8.8, Mali 9.6, Niger 8.9 and Burkina Faso 9.0. Whereas concerning state legitimacy, the countries scored 9.4, 8.4, 7.5, 7.1 and 5.9 respectively. This further supports the argument that the instability in the region is connected to bad governance and lack of state presence.

According to Garrigue (2016), a state of fragility is prone to incessant violent conflicts. As shown in figure 1, such a state is characterized by fragmented governance space (secessionist movements, disputed borders and antagonistic central-local relations); unmanaged expectations (heightened needs, lack of access to information and limited dialogue opportunities); increasing competition and marginalization (discrimination, increase in youth unemployment and unregulated use of public resources); and insecurity and failing rule of law (ANSAs vs. security forces, organized crime and local conflict). The devastating effect of these is the loss of trust in the state, rupture of social cohesion, ineffective public authority and horizontal inequalities which results in the breakdown of social contract and violence as experienced in the region.

Figure 2: How fragility leads to violence. Source: Garrigue (2016)

Way forward: Local governance

As earlier argued in this paper, bad governance and lack of state presence are major factors necessitating the proliferation of ANSAs in the Sahel. Thus, it is simply instructive to proffer solutions that tackle the root cause of the menace through improved service delivery and enhanced governance practices. This paper thus recommends the promotion of local and rural governance that seeks to re-engineer the social contract between the community and the state at the grass-root level to strengthen the peacebuilding and recovery process. Local governance, according to Garrigue (2016) is defined as

> "combined set of institutions, systems and processes at the subnational level through which services, including security and welfare, are provided to citizens and through which the latter articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercise their rights and obligations" (p. 3).

According to Wijn, Hartmann and Valente (2019, p.2), local governance refers to "the way local decisions are made and implemented. This includes decisions regarding the prioritization, availability and delivery of local goods and services and ultimately – whether explicit or implicit – who will benefit." Local governance provides citizens (including youth and women) with the opportunity to engage with decision-makers and be involved in the decision-making process. It helps to strengthen state legitimacy through improved state-society relations. It is a process that encourages participation and inclusion which gives communities an avenue to resolve conflicts amicably, particularly using religious and traditional structures – which evolve and complement political institutions.

Local governance is an open, evolving and multidimensional process that involves all stakeholders such as the citizen, private sector, civil society, development community and donors, political parties and local public authority (Garrigue, 2016). That is, it is a process that emphasizes the interconnectedness and interaction of various institutions and actors in ensuring service delivery to the citizens who are in turn able to advocate for their rights. It is a framework for governance based on the inclusiveness of concerned parties in a polity. As shown in figure 1, the local public authority is saddled with the responsibility of conflict management, contributing to local security, service delivery, managing local development and enabling representation. Civil society, on the other hand, enables participation, mediating conflicts, defending rights, enabling social accountability and engaging in service delivery and local development. Meanwhile, the private sector plans and invests towards local development, create jobs and deliver services and contributes to generating public revenue. Amidst this multidimensional governance framework is the citizen who interfaces with each of these stakeholders whose functions are also intertwined. In this regard, the citizen is caught up in a web of local governance and is actively involved in the processes.

Figure 2: Concept of local governance. Source: Garrigue (2016)

The concept of local governance as expounded above is instrumental in addressing the menace of ANSAs as key players will become involved in nation-building and developmental process to create a society where, as Garrigue (2016, p.17) puts it, "all people, men and women, enjoy improved stability in their communities, urban or rural, can access better socioeconomic status and can overcome, individually, collectively and as a nation, the legacies of violence and conflict". More so, local governance can be used to create responsive institutions that ensure capacity building, improved service delivery, civic education, local finances and social accountability. It also seeks to engender inclusive politics (local parliamentary support, capacity building for local economic recovery, land use control and support to peaceful local elections) and resilient society that is characterized by access to justice, social cohesion, partnership building, central-local relations, local infrastructure for peace and community security. This is supported by Wijn, Hartmann and Valente (2019) that local governance can be used to include women, youth, traditional and religious leaders and minority groups in formal local governance and decision-making processes to strengthen their capacity and build cohesion. More so, infrastructure and development projects that connect the community and the state can be used to create a safe place and reduce conflict. Also, the setting up of vocational training centres can help to reduce exclusion, poverty and

unemployment and engender human capital development, job creation and improved capacity.

There is also the need to adopt digital technology in combating violent conflicts in Africa. Decrying the inadequacy of the conventional means, Falola (2021) aver that the use of surveillance systems, robots, and the strategic censorship of anti-state social media content is instrumental in addressing conflict and terrorism in Africa. Through the deployment of drones, the activities of violent groups can be monitored and disarmed before they degenerate into ANSAs. Artificial intelligence-powered robots can also be used to detect explosive devices used by ANSAs to destroy government facilities and other places. Also, by collaborating with technological and communication companies, states can design a system that tracks and monitors high-profile and security-risk individuals to foil their terrorist attempts. Cyberspace must be protected to discourage the rise of cyberterrorism in Africa while social media must be strategically filtered to discourage the spread of fake news that arouses tension and social unrest in the polity and to track conversations capable of promoting ANSA activities.

Final Thoughts

This paper examines the proliferation of ANSAs in the Sahel. The region is one of the most troubled areas in Africa due to the protracted conflict that has engulfed the various states in it. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria have been particularly affected by this security imbroglio. The effect has been devastating and is evidenced in the number of dead civilians, attackers and security forces. This suffices to reiterate that it has also led to widespread poverty, low development, famine, hunger and other socio-economic challenges. There has also been a surge in displacement and refugees while an extremely high number of people have been forced to flee their homes. The result of this is an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that threatens to deepen the fangs of state fragility and underdevelopment in the region. At the core of this security conundrum, and as shown in this paper, is an array of factors enwrapped in bad governance. ANSAs such as JNIM, ISGS, Boko Haram, ISWAP and militant Fulanis have taken advantage of the poor governance and vast ungoverned space in the region to establish an informal governance system that adopts a combination of violence, inducement, threat, complementary governance and protodiplomacy to protect or punish the population as well as control and maintain a support base, whilst encouraging a shadow economy characterized by kidnap for ransom abduction, counter attacks, illegal mining, illegal migration, banditry, terrorism and cattle rustling – among others. This heightened social unrest calls for a joint, yet eclectic approach from the concerned states in the region. Therefore, attention must be paid to local governance, capacity building, social inclusion, resilience, peace education, human capital development, improved economic conditions, technology and improved security.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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Post-Conflict Peace Construction in Somaliland

Analysing the Internal and External Dynamics

Abdalgani Aid Almi[1]

Abstract:

The Horn of African region has witnessed a prolonged conflict, and Somaliland has grabbed its share. This article explores and finds answers for the questions related with the blockage factors of post-conflict peace construction in Somaliland, analyses and assesses the internal and external dynamics of peace blockages, including but not limited to; constitutional gaps, individuals and interest groups, media and donor approaches. Moreover, other challenges to peace construction are examined, with the understanding that many times to reach a peace agreement or to conclude a peace dialogue is more important than its sustainability. Somaliland peace construction is a viable critique to the entire established peace building and state formation models, including; Liberal, Republican NEPAD's Model. The study is exploratory and intends to present and assess internal and external blockages of post-conflict peace construction. It made use of an in-depth review on the existing literature as a method of data collection under the qualitative approach to research. It is found by the study that a number of internal challenges are faced by Somaliland in its post-conflict peace construction which are; constitutional gaps, individual and group interests, as well as the media which could play a clear role towards peace building, but also can exacerbate the tensions and mistrust, external challenges include without limitation the lack by donors to invite the Somaliland government to participate in fundraising and sectoral allocation.

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Introduction

Somaliland is a *de facto* independent state in the Horn of Africa. It gained its independence on 26 June 1960 from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Soon after its independence, it united with Italian Somalia. Some claim the unification was backed by a sense of Pan-Somali nationalism among Somalis inhabiting the Horn of Africa, which were to form a Somali state, consisting of Ogaden and Reserve Area, Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, French Somaliland and Northern Frontier District of Kenya (NFD).

The idea of Pan-Somali nationalism long prospected to outdo the colonial division and unify Somalis under one state. However, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia's unification and formation of Somali Republic was troublesome to include any of the other three (French Somaliland, Ogaden and Reserve Area, and Northern Frontier District of Kenya) to the unification.

The Somali Republic existed for almost nine years, although the claim of British Somalilanders being marginalized prevailed, yet the Republic ruled its land peacefully and democratically. But in late 1969, a coup d'état overthrew the democratically elected government of Sharmarke, and years of dictatorship and brutality started in the Somali Republic. In the 1980s a flow of insurgents started to fight with the dictatorial regime and a decade long civil war erupted which finally led the Siad Barre rule to be ousted in 1991 (Hirsi, 2018).

The collapse of Barre's regime was the beginning of decades' long efforts of state formation in Somaliland. Traditional leaders with senior Somali National Movement officers laid the foundation stone for the creation of a new, independent and democratic state. With indigenized bottom-up peace formations, Somaliland has attained and existed peacefully since then. At the very first years the capacity and legitimacy of Somaliland over its territory were questioned. Yet, that was not a reason to hinder Somaliland's democratization process, locally managed elections were held, and rivals transferred power peacefully many times. However, from state and peace building to democratization, the international community turned their back to Somaliland in reference to acknowledging their commitment or recognizing it as a state even.

The International Community was not involved in peace construction and state formation of Somaliland from the very beginning, although their efforts and commitments towards capacity building and institutional de-centralization is undeniable, and widely acknowledged by the people of Somaliland. In addition, recent developments in the region and in the globe in general put Somaliland in a place to rustle with multiple issues that stood out on its way of post-conflict peace construction, and to strengthen institutional capacities. In this article, the internal and external dynamics of peace blockages will be critically analysed.

Background of Post-Conflict Peace Construction

The traditional appeasement diplomacy of Somalis to solve any conflict or even to prevent any dispute from escalating into conflict is called Xeer. "Xeer" is an unwritten code of conduct agreed upon by Somali clans in each area. It is a way in which elders and traditional leaders gather in regard to solving a dispute, or a conflict, and as a last resort, the judgment will be based on their knowledge on the traditionality of unwritten previous judgments. Furthermore, any "Xeer" will be dependent on the deliberation of elders who foregather to resolve a particular problem within a clan or between clans (Ali et al., 2007). The "Xeer" played a great role in post-conflict peace construction as it was the intermediate on which clans communicated through.

After the collapse of Barre's dictatorial regime, the Somali National Movement (SNM), with internal and external support, started a movement to form some sort of governance in the northern region of former Somalia (current Somaliland). A number of clans reside in this region, some of which had hostilities with SNM. Hence, in May 1991, the first inter-clan conference on state-construction was held in Burao. This conference is known now as the one in which all inhabited clans in the northern region of former Somalia gathered to declare the restoration of Somaliland's state sovereignty (Ali et al., 2007).

The second conference took place in May 1993 at Borama, which is known as the most important National Reconciliation Conference. According to Lewis, the delegates adopted the country's first National Charter (A framework agreement countersigned by the stakeholders, which gave rise to the Somaliland's longtime peace, political stability, social cohesion, and *de facto* statehood (APD&IPP, 2021). The period between Burao and Borama conferences was marked by a sense of jubilation, economic growth, and social stability.

Moreover, there were many other conferences held parallel with the national conferences of Burao, and Borama, but comparatively less important, since the matters the other conferences dealt with were on specific location and with a narrowed scope.   For instance, the Sheikh Conference of Tawfiiq in 1992, and Erigavo Grand Conference in 1993 dealt with issues of governance and inter-clan accommodation.

Post-Conflict Peace Frameworks and Models

Post-conflict is a term used to describe the period immediately after a conflict is over. According to Cunningham, a post-conflict is the transitional period between a past war and future peace, in which a number of challenges are introduced (Cunningham, 2017). Post-conflict is conceptualized as the intricate, holistic, and

multifaceted method comprising of efforts to improve – at the same time – the security for the sake of the rule of law, governance and rehabilitation of the economy and development (Tzifakis, n.d).

The end of Cold War brought an increase of intrastate conflicts, Smith categorized 100 out of 118 vicious conflicts around the globe between 1990 and1999 as intrastate conflicts (Almi&BinWasi, 2013). Hence, post-conflict peace construction has been on the United Nations agenda, as well as the scholars in the years following the end of the Cold War (Filipov, 2006). For Elizabeth, the concept of peacebuilding is being approached either inductively or deductively; "Deductive" delineates peace building as tools and approaches available to the international communities, whilst "Inductive" relates to the conflict itself, its nature, depth of social support and intensity (Cousens&Cater, 2001). Thus, a logic and more realistic framework will be interweaving these two dimensions as the most preferable model for a post-conflict peace construction.

The liberal peace model emerged at the end of the 1980s. It is advancing democratization, market-based economic reforms and a variety of other organizations linked with modern states as a driving force for peace (Newman et al., 2009). The main argumentation of this model is that promotion of democracy and market-oriented economy in post-conflict states will furnish the way for lasting and sustainable peace. However, there is a question as to whether the liberal peace building model has been successful in addressing the challenges faced by post-conflict societies. According to Kurtenbach, Central American post-conflict societies do not provide proof for self-enforcing cycle of democracy and peace as predicted by liberal peace-builders, but instead pose negative outcomes of weak governance, development and social exclusion. While the wider goal of liberal peace building is to convert war-shattered nations into liberal market states, peace-construction/building strategies lack the ability to build effective institutions before liberalizing any market. Somaliland's peace construction is a viable critique to liberal peace building, as well as its beyond state-building; the dominant narrative in Somaliland is that of the absence of external actors who are at the centre of the liberal peace-construction critiques (Nijeri, 2019).

The republican peace building can be a viable alternative to the Liberal post-conflict peace model. According to Barnett (2006) republican peace building asserts the importance of institutional mechanisms of representation, constitutionalism and deliberative processes to encourage groups to express their views. Liberal and republican models have many commonalities, such as prevalence of liberty, constitution, election and representation. Moreover, the republican model relies on the core doctrine of deliberation *(this process furnishes the way for a public engagement, as it encourages individual units to express their ideas and be tolerant to the opposing ideas)*. For republicans, period to the conflicts of unelected

representations, such as transitional governments are supported until holding an election is possible. Yet, this kind of representation must satisfy three key standards; inclusivity *(combining different groups and views)*, and publicity *(stating out the reason behind any decisions and their intentions)*, and constitutionalism *(this provides a justifiable power-sharing and limitation of authority to restrict exercising arbitrary power)*. However, it is regarded that republican post-conflict peace building is way better than the liberal post-conflict model'. This is because republicans present a viable solution to the challenges faced by post-conflict state building, which include accepting indigenous circumstances to encouraging local accountability and promoting gradual approach to peace building.

Despite criticizing the liberal peace model, a successful alternative model is yet to emerge. There are many types of centric peace-construction/building between the continuum of typical liberal and illiberal peace construction. In illustration, Jihad Al-Bina was adopted by Hezbollah's reconstruction wing aiming to reconstruct the nation after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. The reconstruction efforts of Jihad Al-Bina and the Gulf States do not constitute a full-flagged alternative approach to liberal peace building, yet it reveals some limitations (MacGinty, 2007). A key divergence is that Gulf States and Jihad Al-Bina relied on unconditional cash flows to the needy and affected families. This was regarded to be beneficial as it was immediate and unencumbered by bureaucracy (Goodhand&Walton, 2009).

According to Eaton, states have to utilize what power they have to name and shame war economy profiteers for the purpose of weakening their local legitimacy, which is critical to their survival (Eaton, 2018). In the African continent, another approach has emerged to promote peace-- the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have distinguished taking apart exploitative war economies as a priority for African peace construction. To localize the model of post-conflict peace construction, NEPAD articulated the "African post-conflict peace construction framework". For NEPAD, post-conflict reconstruction phases are three, namely; the emergence phase(this stage starts immediately after the end of hostile confrontations, and encompasses of two stage, namely; setting up a safe and secure environment and facilitating an emergency response to the dire consequences of the conflict); the transition phase (this stage derives its name from an appointed and interim government, which is a period that focuses on developing a legitimate and durable internal capacity), and lastly, the development phase(this period is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and civil organizations with a set of programs and projects intended to foster reconciliation and socio-economic developments). According to this articulation, externally driven post-conflict reconstruction processes lack sufficient local ownership and participation in them are unsustainable (NEPAD, 2005). Furthermore, the

framework provides a common conceptual frame of assessing, planning, coordinating and monitoring post-conflict reconstruction systems across Africa.

In conclusion, Somaliland peace building is not only a viable critique to the liberal peace building and its beyond state formation, but it is a critique to the entire established peace building and state formation processes. Somaliland is the prime example to present that externally driven peace processes, whether it is liberal, republican, or even NEPAD processes, are not the sole typical way to generate social order-. Somaliland has become an example of indigenous and bottom-up form of peace construction and state formation.

Internal Dynamics

Somaliland's "bottom up" approach of peace construction is completely indigenous without external interventions. Thus, the bottom-up indigenous peace construction that emerged in Somaliland consisted of fusion of local institutions, practices, values and social hierarchies (Njeri, 2019). Those fusions are both contributors of peace construction and sometimes blockages to peace sustainability. Somaliland indigenous approach encompasses three complimentary institutions, namely; the president(executive), lower house of parliament and upper house which consist of traditional clan elders called "Guurti", -the house of elders which consists of 82 members selected by clan representatives. The main principle of the Guurti is its inclusivity, in that all clans are included without-considering their number or social status. However, this institution's major statutory mandate is to facilitate mediation and resolve disputes (Gatimu, 2014). According to Fadal, the early role of the Guurti as peace makers is well recognized by Somalilanders as well as outsiders, yet since it has become a legislative body, it is argued that it has become a partisan political institution, which is accused of aligning with the already powerful executive to make it more powerful against the already weaker branches of the government; the lower parliament house, and the Judiciary (Fadal, 2012). Claire Elder and Cedric Barnes state that the Upper House of Elders worries Somaliland's international partners and risks causing a dangerous political and clan polarisation by announcing a two year extension – without consultation with the National Electoral Commission (NEC), government or political parties– for the Silanyo's government term, including a further postponement of the presidential and parliamentary elections (Barnes&Elder, 2015). Although election postponement was more an exception than a rule, yet it was unconstitutional, and acts of this nature trigger the re-occurrence of a conflict. New constitutions have always followed conflicts (Ladley, 2011), and any unconstitutional act may cause new forms of conflict.

Interest groups or pressure groups are any association of individuals or organizations, commonly organized on the bases of one or more shared concerns. Some sort of cooperation between interest groups is needed in the public interest (Hettlage, 1984). It could be a coin of two sides; if interest groups are cooperative, only then would it be a positive initiative, for many times when there are inequalities, specifically economic inequalities, interest groups tend to resort to violence rather than seeking to resolve differences through political negotiation (Stewart, 2002). Although there are zero or very few interest group conflicts in Somaliland history due to the multi-party system, yet in every election there is a great danger of some groups not accepting the outcome.

Governments and social stability are preserved to be a result of a social contract; that is, people will accept state authority so long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable conditions (Stewart, 2002). According to Rusten (2022), political legitimacy of Somaliland comes from contributing to peace Thus, the foundation of the mutual consent is to sustain the peaceful coexistence and any act of the government, an individual or a group perceived by others as compromising the mutual consent could lead to conflict. Moreover, in many peace agreements just to conclude a peace agreement was more important than its implementation. Therefore, generating a sense of mutual trust and implementable agreements, should be a central goal of a peace agreement.

According to Höhne (2008), although some may doubt the importance of media in post-conflict peace construction, the role media plays in post-conflict is clear. The wider they (media) present to the public the diverse viewpoints, the greater the opportunity for competing parties to realize what they have in common. However, local media could exacerbate the tension and mistrust of the public, which at the end could cause a violent conflict. Höhne argued that newspapers printed in the capital city of Hargeisa strongly contributed to the establishment of a democratic political system, yet some propagandist reports on the conflicts in the Far East have the potential to contribute to serious political tensions and escalation of violent conflicts.

External Dynamics

It's important to acknowledge the resilience of Somaliland people who initiated and supported various peace constructions, without any external interventions. Post-conflict peace construction coincided with Somaliland's state formation process. This has legitimized the dire need for relief aid and it was high time the external actors aligned themselves to these needs. According to Njeri, Somaliland's first ten years was community driven, but since then it has been donor driven, with

donors such as the DFID, Danida, EU, with a number of other organizations, engaging with Somaliland to provide institutional capacity building. Yet direct funding cannot be transferred to Somaliland due to non-political recognition and can only be possible through partnership with the UN Development Program (Njeri, 2019).

Although Somaliland's tireless efforts to gain international recognition, it has not yet been fully successful, this could be regarded as positive and negative trends at the same time, because otherwise there could be direct cash follow which in some point could cause a conflict of interest, since there is no strong central government with powerful forces to keep the rule and deter any conflict of interest due direct cash follows, donors and agencies are increasingly aware of the potential of Aid to do harm, on the other hand (Goodhand&Atkinson, 2001). Moreover, it could be regarded as negative because even currently the Somaliland government is unable to deal with international donors.

Although the importance of aid for peace-construction is clear for global development, yet troubling critiques have been made about its overall impact and effectiveness (Goodhand&Atkinson, 2001). According to one report, Somaliland views aid as unpredictable and donor-driven, which does little for a Somaliland to be able to undertake its own post-conflict development agenda. Somaliland government mentioned the lack by donors to invite them to participate in fundraising, and sectoral allocation of funds, which undermines Somaliland's efforts (Renders, 2012), such as; allocating sufficient budget for conflict prevention mechanisms and enhancing capacity for conflict resolution-related institutions.

Conclusion

International donors and external mediators were not involved in the peace construction of Somaliland, at least from the foundation, yet their efforts and commitments towards institutional capacity building are undeniable and widely acknowledged by the people of Somaliland and their government. However, the effectiveness of donor-led fund allocation sabotages Somaliland's efforts of peace construction and institutional capacity building.

Somaliland peace building is not only a viable critique to the liberal peace building and its beyond state formation, but it is a critique to the entire established peace building and state formation processes. Somaliland is the prime example to present that externally driven peace processes, whether it is liberal, republican or even NEPAD processes are not the sole typical way to generate social order. Somaliland has become a prime example of deliberate discussions (bottom-up approach) which as a result outlawed the war without international engagement.

Somaliland could be the prime example to present a viable critique to most of the known peace-construction models such as the Liberal, Republican or even the NEPAD process of peace building. Yet, it is facing a number of internal challenges in its post-conflict peace constriction, which are – but not limited to – constitutional gaps, individual and group interests, as well as the media which could play a clear role, but also could exacerbate the tension and mistrust of the public. Moreover, external dynamics of post-conflict peace construction in Somaliland include without limitation the lack by donors to invite the Somaliland government to participate in fundraising and sectoral allocation. Thus, its efforts for post-conflict peace construction could be undermined.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Linking Theory to Practice

The Potency of the "New Wars" Thesis in Better Understanding Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Supporting Peace Operations and Reshaping Post-conflict Resolution – A Liberian Case Study[1]

Richárd Schneider[2]

Abstract:

Before the 1990s, the practice of post-conflict management mainly focused on military and law-enforcement priorities. Since then, a development-oriented approach has evolved by making a greater sense of the better addressing of the root causes and characteristics of conflicts, as well as the needs and motivations of actors and individuals. In the same vein, critical approaches to the traditionally „minimalist" approach suggested a relatively new, community-based practice that may help to better understand the complex political, psychological and economic situation in local terms to enhance the efficiency of reintegration of former combatants and make them socially and politically represented after conflicts end.

At the same time, according to Mary Kaldor's theory, we have witnessed meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts which pose vital challenges to the Westphalian international system as they reshape the concept of sovereignty and question the state monopoly on violence. Proponents of the "new war" thesis argue that such qualitative changes in wars also necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches. In Kaldor's view, as a consequence of the rapid globalisation during the 1990s and the never-ending erosion of state sovereignty a fundamentally new theoretical framework is needed in the course of peace operations which is entirely different from the former so-called „liberal peace". Thus, the new characteristics of wars pointed out by Kaldor may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be planned and implemented in post-conflict settlements.

In this analysis the question is how the failure of traditional disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and the prospective new generation of them reflect to „new wars" theories, particularly to Kaldor's thesis, so what connections they may have, if any. The author makes this search through a Liberian case study. The focal points of the analysis include: actors (1); motivations and goals (2); brutality and the victimisation of the civilians (3); and economic and financial characteristics (4).

Keywords:

DDR; demobilisation; disarmament; Kaldor; Liberia; „new wars"; peacebuilding; reintegration.

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Introduction

As a fundamental element of peacebuilding efforts and peace operations in general[3] (Kilroy, 2008; Verkoren et al., 2010), DDR programmes, focusing on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, have gone through an evolution since the 1990s (Seethaler, 2016).[4] At the same time, according to some scholars, the number of classical interstate wars has decreased while wars waged by non-state actors have become more typical (Kaldor, 2012) as a consequence of the significant increase in the number of armed non-state actors. So-called „new wars" protagonists argue that some meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts pose vital challenges to the modern state system developed in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. In this regard, according to Kaldor, such changes also necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches (Kaldor, 2019, p.24).

Before the 1990s, in an era determined by the superpowers' antagonism, the practice of peacebuilding operations mainly focused on a kind of „minimalist" (Muggah, 2009) or „first generation" (Kenkel, 2013) approach that saw post-conflict recovery through a military and law-enforcement lens, when the aim was usually just to overthrow or support certain reigning elites (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005). However, critical approaches to the traditional[5] approach suggested a relatively new, community-based practice that may help to better understand the complex political, psychological and economic situation in local terms to enhance the efficiency of reintegration of former combatants and make them socially and politically represented after conflicts end.

After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially since the beginning of the new millennium, when both the globalisation of world politics and technological revolution intensified, the humanitarian crises of the 1990s oriented academic research in Germany, Great Britain and the United States (Mello, 2010) to describe the seemingly new character of war after the bipolar international system and to examine whether such a novelty necessitates the revision of former military and war-related strategies. As a consequence, a new „maximalist" approach has evolved (Muggah, 2009; United Nations Department on Peacekeeping Operations – UN DPO, 2010) – with a greater emphasis e.g. on development

[3] In 2000, the so called Brahimi Report prepared by a special committee of the United Nations differentiated three categories of peace operations: those for prevention and peacemaking; for peacekeeping; and for peacemaking (United Nations General Assembly, 2000).
[4] With regard to that kind of evolution, there are different methods in the literature that are willing to make clear distinction between the generations of peace operations and DDR programmes, e.g.: Kenkel, 2013; Lamb, 2008. According to Muggah and Baaré (2009 cited Söderstrom, 2013), a kind of American-British-Western-European-led „first generation" analytical style, operating with qualitative methods and case-specific focus, was typical until the mid-2000s. He argues that at that time, economic indicators and the positioning of DDR programmes in peace missions were at the focal points of any analysis while former combatants were seemed to be rational individuals led by self-interest and economic benefits (*homo oeconomicus*). Then Muggah (2010, p.11) mentions statistical, empirical and comparative evaluations and analyses as „second generation" practices that made bi- and multilateral international development organisations' and think tanks' committed to and interested in complex peacebuilding programmes with all their cultural and local characteristics.
[5] „Traditional" refers to that kind of „minimalist' approach – focusing more on military and law-enforcement aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction and less on the reintegration of ex-combatants – just to make them differentiated from „second generation" or community-based practices.

aspects – in order to better address and understand the root causes and characteristics of conflicts. Within the frame of such „second generation" peace operations (Kenkel, 2013), DDR programmes became typical and tried to accomplish their mandate even if armed struggles in all their hybrid forms (Munive and Stepputat, 2015) have not ceased yet.

At the same time, having an extensive literature, „new wars" theories argue that qualitative changes in wars after the end of the bipolar world showed that both a better understanding of the root causes and motivations of armed conflicts and belligerents, and a strengthened commitment to the reintegration of ex-combatants are needed to find long-term resolutions for conflicts. Such 'new wars' theories have the axiom that there are wars which can be differentiated from earlier wars. In the same vein, according to Mary Kaldor (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014), we have witnessed meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts and such changes pose vital challenges to the Westphalian international system as they reshape the concept of sovereignty and question the state monopoly on violence. Theorists of the so-called „new wars" argue that those qualitative changes in wars also necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches. In this sense, the new characteristics of wars pointed out by Kaldor may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be planned and implemented in post-conflict settlements (Kaldor, 2019; Kilroy, 2008; Verkoren et al., 2010). In her view, a fundamentally new theoretical framework is needed in the course of peace operations which is entirely different from the former, traditional, so called „liberal peace", as a consequence of the rapid globalisation during the 1990s and the never-ending erosion of state sovereignty.

Kaldor's „new wars" argument, which is mostly based on qualitative rather than quantitative data (Kaldor, 2013), is widely criticised, questioning the raison d'etre of any differentiation between wars. Regardless the validity of any differentiation and criticism there is a consensus in the literature that „new wars" theories can add useful insights into how „contemporary" wars are being waged. Therefore, they may contribute to better address how peacebuilding efforts could be more effectively planned and implemented (Kaldor, 2019).

If we accept the idea that wars have new characteristics and they can be fundamentally distinguished from their earlier forms, the emerging question concerns the role, the nature and the novelty of post-conflict peace operations and peacebuilding programmes in managing post-conflict reconstruction, so whether they can take on the challenges „new wars" pose. In this regard, according to the aforementioned thoughts, critical views to traditional practices propose a relatively new, community-based approach by making a greater sense of local, cultural components and reintegration programmes during peace operations. Regarding such a conceptual change, the next question is whether programmes focusing more on local communities and the recommendations made by the critical literature on traditional DDR programmes in general could grasp the real causes and motivations of conflicts and overcome the menacing challenges of „new wars".

In this paper the author is willing to find out how the so-called failure of traditional programmes in finding long-standing resolution for conflicts and the prospective new generation of DDR reflect to and intertwine with the discourse developed by „new wars" proponents, particularly Mary Kaldor, so what connections they may have, if any. The author makes this search through a case study, namely the Liberian wars[6] (1989-1993; 1997-2003) and the second DDR programme (2003-2009). The focal points of the analysis include: the actors (1); their motivations and goals (2); the brutality and the victimisation of civilians (3); and the economic and financial characteristics (4).

General Overview of DDR

Beyond the international framework of arms control regulations, ad hoc arms embargoes, general or conditional amnesty promises and comprehensive reforms of the security sector, since the 1990s DDR programmes[7] focusing on the disarmament of belligerents and armed groups as well as the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants have become an essential and unique part of peace operations and post-conflict resolution in general (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005). The first DDR programme – authorised by the United Nations Security Council and designed by its relevant organs – took place in Namibia between 1989 and 1990, and since then the majority of DDR programmes in conflict-torn regions were also carried out with the support of that organisation (Chounet-Cambas, 2018) that demonstrate the UN's prominent role in implementing such peacebuilding missions.[8]

In 2006, based on the authorisation of the Swedish government, a DDR-related Report was issued by the Stockholm Initiative (Ministry for Foreign Affairs – MFA, 2006). Besides addressing the complexity of peace missions and referring to the ever-growing role of the communities in building capacities for long-term stability, it outlined the connection between DDR and security sector reform (SSR) on the one hand, and that between DDR and transitional justice on the other (Muggah, 2010). While the Initiative was originally intended to revise former DDR programmes, the document was rather to strengthen former practices committed

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[6] The conceptual method to clarify the differentiation between wars, armed conflicts, civil wars etc. corresponds to that used by Correlates of War Project that Kaldor (2013) mentioned in her work and that other scholars also referred to. According to that, within the frame of a state-based conflict, which is „a contested incompatibility over government and/or territory, where at least one party is a state, and the use of armed force results in at least 25 battle related deaths within a calendar year" (Palik et al., 2020, p.5), war is a „state-based conflict that reaches at least 1,000 battle-related death in a specific calendar year" (2020, p.8). In the same vein, a non-state conflict refers to „the use of armed force between organised groups, none of which is the government of a state, resulting at least 25 annual battle-related deaths" (2020, p.5). In this paper the author concentrates on the qualitative changes of conflicts so for understanding purposes the author is not willing to use such strict methodological criteria, thus definitions are interchangeable throughout this analysis. According to Kaldor (2009) conceptual clarifications are problematic as contemporary wars combine the oppression of civil society with political discrepancies, criminal activities for economic benefits and human rights violations. She defines war as „an active violence that is framed in political terms" (2014) or „a violent enterprise[…], an act of violence involving two or more organised groups framed in political terms " (Kaldor, 2013, p.3;13). Having the aforementioned conceptual notes, in this paper the author uses the word „war" for the Liberian armed conflicts during the 1990s.

[7] In this paper, DDR programmes refer to the ones implemented by external support. In this regard, Appendix 1 demonstrates wars and related DDR programmes between 1979 and 2006.

[8] For example, Doyle and Sambanis (2000 cited Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010) found positive effects UN peacekeeping forces' presence in post-conflict situations have on the duration of peace.

for military and political issues (Lamb, 2008). According to Söderstrom (2013), the authors of the Report perceived the political integration of former combatants – which was a part of their broader integration – as a natural and automatic concomitant and consequence of their general economic and social integration, so they did not even take care of ex-combatants' political representation.

Besides the mobilisation of the European Union for the support to DDR (2006), due to the efforts made by the United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (UN IAWG) the so-called Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) concretising the preconditions and requirements of DDRs for effective implementation has also been created (UN IAWG, 2006). Among others, the purpose of this inter-institutional organisation was to reflect to the challenges posed by the incoherence of former DDR practices in the field of organisational mechanisms (Lamb, 2008). In the same vein, the document sought to assist the UN's work on demobilisation and reintegration while forming new strategies and politics (United Nations General Assembly – UN GA, 2006). Pointed out in its mandate, IAWG provided a comprehensive set of policies for DDR practitioners (Muggah, 2009), proposed new approaches regarding human resource and financial management, heralded the development of economic and social reintegration of former combatants, while it also called for a better understanding of the needs (Kilroy, 2010) of minorities, women, children, the poor and the people with disabilities as groups identified as particularly vulnerable to armed conflicts.[9]

After the two-year long consultation in the IDDRS the UN admitted both the complexity and the importance of the political aspects of DDR programmes, and laid down five fundamental principles regarding UN-led DDR programmes, according to which programmes have to be: people-centred(1); flexible, accountable and transparent(2); nationally owned(3); integrated(4); and well-planned(5) (Lamb, 2008). The original aim of DDR[10] has been finally clarified: to create the capacities and security guarantees for long-term peace on the one hand, and strengthen as well as promote social cohesion, societal development and peaceful coexistence by integrating former combatants into the society on the other. In this vein, as a fundamental element of post-conflict resolution and peace operations in general (Kilroy, 2008; UN GA, 2006; Verkoren et al., 2010) DDR – having a kind of voluntary nature – strives for the prevention of war recurrence by collecting, registering, storing, transporting and disposing weapons; demobilising combatants and taking them out of former hierarchical chains of command; integrating them into civilian life; strengthening social cohesion; and promoting social trust and reconciliation (United Nations Development Programme – UNDP, 2012).

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[9] In this regard, e.g. Muggah (2009) emphasised how important the arrangement of children's status is and how special their needs are they may have during and after conflicts.
[10] Even though we have examples and practices from Asia and Latin-America, the majority of DDR programmes have been developed and implemented in Africa (Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 2010).

Notwithstanding the aforementioned development in the conceptual field of DDR, it seems like former programmes' practical effectivity is still being uncertain as they generally disregarded the complexity of post-conflict settlements and – by underestimating reintegration phases – they overemphasised the political and security-related issues. Based upon such doubts, critical voices questioned the *raison d'etre* of DDR programmes as effective means for building peace, and called for a new approach.

Critical Literature on DDR

On the one hand, critical approaches to DDR pointed out the conceptual deficiencies connected to the earlier peace operations' theoretical framework and listed the challenges the so-called concept of „liberal peace" posed to programme coordinators and developers as they were fundamentally characterised with and based solely on western concepts such as democracy, free market economy and human rights (Cunliffe, 2012; Danesh and Danesh, 2002; Danesh, 2006; Goodhand and Walton, 2009; Krause and Jütersonke, 2005; Loode, 2011; Paris, 2002; Richmond, 2006; Söderstrom, 2013; Verkoren et al., 2010). On the other hand, the literature that is criticising DDR programmes for their practical deficiencies (Bowd and Özerdem, 2013; Colletta and Muggah, 2009; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008; McQuinn, 2016; Muggah, 2005; Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 2010; Munive and Stepputat, 2015; Özerdem, 2012; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Seethaler, 2016; Sprenkels, 2014; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011) called for a revision and emphasised: the wrongly executed evaluation methods based on the number of weapons collected from ex-combatants and also on criminal- and economic-related indicators; the severe consequences of neglecting and underestimating reintegration processes as prerequisites of long-term peace and stability; and the lack of a holistic approach integrating cultural, social, religious and psychological components due to short-term economic and political priorities (e.g.: Colletta, 2012; Kilroy, 2008). Muggah (2005) criticises former DDR practices for: sacrificing reintegration programmes for short-term purposes; developing improperly considered strategies with financial shortfalls; having unfounded assumptions about the positive effects that collecting weapons might have on security. However, he also emphasises the basic necessity for disposing and destroying arms and munitions as a must to prevent their recirculation and stop illegal arms trafficking. In the same vein, he calls for the better understanding of the belligerents' motivations and goals, while he called on to harmonise short-, mid- and long-term interests.

A typical critique of DDR programmes is that they used to disregard context-specific features of different armed conflicts while they neither spared the time to comprehend their organisational characteristics nor their national and international interferences. They instead tended to follow a one-size-fits-all-approach, which is problematic, because context specifications matter not only in regional terms, but within the same country (Arnould, 2021). By prioritising only financial and economic components (Bowd and Özerdem, 2013) may lead

to the deceiving perception that DDR programmes' participants are members of a homogeneous group in which they are treated as individuals always react rationally for financial incentives (Muggah, 2009; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011), thus DDR perceived to be only a technical asset that is aiming to guarantee only material goods and adapt to the interests of donors and those of the economic and political elites (Muggah, 2010; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011). But, what is quite obvious now is that programmes focusing too much on such economic aspects and neglecting complex political, security-related, social and psychological issues – just like the potential of former hierarchical ties (Bøås and Bjørkhaug, 2010; Colletta, 2012; McQuinn, 2016; Munive és Stepputat, 2015; Söderberg Kovacs, 2007; Stankovic and Torjesen, 2011) or the importance of personal reconciliation (Arnould, 2021) – generally entails further escalation of social conflicts and a radicalisation of the conflicting parties (Kraus et al., 2005).

In summary, the critical literature on DDR programmes proposed a new approach and called for developing new strategies that are able to address the root causes of different conflicts and the motivations of the armed actors. Herein the literature suggests to develop a community-based framework that now highlights the importance of the communities in building capacities for long-term peace. Critics emphasise the need for mapping the complex psychological state of former combatants and to support their reintegration and political representation in post-conflict settlements. In addition, they proposed reforms for measuring the efficiency of DDR programmes (Bowd and Özerdem, 2013; Colletta and Muggah, 2009; Muggah, 2009; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Seethaler, 2016; Söderstrom, 2013). The emergency of the so-called second generation or community-based views was an inevitable response for the increased awareness of strengthening and reforming DDR practice.

Community-based DDR Programmes

In 2005, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan admitted (UN GA, 2005, p.31) the institutional defect that seemingly hindered the implementation of any efficient peace mission. He suggested a reform by reshaping the institutional framework that have been traditionally specialised for the resolution of interstate conflicts, in order to empower UN organs to react to the challenges of the 21st century appropriately (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005). This reform, on the one hand, also refers to the revision of the traditional concept of peace operations i.e. „focusing on rights rather than on needs"[11] (Arnould, 2021, p.7), and, on the other, to the so called „liberal peace" that used to disregard the importance of domestic political processes and substate actors in creating the capacities for peace (Goodhand and Walton, 2009) and the importance of context-specific analysis (MacGinty, 2011 cited Sabaratnam, 2013). Having such processes revised, this reform then implied to turn away from

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[11] Arnould (2021) in her work discusses how decentralised transitional justice – as a part of a broader post-conflict peacebuilding process – could be carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

state-centric approaches while the role of local communities and organisations have become overvalued and the conception of sovereignty has been redefined.

In 2006, the UN General Assembly stressed the importance of an „integrated approach" that is to reflect to the ever-changing menaces and challenges in the new century (UN GA, 2006). According to the Assembly, DDR programmes' goals concerning the reintegration phase would be successful only if the difference between the target groups were detected by programme developers and if they were willing to concentrate on the recognition of the specified and different needs of men, women, children, mentally and/or physically disabled people who were associated with armed groups.[12] So, in addition to highlighting the role the local communities might have in post-conflict situations, so called „integrated missions" were born to reveal the *casus belli* of different armed conflicts in political, economic and social terms and they now include humanitarian purposes like mapping and satisfying the special needs of different, sometimes highly vulnerable layers of society (UN GA, 2006). This, however, also necessitates to support women and children associated with armed groups to participate in DDR programmes and to let the civil society be incorporated into planning and decision-making processes (Lamb, 2008; UN DPO, 2010). It is not a coincidence that according to the United Nations' Practice Note on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants DDR, programmes are "means" used for supporting communities throughout the reintegration phase (UNDP, 2012, p.37).

In 2010, the UN admitted the legitimacy of the criticism regarding the insufficiency of DDR programmes and the necessity to revise them (UN DPO, 2010). According to the document, the strategical priorities of second generation programmes[13] are not new in comparison with former practices. However, it made a clear distinction based on the programmes' target groups. While armed combatants were in the centre during first generation programmes, the new approach was to deal with the broader community. In this sense, such a new conceptual framework necessarily revealed the need for a community-led approach reiterated by the critics of former, state-centred practices.

Even if community-based approaches put a greater emphasis on the reintegration phase compared to the disarmament and demobilisation processes (Verkoren et al., 2010), their practical efficacy is still uncertain. Notwithstanding the fact that locally focused strategies may exclude certain groups from the participation (UNDP, 2012, p.55), just like happened during the Liberian DDR (McMullin, 2020), they can amplify and strengthen the practice of traditional DDR programmes (Muggah, 2010; Verkoren et al., 2010) and then „the point of departure has

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[12] As McMullin states: „Whilst the IDDRS refer more generally to 'specialized needs' of disabled ex-combatants, in practice DDR provision [in Liberia] has not consulted with disabled ex-combatants about specialized needs[…]". He argues that disabled excombatants were „screened, separated, and removed from able-bodied colleagues and go through a separate process" that reinforced stigma. Moreover he claims that any „segregated forms of assistance[…]violate the core principles of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD), which are non-discrimination, inclusion, participation, and accessibility" (2020:16).
[13] Which is namely: supporting peace processes and building capacities for secure conflict resolution and reconciliation while managing political struggles.

to be the impact that violence and human rights violations have had on victims and communities and the needs that ensue from this" (Arnould, 2021, p.7).

A General Overview of Mary Kaldor's Theory and the 'New Wars' Debate

After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union when the globalisation of world politics and technological revolution intensified, the humanitarian crises[14] of the 1990s oriented academic research in Germany, Great Britain and the United States (Mello, 2010) to describe the new character of war after the bipolar international system and whether such a novelty necessitates the revision of former military and war-related strategies and conceptual frames. However, since then, it is still much less clear what such a revision or reform actually means.

The so-called „new wars" theories include different disciplines like political theory, history, international studies, political economy, military strategy (Mello, 2010), but what they all have in common is the axiom that there are wars which can be differentiated from the earlier ones on the grounds of specified characteristics.[15]

Kaldor argues (2019) that the new form of wars may be, or even should be differentiated from their earlier forms which used to be waged in an era when wars went hand in hand with the dependency on modern industry, mass production, mass media and fossil fuels. As one of the most prominent proponents (Shaw, 20000) and the first founder of „new wars" theories, Mary Kaldor gave a comprehensive and widespread, but highly criticised thesis of „new wars" that gives the researchers the opportunity to use that as a conceptual framework for their analysis. This paper is not to verify or reject any conclusions the theorists of „new wars" have drawn, but to clarify the arguments Kaldor used and the criticism she received where that was needed. This general overview of Kaldor's theory and the „new wars" debate helps to draw valid and reliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of DDR strategies in Liberia.

According to Mary Kaldor's (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2019) theory, „new wars"[16] have become typical during the 1990s and they can be contrasted with „old wars" in terms of actors, goals, methods, effects on civilian population and their economic characteristics. In her view, as a consequence of the rapid globalisation during the 1990s and the incessant erosion of state sovereignty, a fundamentally new theoretical framework is needed in the course of peace operations which is entirely different from the former so-called „liberal peace" (Shaw, 2000) inappropriate to explain the social, political and economic characteristics

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[14] For example the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the first Gulf War in 1991, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 or the Yugoslav Wars throughout the decade were typical cases of humanitarian catastrophes, but civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are also among them, just to mention a few.

[15] In this regard, according to Newman (2004) such a differentiation can be based on the root causes of war(1); the nature and number of belligerents(2); their goals and motivations(3); the spatial characteristics of wars(4); the means by which wars are being waged(5); and the effects that violence has on the civilian population(6).

[16] Newman (2004) gives some examples which mostly meet the requirements of the so called „new wars". Among them he mentions: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Chechnya, Somalia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Liberia, Congo (supposedly the Democratic Republic of Congo – the author's note), Angola.

of wars. She also argues that due to the intensification of globalisation and the erosion of the Westphalian modern state, the qualitative changes in wars showed that both a better understanding of the root causes and motivations of armed conflicts and belligerents and a strengthened commitment to the reintegration of ex-combatants are needed to find long-term resolutions for conflicts. Kaldor's theory gives a critique of classical peace operations on the one hand, and the „liberal peace" as a conceptual basis of such practices on the other that actually visions representative democracy and free market economy as a required end of peace processes. In this sense, her thoughts may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be planned and implemented in post-conflict settlements (Kilroy, 2008; Verkoren et al., 2010).

Whereas the globalisation intensifies economic interdependence and multilateralism that led to the erosion of state power caused by supra-national phenomena like international organisations and international law, in some cases subnational entities tend to question state sovereignty through both legal and illegal activities (Kaldor, 2013; Newman, 2004). According to Kaldor, „old wars" refer to the conflicts that were to strengthen state authority and power by waging wars. This method was typical from the late 18th to the mid-20th century (Kaldor, 2013). Such wars were characterised by clear frontlines (Mello, 2010) and direct fights between uniformed state armies through which the state monopoly on violence was established, and private armed activities were forced to stop (Kaldor, 2005).

In addition, in the age of „old wars" states guaranteed the wherewithal for their war-related activities by: restrictive financial measures (e.g. tax increases); the centralisation of the national economy; taking out loans, made possible by the state-sponsored financial and banking system. In „new wars" theories „old wars" were interpreted as ideological or geopolitical ones, where the former means the completion of a certain programme aiming to spread, establish or preserve an ideology, while the latter refers to conquering or defending geographically advantageous territories.[17] In certain terms, these ideological and geopolitical considerations legitimated and justified wars and state armies that also meant a reciprocal acceptance and recognition between the belligerents (Mello, 2010). Such wars generally ended with peace negotiations or the victory of any of the conflicting parties which was actually the basis on which classical peace operations have been built (Kaldor, 2013).

The so called „new wars" are just the opposite. In this regard, the impacts of an ever-intensifying globalisation have reshaped the concept of state sovereignty, questioned the state monopoly on violence and eroded public services. According to Newman (2004), as a consequence of the national economies' collapse in weak and fragile states, illegal trade and criminal activities have enabled armed groups to evolve and wars waged for natural resources became common.

Kaldor (2013) listed four typical characteristics the differentiation between „new" and „old" wars might be based on. A short, but concise review of these characteristics is necessary

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[17] However, one does not exclude the other (the author's note).

at this point, as in the next chapter, the analysis of the Liberian wars and experiences will rest on them. Firstly, according to Kaldor, in addition to the states, the number of armed non-state actors have increased significantly. In this regard, private security providers, private armies comprised of mercenaries and child soldiers, armed militias connected to political parties, organised crime groups, insurgent and separatist movements have become typical. These actors do not treat other belligerents as legitimate enemies, thus a kind of illegitimate reciprocity becomes a decisive feature of „new wars" (Mello, 2010). In this sense, the significance of horizontal structures in wars have increased at the expense of verticals (Briscoe, 2015; Kaldor, 2009). Decentralisation and localisation also contributed to the growing efficacy of controlling and monitoring both the civilian population and the conquered territories in a certain region dominated by an armed group, because of independent illegal financial resources and recruiting mechanisms (Briscoe, 2015). At the same time, as „horisontalisation", decentralisation and localisation – similarly to those of between political and economic or privately and publicly financed armies – the distinction between criminals and combatants just like between state and non-state actors has started to blur (Kaldor, 2013).

Secondly, she argues (2013) that former geopolitical and ideological aspects of armed conflicts have been replaced primarily by identity politics relating to ethnic, religious and tribal clashes. She highlights that through the contagious spread of violence, intimidation and hatred – that are also desired consequences of „new wars" themselves –, instead of parental identities, tribal and community-related or ethnic identity forms were being strengthened as a consequence of the life-threatening dangers. In the long run, Kaldor interprets identities instrumentally (Mello, 2010) that are actually the real consequences, means and also goals of wars rather than their triggers or the root causes (Shaw, 2000). Such identities were often induced to gain as much power as possible to have the capacity to represent the groups' interests and increase its influence (Kaldor 2009). Similarly to Lind and Thiele (2015) who described a new generation of warfare in their handbook, reaching such purposes in „new wars" is possible through having the support of the society, community or group and breaking down the enemies' martial spirit rather than conquering new territories or destroying the enemies' arm stocks (Echevarria, 2005; Malantowicz, 2013).

Thirdly, even though Kaldor (2013) – just like Clausewitz (1976) who defined them as crucial elements – mentions direct battles as the peaks of „old wars", she stresses that in the context of the „new wars" the use of intentional violence against civilian population has become a determinant characteristic, so in the light of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement only indirect battles are conceivable. In this regard, Shaw (2000) mentions the extermination of a potential threatening group of people differentiated on the basis of preliminarily defined features as a novum that characterises contemporary wars.

Fourthly, in contrast to former wars that were financed through taxes, Kaldor (2013) argues that „new wars" are mainly based on international humanitarian aid channels, looting, smuggling and raiding, which all contribute to the emergence of a kind of global war economy. Despite the fact that those financial channels are decentralised and usually criminal in their

nature, they are well-embedded into the global world economy in many respects. Among them are the organised crime groups' transborder activity; diaspora-networks; international and national organisations; and the presence of global news agencies (Kaldor, 2013). According to Shaw (2000), the mixing of wars before 1950 with the capitalist mode of production during the bipolarity of Cold War and the nuclear arms race induced shifts in the relations between war, economy and society. Kaldor's concept which interprets „new wars'" economic conditions within the realm of globalisation seems to be the consequence of such shifts Shaw described. He argues that the ever-intensifying interdependence and external exposure – that are both main concomitants of globalisation – fundamentally question the concept of total war. Having such an argument on behalf of the inconceivability of total wars, Kaldor's theory makes sense in this respect as she argues (2013) that with their specific financial resources and network, actors in „new wars" strive to wage and conserve low-intensity conflicts.

Old wars	New wars
Fought between states that are generally supported by the majority of the societies and waged for ideological, geopolitical purposes. The conflict strengthens the state's sovereignty and legitimacy.	Fought within states, waged by numerous state and non-state actors/groups along religious and ethnic-based identity politics without any social support. The conflict causes the erosion of the state's sovereignty and legitimacy.
The distinction between combatants and non-combatants is clear.	Combatants are not easily recognisable. The distinction between criminals and combatants blurs.
Civilians are not direct targets of the violence, the majority of civilian deaths interpreted as unintentional, collateral damage.	The main victims are civilians.
The territory and the borders of a state are controlled by direct military engagement. Direct military clashes between the national armies are typical.	The territory is controlled by different armed groups through abusing, intimidating and controlling the population (displacement, rape, ethnic cleansing are means of wars).
There are clear frontlines.	Frontlines are unclear.
War financing befalls through tax increases, by setting up the central bank system and having foreign loans that all have state-building effects.	Legal and illegal international trade, organised criminal activity, looting, hostage taking, humanitarian aid and diaspora relations are among the main sources of financing wars that all contribute to the erosion of state structures and public services.

Table 1. Some of the main characteristics of the „new" and „old" wars. Edited by the author based on the original table from Rigterink, 2013, p.5.

Even though Kaldor's „new wars" theory has been followed by an intense academic debate that is exemplified by the extensive critical literature the field has, it is not the aim of this paper to review that discourse. However, it is worth mentioning that the critical approaches are primarily to indicate that Kaldor's differentiation between wars is inaccurate. The critical literature on „new wars" argues that in certain circumstances the theory fails to stand up for empirical scrutiny and the characteristics of „contemporary" wars identified by Kaldor are

actually not new, the identity politics she described cannot be separated from ideological ones, therefore Kaldor's conclusions are unfounded and rash (Chojnacki, 2006). Besides – similarly to the critics on Lind and Thiele's (2015) four generation warfare theory (Echevarria, 2005; Jackson, 2007) – critical views emphasise that „new wars" theories in general neglect historical rigidity, consequently their differentiation between wars is highly arbitrary (Berdal, 2003; Kalyvas, 2001; Mello, 2010; Newman, 2004). Furthermore, some critics also question the allegation that the number of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) and civilian casualties have been growing since 1990 (Briscoe, 2015; Smith, 2018), and that since the end of the Cold War armed conflicts have been waged only between ANSAs, for economic benefits, in a more lethal manner.

In sum, both historical comparative analyses and empirical, qualitative case studies have criticised Kaldor and the „new wars" theories in many respects (Berdal, 2003; Kalyvas, 2001; Mello, 2010; Newman, 2004). But regardless the validity of any differentiation and criticism there is a consensus in the literature that we have witnessed some qualitative changes regarding armed conflicts and that „new wars" theories can add useful insights into how „contemporary" wars are being waged. Therefore, they may contribute to better understand how peacebuilding efforts can be more effectively designed and implemented (Kaldor, 2019).

Case Study – Liberia

Due to the length limits of this paper, there is no possibility of examining if armed conflicts after 1990 fall within the domain of „new wars" and if the qualitative changes defined by Kaldor are applicable to them. Nor does this paper aim to evaluate DDR programmes implemented in post-conflict situations. The specific purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate how Kaldor's theory intertwines with and reflects to some of the defects traditional DDR programmes have had. Furthermore, to point out how useful community-based solutions are in conflict-torn societies and how they might reflect to the „new" challenges contemporary wars pose.

Even if the hostilities and wars in Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia and Somalia – just to mention a few – may seem to be evident[18,19] as case studies when discussing „new wars", this paper uses the Liberian wars (1989[20]-1997 and 1999-2003), their historical antecedents and the second DDR programme (2003-2009) to present some of the challenges of the

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[18] Among the conflicts listed, Kriege (2008) examined for example the relevance of the „new wars" theories in the context of Sierra Leone, while Malantowicz (2010) did the same with respect to Rwanda, Darfur and Syria.

[19] Due to the vast and unprecedented use of violence against civilian population (for more information: https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboad), Syrian War is a good example of contemporary „new wars" (Malantowicz, 2013), therefore that could also be a proper case study as one of the most lethal present-day conflict. But, due to the fact that the Syrian War is not ended at the time of this writing, any presumption connected to a future DDR programme may proved to be rash and irresponsible. What seems to be a guidance for future reintegration programmes is the analysis about peacebuilding and DDR programmes in the Syrian context conducted by Chounet-Cambas (2018). In this regard, we should be aware of those hasty reintegration practices that could generate new lines of fractures when the war has not ended yet (Haid, 2018a; Haid, 2018b; Khaddour, 2018; Osseiran, 2018).

[20] For example Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010:46) perceived 1992 as the start of the First Liberian War.

traditional DDR practice and reintegration programmes, and to demonstrate how „new war" theories and community-based approaches connect to them.

The choice fell on Liberia firstly because that is one of the classic example of „new wars" due to the economic conditions, the illegal trade-related financial channels, the actors who played a vital role in the war and the conflict's regional and international nature that all characterised the country throughout the two wars and their aftermath (Bøås, 2005). Secondly, because the Liberian experience is the epitome of the problems and the shortfalls of the traditional DDR framework. The choice is fundamentally justified as the Liberian DDR started from the outdated assumption that ex-combatants are always rational individuals striving for profit maximisation, therefore the satisfaction of their economic needs automatically leads to the reduction of violence intensity (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012). This logic may seem to be quite oversimplifying in the Liberian case as some authors (i.e. Shittu et al., 2017, p.60), using Galtung's concept of negative peace, refer to the country as one infected by structural violence that accordingly necessitate complex conflict resolution also emphasising its political and psycho-social aspects. Thus a detailed inquiry of the Liberian case is also needed to dispel the obscurity and any doubts about the complex situation the DDR programme tasked to deal with. That is out of question that generalisation is not allowed throughout this analysis as the connections revealed and conclusions drawn here can only serve as guidelines for similar future analyses.

Historical Context and a Short Overview of the Liberian Wars

After Monrovia – the capital city of the West African country of Liberia – was founded in 1922, the descendants of former African slaves who were resettled from the American continent to their birth of origin founded the country and proclaimed its independence (Paragi, 2005). The origins of the hostility and the wars during the 1990s can be found at that time due to unsolved religious and ethnic heterogeneity all over the country. Lacking experience, the most evident and familiar public administration model that emerged for the Americo-Liberian elite who possessed disproportionate power was the legacy of British-American slavery (Bøås, 2005)[21] which determined Liberia's modern statehood until 1980. The True Whig Party (TWP), founded formally in 1870 and governing for the next 110 years, played a vital and decisive role in creating a system based on plantations, feudal structures, the export of natural resources, forced labour and the oppression of different indigenous ethnic groups and tribes (Shittu et al, 2017) on the one hand, and a devoted commitment to a united African continent on the other (Paragi, 2005).

After World War II, William Tubman's (1944-1971) and William Tolbert's (1971-1980) presidency prioritised their personal aggrandisement through clientelism and patrimonialism instead of supporting the stability in the country. In 1980, an ethnic Krahn, Samuel Doe staged

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[21] It is not a coincidence that the Liberian constitution was based on the American constitutional model and its political principles (Bøås, 2005).

a *coup d'état* that resulted in the execution of the president and other TWP leaders. As a *de facto* head of state, Doe ruled from 1980 to 1997 which ended the 150 year-long domination of the Americo-Liberian elite. Even though his ruling did not bring significant political progress in the country (Ebo, 2005 cited Neumann, 2011), due to the proclamation of democracy and the approval of a new constitution, Doe's popularity grew quickly (Shittu et al., 2017) among economically and politically marginalised tribes and clans who had been serving traditionally the elite (Bøås, 2005).

As the head of a rebel group, the Americo-Liberian Charles Taylor supported by the Gio and Mano tribes staged a raid in December 24, 1989 against Doe's regime backed by the Krahn and the mainly settled Mandingos, which marked the beginning of the First Liberian War (1989-1996). The number of insurgent groups increased quickly. At first, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) strived for managing the conflict and resolve societal and political tensions. Negotiations started in Gambia with Nigerian mediation which led to the creation of a monitoring, peacekeeping unit (ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia, ECOMOG). The Groups' competence included – in accordance with the principle of neutrality and the general rule of the use of force only in case of immediate threat and self-defence – reconciliation processes between the parties, the maintenance of ceasefire agreement and the separation of armed troops. Taylor questioned ECOMOG's legitimacy since the beginning and the belligerents breached ceasefire agreements from time to time (Paragi, 2005). During 1995 and 1996, Abuja Accord and a supplemental peace agreement to the Accord led to the presidential election by which Taylor was formally elected president and ended the First Liberian War.

Taylor's role in the Sierra Leone civil war – especially through training fighters and financially supporting oppositional militias – and his involvement in illegal diamond trade entailed Liberia's sliding into isolation (Bøås, 2005) that was heightened by internal conflicts induced by the depression of international aid and the tensions revenant fighters generated in the communities.

In this situation, the former pro-Doe rebel group ULIMO (United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy) split in two different squads which messed the political landscape. Taylor had to deal with the Mandingo LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) incursion from Guinea and the Krahn and Côte d'Ivoire-backed MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia) simultaneously. After the wars the majority of DDR beneficiaries were affiliated with these groups.

Intensifying hostilities led to the Second Liberian War (1999-2003). However, opposition forces invaded significant territories quickly, final victory was out of their reach. In order to prevent further escalation of the conflict, ECOWAS deployed a renewed peacekeeping mission (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia, ECOMIL). For the sake of peremptory conflict resolution, special efforts were made by the civil sector, the ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations, the

United States and the European Union.[22] That is logical as Liberia was among the poorest countries in the world with an unemployment rate at 85%, where 76%[23] of the population was living on 1 dollar or less a day at that time (Jaye, 2009).

Two months after signing a ceasefire agreement on June 17, 2003, Accra Peace Agreement ended the war. Peacebuilding processes could start along with the authorisation for a UN mission and the deployment of peacekeepers. However, it was still uncertain how reconciliation and long-term peace will be reached after 14 years of war when masses of people were raped, sexually abused, mutilated and the overwhelming involvement of child soldiers were typical.[24]

DDR in Liberia

Two DDR programmes were implemented in Liberia, primarily designed in the wake of security Council Resolution 1325 (McMullin, 2020). The first took place after the 1993 Cotonou Agreement (UN SC, 1993) that outlined the details regarding the ceasefire agreement, the transitional public administration, the amnesty laws and the military aspects of DDR, just to mention a few. This programme dealing with logistical, financial and personnel challenges was executed between 1994[25] and 1997 (Jaye, 2009).

After the Second Liberian War, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the United Nations could directly deploy peacekeeping forces to the country to promote the transitional government, prepare multiparty elections scheduled for 2005 (Bøås, 2005), support the rebuilding of the country and the reintegration of ex-combatants (Levely, 2012). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in 2003 the Security Council Resolution 1509 (UN SC, 2003) established a peace mission (United Nations Mission in Liberia – UNMIL) – originally for a period of 12 months[26] – to start to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate thousands of combatants. "CPA gave UNMIL (and the Transitional Government) extra-constitutional powers, suspending the constitution during the inteim period[…]" (McMullin, 2020, p.27), which made UN decisions legally justified throughout the programme (McMullin, 2020).[27]

With its mandate, UNMIL was to embody the full complexity of peacebuilding with a focus on shaping basic local and national-level administrative, judicial, executive and legislative mechanisms; reorganising law enforcement agencies; monitoring the ceasefire; maintaining

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[22] The desire for final resolution was quite evident and visible, albeit *Bøås (2005) stressed how France, the United States and the United Kingdom – intentionally or not – contributed to the reinforcement of anti-Taylor armed groups through financing Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, among which the former supported the LURD, the latter the MODEL.*

[23] 76,2% in 2001 (Jaye, 2009).

[24] For a detailed inquiry regarding the involvement of children in armed struggles in Liberia and their reintegration prospects, see: Shittu et al., 2017.

[25] Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis (2010:46) regard 1996 as the beginning of the first DDR programme.

[26] The mission officially accomplished its mandate on March 30, 2018. For more information: https://unmil.unmissions.org/ (Accessed: 21 April 2021).

[27] This is why the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) could be easily disbanded in its entirety as a result of the incoming Johnson Sirleaf administration that did not trust such forces' loyalty (McMullin, 2020).

peace and stability; and promoting and protecting human rights (UN SC, 2003). In its resolution, the Security Council urged the international community to ensure the necessary resources for execution, and called upon all conflicting parties – primarily the groups of LURD and MODEL – to cooperate in the implementation.

Similar to the DDR programme that had just ended in Sierra Leone (1998-2004), both the monitoring of programme compliance and the operative guidance were performed by the United Nations and a competent national committee. While financial resources for disarmament were granted by the UN, rehabilitation and reintegration costs were guaranteed through donations and a trust fund (Human Rights Watch – HRW, 2005) that was overseen by the UNDP. Among the main donors were the European Commission, the USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and a former British ministerial department (Department for International Development) (Jaye, 2009).[28]

From this point this paper will concentrate on the second DDR programme (2003-2009) and examines the connections between „new wars" theories and DDR practices in that context, because the first programme's results regarding reintegration have practically lost relevance and significance in the light of the second war.

With regard to the number of participants,[29] the complex nature of vocational trainings, the improvement in ex-combatants' economic and safety conditions some argue that some kind of success could be perceived in Liberia (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012[30]; Pugel, 2006 cited Jaye, 2009; Jaye, 2009). Ex-combatants usually mentioned the UN mission without which they would not have chosen to accept disarmament (Jennings, 2007). Neumann and Schia (2012) also confirmed the community-based approach in Liberia that was essential in conflict resolution and effective peacebuilding.

At the same time, the challenges the programme coordinators faced and the defects revealed later on may justify a more prudent evaluation as DDR efficacy in Liberia is still questioned by critics, especially with respect to the reintegration results (Ackermann, 2009; Jennings, 2007; McMullin, 2020, Shittu et al., 2017). This paper is not aiming to take a stand on DDR efficacy in Liberia, but strive to describe the connections between DDR practice, the role communities may have and the characteristics of „new wars" through detailing some dysfunctionalities.

The Second DDR Programme (2003-2004) – Disarmament and Demobilisation

After the second Liberian War (1997-2003), the DDR was divided into two phases. The first engaged with disarmament, disengagement and demobilisation, the second with rehabilitation and reintegration aspects. While the latter put a greater emphasis on vocational trainings, education and social reintegration, the former – along with traditional guidelines – meant the rapid collection of weapons and used the highly desired notion of decreasing the

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[28] In September, 2020 the Department has been replaced by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

[29] A total of 102,193 people (Paes, 2005), including 22,33 women, 8,500 boys and 2,400 girls (McMullin, 2020).

[30] In an interview made by the authors themselves, they cited the viewpoint of one of the political advisers to the UNDP from 2006, who pled for the programme's success.

odds of war recurrence through buying up weapons rapidly. As a consequence of such a great demand for guns and bullets, the illicit arms traffic has given the green light to rebound. In this situation what happened in Liberia is that foreign intervention contributed to the uncontrolled recirculation of weapons and created an undesired market where arms became the objects of trade rewarded by the programme itself (Jennings, 2007).

During the first phase, which officially ended in November, 2004 (Jennings, 2007), people just had to surrender their arms to be eligible for the programme and for all its cash benefits. Dysfunctionalities become evident if we note that the majority of the UN staff in Liberia were unfamiliar with the local context as they were redeployed from Sierra Leone where DDR processes had just ended (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012; Jaye, 2009). Due to the low entry criteria, the tempting financial benefits and the uncertain and inappropriately managed datasets based on information provided by armed militias' leaders, the number of participants rose rapidly,[31] while both the benefits per person and the time for demobilisation decreased. In the light of such unforeseen tendencies, and due to the original case overload, it was to be feared that no money would be left for rehabilitation and reintegration.

The discontent among the people was heightened[32] further by the fact that policy-makers intended to complete pro-government militias' disbursement at first (Jennings, 2007) while certain groups (i.e. the so called *540 group*) were being excluded from formal programming (Mcmullin, 2020), and that former commanders, sometimes bribed by other war lords to re-recruit combatants (Shittu et al., 2017), were charged with the identification of former combatants who used to serve under their leadership (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012). The latter became the essence of a post-war state of dependence and clientelism through which former commanders have given the authority to select between the applicants and prioritise their family members on the one hand, and to gain additional benefits by claiming money in return for applicants' participation on the other (McMullin, 2020).[33] Henceforth, commanders were not only seen as high-ranking officials in the hierarchy of an armed group, but also as guarantors of economic benefits and survival[34] that resulted in the maintenance and renewal of former clientelistic, patrimonial societal structures based primarily on loyalty (Jennings, 2007; Munive and Jakobsen, 2012; Jaye, 2009). Similarly to Jennings (2007), Munive and Stepputat (2012, pp. 361, 369-370) argue that the aforementioned tendencies led to the blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians, creating „bureaucratic combatants" who were civilians simply impersonating armed fighters in order to have DDR benefits.

The second phase, demobilisation was tasked with the disengagement of combatants from former hierarchical structures through having courses relating to civics, democracy, HIV, AIDS,

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[31] According to an interview with a UNDP official, Munive and Jakobsen (2012:367) mention that for lack of any prior survey, the calculations regarding the total number of participants based on rough estimates, the experiences from Sierra Leone and the First Liberian War, thus the numbers were finally exceeded the original plans almost three times.

[32] Which e.g. resulted in the death of 9 participants (Jennings, 2007).

[33] McMullin also warns „*not to focus exclusively on formal commanders' malfeasance*", but also on internal UN curruption (2020:10).

[34] That is quite important as the majority of the combatants were under the age of 30, just seeking for life purposes and the means of livelihood, which made them highly malleable and exposed to such structures of dependence (*Bøås and Bjørkhaug, 2010; McMullin, 2020; Shittu et al., 2017*).

public health and family planning in detached camps. Due to the growing number of participants and the decreasing budget, the original time frame decreased by 75%, while the per capita financial benefit has been cut by a third (HRW, 2005). After completing demobilisation, the participants were given a transitional safety net allowance (TSA) by which they started a six-month long, paid training programme chosen by the applicants themselves (HRW, 2005). Via their warrant of identity they could choose from four categories agricultural programme; civil sector; vocational trainings;[35] and formal education (Levely, 2012).

By and large, along with the critics of traditional DDR programmes, planning mistakes in Liberia and the lack of local, context-specific knowledge resulted in instability and discontent in many respects. The process could only be regarded successful if evaluation were based on participation only. But taking the numbers collected pro rata to the number of the participants – that is one weapon for four people –, then such a success is highly questionable (HRW, 2005; Jennings, 2007; McMullin, 2020; Shittuet al., 2017). Taking everything into consideration, Liberian disarmament and demobilisation – even in the light of the inadequacy of the reintegration phase – seemed to be quite effective (Jaye, 2009).

The reintegration of combatants in Liberia

After the Second Liberian War, the reintegration of former combatants exceeded the officially scheduled deadline by two years and ended on July, 2009 (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012), with a ceremony presided over by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (McMullin, 2020). Levely (2012) argues that – Liberian – reintegration programmes should be distinguished from disarmament and demobilisation processes and perceived as a part of a broader development policy. In this vein, vocational and educational programmes defined during the demobilisation of combatants should rather be interpreted within the framework of their reintegration as a progress of picking up new skills aiming to prepare them to take care of themselves, therefore increase the odds of their reintegration into their communities of origin that is actually the ultimate purpose of DDR programmes. This approach fits in the spirit of reintegration programmes which see the prerequisite of lasting peace and the essence of the strategy against military recruitment in eliminating economic incentives of taking up arms, develop self-awareness and offer alternatives for self-care through education, vocational trainings, job creation and sustainable income generation. However, approaches rest exclusively on economic considerations make both societal and personal reconciliation impossible if ethnic and identity-based struggles are not given a special attention and victims' needs are not "addressed alongside those of combatants" (Arnould, 2021, p.6).

Along with the growing number of participants and decreasing amount of transitional allowances, the reintegration process faced severe budget shortfalls. For example, the assistance for one person has been halved (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012). Liberia illustrates how budget cuts in a post-conflict situation and time gaps between programme phases risk

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[35] E.g.: carpentry, weaving, car mechanic, masonry.

the fragile peace and stability and how it leaves room to war recurrence.[36] It is quite evident how apocryphal the programme propagating the importance of financial and security stability became in the eyes of the participants when the basic amenities to survive, the means and guarantees for basic subsistence were not available. In such a situation, ex-combatants found themselves highly exposed to former hierarchical dependence which – without effective checks and balances – contributed to the reproduction of former clientistic ties (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012).

In the Liberian context, Jaye (2009) refers to different surveys that draw contradictory conclusions regarding DDR efficacy, among which the outcomes of the reintegration phase are highly diverse. What is seemingly authoritative in this regard is the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia from 2007 (UN SC, 2007). Based on a comprehensive evaluation, this document stated: four years after the war ended, without real job security and guarantees, the preponderance of ex-combatants generally opt for illegal income generation due to the inability of the programme to offer sustainable alternatives to the participants (UN SC, 2007, p.7).

A survey conducted by Hill et al. (2008) in Lofa Province, a northwest county of Liberia contiguous to Guinea and Sierra Leone, searched for the main causes of war recurrence. According to their findings, the lack of jobs, trainings, earnings, so poverty and economic deprivation are among the most common triggers for taking up arms. In addition, the lack of acceptance by the family or the community may further hinder reintegration and reconciliation (Hill et al., 2008), meanwhile ethnic and tribal conflicts in the country are still unsolved, they are thus also potential risk factors of renewed violence to the very day. According to the authors, 97% of the respondents viewed that their living conditions have been improved after the war.[37] 13% of them would take up arms again for survival, particularly in hope of some economic benefits. Moreover, some of them put in view their mobilisation in case of the protraction and cancellation of DDR benefits. These all confirm the necessity of economic incentives in order to avoid war recurrence and support DDR efficacy.[38] However, after earlier practices, the Liberian reintegration efforts dealt rather with vocational trainings then job creation, even though the negligence of the latter might increase the odds of war recurrence as detailed above and argued by McMullin who refers to biannual Hot-Spot assessments identifying "the lack of livelihood opportunities as the biggest challenge to stability in the areas under review" (2020, p.4).

On the basis of a nationwide, UNDP-supported survey that reached 540 ex-combatants and conducted by Pugel (2007), Levely (2012) examined and measured what impacts the DDR might have on certain economic indicators like employment rate and income generation. He found that DDR in Liberia did not have significant impact on the personal incomes of those

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[36] In January, 2005 four thousands students who had gained admission to secondary schools supported financially by the programme were dismissed due to the budget shortfalls (HRW, 2005).

[37] On the contrary

[38] This is much more relevant and outstanding among those who had jobs and regular income before the war, because being unemployed and financial insecurity in Liberia goes hand in hand with the loss of prestige. So, among them, unfulfilled promises could result in more serious and drastic consequences.

completing the programme. He thus argues that DDR trainings seemed to have low efficacy, especially in a country with a high unemployment rate.

Ex-combatants' perceptions of their reintegration and community acceptance are but two yet quite important of many indicators of reintegration programmes. According to the literature, traditional DDRs, just like in Liberia, disregarded real reintegration challenges the combatants generally face when returning to their community and family or the methods to support them in such struggles were insufficient. According to Hill et al. (2008), 27% of the respondents struggled with problems during their homecoming, meanwhile 40% of them felt that the community they returned to deems them negatively. This is highly problematic in Liberia, where traditional peace concepts used to focus less on vulnerable groups like women,[39] meanwhile female ex-combatants are actually more likely to take up arms again (Hill et al., 2008), which in all makes the reintegration of women fragile.

The Liberian DDR (2003-2009) in the Context of „New Wars"

Bøås (2005) argues that „new wars" theories may help to better understand the diverse dimensions of conflicts, just like the Liberian case.[40] Even though the critical literature usually considers „new wars" theories as reductionist conceptual fields of inquiry that tend to overvalue and overemphasise some characteristics of contemporary conflicts, in reality, they used to focus on and still strive for indicating the complexity of wars.

This section tries to put the Liberian events into the context of „new wars" in which the focus is not on the uncertain novelty of some conflict features, but rather on their presence and relevance in describing reality. The analysis concludes that the two Liberian Wars mostly comply with the conditions described by Kaldor. This has just been proved in this section through the four key conflict features: the actors (1); the goals and motivations (2); the scale of brutality and the victimisation of civilians (3); and the economic and financial characteristics of the war (4).

Irrespective of any novelty contemporary conflicts can be characterised with, „new wars" theories may add useful guidelines to better understand armed conflicts and to develop effective peacebuilding strategies as well. Thus, in the following sections, this paper aspires to perceive the Liberian context in the conceptual framework of „new wars" and indicate how such a theory can grasp some of the crucial aspects of armed conflicts and how they can be used for clarifying some problems and challenges the Liberian DDR faced.

a) Actors and blurring lines

With its eroding state capacities, collapsing modern statehood and the number of non-state actors in conflicts, Liberia is the epitome of „new wars". The mode of warfare during the

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[39] For a detailed review of the lasting negative impacts of the exclusion of women, girls (and disabled combatants) from programming see: McMullin, 2020.

[40] *Among such dimensions the author probably means the economic motivations, the illegal trade relations as means of war financing, and regional and global connectivity (the author's note).*

1990s with numerous rebelling armed groups (e.g. MODEL, LURD, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia or the Independent National Patriotic Front), the involvement of masses of child soldiers (Shittu et al., 2017) and private security services in the armed struggles to gain power in the country also testify this. Conflicting parties striving for power usually did not accept and recognise each other as legitimate enemies, moreover they questioned the legitimacy of any international peace mission, like Taylor did with the ECOMOG forces.

In addition to the growing number of conflicting parties and their changing roles, Kaldor (2013) also mentions the blurring lines between combatants and civilians as a typical feature of „new wars". In this regard, whereas DDR programmes rightly aim to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life through mellowing former hierarchical military structures, in Liberia the programme really missed to grasp the essence of demobilisation and conserved the differentiation by making a greater sense of some localised conflicts on the one hand, while on the other, let former structures remain and clientistic dependence flourish during which civilians personate combatants for financial benefits through which the lines between combatants and civilians thus started to blur (Bøås, 2005; Colletta, 2012). Founded their argumentation on field research outcomes, Bøås and Bjørkhaug (2010) stresses that Liberian DDR was counterproductive as stigmatisation and some lines of fracture between the combatants and civilians derived from – abrupt and poor – DDR planning.

A survey conducted by the authors in Monrovia and Voinjama concluded that there were no difference between young fighters and other layers of the society regarding the standards of living, the employment rate or the income generation, thus stigmatisation of ex-combatants originated from the UN peace mission which presumed that all those who used to be associated with armed groups and participated in the fights were necessarily threats to the security and stability. This, however, was not the case in Liberia. Colletta (2012), among others, pointed out how – if differentiation is inevitable – durable fraction lines can be preserved and maintained for organisational purposes and how war-related competences can be used for guaranteeing security in rural areas. So, whilst conflicting organisations and war structures were being dissolved formally and ostensibly, they were actually transformed and fixed in an other way (Bøås and Bjørkhaug, 2010). After all, the DDR unfortunately conserved such dependence and hierarchical structures without taking institutional advantages of them for peacebuilding purposes.

According to Kaldor (2019), „new wars" are fragmented and decentralised, thus local and regional levels are the quintessence of dealing with post-conflict challenges. This also demands substate-level actors and communities to be involved in and incorporated into peacebuilding processes. In Liberia, the decentralisation of the UN mission UNMIL has been carried out through so called Civil Affairs (CA) committees founded on the principle of respecting the local cultural context to practically support state capacities at local levels, rebuild social trust and promote reconciliation through mediation, while representing, implementing and monitoring mission activities at community levels (Neumann and Schia, 2012).

Some tends to raise attention to the success of the Liberian programme, even though the Liberian DDR - sometimes with exaggerated „liberal peace" concepts – was prone to be perceived as a partner of state institutions rather than locally engaged substate actors or communities. By and large, leaving behind state-centric approaches was not reached. Continued attention by the international community primarily to the capital of the country and to a nationwide state-building standpoint (Neumann and Schia, 2012)[41] blocked any new approach to evolve.

b) Goals and motivations

Regarding the goals, according to Kaldor's theory, in „new wars" people are mobilised around identities that gets further consolidated during the wars, primarily in pursuit of economic benefits. In Liberia, economic exploitation was an integral part of Liberia's historical development since the emerging of its modern statehood which has accelerated afterwards and become more decisive through illicit diamond trade and rivalry about caoutchouc production[42] whose starting point at that time also can be found in profit-oriented, market-driven exploitation.

Jaye (2009) argues that ethnic and tribal origins – that are determinants of post-bipolar „new wars" as claimed by Kaldor – are but two of many triggers. Even though the scale of war motives are diverse, it is important to mention that prior to the war, discrepancies and conflicts were themselves mainly along ethnic and tribal fractures. Consequently, the inequality and the diversity of the fields of antagonism do not question ethnicity as a main fracture and organising principle along which the wars were waged, just indicate how numerous manifestations the ethnicity could have in a war-torn country. Moreover, while pre-war ethnic lines were not entirely impermeable, after the long decades of crystallisation of such ethnic categories wars themselves fixed them definitively (Bøås, 2005, p.77) underpinning Kaldor's (2013) argumentation who stated that ethnicities are the real products, means and in some sense goals of „new wars". "Products" primarily in terms of Besenyő's (2019, p.295-296) concepts of spontaneous and semi-spontaneous securitisation "where the referent object of securitization is not the nation state…but the more traditionally defined community and its individual members, plus religiously or ethnically defined groups that are under the protection of the regionally dominant identity community", „guided by traditional concepts of (ethno-) national survival". Even though, economic, social and political conflicts should be perceived along ethnic and tribal fractures in Liberia, it does not mean that ethnic clashes should have inevitably resulted in war, just that ethnicity played a critical role in the forming of fractures that should have been taken into account during post-conflict peacebuilding. In this field, the conservation of ethnic-based group structures through the Liberian DDR programme did not resolve but intensified such identity struggles, while

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[41] According to Neumann and Schia, (2012), social mistrust towards state institutions remained after the war, when Civil Affairs failed to manage conflicts. This lasted until 2009 when so called Peace Committees focusing on the local historical and cultural context and representing all layers of the Liberian society were created on a voluntary basis to better address and resolve conflicts.

[42] For more details see: Neumann and Schia, 2012:37-38.

hierarchical social ties with their clientistic and nepotistic dependence have also been intensified through DDR-guaranteed economic benefits that were to be the primal triggers of war (Jennings, 2007; Munive and Jakobsen, 2012; Jaye, 2009).

It is quite clear when Pernice (2013) – like Bøås and Bjørkhaug (2010) – argues that contrary to economic incentives, the roots of mobilisation and inclination for violence can be found in the searching of individuals for security guarantees against state authorities which finally led to an extensive joining to militias.[43] However, when the author contests the applicability of „new wars" theories in the context of Liberia and rejects to perceive the Liberian wars as „new wars" based on such a sequence of ideas along with the underestimation of their novelty and brutality seems to be unfounded. On the one hand, the lack of security guarantees in Liberia derives from the erosion and destabilisation of the state which resulted in ethnic and tribal group cohesion that exactly what „new wars" theories strive to stress. On the other hand, conflict did not escalate and accelerate because of individuals living in fear and searching for security, but primarily due to those high-ranking officials who aspire for economic benefits through the exploitation of people exposed to fear and deprivation. In addition, when Pernice stresses the role that international humanitarian aids have in war economy and refers to the low intensity and prolonged nature of conflicts, he in fact justifies the relevance of Kaldor's „new war" theory (2013, p.10).

Economic incentives as personal motivations and ethnic/tribal fractures as products, means and goals of armed conflicts are determinants of „new wars", and were typical of the Liberian events. Peacebuilding should incorporate „new wars" theories – which were capable of identifying the main features and guiding principles of the war in Liberia – into the designing and planning of DDR programmes in order to fix structural defects and contribute to the reconciliation by better addressing the war motives and fractures.

c) Brutality and the victimisation of civilians

According to Kaldor's thesis, instead of direct battles between state armies, the prevalence of the use of force against civilians and indirect clashes between the conflicting parties became common. For example, Shaw (2000) mentions ethnic cleansing and genocide as concomitants of „new wars". Serious human rights violations, widespread sexual violence and rape, the killings of masses of civilians and the exploitation of women and children are suggestive examples of brutality which have been confirmed and proven in the Liberian wartime and reached unprecedented heights compared with other conflicts in the African continent (Bøås, 2005; Shittu et al, 2017; Jaye, 2009). Forced displacement – that is also typical of „new wars" – was qualified as widely accepted practice in Liberia too. Monrovia, the capital of the country, for example, while having the predominant amount of development assistance (McMullin, 2020), hosted masses of internally displaced people (IDP) for years (Jennings, 2007).

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[43] Some argues that the struggling for survival (*Bøås és Bjørkhaug,* 2010) and human rights abuses (Shittu et al., 2017) have not ceased when the war ended.

In connection with sexual violence as one heinous manifestation of brutality in Liberia, Amnesty International (2004, p.3-4) highlighted that between 1989 and 2003, 60-70% of the population was sexually abused and became victims of some forms of sexual violence. Notwithstanding the difficulties regarding measuring and quantifying brutality, based on the reports and statements, Liberia is certainly one of the most deadly and cruel example of „new wars".

Concerning the aforementioned brief insight into the involvement of the population in the war clarifies why social reconciliation, investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of mass human rights violations and the rebuilding of national justice should (or should have) given the priority in post-conflict resolution which rarely happened in Liberia (Neumann, 2011).

d) Economic features

As Bøås (2005, p. 82) details, the worsening conflict environment in Liberia created its own logic of war economy which – like Kaldor described – was able to refinance and sustain the state of war even if illicit trade activities were halted due to international efforts. Instead of supporting DDR and reintegration, the strategy to giving financial benefits in return for weapons created a segregated market economy used primarily by ex-combatants that deepened the gap between fighters and civilians (Jennings, 2007). Similar to Kaldor's (2019) argumentation, Pernice (2013) acknowledges the role that international humanitarian aid generally has in sustaining and prolonging wars. In this regard, in Liberia, such an economy based on predation, looting and rivalry for resources to gain power and control over a territory is mentioned in the literature (HRW, 2005; Jaye, 2009).

The starting point of the Liberian DDR rested on the assumption that preventing further radicalisation and recruitment, as well as the resolution of conflicts in the country are available through removing economic incentives of taking up arms. This is well within the reach of a DDR programme if instant disbursements to satisfy ex-combatants' basic needs and long-term stipends through employment are both guaranteed. This is exactly what the Liberian DDR missed to fulfil in some cases by focusing on the participants as rationally profit-maximising individuals[44] without guaranteeing the necessary means to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate them, conserving new financial and institutionalised dependence (Munive and Kajobsen, 2012) using former hierarchical structures for participation[45] or by disregarding other crucial aspects of conflict-resolution – used also by Kaldor to specify „new wars" – like identity, ethnicity, personal reconciliation and the fundamental roles the local communities can have in resolving conflicts. Moreover, some argues that reintegration and vocational programmes – as mentioned above – were not necessarily followed by the improvement of living standards

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[44] This refers to the notorious theory of 'greed and grievance' developed by Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2004; and: Collier et al., 2006) who interpreted conflict motivations in the context of economic benefits.

[45] After the peace processes of 1997 and 2003, the new political and economic power structures were created along with the intention to preserve former commanders' status and influence which made accountability highly problematic (Jaye, 2009).

and earnings (Levely, 2012; UN SC, 2007).[46] So, taking the assumption that economic benefits lead to a more effective demobilisation, the outcomes of the Liberian DDR programme seem really contradictory.

Jennings (2007) clearly stresses that poverty and unemployment were extensive after the Second Liberian War, and two of the greatest challenges of development and state-building were to exceed that kind of war economy based on looting and to overcome ethnic polarisation so typical of Liberia. With respect to the former, in the author's opinion, reintegration programmes were incapable to satisfy ex-combatants' needs in terms of earnings and jobs. Some of the respondents of the survey conducted by the author mentioned two indispensable aspects which might be the core elements of long-term reintegration and dissolution of such kind of war economy. The first was the basic demand to better address the real needs of ex-combatants. The second was the responsibility the programme had to keep its promises (2007, p.207).

Conclusion

Theorists of the so-called "new wars" argue that we have witnessed meaningful qualitative changes regarding the nature of armed conflicts and such changes in wars necessitate a fundamental shift from the traditional peacebuilding approaches (Kaldor, 2019, p.24). The field already has extensive critical literature on "liberal peace", DDR programmes and traditional peace operations, which may serve as a good starting point. In this regard, second generation programmes focusing much more on communities and their role in post-conflict settlements try to define and describe how such a shift should look like to better resolve contemporary conflicts.

According to Mary Kaldor's (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2019) theory, „new wars" have become typical during the 1990s and they can be contrasted with earlier wars in terms of actors, goals, methods, the effects of war on civil population and their economic characteristics. She argues that qualitative changes in wars showed that both a better understanding of the root causes and motivations of armed conflicts and belligerents and a strengthened commitment to the reintegration of ex-combatants are needed to find long-term resolutions for conflicts. In this sense, the new characteristics of wars pointed out by Kaldor may have a great significance in how peacebuilding and DDR programmes should be designed and implemented in post-conflict settlements.

After a detailed review of the relevant literature, the Liberian wars seem to fit the trends of „new wars" described primarily by Kaldor. Regardless whether there is any novelty in the evolution of armed conflicts, the Liberian case is roughly consistent with the complex description she detailed (2005; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2019). After a general review of DDR

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[46] With special regard to disabled ex-combatants McMullin argues that DDR/SSR and their aftermath ended up providing less social safety net support to them than existed under the Charles Taylor regime (2020:17).

programmes and Kaldor's „new wars" theory, and a brief summary of the Liberian conflicts and experiences, such a correspondence has been testified in this paper on the grounds of war actors, their goals and motivations, the economic conditions, the scale of brutality and the involvement of civilians in war struggles. What has also been confirmed is that „new wars" theories reflected to many of the problems and shortfalls the second Liberian DDR programme – and traditional DDR programmes in general – are characterised with, and revealed some ways to better resolve them. In fact, due to Kaldor's work, some of the typical characteristics of contemporary wars have given prominence whereof the critical literature on traditional DDR programmes actually strive to raise the attention. In this vein, Kaldor's thesis may have relevance in better addressing and understanding the conflicts and make programme designing and planning more efficient through calling the international community's attention to the economic, political and social complexity of security in a post-conflict situation (Malantowicz, 2013).

Systematic underestimation and ignorance of the local context and obsessive application of the sometimes highly outdated concept of „liberal peace" resulted in counterproductive solutions in Liberia. According to field research by Neumann (2011) conducted in rural Liberia, the set-up of a formal, western-styled justice system in the country eventuated in parallel institutions which thus led to the decreasing sense of justice among the people and to the decline of local customary law as traditional channels were often replaced by western inventions (2011, p.66). The author – like second generation community-based DDR programmes – thus proposed a localised approach focusing more on the local cultural context. Besides, she showed how UN-supported, in that case incautious decentralisation of the elections of 2011 along with the principles of democratisation, rule of law, freedom of religion and guaranteeing of human rights – originated from the „liberal peace" concept – reached contrary effects.

Taking all the facts detailed in this paper into consideration, community initiatives, localised programmes, context-specific analysis, peacebuilding strategies reflecting to cultural specifications and the strengthening of the local and regional levels are indispensable for effective conflict resolution and reconciliation in Liberia. This is what Kaldor (2019) also admits and proposes to consider. After all, while Neumann and Schia (2012) hold a brief for the effective community-based approach in Liberia,[47] Jennings (2007) argues that the Liberian DDR's impact on the local-level and its development potential were insufficient. One thing is for sure: communities and local-level projects' role for long-standing reconciliation and peace are vital (Jennings, 2007; Kaldor, 2019). This is evident as severely damaged countries sometimes face unprecedented challenges and social hatred that basically corrode social cohesion. Thus the prerequisite of a successful reintegration and having decades-long legacy

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[47] In addition to the authors, who consider the channel of Civil Affairs committees as an integral part of such a community-based approach, McMullin (2020), for example, also refers to labour-intensive road rehabilitation projects as platforms where "*both ex-combatants and non-combatant community members working together in teams, demonstrated high utility to peacekeeping efforts at a relatively little cost*" (2020:37), while some examples of local civil activities and localised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) might be also perceived to be useful means on the ground for reconciliation (Jaye, 2009).

of mass human rights violations left behind is the rebuilding and the supporting of communities, while addressing and resolving local challenges and threats. Especially in Liberia, where the state always used to be highly centralised (McMullin, 2020), the quality of infrastructure low and the communication between the urban and rural areas weak.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Appendix

1. Civil Wars and Externally-Assisted DDR Programmes, 1979-2006. Note: Wars are coded as of December 31, 2006. DDR is coded through December 31, 2009. Source: Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p.44,46. (shortened, without footnotes)

	Country	Conflict	War Years	DDR Years
1.	Afghanistan	United Front v. Taliban	1996-2001	2003-Ongoing
2.	Afghanistan	Taliban	2001-Ongoing	2003-Ongoing
3.	Angola	UNITA	1975-1991	1991-1992
4.	Angola	UNITA	1992-1994	1995-1998
5.	Angola	UNITA	1997-2002	2002-2008
6.	Bosnia	Rep. Srpska/Croats	1992-1995	1996-Ongoing
7.	Burundi	Hutu groups	1991-Ongoing	2004-Ongoing
8.	Cambodia	Khmer Rouge; FUNCINPEC; etc.	1975-1991	1992
9.	Central African Republic	Factional fighting	1996-1997	1997-2000; 2004-2007
10.	Chad	FARF; FROLINAT	1980-1994	1992-1997
11.	Chad	FARF; FROLINAT	1994-1997	1992-1997; 1999-2000
12.	Colombia	FARC; ELN, drug cartels, etc.	1978-Ongoing	2002-Ongoing
13.	Congo-Brazzaville	Cobras v. Ninjas	1998-1999	2000-2009
14.	Congo-Zaire	RCD; etc.	1998-Ongoing	2004-Ongoing
15.	Côte d'Ivoire	Forces Nouvelles	2002-2005	2006-Ongoing
16.	Croatia	Krajina; Medak; Western Slavonia	1992-1995	1996-1997
17.	Djibouti	FRUD	1991-1994	1994-1996
18.	El Salvador	FMLN; RAES	1979-1992	1992-1997
19.	Ethiopia	Eritrean war of independence	1974-1991	1993-1997
20.	Ethiopia	Ideological; Tigrean	1978-1991	1991-1995
21.	Guatemala	Communists, Indigenous	1978-1994	1997-1998
22.	Guinea-Bissau	Vieira v. Mane mutiny	1998-1999	1999-2006
23.	Haiti	Cedras v. Aristide	1991-1995	1994-1996
24.	Indonesia	East Timor	1975-1999	2000-2004
25.	Indonesia	Aceh	1999-2005	2005-Ongoing
26.	Iraq	US/Coalition occupation; civil war	2003-Ongoing	2003-Ongoing
27.	Lebanon	Aoun; militias; PLO, Israel	1975-1991	1991
28.	Liberia	NPLF; ULIMO; NPF; LPC; LDF	1992-1997	1996-1997
29.	Liberia	anti-Taylor forces	1999-2003	2003-2009
30.	Mali	Tuaregs; Maurs	1990-1995	1995-1997
31.	Mozambique	RENAMO; FRELIMO	1976-1992	1993-1997
32.	Namibia	SWAPO; SWANU; SWATF	1973-1989	1989-1990
33.	Nepal	CPN-M/UPF (Maoists)	1996-Ongoing	2007-Ongoing
34.	Nicaragua	Contras & Miskitos	1981-1990	1990-1992
35.	Papua New Guinea	BRA (Bougainville)	1988-1998	2001-2005
36.	Philippines	MNLF; MILF	1971-2006	1997-Ongoing
37.	Rwanda	RPF; genocide	1994-1994	1997-Ongoing
38.	Senegal	MFDC (Casamance)	1989-1999	1992
39.	Sierra Leone	post-Koroma coup violence	1997-2001	1998-2004
40.	Somalia	post-Barre war	1991-Ongoing	1993-Ongoing
41.	South Africa	ANC; PAC; Azapo	1976-1994	1995-1997
42.	Sudan	SPLM; SPLA; NDA; Anya-Anya II	1983-2002	2006-Ongoing
43.	Sudan	Darfur	2003-Ongoing	2009-Ongoing
44.	Tajikistan	Popular Democratic Army; UTO	1992-1997	1997-2003
45.	Uganda	NRA; etc.	1981-1987	1992-1995
46.	Uganda	LRA; West Nile; ADF; etc.	1995-Ongoing	2005-Ongoing
47.	Yugoslavia	Kosovo	1998-1999	1999-2004
48.	Zimbabwe	ZANU; ZAPU	1972-1979	1980-1985
49.	Zimbabwe	Ndebele	1983-1987	1980-1985

Turkey's Military Role in Libya and Its Wider Strategic Environment (interest) in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin

András Málnássy[1]

Abstract:

As a result of the Arab Spring and the return to building the sphere of interest of the Ottoman past, Turkey's relations with the countries of the North African region are increasingly appreciating, and they seem to be a longer-term vision in Turkish geopolitical thinking. Libya has historically been a part of the Ottoman Empire, a traditionally Turkish sphere of interest in this sense. The study seeks to present the drivers and goals of Turkish foreign policy in relation to a North African state, Libya. In the analysis, examining Turkey's expansive foreign policy, we can also get an idea of how Ankara intends to increase its sphere of interest in the wider region, namely in the Eastern Mediterranean, through its military support.

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Introduction

The waves of anti-government protests that erupted in early 2011 brought significant change to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The "Arab Spring" has fundamentally changed the political map of the region, disrupted the status quo and created instability domestically and politically in many countries. The circumstances changed and challenged Turkey's regional power ambitions, and foreign policy. Accelerated processes have forced a reassessment of foreign policy concepts, thus Turkey had to give up its "zero problem with its neighbors" policy linked with the name of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. The Libyan civil war was one of the challenges that the zero-problem policy had seriously faced. The events highlighted the vulnerability of the concept and showed the Turkish leadership the need for a more active and proactive foreign policy to maintain the country's central power role. The research question of this paper is: Has the Turkish zero-problem foreign policy changed after the Arab Spring?

The aim of the study is to examine the changes in Turkish foreign and military policy in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in relation to Libya, a country most affected by the process. The hypothesis of the paper is that the Turkish problem of zero foreign policy changed during the Arab Spring and transformed into a more expansive, pragmatic real policy willing to intervene in domestic political processes with hard power (military power). For the purpose, the study examines in Chapter 1 Turkey's wider strategic (interest) environment in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Chapter 2 covers the increase of Turkish presence in Libya, and Chapter 3 Ankara's strategic goals of geopolitics in the Northern African country. Chapter 4 examines Ankara's economic interests in Libya, and Chapter 5 the military intervention. Chapter 6 summarizes the influence of the Turkish military industry in Libya. The author verifies the hypothesis using an inductive method that focuses on how Turkish foreign policy has changed during the processes in the states of the Arab Spring. Due to length limits, the work seeks to focus on the current situation, describing and contextually examining and analyzing Turkish geopolitical goals and the evolution of Turkish-Libyan affiliates in light of the Arab Spring and the events of the Civil War. The study draws on the international literature and presents the changes in the events in Libya and the Turkish reactions to them from a Turkish perspective.

Turkey's Wider Strategic (Interest) Environment in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin

One of the important "side areas" of the Libyan conflict from the Turkish point of view is the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the strategically important natural gas fields there, which are at the intersection of Turkey's broader geopolitical goals. In recent years, the geostrategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean region has clearly increased and foreign policy activity in the region has accelerated. This is largely due to the fact that several significant gas fields have been discovered since 2009 in the sea areas bordered by Egypt, Israel and Cyprus.

Some research suggests that there are additional significant hydrocarbon reserves in the region that have attracted the attention of governments in neighboring countries. By seizing the opportunities, countries that have hitherto needed to import can become gas exporters, energy hubs, and generate huge revenues (Chehabeddine and Tvaronavičienė, 2020, p. 431). Due to its significant gas assets in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey wants to achieve a "redrawing" of its maritime borders and is demanding significant areas. In this effort, Turkey sees Libya as an ally in the Mediterranean as a dominant state in the region (Tagliapietra, 2020).

As an adverse move, Turkish foreign policy has interpreted a close co-operation with the participation of Israel, Egypt and the Republic of Cyprus, which already have successful drilling, as well as Greece, which is important for transport, with the exclusion of Turkey. This led to a meeting in Cairo in January 2019 with the Republic of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Italy and the Palestinian Authority to agree on the establishment of a regional institution (Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum) to coordinate energy cooperation. The rapprochement of the Turks with Libya can, in a sense, also be seen as a step taken to counterbalance this alliance. In response, on 27 November 2019, Ankara agreed with the Libyan Unity Government (Turkish-Libyan Maritime Agreement) on a common maritime border of approximately 18.6 nautical miles (35 km). In practice, this means that a significant part of the territory of the Mediterranean, which previously belonged to Greece and the Cypriot Greeks, has been declared to belong to, and by, Turkey (Hacaoglu and Kozok, 2019).

Figure 1: The Turkish-Libyan Delimitation Convention and the demands of actors in the region. Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (2020, p. 5).

Events in the region have been adversely affected by the signing in January 2020 by the Energy Ministers of Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus of the final documents of the plan for the 1,900 km long Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline Project on Israeli-Cypriot territorial waters, which, if realized, would supply natural gas to Europe bypassing Turkey. The project poses a serious threat to Ankara's interests and could result in the planned gas pipeline passing through the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) designated by the Libya-Turkey Maritime Agreement (Kansu, 2020, p. 55).[2]

On the one hand, the main problem in resolving the conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean is the Cyprus dispute, which allows Ankara to look at the maritime borders from the perspective of Turkey's best interests (without recognizing the maritime borders of the Republic of Cyprus). On the other hand, a source of tension is that, as Turkey has not ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it does not interpret the creation of an exclusive economic zone in accordance with the convention. While Greece, for example, would count the border of the EEA from its islands, Turkey would count from the mainland, thus significantly reducing the territorial scope of the economic zone belonging to Athens (Málnássy, 2020, p. 80).

Turkey's goals in the eastern Mediterranean are clear. The Turkish government wants to guarantee itself the right to extract natural resources under its own continental shelf and, at the same time, in the territories of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. To this end, Turkey sought an ally in the region (Libya) and sent research ships and warships to the waters under its jurisdiction as demonstrations of strength. With this move, Ankara could put pressure on Eastern Mediterranean cooperation, especially in Cyprus, which has been unfavorable to it and has accelerated in recent years (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2020, p. 5).

The Increase of Turkish Presence in Libya

Turkey, as well as other dominant powers in the Middle East and North Africa, were unprepared for the events and consequences of the Arab Spring. However, overcoming the initial "shock", Ankara adapted its priorities relatively quickly to the new circumstances and began to pursue an active foreign policy to achieve leadership in transformation. Turkey, a key player by virtue of its geopolitical location and its geographical proximity to the countries of the Arab Spring, has become almost indispensable in dealing with the problems (Kardaş, 2011, p. 5).

Following the outbreak of the Libyan civil war in February 2011, Turkey's policy towards Libya can be divided into several phases, which practically reflect the dynamics of the progress of events. The first phase is the period 2011-2014 consisting of two parts: the first is the Libyan

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[2] The exclusive economic zone may be a sea area extending up to 200 nautical miles, in which the state has sole control over the resources and raw materials located there.

civil war (2011-2012) and the second is the subsequent transitional period. In the former, the most important fault line was the attitude towards the Gaddafi regime, which determined the decisions and reactions of the opposing parties. While Western countries quickly broke with the support of Muammar Gaddafi and sided with the insurgents, the zero-problem policy[3] marked by the name of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu dictated for Ankara to maintain good relations with the Libyan regime. The Turkish government initially took a neutral stance, but when the international image of the country in Asia was affected by the dictator's support, the Turkish foreign policy leadership abandoned that policy and sided with the insurgents. The status quo, no matter how favorable to Turkey, was no longer sustainable for Libya. As the process progressed, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's involvement in the Libyan conflict became a central element of its foreign policy, with the Ankara government trying to restore its battered economic ties by supporting the establishment of a stable central government. The chaotic situations in the country and the spread of violence have already caused more and more damage to Turkish economic interests at this stage (Fredriksen and Tziarras, 2020, p. 11).

The next phase (2014-2019) began with the Second Libyan Civil War, and there has been an acceleration in Turkish foreign policy activity and a gradual shift towards military intervention. Islamist parties sympathizing with the Muslim Brotherhood virtually took power over Tripoli in the first half of 2014, and more "driven" anti-Islamist, secular forces fled to Tobruk. This created two legislatures, the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, which created two loose power organizations in the country. General Khalifa Haftar, who formally made an alliance with the center of power in Tobruk and became a leader in the fight against Islamists, took a stand against Islamism. The strengthening of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country was also seen as a serious threat by neighboring Egypt, which retaliated against members of the organization following a military coup in the summer of 2013. The judgment of the Muslim Brotherhood has, in fact, defined and still defines the dividing line between international actors appearing in Libyan domestic politics, which can also be interpreted as an ideological organization of the opposing parties. He took a similar position and, as a result, supported the forces of General Haftar with arms and military means in addition to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, and to a lesser extent France and Russia. Meanwhile, the Islamist bloc supporting the Muslim Brotherhood included Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan, and this group was even assisted by Italy (Fredriksen and Tziarras, 2020, p. 14).

In the first six months of 2015, the Islamic State occupied the Cliffs and part of Libya's northeast coast, creating a third center of power in the country. The Libyan Political Agreement, signed in Morocco on 17 December 2015 in Morocco under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), proved to be a temporary solution to the Libyan National Unity Government (GNA) under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. One of the key findings of the

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[3] Zero problem policy seeks to minimize conflicts with neighboring countries and regions and avoid involvement in international conflicts. Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision envisages Turkey becoming a global player.

agreement was that the Libyan crisis could not be resolved by military means, and the parties should seek to waive the use of force. Under the agreement, the GNA would have been tasked with weapons to be collected, disbanding various militias, and integrating them into a common Libyan army. Under the agreement, a transitional government was formed in January 2016, but the Tobruk House of Representatives did not vote for it. Internal tensions were also heightened by the inability of the unity government to effectively counter growing militias and radical organizations under the pretext of increasing pressure on the government by the Haftar-led Libyan National Army (LNA). With his anti-Islamic narrative, the general gave the impression that he alone was fighting against the advance of radical groups in the country that had also infiltrated the ranks of forces allied with the GNA. The former HoR-GNC confrontation at this stage transformed into a rivalry between pro-GNA and anti-GNA groups, and despite the initial results, by the summer of 2016, another crisis in Libya's domestic politics was clearly outlined. Over the next two years, there was still an intensive attempt to reconcile the parties, bringing the LNA and GNA to an agreement, but with little success (Missaglia, 2017, p. 2).

Haftar decided in early April 2019 to launch a military attack on Tripoli, throwing up the hitherto largely negotiated solution. However, the strategy of rapid military victory failed and the Third Libyan Civil War turned into a protracted armed conflict. This was most evident in the fact that after the initial minor clashes, the fighting became more and more brutal. And the attacks more often affected residential areas and the civilian population. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced in response to the process that Turkey was ready to provide all assistance to the unity government to curb Haftar's attacks. Support was also provided in the form of specific military assistance, and Turkey sent military equipment to the GNA. He described this move as an open threat to Camp Haftar, a spokesman for the LNA headquarters who spoke outright about the "Turkish invasion," which could lead to a military confrontation. The spokesman added that the LNA would then target Turkish ships stationed off the coast of Libya, soldiers in the country and economic interests. The announcement of the LNA threatened Turkey with an open military confrontation with consequences that Turkish citizens lost their lives in the clashes (International Crisis Group, 2020).

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the GNA on the sovereignty of the Mediterranean and military cooperation on 27 November 2019 marks the beginning of a new phase in Ankara's Libya policy. The political significance of both agreements goes beyond the borders of a country affected by the civil war and prepared for the actual military intervention by Turkey. The Maritime Agreement emphasizes that the borders concerned of the Eastern Mediterranean region may be the subject of debate, as a completely new situation has emerged in the region due to the exploration for oil and gas in recent years (Butler and Gumrukcu, 2019). The document points out that Turkey's political and economic goals do not stop off the Libyan coast, but that Erdoğan's efforts are much more part of an expansive regional policy to exploit raw materials in the Mediterranean, in which Libya is an important ally and partner for Turkey. The Military Cooperation Convention has been extended to include actual military assistance, counter-terrorism training, assistance in managing

migration, military transport, and the exchange of experts. Libya can "activate" the military assistance provided for in the agreement with a request formally submitted to the Turkish government, which, after approval by the Grand National Assembly, can send military units to assist Libya. The agreement was also ratified by the Libyan unity government and the Turkish parliament in December 2019 (Bozkurt, 2019).

In Libya, on March 15, 2021, under the leadership of Abdulhamid Dbeibeh, the new Provisional Unity Government took office. The Interim Government has good relations with Turkey, as evidenced by the fact that Ankara and Tripoli have reaffirmed their commitment to the Turkish-Libyan Mediterranean Maritime Accord, signed in November 2019, which guarantees the national interests of both parties (Kansu, 2020, p. 66).

Ankara's Strategic Goals of Geopolitics in Libya

In recent years, there has been unprecedented Turkish foreign policy activity in the Middle East and North Africa since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. In September 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan made a historic tour of the three sites of the Arab Spring, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, which supported the rise of Turkish foreign policy activism in the region. Turkey is determined to become the leading regional power in the wider Middle East. Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, the Turkish leadership has sought to create an area of stability, prosperity and economic cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa. Such an environment would be most suitable for Turkish interests. Ahmed Davutoğlu has also developed a zero-problem policy for the former (Mercan and Usta-Lazaris, 2012, p. 7).

In the aftermath of the events of the Arab Spring, policymakers recognized that the zero-problem of foreign policy needed to be reassessed and that changing regional political actors posed new challenges for Ankara. In order to maintain Turkey's position of power, Turkish foreign policy must be active and proactive rather than the previous cautious, wait-and-see attitude. The aim of this active foreign policy is to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, to export the Turkish model where appropriate, and to weaken regional opponents, i.e. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which were key players in the Libyan conflict as foreign supporters. The former countries attacked all political groupings affiliated in some way with the Muslim Brotherhood, which enjoyed the support of the Turkish government and strengthened relatively during the Arab Spring. As the Libyan government is currently part of a political force that can be linked with the Muslim Brotherhood and is also supported by Ankara, it sees its weakening as an attack on Turkey's own foreign policy interests (Hiltermann, 2018, p. 16).

As has been suggested before, the events of the Arab Spring have seen an increase in Turkish geopolitical ambitions, as well as the fact that in many cases Ankara is pursuing its foreign policy goals with military force and means. Based on the experience of recent years,

this effort is now visible not only on land (e.g. Syria, Libya) but also at sea (Mediterranean). The advocacy strategy is that Turkey has spent significant financial resources in recent years on building a strong navy. According to Turkish plans, a total of 24 new ships will be completed by 2023, including four frigates. The expansive direction is also reflected in the concepts of Turkish foreign policy, according to which the Turkish Homeland (vatan) is not meant exclusively for the mainland (Anatolia), but also for the Blue Homeland, i.e. the seas (mavi vatan). The term was first used by Admiral Ramazan Cem Gürdeniz in 2006 (Gürdeniz, 2018), while in geopolitics the term was used from March 2019 after a naval exercise. Between 27 February and 8 March 2019, the largest naval exercise in the modern history of Turkey was held under the name "Mavi Vatan". The operation in the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean involved 103 warships, submarines, and other ships, as well as drones. All of this symbolically marked the expanding direction of Turkish foreign policy towards the "blue homeland," that is, the seas (Tsiplacos, 2019, p. 6).

Figure 2: Blue Homeland: Turkey's expanding naval horizons in Mavi Vatan Source: Turkeygazette (2020).

In Libya, Ankara's clear strategic goal was to ensure and support the survival of the Allied Tripoli government through military intervention and to protect its economic interests. The Turkish government's assistance with military equipment since April 2019 quickly became insufficient to achieve these goals and military intervention became inevitable. It didn't take long to do this, in November 2019 the Haftar-led units made significant breakthroughs, and Erdoğan opted for actual military intervention. The Turkish president used two

complementary narratives to justify this move. Support in part can be traced back to the time of the Ottoman Empire, according to which, as a "consequence" of the Turkish rule at that time, more than one million so-called Köroğlu Turks still live in Libya, who need to be protected from Haftar's ethnic attacks. The other argument for legitimizing Turkish military intervention was that, according to Erdoğan, Haftar should be seen as a legitimate "coupist" fighting for the overthrow of the UN-recognized Libyan government, and the attack on Tripoli as a "coup attempt" supported by anti-democratic countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Akan et al., 2020). According to the International Crisis Group (2020), with military intervention, Ankara actually wanted Haftar not to be able to reap a military victory over GNA and move the parties toward the discussion again.

Ankara's Economic Interests in Libya

The African continent has not been a major target of Turkish foreign policy for a long time, but that changed in 1998. Since then, Turkey has built economic and trade relations with African countries under the "Opening to Africa Policy," in which various Turkish humanitarian and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a significant role (Besenyő, 2021, p. 79).

Turkey already developed close ties with Gaddafi's Libya in the 1970s. The economic relationship between the two countries was given a major boost by a similar political stance in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Libya has supported the Turkish-led Operation Cyprus Peace and supplied military assets to Ankara as a covert operation. In January 1975, the two countries held high-level consultations, during which they signed the Economic Partnership and Trade Agreement and a number of other economic agreements that encouraged investment in the following years. As a result of the strengthening of relations, the volume of trade between the two countries increased significantly due to the increased number of joint projects and companies. The Turkish Arab Bank (A&T Bank) was established in Istanbul in 1977 with the specific aim of facilitating trade and economic relations between Turkey and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As early as the late 1970s, the parties identified as a priority the need to significantly increase the number of Turkish guest workers in Libya (Öztaş and Polat, 2019, p. 14).

The construction sector, as indicated above, has always occupied a prominent place in the development of economic relations between Turkey and Libya. Turkish construction companies have long seen the country in North Africa as a prosperous market where increasing profits and further investment can be realized in the future (Beaumont, 2019). In the 1970s, hundreds of Turkish companies won infrastructure and construction projects in Libya. While in the 1990s Russia (35%) was the main area of operation for Turkish construction companies, ahead of Libya (14%), in the first decade of the 2000s, with a declining share of Russia (15%), the North African country (12%) became a major player partner. In 2011, 12% of foreign contracts of Turkish construction companies were related to Libya, with a total value of more than $ 2.4 billion. During this period, more than 200 Turkish companies carried out

construction work on 214 projects, with ongoing construction in several major Libyan cities, Tripoli, Tobruk, Benghazi and Derna. For the entire period from 1972 to 2010, Libya was the second most important partner, with Turkish companies implementing construction projects worth more than $ 26 billion (Öztaş and Polat, 2019, p. 13).

The quality of economic relations was demonstrated by the fact that in 2011 Turkey provided significant financial support and loans to Tripoli through the Turkish Arab Bank and the Turkish Savings and Insurance Fund (TMSF) (Öztaş & Polat, 2019, p. 14). Another important area for Ankara was the Libyan oil industry. Turkey's oil company, TPAO, invested more than $ 180 million in Libyan oil production before the civil war, which was forced to give up its activities later (Can, 2020).

The Turkish government has consistently sought to "revive" the Turkish construction industry in Libya, which has suffered significant losses since 2011. Due to the lost revenues, the Turkish-Libyan Joint Construction Working Group met again in Istanbul on 31 January 2019, during which GNA set the goal of ensuring the continuation of project sin process. At the end of the event, the parties signed a MoU that will lay the groundwork for continued construction investment in Turkey. In November 2019, Turkey hoped for the development of bilateral economic relations from the conclusion of both the military and the naval agreement, but in another reading we can put it this way: the condition for maintaining economic positions was the military assistance provided to Tripoli. The Association of Independent Craftsmen and Businessmen (MÜSIAD), an advocacy organization that also influences Turkish foreign policy, has predicted that annual exports could rise from $ 1.49 billion in 2018 to $ 10 billion in the coming years as a result of closer ties. And the Turkish defense sector could be a significant part of the expected export surplus (Razek, 2020).

It is seen from the developments that, despite the previous prosperous Turkish-Libyan economic relationship, Turkey intends to continue to play a leading role in the country's economic life, recovery, and reconstruction, despite the negative effects of COVID. This is also supported by the Turkish-Libyan Joint Business Meeting held in Istanbul in February 2019. In the meeting the parties identified areas in which they intend to cooperate in the near future. According to the agreement, they want to create joint investments in the energy, small and medium-sized enterprises, banking, transport, technology, and agricultural sectors (Öztaş and Polat, 2019, p. 8). The position of the North African country is also appreciated for Turkey by the fact that Libya is seen as a "gateway" to gaining economic influence on the continent and a stable presence can facilitate access to potential economic investment in other African countries (Besenyő, 2021, p. 78).

Military Intervention by Turkey in Libya

In the following chapter, Turkey's military intervention in Libya is presented as a powerful foreign and geopolitical move. The domestic political events in Libya has brought about that the use of "hard power", i.e. military force, has become inevitable from Ankara's point of view in achieving its strategic goals. The offensive launched by General Haftar in April 2019 to occupy Tripoli in December 2019 posed an increasingly serious threat to the Libyan unity government. As a result, on 20 December 2019, GNA formally requested military assistance from Turkey by air, land and sea under a military agreement signed in November (Mahmoud, 2019). Erdoğan submitted a proposal to the Grand National Assembly on 30 December 2019, and on 2 January 2020, the Turkish parliament passed a bill authorizing the government to send troops to Libya to support the GNA for one year (Sayın, 2020).

Military assistance, as I mentioned earlier, had a precedent. Since the start of Haftar's operation against Tripoli, Turkey has unofficially supported the government of el-Saraj by various military means (International Crisis Group, 2020). However, with the signing of a military agreement in November, Turkey has entered into a phase of open military support that has significantly increased and deepened the country's involvement in the Libyan conflict, helping the unity government to slow the advance of Haftar's coalition forces. As a part of its military assistance, since January 2020, Ankara has sent more than 100 Turkish military officers to Libya, primarily to assist and coordinate the operations of government forces and to train local allied forces. Turkey has also increased the supply of military equipment and weapons to government forces and allies. By January 2020, Ankara had provided GNA with military drones (Bayraktar TB-2), missiles, armored personnel carriers (BMC Kirpi), Turkish operating personnel and experts. According to the International Crisis Group (2020), several cargo ships arrived from Turkey carrying military equipment. Medium-range anti-aircraft missiles were deployed by the Turkish army at Tripoli and Misrata airports, increasing the security and defense of strategic hubs. In April 2020, Ankara stepped up intervention and commanded two warships off the coast of western Libya. The Turkish Air Force has been deployed several times, primarily for reconnaissance and deterrence purposes (International Crisis Group, 2020).

In addition, of course, the forces supporting Haftar also increased arms deliveries to the country. In January 2020, LNA forces recaptured the city of Sirte, which has been the biggest military success for them since April 2019. In February 2020, Haftar's troops attacked Tripoli with missiles, and Turkish air defense missiles were also deployed during the defense. On 18 February 2020, an LNA-affiliated unit fired a rocket at a Turkish ship stationed in Tripoli, killing two Turkish soldiers. On 28 February 2020, more than a hundred missiles were fired at Tripoli's only operating airport, Mitiga Airport, where the Turkish army has set up an operations center (Aslan, 2020, p. 93).

On 26 March 2020, the Turkish-backed Libyan unity government launched a counter-offensive (Operation Peace Storm) to help the capital. While fighting continued in and around

the capital, in April 2020, GNA units achieved military success in western Libya. Government forces successfully cut off Haftar's supply route, which transported fuel, food, and weapons to their allies. As a result, on 14 April 2020, GNA units captured Sabratah and Surman, which were under the control of security forces loyal to Haftar for nearly a year. On 18 April, government troops advanced into the city of Tarhuna, which was Haftar's priority military base and from which they directed the operation against Tripoli. GNA forces began bombing and encircling the city, but were unable to occupy it until the moment the manuscript was submitted (Canli, 2020).

As a part of military aid to the Libyan government, Ankara recruited militants from groups fighting on the side of the Turks in northern Syria. Fighters recruited from the Faylaq al-Sham group, mostly affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the Murad Sultan Squadron of the Turkmen resistance unit, were tasked with assisting the military objectives of the al-Sarraj government to be achieved. According to Akoush and McKernan (2020), the small Asian country had already transported 650 members of the Syrian National Army (SNA) opposition armed group to Turkey to Tripoli in December 2019, even before the authorization by the Turkish parliament of the intervention in Libya to strengthen the unity government. In January 2020, an additional 1,350 Syrian fighters arrived in the country. With them, GNA signed a half-year, $ 2,000-a-month contract. Different figures are available for the number of Syrian soldiers present in Libya. According to the International Crisis Group (2020), about 2,000 fighters arrived in Tripoli in January 2020 and an additional 2,500 in March, but the LNA says the number could exceed 6,000.

The reception of Syrian fighters in Libya was quite mixed. Haftar and the United Arab Emirates, which supported the LNA, have sharply criticized Turkey, calling those coming from Syria outright foreign terrorist fighters or seen as a risk of escalation of violence. The views of the Syrian militants were not clear from the GNA either, who treated the situation with relative reservations. Rejecting criticism, however, Ankara justified "Syrian military assistance" by "outsourcing" tasks and likened the Wagner Group to some 2,000 Russian military mercenaries in Libya and some 5,000 Sudanese units (Jones, 2020).

Influence by the Turkish Military Industry in Libya

In addition to permanent civil war situations, many external actors have played and continued to play to varying degrees in shaping the country's political and military developments. These actors are also gaining more and more military influence in the country, whether it is arms transfers, support for political groups, or even direct military intervention (Ilchenko et al., 2021, p. 439). Turkey is also standing out among these actors, as it can intervene more and more effectively in the military development in Libya in terms of own objectives. The direct involvement of the Turkish armed forces in Libya, as explained in detail above, began early

2020. Turkey had been involved in the conflict before that, but mainly with military advisers, intelligence, and training assistance.

In a relatively short period of time, Turkish troops, mostly land units and air and naval units, helped advance GNA forces, recaptured several cities, and inflicted heavy losses on General Halifa Haftar's forces. Besides, Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles in Libya could destroy modern Russian air defense equipment. By mid-2020, owing to strong Turkish support, Tripoli had also been recaptured from Haftar. The balance of power changed in favor of the Turkish side during the summer months to such an extent that there were several airstrikes against Turkish targets by other external actors to limit Turkish influence. The August 2020 ceasefire between the two Libyan governments brought a temporary respite to the conflict. However, this proved to be only short-lived and served much more for both sides to prepare for further stages of the conflict (ACSRT, 2021, p. 4).

One of the Turkish weapons deployed in Libya is the Korkut Mobile Air Defense Unit. The crawler self-propelled air defense system, developed and manufactured by Aselsan is specifically designed to protect the air of mechanized units. The machine gun ammunition is also developed and manufactured in Turkey. The weapon is most effectively deployed against unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles. The former has been exemplified in many cases in Libya, as the device has successfully destroyed several drones belonging to the Eastern government or one of its foreign supporters. Another six-engine device is the T-155 Firtina self-propelled gun and the T-122 Sakarya rocket launcher. The means were used to destroy enemy artillery posts and assets in Libya, also with success. Combined with radars measuring enemy artillery shells and positions, the Turkish artillery was able to elicit a response in 30 to 60 seconds. In response, eastern government forces even reactivated mobile artillery units from the Gaddafi era and were able to successfully retaliate against Turkish forces for some time (Thomas, 2020, p. 8).

Another Turkish military technical device is the Bayraktar TB-2 unmanned aerial vehicle. The armed drones could be deployed by the Turkish forces in an extremely highly integrated system on the Libyan battlefield. It was used successfully not only to destroy the artillery devices already involved, but also against a variety of moving vehicles. In Libya, it has proven to be surprisingly resistant to various attempts at electronic interference. Another drone is the Anka S drone. The reconnaissance drone "cooperated" primarily with Bayraktar TB-2 and other armed drones, and took part in artillery guidance, surveillance, and reconnaissance tasks. The Akıncı unmanned aerial vehicle is a completely new HALE-category drone manufactured by Baykar and has been deployed in Libya (Pack and Pusztai, 2020, p. 5).

The Koral electronic warfare system assisted the activities of Turkish air and ground units. The Hisar-A and Hisar-O anti-aircraft missile systems were deployed in Libya by Roketsan's short- and medium-range crawler anti-aircraft missile systems, together with troop deployments in the spring of 2020. Hisar-A provided mobile air defense for maneuvering Turkish land formations, and Hisar-O provided air defense for Turkish advanced bases, air

bases, and warehouse facilities. The interesting thing about the TMR-II robot is that the military robots manufactured by the company Elektroland have already been deployed by the Turkish army in the controlled areas of Libya, where it was mainly used to detect and deactivate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines and other installed explosives (Thomas, 2020, p. 8).

Conclusion

During the the Arab Spring, Turkey realized that these geopolitical changes will create a different security environment in the Middle East as well as the Eastern Mediterranean in which if it wants to preserve the zero-problem foreign policy then it must be at the forefront instead of simply follow the events. The zero-problem foreign policy of the Turkish government that used to work well was no longer applicable to the "new" security situation. This recognition led to the revision of zero-problem policy and introduced a more realist Turkish foreign policy strategy which confirmes the paper's hypothesis. The events of the Arab Spring in Libya posed a threat to Turkish national interests but the Turkish government was able to forge an advantage from it by applying a reconsidered foreign policy that was used in the country.

With the Turkish military intervention in January 2020, the Libyan unity government managed to avoid a complete military collapse and even launched a counter-offensive in some areas. Paradoxically, Ankara's political goal with open military intervention - counterbalancing the military power of the LNA and the countries that support it - was to strengthen the GNA affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and to promote a ceasefire for the opposing parties as soon as possible and to resolve their political differences through negotiation. This goal was essentially achieved through the new Provisional Unity Government, which took office on 15 March 2021 under the leadership of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh.

On the one hand, Turkey sees Libya as a "geopolitical buffer state" where gaining a stable position vis-à-vis Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia could have a positive impact on the political and economic influence of the Asia Minor country in the Middle East and North Africa region. On the other hand, gaining ground in Libya could also help Ankara's goals in the Eastern Mediterranean and thus fight for a more favorable position in the negotiations on hydrocarbon reserves.

Finally, as regards the influence of the Turkish military industry, Turkey has successfully achieved its operational objectives in Libya with a high-tech intervention force, forcing external actors in support of the other government to take serious action.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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The Winner Takes It All?

Who Benefits from China's Increasing Presence in Francophone Africa?

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Abstract:

In this paper we explore whether China's presence in Francophone Africa is to the detriment or the benefit of the countries of the region. In each of our five case studies - the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, Guinea, Mauritius and Djibouti - we examine the respective countries' motivations to cooperate with China, the advantages and disadvantages derived from the relationship, China's drivers in its Africa-relations, and whether the cooperation can be considered successful for both sides. We find our hypothesis verified. The selected countries are indeed attracted to China primarily by the need for financial resources and infrastructure development and the promise of non-interference in domestic politics. China is motivated primarily by global trade and political ambitions, raw materials and the growing regional market. With certain limitations, the relationship between Francophone Africa and China can indeed be a win-win relationship.

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Introduction

Compared with Europe, the People's Republic of China (China) is a new player on the African continent, having been present in the region for less than seven decades. Its presence, however, has become significant in a relatively short period of time, as "the most important set of dynamics to shape Africa's external relations since the end of the Cold War" (Kopinski, Polus, and Taylor 2011, p. 129). Beijing's economic penetration is the most visible aspect of the relationship, yet it shouldn't necessarily mean that it is driven by purely economic interests. In fact, even at the very beginning of the cooperation, the Sino-African relationship was typically driven by ideological and political motivations, while economic relations were of secondary importance. Economic interests were added to these motivations later on, but it should be stressed that this aspect did not replace but only supplemented the earlier set of motivations (Szunomár et al. 2017).

In many ways, China is becoming a direct competitor of developed country actors in Africa. This tendency is further reinforced by African countries' foreign policy strategies, that seek to diversify their external relations and are in many ways more open to a power that lends money but does not expect reforms in return; builds long-awaited infrastructure but does not wish to interfere in internal affairs; offers affordable technology, youth exchanges and medical training programmes; and has pledged 1 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine to African governments at the 2021 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

Several different narratives have emerged in recent years on Africa's relationship with China. The Chinese narrative emphasises the 'win-win' nature of the relationship, that is, cooperation is presented as mutually beneficial (FOCAC, 2018). Furthermore, China also represents a long-awaited, gap-filling source of investments to build infrastructure for African countries (Taylor, 2006) and appears as a positive development model from the Third World (Alden 2005). Meanwhile, most Western narratives typically see China as an exploitative power, an emerging actor in the new scramble for the continent's natural resources (Lee 2006; Marton and Matura 2011) and markets (Adovor Tsikudo 2021) driving African countries into commodities-export dependence (Sindzingre 2011) or debt traps (Carmody et al. 2021). Others highlight the complementarity between China's capital abundancy and resource needs and Africa's natural resource abundancy as well as infrastructure and investment needs (Wilson 2005). Furthermore, Zeleza (2014) points out that China's increasing weight in global supply chains may curb Africa's industrialization and development opportunities.Opinions and perceptions of China's presence in Africa are also divided among African people: Beijing is seen either as a saviour or a new coloniser (Dadzie 2012). The truth probably lies somewhere in between these two positions, while the cooperation between Africa and China brings both opportunities and challenges for African countries.

There is no clear demarcation line between Francophone and other African countries' relations with China, i.e. the characteristics and narratives of Sino-African relations also characterise Sino-Francophone African relations. Nevertheless, one can detect a significant

difference in the level of economic performance (GDP) and human development between former British and French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding five North-African countries and South Africa with different historical and development paths and former Portuguese or Spanish colonies). Scholars researching this phenomenon (Crowder 1968, Firmin-Sellers 2000; Grier, 1999; Njoh, 2000) explain the lag of Francophone countries – former French and Belgian colonies – with the legacy of the socio-political systems of colonial governance. If we regard GDP per capita as an indicator (WDI, 2022), this finding is also valid for the recent years. After excluding two high-income outliers, the small countries of Mauritius and the Seychelles Islands, the average GDP per capita of Anglophone countries is nearly one-third higher than that of their Francophone counterparts South of the Sahara for the period of 2015-2019 (See Appendix 1). This implies that French-speaking African countries are more demanding for external investments and infrastructural support that, among others, China can provide. Moreover, as Donou-Adonsou and Lim (2018) highlight, Chinese investments seem to be playing a relatively more important role in the region's income per capita increase compared with those of the traditional economic partners of the continent, namely, developed countries of the West. Besides, they also claim that Chinese investments raise standard of living in Francophone African countries more than French ones (Donou-Adonsou and Lim, 2018). On the basis of these findings, we have decided to focus our research on the relations between Chinese and Francophone Africa.

In this paper we explore whether China's presence in Francophone Africa is actually to the detriment or the benefit of the countries of the region. To ensure higher external validity of our results, we apply a most-different-cases research design (Seawright and Gerring 2008). That is, we selected cases that differ from each other in a number of ways to reflect the variation in the overall sample. In each of our five case studies - the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, Guinea, Mauritius and Djibouti - we examine why the respective Francophone African countries decided to cooperate with China, what advantages and disadvantages have been derived from the cooperation, what motivations have driven and continue to drive China in its Africa-relations, and whether the cooperation can be considered successful for both sides. According to our hypothesis, Francophone African countries choose to cooperate with China primarily due to the need for financial resources and infrastructure development (and the lack of political expectations associated with these), while China continues to be driven by political motivations. The access to raw materials and the growing local market are also important aspects: through African countries, Beijing is creating a diplomatic backbone that will boost its international image and thus support China's rise as a great power.

Our article is structured as follows: in the first section, we briefly review the history of Sino-African relations as well as the dynamics of the development of economic relations, supported by statistical data. Then, after briefly summing up our methodology, we present our five cases and analyse them in separate subsections, highlighting the specificities of each relationship. In the conclusion, we summarise our findings and examine the verification of our hypothesis.

China-Africa Relations in Historical Perspective

Although China's rise as a great power in recent years has drawn more attention to China's presence in Africa, in fact the relationship between China and Africa is far from being entirely new. After the proclamation of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, Beijing showed ideological solidarity with the less developed countries of Africa almost straight away, as early as the 1950s and 1960s, to promote Chinese-style communism as opposed to both Soviet and American ideologies. Beijing sought comprehensive alliances with the countries of the region, which at the time were mainly of diplomatic - rather than economic or political - importance to China, especially on the issue of non-recognition of Taiwan.

Since the 1980s, China has also been involved in economically beneficial cooperation. From this period onwards, many Chinese companies set up operations in Africa to participate directly in, for example, construction projects, often financed by Chinese loans. In addition to the involvement of Chinese firms, the use of Chinese raw materials also characterised the cooperation and was also an important element of Chinese aid programmes. Of course, China did not initiate its support to Africa out of goodwill, but from the beginning it has sought to ensure that cooperation benefits both sides, albeit not equally, for example, through infrastructure development that could not otherwise have been achieved on the African continent. Another benefit of Chinese aid has been to make African political-economic elites more China-friendly. Consequently, the international reaction to the events of 1989 was not really echoed in Africa, as the continent's leaders did not condemn the Beijing government's intervention in Tiananmen Square. But African countries - which tend to vote in a bloc in multilateral fora (Alden 2005) - have been counted on whenever China, Chinese foreign policy or the human rights situation is discussed.

Both China's going global policy (zou chu qu) in the early 2000s and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 was accompanied by a growing Chinese engagement globally. Therefore, China's role in Africa, both economically and politically, has continued to grow since the turn of the millennium. In 2000, for example, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established at China's initiative, while diplomatic visits have also increased. Of Africa's 54 countries, 53 - including all the Francophone African countries - abide by the One China principle, i.e., they acknowledge that there is only one sovereign state under the name China, governed by the PRC and Taiwan is part of it. Meanwhile, China has also made progress on the economic front, accounting for more than 15% of Africa's trade in 2020 and disbursing USD 153 billion in loans to the continent between 2000 and 2019 (Pairault 2021).

In parallel with the expansion of trade, the product structure has also changed: As far as the structure of exports from China to (Francophone) African countries is concerned, it is very similar to the structure of China's exports to other regions and countries. In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese exports consisted mainly of light industry products, foodstuffs, and chemical products, but since the turn of the millennium, exports of machinery, mechanical engineering products, automobiles and electronics have also increased significantly. Chinese exports to

Africa were initially dominated by primary products such as cotton and phosphate, but the export structure has changed significantly in recent years. Today, energy, raw materials and minerals are clearly dominant, which fits perfectly into the African export structure. To put it simply: China needs the same from Africa as any other country.

Figure 1. Trade between China and Francophone Africa, mUSD. Source: Authors' own compilation based on statistics from the Johns Hopkins University, SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative Database

As regards foreign direct investment (FDI), Chinese FDI is a less common form of Chinese economic presence in Africa compared with Chinese presence in the developed world. The majority of those foreign direct investment projects that took place are mostly linked to the production of raw materials. Consequently, those Francophone African countries that are rich in raw materials - such as oil, bauxite, iron ore and copper - are the main destinations of Chinese FDI. Such raw materials do not only attract Chinese capital to mining, but also to infrastructure, since raw materials extracted from the acquired mines have to be transported from the mine to the port so as it can be shipped to China.

Figure 2. Sectoral distribution of Chinese FDI in Africa (2013-2019). Source: Authors' own compilation based on the database of Johns Hopkins University, SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative.

The primary purpose of most of the infrastructure projects implemented by Chinese construction companies are therefore not necessarily to improve the well-being of the Francophone African population, but to provide the first steps in the supply of raw materials to China. At the same time, investments have also been made in projects such as hydroelectric power stations and public facilities that have a broader social benefit for the analysed African countries. These projects - in addition to generating substantial revenues for the Chinese constructors - have in many cases been financed by Chinese bank loans.

Figure 3. Construction revenues of Chinese companies in African countries, 1998-2019 (mUSD) Source: Authors' own compilation based on the database of Johns Hopkins University, SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative. (To ensure clarity, only values above 10 billion USD are shown.)

Variations of Francophone African and Chinese Relations: Case Studies

Taking stock of the relations between all 25 Francophone African countries and China, we can conclude that the relationship is not a particularly important one, apart from the fact that the Chinese presence is growing there in line with global trends. There are, however, a few Francophone African countries that are strategically important partners for China. In the following, we focus on these relations through case studies, describing the variations in the relations between the selected countries and China. The countries we have chosen to examine, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algeria, Guinea, Mauritius, and Djibouti, have been selected on the basis of a most-different-cases research design. That is, we tried to ensure that our case studies reflect variations in the Sino-Franco-African relationship, both in terms of territory, population, and the characteristics of the Chinese presence. We have sought to include countries of all sizes (small, medium, large) and levels of development (relatively more developed, developing, and underdeveloped), that represent all regions of French-speaking Africa and have experienced substantial progress in their economic relations with China in the past years.

As will be shown below, in each of these relations, one can observe substantial development of economic relations, but in most cases in a rather one-sided way. Although there are several similarities between the five cases, there is no uniform pattern. That is, the nature of the relationship, the relevant sectors and African export products are often different, mainly due to the characteristics and specificities of the Francophone African country concerned. There are, however, similarities between the structure of imports from China and the Chinese companies involved in infrastructure and extraction projects in the region.

Each chapter covers the development and characteristics of the trade relationship, the amount of FDI inflows and the sectors targeted, as well as the characteristics of the infrastructure built/under construction by Chinese companies, and the level of related loans.

During the analysis, we faced challenges as regards access to data. On the one hand, it was difficult to find reliable and comparable data on both the Chinese and the African side, while on the other hand, the discrepancy between the two national statistics - that of the respective African countries and the Chinese - was often significant. For these reasons, we tried to use statistics from international databases to ensure comparability. For bilateral trade data, we used data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC, 2021)[3], while for FDI and infrastructure projects we used statistics from the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) [4]. For both databases, we have also cross-checked our data with the UN Comtrade and UNCTAD databases whenever it was possible. In addition to showing the amount of money spent and sectoral priorities, the CGIT database also helped us to identify those Chinese companies

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[3] https://oec.world/en
[4] https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/

active in the region. Data on the extent of loans granted by Chinese banks was taken from the China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI)[5] database.

Guinea

In many ways, the China and Guinea relation is a prime example of the relationships between China and resource-rich developing countries. Guinea has a wealth of valuable resources - it is the world's second largest producer of bauxite, accounting for around 22% of the world's bauxite production and the largest currently discovered deposit (USGS 2021) - but it is very poor. It therefore needs significant investment and technological know-how to take advantage of its potential. This is where China comes in, for which the continued and cheap supply of minerals such as bauxite, iron ore, and nickel is of strategic importance, both in the short and long term. China has a large amount of capital and several construction companies: it can use its capital to invest and buy mining rights, or provide loans to the Guinean government, while its large companies can carry out the necessary infrastructure development. However, this process can ultimately lead to considerable vulnerability and does not necessarily contribute to Guinea's future development.

The above process is well illustrated by the trade relationship between the two countries. Until 2015, Guinea exported almost nothing to the East Asian power, while China exported a very diverse package, typically including clothing, footwear, motorbikes, rice, and electronics, according to the OEC.

Figure 4. Guinea-Chine trade data 2010-2019 (mUSD). Source: Authors' own compilation based on OEC data

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[5] https://chinaafricaloandata.bu.edu/

However, after 2015, exports to China started to increase significantly, mainly for bauxite - and other processed forms of bauxite - which is the raw material for aluminium production. By the second half of the decade, China had become Guinea's main export partner alongside the United Arab Emirates: while in 2010 exports to China accounted for 2.5% of the country's total exports, in 2019 this figure had increased almost 14-fold. In parallel, the share of bauxite in total Guinean exports rose from 30% to 46%. This significant increase was also reflected in the Guinean trade balance: the deficit that had been present in the first half of the decade turned into a surplus from 2017. The trade balance with China, too, has been positive since 2017.

Figure 5. Chinese investments and construction agreements in Guinea 2011-2021 (mUSD). Source: Authors' own compilation based on CGIT data

Based on CGIT data, a total of USD 12.51 billion of Chinese investment and construction contracts were identified for the period 2011-2021. A slightly larger share of this - nearly USD 7 billion - has been spent on construction and development contracts, while a smaller share was allocated for investments. Considering the above, it is not surprising that one third of the FDI and development projects are related to bauxite extraction. Hydropower and real estate development projects account for roughly 20% each, but iron ore, steel mining and transport have also attracted Chinese companies to the country.

Societe Miniere de Boke (SMB) and Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) are the country's two largest bauxite producers. SMB is owned by a consortium including Shandong Weiqiao, a subsidiary of China Hongqiao, one of the world's leading aluminium producers (SWI 2021). Chinese companies have also acquired mining rights in Guinea on several further occasions. In 2013, China Power Investment Corporation signed a mining rights contract with the Guinean government to explore and extract the Boffa bauxite deposit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2014). The extraction was supported by a $590 million investment by Chinalco in 2018, according to CGIT. To facilitate the transportation of bauxite,

China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) completed the construction of a railway line from Boffa to Boke in July 2021, doubling the one-way freight capacity (GlobalData 2021). Further phases of the project include the exploitation of bauxite resources in the new mining areas of Santou II and Houda, and the development of an alumina refinery in the Boke Special Economic Zone. Furhermore, in 2019, China Nonferrous Metal Industry Foreign Engineering and Construction signed a $1.1 billion agreement to build the Telimele bauxite mine and related infrastructure. The mine has a planned production capacity of 20 million tonnes per year of bauxite and refined rock suitable for alumina production (Reuters 2019).

Guinea also has the world's largest and one of the highest quality untapped iron ore deposits at the Simandou location. Understandably this has caught the attention of Chinese companies, which have also acquired several interests in Guinean iron ore mines. The Kalia iron ore mine, with an ore reserve of nearly 87.5 million tonnes at an iron grade of 54.1%, reached full capacity in 2018. The project, financed by the China International Fund, cost an estimated USD 4.45 billion and included the associated railways and port infrastructure (Mining Technology 2013). Production has not yet started at the Simandou iron ore mine, but the mining rights are divided into four separate blocks and Chinese companies have interests in each (NikkeiAsia, 2020). However, in order to access the vast quantities of iron ore hidden in Simandou, the mined iron ore must be transported to the Atlantic. This will require the construction of nearly 650 km of railways, 35 bridges, 24 km of tunnels and a deep-sea port at a total estimated cost of USD 23 billion (Reuters 2017). The Simandou project is thus directly linked to the construction of the Trans-Guinea railway line. The railway line is being built by China Railway Construction (China Daily 2020), the same company that built the railway line between the cities of Boke and Kindia, opened in the summer of 2021 (Railway Technology 2021).

In addition to the construction of the railways, the country's two largest hydroelectric power plants (Kaleta and Soupati) were also built by Chinese companies: China International Water & Electric Corporation (Tagmydeals 2022) and Three Gorges Corporation (NS Energy 2022), respectively. The Chinese hydroelectric power plants are also depicted on Guinean banknotes: the new 20,000 Guinean franc banknote of 2015 features the new Kaleta hydroelectric power plant, while the 5,000 franc note shows the Kinkon hydroelectric power plant, also built by the Chinese in 1960. The construction work was financed by a credit line from the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM) and - in addition to the two large companies mentioned above - involved several further Chinese subcontractors. Chinese companies have also been contracted by the Guinean government to develop the port of Conakry for $770 million (Reuters, 2016), a housing complex of 5,000 apartments in Kansonyah (CAHF 2018); or a new modern district of Conakry, the 'Guinea Mar Grandioso', yet to be built (Plaza Diamant Website 2022).

In the CARI database, eight loan agreements between China and Guinea are recorded since 2010, for a total of USD 2.6 billion. As an outstanding indication of the country's economic

importance to China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China granted USD 20 billion to Guinea in 2017 for a 20-year term (Barma 2017). This has been a particularly big deal because Guinea's GDP in 2018 was USD 11.857 billion (by 2020 it reached USD 15.681 billion) (World Bank 2022). Hence, China provided almost double the country's GDP.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

Diplomatic relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (later mentioned as DRC or Congo) and China got off to a turbulent start: in October 1960, the newly independent predecessor of the DRC, then called the Republic of the Congo, established diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2006), changed its recognition to the People's Republic of China in February 1961, and then recognised Taiwan again in September of the same year. Diplomatic relations were finally stabilised in 1972 between the DRC, then known as the Republic of Zaire, and the People's Republic of China (Rockefeller Foundation 2010). Since then, the relationship has been balanced and growing in economic terms, especially since the 2000s.

China is clearly Congo's most important export partner: in 2019, more than half of all exports went to China, according to the OEC database. Copper and cobalt exports accounted for the largest share, with 47% of exports to China being cobalt and 42% copper. However, while copper comes to China from multiple sources, 88% of refined or pre-processed cobalt and 97% of cobalt ore originated from Congo in 2019. Thanks to its significant mineral exports, the DRC, like Guinea, has enjoyed a consistent trade surplus with China in the second half of the decade. Just as in most of the cases in Africa, Chinese imports are very diverse, with the most common import products being automotive and electronics products, as well as clothing and footwear.

Figure 6. DRC-China trade data 2010-2019 (mUSD). Source: Authors' own compilation based on OEC data

The cornerstone of the relationship between the DRC and China is the so-called Sicomines Agreement (Jansson 2011). This multi-billion-dollar mineral exchange agreement, concluded in 2009, created the Sino-Congolese mining joint venture Sino-Congolais des Mines (Sicomines) and allocated mining rights to Chinese companies in the mineral-rich south-eastern province of Katanga. In exchange for access to the mining rights, Sicomines promised to build transport and social infrastructure financed by loans from China's Exim Bank. Repayment of the loans is to be covered by profits from the mining venture. Under the agreement, China has committed to invest USD 3 billion to rebuild a disused mine and to invest a further USD 6 billion in infrastructure, including more than 3,000 kilometres of railways, 7,000 kilometres of roads, hospitals, and hydroelectric power stations. In return, Chinese companies have gained access to 10.6 million tonnes of copper and 600 000 tonnes of cobalt. In the years since, however, there have been significant tensions over both the agreement and the project: according to a 2017 Carter Center report, USD 685 million in loans related to Sicomines' infrastructure projects have disappeared and there is no evidence that the money has been used for its intended purpose (The Carter Center 2017). In 2021, the Congolese government initiated a review of mining concessions (Reuters 2021).

According to the CGIT database, between 2008 and 2020 China spent a total of USD 14.34 billion on investment and construction activity in Congo. The bulk of this amount - more than USD 10 billion - is FDI, the rest being construction contracts. Of the total value of projects, 80% are related to copper and cobalt mining and processing. In addition, there is significant activity in hydropower and power network projects.

Figure 7. Chinese investment and construction activities in DRC between 2008 and 2020 (mUSD). Source: Authors' own compilation based on CGIT data

We identified 20 Sino-Congolese mining projects up to 2021. These include operating mines, mines under construction and other sites (see Table 1). Overall, as a result of the Sicomines agreement and the acquisitions that followed in the decade after, Chinese

companies and their interests now control nearly 70% of the Congolese mining sector (Reuters 2021).

Year	Acquisition	Affected mines
2011	China Minmentals Group acquired Anvil Mining for USD 1.28 billion	Kinsevere and Mutoshi (Reuters 2012)
2012	China Railway Groups' share in three mining projects	Luishia (72%), KMK 71%, Sicomines (33%) (China Railway Group Limited 2012)
2012	Jinchuan Group acquired Metorex company	Kinsenda, Ruashi, Dilala East and Lubembe (Jinchuan Group 2016,Metorex Limited 2022)
2015	Zijin Mining Group gained a 49.5% stake in Ivanhoe Mines for an investment of USD 412 million	Kamoa-Kalua (Zijin 2015)
2015	DongFang International Mining (subsidiary of Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt) bought mining rights in deposits $52 million	Luiwishi, Lukuni (Reuters 2015)
2016	China Molybdenum acquired stakes from Freeport-McMoran's (56%) and Lundin Mining's (24%)	Tenke Fungurume(Li 2016, Lundin Mining 2016)
2016	Strategic partnership: China Nonferrous and Eurasian Resources Group (ERG)	Frontier (ERG 2016)
2016	ERG Metakol Tailings: 112 million tonne extraction concession	Musono (RRPLC 2019)
2017	China Nonferrous agreed a USD 420 million investment with Yunnan Copper Industry Group to establish a copper smelter (S&P Global 2017)	
2018	Sinomine HK bought subsidiaries and mining rights from Tiger Resources	Kipoi, Lupoto (Tiger Resources Limited 2018)
2020	China Nonferrous Metal Mining's mine (51%) started operation	Deziwa, Kambove, Lualaba copper smelter, Mabende smelter (Reuters 2020a,Bloomberg 2020)
2020	China Molybdenum acquired Freeport McMoran's 95% stake	Kisanfu (Reuters 2020b)

Table 1. Sino-Congolese mining projects. Source: Authors' own compilation based on press reports

Besides mining and related acquisitions, there is also significant cooperation between the two countries on infrastructure projects. In 2009, China's Sinohydro and the Congolese government signed an agreement for the construction of the Zongo II hydropower plant, worth USD 360 million (African Energy 2019). The power plant is in operation since 2018, has an annual capacity of 850,000 megawatts of electricity generation and was fully financed by China's EximBank through a 20-year loan at 5% interest rate. The construction of the high-voltage grid connecting the power plant to Kinshasa and Kinsuka is also financed by China's EximBank (Takouleu 2019). But this is not the only hydropower project involving Chinese companies: in addition to agreements to build smaller-capacity hydropower plants in Busuga (Global Construction Review 2016), Sombwei (Banktrack 2021) and Kolwezi (MarketScreener 2019), there are more ambitious projects in the pipeline. If built, the Grand Inga power plant could be the world's largest hydroelectric power plant, with a planned capacity of 44,000

megawatts (Gnassou 2019). This includes the Inga III dam and power plant with a capacity of 12,000 megawatts. To build it, the Congolese government selected a Sino-Spanish-German consortium of 6 Chinese companies, which together own 75% of the project, including China Three Gorges Corporation, PowerChina and Sinohydro. In 2020, the Spanish partner announced its withdrawal from the project (Takouleu 2020).

Under the Sicomines agreement, credit lending from China started in 2008. CARI's database lists a total of 51 loan agreements for the DRC for the period 2008-2019, worth USD 2.087 billion. These were predominantly spent on transport (USD 1,015 million) and energy projects (USD 676 million), with more significant amounts also going to infocommunications (USD 167 million) and health (USD 115 million).

The importance of good relations with Congo for China is also illustrated by the fact that in January 2021, the Chinese government agreed to cancel USD 28 million of Congolese debt and pledged a further USD 17 million in aid, mainly for development projects.

Beyond economic relations, military cooperation is another area worth mentioning: China has contributed to the reform of the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC). In addition to the provision of military equipment, the FARDC headquarters and a naval base have been built with the support of Chinese companies (Omanyundu 2018). The DRC also joined the BRI initiative (Nyabiage 2021).

Algeria

The relationship between Algeria and China has been shaped by historical factors. When the FLN (National Liberation Front) proclaimed Algeria's provisional government in December 1958, China was the first non-Arab country to recognise it. After Algeria's independence in 1962, China provided substantial support in the form of food supplies, loans and equipment (Byrne 2016; Larkin 1973). The relationship appeared strategic: on the political front, China and Algeria closely coordinated their efforts in the UN on issues ranging from the Arab-Israeli conflict to apartheid in South Africa (Olimat 2014). However, Soviet-Chinese rivalry resulted in the two countries to drift somewhat apart during the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, during the economic and political crises of the 1990s, China sold an estimated USD 100 million worth of arms to Algeria (Grimmett 2003).

For our analysis, it is therefore important to note that economic and political relations between the two countries were already intensive and there was a coomon ground for their cooperation, such as confrontation with the West and the tradition of a similar economic-political structure, that is, the strong state control of the economy.

The spectacular re-appearance of China in Algeria dates back to the beginning of the new millennium. Once the security and political situation in Algeria had stabilised and the country had rapidly gained access to huge amounts of oil revenues, the government began to tackle the two main problems needed to maintain stability: housing and unemployment. The Economic Development Framework Programmes (EDFPs) were mainly used to build

infrastructure and housing, backed up by massive public investment, which provided a good platform for Chinese state conglomerates to enter the market (Calabrese 2017). It is therefore not surprising that in 2014 Algeria became the first Arab country to build a comprehensive strategic partnership with China (Li, 2021).

In line with the above, trade between the two countries has also intensified. While Chinese exports were almost negligible in 2000, in the 2010s Algeria became China's largest market in the Maghreb region and China replaced France as Algeria's largest supplier. In 2012 and 2013, for example, the Algerian market was the largest market for Chinese-made passenger cars (Calabrese 2017). At the same time, however, in contrast to the two cases discussed above, a trade deficit has emerged in the relations: while in 2000 imports from China accounted for just over 2% of total annual imports into Algeria, this figure had increased to almost 18% by 2019. Oil products account for literally all (more than 99%) of Algeria's exports to China, while the Chinese export consists mainly of automotive and electronics products.

Figure 8. Algeria-China trade data 2000-2019 (mUSD). Source: Authors' own compilation based on OEC data

As mentioned above, infrastructure development has been a central element of economic development in Algeria since the early 2000s, and China has played a significant role in the local construction boom: between 1998 and 2019, the revenues of Chinese companies from construction contracts in Africa were the highest (80.32 billion dollars) in Algeria according to CARI database. The sharp increase is illustrated in Graph 9 below. Some estimate that Chinese firms accounted for nearly 80% of development contracts in the 2000s (Pairault 2014). The CGIT database shows construction contracts worth USD 24.61 billion between 2005 and 2020, most of which are for transport development (rail and road networks, airport development and port construction) and other construction and energy (oil and gas, but also solar farms) (African Review 2013).

In addition to the above, Chinese companies have completed a number of prestigious projects, including the new Algiers airport (CSCECOS 2022a), the Olympic stadium in Oran

(MCC 2012), the new buildings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Constitutional Court, the country's largest prison and five large hotels, the first shopping mall, the expansion of the railway network (Railway Technology 2009) and several highways (CITIC Construction 2022, CSCECOS 2022b), the longest tunnel in North Africa (ECNS 2017), and a 750 km water pipeline and a nuclear power plant (Pairault 2014). This 'special relationship' with the construction industry is symbolised by the fact that the Great Mosque of Algiers, which is set to become Africa's largest mosque, and the capital's new port were both built by the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (The State Council of PRC 2016). In view of the above, Chinese stakeholders could afford to be generous, as the Algiers Opera House, which opened in 2016, was a USD 40 million gift from Beijing to the African country (Khettab 2016).

Figure 9. Construction revenue of Chinese companies in Algeria 1998-2019 (mUSD). Source: Authors' own compilation based on data from Johns Hopkins University, SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative

Closely linked to the intensive presence in the construction industry is the fact that several Algerian cement factories are owned by Chinese companies (Sinoma Construction Co. Ltd. 2016). Such huge investments and construction works often go hand in hand with the inflow of Chinese workers; there is even a Chinatown in Algiers. However, the issue of 'taking jobs away' caused public outcry, and the government has finally capped the proportion of Chinese workers on construction sites at 20% (Pairault, 2014).

Although construction is clearly the most important element of the economic relationship, the sale and production of cars and commercial vehicles is the second area where Chinese companies have a strong presence in Algeria. However, Chinese operators have already encountered obstacles: In February 2015, Algeria imposed an obligation on all foreign car dealers to set up assembly plants in the country, in order to reduce the country's dependence on foreign vehicles and imports (Economist Intelligence 2015). Accordingly, joint ventures have been set up, for example, between the Chinese Anhui Jiamghuai Automobile Company (JAC) and the Algerian Emin Auto to build a truck assembly plant, and between the Chinese

car manufacturer Foton and the Algerian car dealer KIV to build a car and truck assembly plant (Xinhua 2017a).

The third most important area of the Sino-Algerian relationship, and one that has already played a role in the past, is the arms trade. Although Russia remains Algeria's number one supplier of arms and military equipment, the emergence of China in this market has provided an opportunity for diversification and sometimes even competition. Algerians started to buy Chinese weapons in 2007 (Pairault 2014), including, for example, surface-to-air missile systems, anti-ship missiles and naval corvettes (Calabrese 2017).

Unlike the previous two cases, the relationship between China and Algeria is not characterised by intergovernmental loans.

Mauritius

Mauritius is one of China's most favoured African partners. This is mainly because the African island has been one of the world's top offshore and tax havens since the 1980s, making it a central player - and offshore destination - for companies involved in trade between India, China, Africa and the Middle East. Today, Mauritius increasingly becomes a centre for capital flowing back and forth from India to India and from China to China, and a gateway to Africa for Chinese companies (China Offshore 2014). The country's attraction is based on three main factors: stability, access to the huge African (and by extension American and European) market and tax exemption.

Mauritius itself is one of the most stable countries in the world. In 2020, it was ranked No. 1 in the Mo Ibrahim Index of African countries' governance performance, No. 13 in the World Bank's Doing Business Index and No. 52 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. That is why several major Chinese companies, such as Huawei, Shanxi Tianli Group and CAD Fund, have registered their regional headquarters here. In addition, one of China's first African Special Economic Zones - established in 2009 with an investment of USD 750 million by Taiyuan Iron, China Development Bank, Shanxi Tinali Group - is located near the capital, Port Louis (Li 2018).

Foreign trade between the small island and China is almost minimal. According to the OEC, only 1.5% of Mauritius' exports went to China in 2019 (Upton 2019), with copper accounting for more than 80% and frozen fish for nearly 12%. Imports from China accounted for only 4% of total imports, with electronics and textiles being the main product groups. However, the free trade agreement (FTA) signed in 2019 with Mauritius could boost trade relations by reducing tariffs on, for example, several food products, some raw materials and jewellery. The FTA will also open up 130 service sectors in Mauritius to Chinese investors, including communications, education, finance, tourism, culture, transport and traditional Chinese medicine. Indeed, Mauritius could benefit from becoming a base for Chinese exports to Africa, not primarily in goods - for which local manufacturing capacity would be insufficient - but in

services: professional services, lawyers, accountants, translators, and import-export agents (Devonshire-Ellis 2021).

Moreover, the FTA seems to be even more important when considering those 50 double tax treaties with other countries (29 of which are African countries) Mauritius has recently concluded. By taking advantage of this framework, Chinese investors registered in Mauritius can achieve tax savings of 10.5 percent on dividends from, for example, Congo and 30 percent on capital gains in Uganda (Li, 2018). Mauritius has also concluded 45 investment promotion and protection agreements with other countries, including 23 African countries. In addition, Mauritius is a member of two African Economic Communities (COMESA - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, and SADC - Southern African Development Community), both of them providing Mauritian-based businesses with easy access to the economies of East Africa. The African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), entered into force in January 2021, can also give a new boost to the relationship, since it has been signed by all African countries except Eritrea and requires members to eliminate tariffs on 90% of goods and services.

Mauritius can also serve as a facilitator of trade between China and developed countries. Under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA 2022), nearly 6,500 products from Mauritius can enter the United States if the product is eligible under the Generalized System of Preferences or Normal Trade Relations. This gives Chinese manufacturers (such as textile companies – China Offshore 2014) a way around the anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations often initiated by the US Department of Commerce. Mauritius also signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union in 2009 (European Union 2012), the key elements of which included the elimination of tariffs and quotas on imports into the EU and rules of origin regulations.

According to official data from the local central bank, China is the third largest investor in Mauritius after France and South Africa (see Figure 10). In addition to FDI, one can also find infrastructure projects. In 2011, China Three Gorges, a company with a presence as a contractor in several African countries, was contracted to build a reservoir near the capital to address water scarcity problems (People's Daily Online 2011). In 2018, Guizhou Transportation Planning was awarded a US$320 million contract for real estate development (Tang 2018).

Figure 10. Inward FDI flows to Mauritius, 2011-2019, in millions of Mauritian rupees (missing data for 2018). Source: Authors' own compilation based on data from the Bank of Mauritius (2011-19). The CGIT database for Mauritius has no investment records, as a result we relied on the Bank of Mauritius, which only provides flow data and is partially incomplete, as no data is available for 2018.

In view of the above, it is not surprising that Mauritius is a frequent stopover for Chinese leaders, but it is also a major tourist destination, with nearly 100,000 Chinese tourists visiting the island annually (CGTN 2018). There are direct flights between the two countries, with Chinese flights landing at the Mauritius airport, which was built by China State Construction Engineering (CSCECOS 2022c). To further develop the relationship, there is an ongoing negotiation on abolishing visa requirements for Chinese citizens (China Offshore 2014), while educational and cultural cooperation is also high on the agenda, with the opening of the Confucius Institute at the University of Mauritius in 2016 (CGTN 2018).

As regards loans, 13 agreements were concluded between China and Mauritius between 2009 and 2019, for a total of USD 507 million, according to the CARI database. These typically financed health, ICT, water, and transport projects.

Djibouti

Djibouti is the smallest country in Africa, if excluding the small island nations, but has a strategic geopolitical position, making it an important stop for shipping and maritime freight between Europe and Asia. Djibouti is also a physical gateway to East Africa, especially Ethiopia, with a population of nearly 115 million. It is therefore in China's keen interest to maintain friendly relations with the Djibouti government and to ensure a significant economic and even military presence. The small country is also considered a key player in the maritime component of the BRI: goods arriving by sea and Ethiopian exports enter and leave the continent via Djibouti.

Figure 11. Djibouti-Chine trade data (mUSD). Source: Authors' own compilation based on OEC data

Although Djibouti's role as an intermediary in the China-Africa trade relationship is significant, the direct trade volume between Djibouti and China is not that relevant. Exports to China were less than 1% of total Djibouti exports until 2019, and then suddenly jumped to 14% in 2019, of which chlorides accounted for more than 98%. The share of Chinese imports, like in other African countries, is steadily increasing. From around 20% in 2010, Chinese imports had risen to 40-45% by the end of the decade. Consequently, Djibouti has a huge trade deficit with China: in 2019, Djibouti's exports to China were only USD 19 million, while Chinese imports amounted to more than USD 2 billion.

While trade relation is not the most important aspect of the relations, Chinese companies are keen to participate in local infrastructure development: since 2008, China has invested around USD 15 billion in ports, airports and digital infrastructure (Ford 2020). For instance, the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port was built in 2017 with USD 590 million of Chinese funding from the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (China Daily 2019, Leighton 2021). The project is directly linked to the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line, also built by the Chinese in 2018, which is planned to be extended all the way to South Sudan (Global Construction Review 2013). The current 759 km Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, the first fully electric international rail system in Africa, has reduced travel time between the two cities from two days to around 12 hours. When ready, the line will be operated by China Railway Group Ltd. and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation until 2023 (Ford, 2020).

The China Merchants Group has a 24% stake in the Doraleh port and plans to develop it from a budget of USD 3 billion (Leighton 2021). The port is, however, not only important from a commercial point of view, as China's first foreign military base since 2017 is located right next to it. The United States, Japan, Italy and France also have military bases in Djibouti, and

Saudi Arabia and India are planning to set up their own bases (Small Wars Journal 2019). Thus, China's own base does not need much explanation: it will increase China's global influence and better protect its security interests away from its shores, particularly in Africa and the Indian Ocean. The base in its current form is mainly capable of logistical tasks, but in 2020 major upgrades have been made so that it can accommodate aircraft carriers, destroyers, or even nuclear submarines (Leighton 2021).

According to the CARI database, 8 loan agreements can be identified between 2010 and 2019, with a total value of USD 1.436 billion. In line with the above, it is not surprising that two thirds of this are used for transportation development.

Conclusion

In the pages above, we have presented the variations in relations between Francophone Africa and China through five case studies. For the sake of diversity, we have selected countries rich in various raw materials and natural resources, as well as countries important for global trade, regional security, or taxation, and briefly reviewed their political and economic relations with China. Although the analysed countries are different in many respects, there are several similarities in their relations with China. For example, even if the history of relations in numerous cases has its roots in the second half of the 20th century, the real upsurge in economic relations took place from the beginning of the 21st century onwards, with the announcement of the BRI giving a further boost to bilateral cooperation.

Trade relations provide a more mixed picture. As the above case studies show, DRC and Guinea have accumulated trade surpluses with China due to their significant mineral exports, while Djibouti and Mauritius have a significant trade deficit with China, given that they hardly export anything to China. Perhaps the most surprising is the case of Algeria, where exports of oil products cannot sufficiently offset imports, meaning that Algeria has also been running a growing deficit in recent years.

The dividing line for FDI is also the raw material/mineral resource factor, i.e. if the country is rich in raw materials, Chinese corporate investment typically targets mining, its related sectors and construction, including infrastructure for transporting and processing raw materials. Smaller countries are, however, less likely to have large amounts of Chinese FDI. We have shown two exceptions to this rule: The offshore and tax haven nature of Mauritius has encouraged many Chinese companies to locate their African regional headquarters in the African island. There has also been a growing number of Chinese investments and companies in Djibouti, due to the small country's growing role in East African and global commodity trade as well as its strategic location.

Although some of the infrastructure development projects, especially those linked to mining-related investments, takes the form of FDI, most construction projects are typically carried out in the framework of a loan agreement, that is, Chinese companies build roads,

railways, ports, airports, public buildings, power plants, often involving Chinese migrant workers. These projects are typically financed by Chinese state banks, by 80-100%. The details of the loan agreements are often confidential, but the loans are in most cases neither preferential, nor are they particularly long-term, although in some cases part of the debt has been cancelled. Of the five cases, the two poorest countries, the DRC and Guinea, are the ones with the highest levels of loan agreements, and, therefore, the two countries are most at risk of debt traps.

Perhaps in response to criticism of the above-mentioned debt trap narrative, the Chinese leadership decided to rethink its strategy towards the African continent recently. Indeed, announcements made at the China-Africa Forum at the end of 2021 showed that, in the midst of the Covid crisis and the fierce competition for global power, China would rather focus on vaccine diplomacy, with a slight reduction in financial incentives. In his video message, President Xi pledged USD 40 billion to Africa, including everything from credit lines to investment. This means a significant drop from the USD 60 billion pledged at the previous two summits. While reducing the financial pledges, the Chinese President has offered one billion doses of vaccines, including 600 million donated and 400 million locally produced doses, to complement the 200 million doses already delivered to African countries earlier. China is also sending 1,500 health experts to Africa to help to respond to the pandemic (Ni and Davidson 2021).

China's vaccine diplomacy is clearly a soft power tool, closely related to both the African and international criticisms of the previous strategy based on economic incentives. China is sensitive to its international image, especially when its activities in the developing world are criticised. In this case, it typically responds in a way that could impress not only the targeted region but also the international community. And vaccine diplomacy is clearly part of the narrative China wants to promote: how Beijing helped to end the pandemic not only within its borders but also beyond.

Although this paper assesses the China relations from the perspective of Francophone African countries, to evaluate our hypothesis, it is essential to briefly describe what Africa means to China. China is indeed an important player for Francophone Africa, but the importance of Francophone Africa for China in global trade and FDI flows is currently very low: in 2020, Africa accounted only for 4% of China's global trade (4.4% of its exports and 3.6% of its imports), while in 2019 only 2.9% of Chinese FDI flowed to Africa (Pairault 2021). Moreover, China no longer needs to 'buy' allies in the region, as by now all the countries of Francophone Africa recognise the One China principle. That is, these aspects don't really justify Africa's prominent place in China's globalisation strategy. What motivates China's growing expansion in Africa then? The international literature often states: political interests. Pairault (2021), for example, argues that Africa is in fact the cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy, since the countries of the region are all allies of China and thus not only extend the reach of China's activities on

the international stage, but also increase China's strategic power in disputes with the United States, thereby strengthening China's international influence.

As far as the relationship between China and the 25 Francophone African countries is concerned, we agree with the more general statement above. However, as we have shown in our case studies, there are exceptions, i.e. bilateral relations that are not only important for the African side, but sometimes even of strategic importance for China. Our hypothesis is thus verified: Francophone African countries are indeed attracted to China primarily by the need for financial resources and infrastructure development and the promise of non-interference in domestic politics, while China is motivated primarily by global trade and political ambitions, raw materials and growing local market size. Through the African countries, Beijing is creating a diplomatic backbone that will raise the country's international profile and thus support China's rise as a great power, while these relationships will also give China access to raw materials that are essential for its economic development. Therefore, with certain limitations, but in some ways the relationship between Francophone Africa and China can indeed be a win-win relationship.

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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Appendix

Francophone countries	Average GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $), 2015-19	Anglophone countries	Average GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $), 2015-19
Benin	3080,0	Botswana	15813,8
Burundi	781,3	Ethiopia	2004,1
Burkina Faso	2048,9	Eswatini	8442,1
Cameroon	3664,9	Gambia, The	2110,2
Chad	1657,4	Ghana	5118,9
Central African Republic	905,7	Kenya	4243,3
Comoros	3022,3	Lesotho	2669,0
Congo, Rep.	4351,4	Liberia	1554,7
Cote d'Ivoire	4821,9	Malawi	1483,5
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1072,9	Namibia	10241,1
Djibouti	4966,5	Nigeria	5256,1
Gabon	15113,2	Sierra Leone	1627,9
Guinea	2365,2	Somalia	886,5
Madagascar	1581,5	Sudan	4256,1
Mali	2238,1	Tanzania	2515,4
Mauritania	5123,0	Uganda	2107,7
Niger	1174,1	Zimbabwe	3746,9
Rwanda	2026,2	Zambia	3477,7
Senegal	3181,8		
Togo	2018,6		
AVERAGE	**3259,8**	**AVERAGE**	**4308,6**

Comparison of GDP per capita of Francophone and Anglophone Sub-Saharan African countries.* Source: Authors own construction based on the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank

*No data: Eritrea, South Sudan; excluded: Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa

On the Issue of Monetary Circulation in the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

Anton Andreev[1]

Abstract:

The SADR remains one of the states whose name is most often used by unscrupulous manufacturers of various souvenir products under the guise of coins. These tokens' (fantasy or unusual coins) design meets the demand from unsophisticated coin collectors in the most popular segments. The issue of monetary circulation on the territory of the SADR in 1976-2022 is being investigated, information on the coins issued officially by the SADR and the tokens issued unofficially under the name of the SADR, is systematized.

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Introduction

The independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (the SADR) was proclaimed by the POLISARIO Front[2] representatives on February 27, 1976, after the formal end of Spanish colonial rule following the results of the tripartite Madrid Accords on the division of the territory of Western Sahara, treated in November 1975 between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania.

Since the end of the 19th century, the territory of Western Sahara was under the protectorate of Spain and thus was called Spanish Sahara. In the wake of the movement for the decolonization of African countries, and under pressure from the UN General Assembly in 1974, Spain announced preparations for a referendum on the self-determination of the indigenous population of the territory of Western Sahara. Morocco and Mauritania, which had already gained independence by that time,[3] appealed to the geographical and ethnic community with Western Sahara and demanded its territories. During 1975, attempts were made by Morocco to resolve the issue by military means, and in early November 1975, a peaceful march of tens of thousands of Moroccans to the territory of the Spanish Sahara (the so-called "Green March") took place (Cobo, 2005).

According to the Madrid Accords, the Sakiet-el-Hamra area fell to Morocco, and the Río de Oro area to Mauritania, while the POLISARIO Front advocated independence. A long-term armed conflict ensued between the militia of the Polisario Front with the military and political support of Algeria on the one hand, and the armies of Morocco and Mauritania on the other (Besenyő, 2009; Podgornova, 2013).

In 1979, Mauritania renounced its territorial claims and withdrew its troops, soon after the Río de Oro area was immediately occupied by Moroccan troops.

During 1980-1987, the Moroccan authorities, with the help of the army and foreign advisers, built a system of fortification walls (berm), dividing the territory of Western Sahara into two unequal parts (Besenyő, 2017). The so-called "Southern Provinces" of Morocco, including the entire shelf and 70-80% of the territory, to the west of the wall, - and the "Free Zone" under the control of the POLISARIO Front, in mostly uninhabited, to the east of the wall (Figure 1).

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[2] The military-political organization "Popular Front for the Liberation of Sakiet el Hamra and Río de Oro" (from the Spanish "Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro"), established in 1973. Since 1979, it has been recognized by the UN as an organization legitimately representing the Sahrawi (people of Western Sahara).
[3] Morocco gained independence in 1956, while Mauritania did in 1960.

Figure 1. The map of Western Sahara in 2012.[4]

The peace plan for the settlement of the conflict was ready in 1990, its details were reflected in UN Security Council Resolution No. 658 of June 27, 1990. The ceasefire agreement between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front came into force in September 1991, after 16 years of fighting.[5]

The plan provided for a transitional period for the preparation of a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara had to make a choice between independence and integration with Morocco. UN Security Council Resolution No. 690 of April 29, 1991 established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) (Ivanchenko, 2018).

The mandate of MINURSO has been renewed annually,[6] and the referendum originally scheduled for February 1992 has not taken place since then. This is due to disagreements with the approval of the list of persons entitled to participate in it. According to the 1974 census, about 74,000 people lived in Spanish Sahara.[7] The inclusion of hundreds of thousands of Moroccan immigrants in the number of voters, which Morocco insists on, would have a

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[4] See https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/wsahara.pdf.
[5] In November 2020, the situation escalated again, and the SADR authorities announced the end of their obligations to observe the ceasefire (see, https://www.spsrasd.info/news/en/articles/2020/11/14/28491.html).
[6] Till November 2022, see https://minurso.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/res_26022021_minurso_e.pdf.
[7] In 2021, the UN estimates the population of Western Sahara to be 612,000 (see https://data.un.org/en/iso/eh.html).

decisive influence on the result of the referendum. Therefore, it is not supported by the POLISARIO Front.

At the same time, tens of thousands of Sahrawi people were forced to leave Western Sahara and settle in refugee camps near the Algerian Tindouf, where they still live in difficult conditions (Besenyő, 2009; Vicens, 2007). By the end of 2017, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the total number of Sahrawi refugees in these camps to be almost 174,000 people.[8]

Over 80 countries, including Algeria, Cuba,[9] Libya, and Venezuela, have recognized the independence of the SADR[10] (Dobronravin, 2013). Russia, like the former USSR, is not among them, but supports the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, and has consistently advocated the search for a mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict, based on the provisions of relevant UN resolutions.[11]

Political Structure of the SADR

The SADR's form of government is close to a mixed republic with a strong presidential power. Until the SADR gains full political independence, the POLISARIO Front remains the only political body. The highest official of the SADR is the President, who holds the position of the General Secretary of the POLISARIO Front (The Constitution, 2015). The General Secretary is elected by the General People's Congress.[12]

The executive branch is represented by the Council of Ministers, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice and Religion, Education, Economic Development, Information, Health, and Occupied Territories. The Council of Ministers is headed by the President, who also appoints the Prime Minister and approves the composition of the Council of Ministers on the proposal by the Prime Minister (Makhmutova, 2021).

The legislative authority is the National Council. It consists of 53 members elected by the General People's Congress.

The judiciary is represented by the courts of first instance, the courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court (the Supreme Judge is appointed by the President).

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[8] See https://www.usc.es/export9/sites/webinstitucional/gl/institutos/ceso/descargas/UNHCR_Tindouf-Total-In-Camp-Population_March-2018.pdf.

[9] After Cuba recognized the independence of the SADR in 1980, the two countries developed particularly close relations in the field of education and health care. Almost 500 Cuban medical staff at various times worked in the SADR, while more than 2,000 Sahrawi students received higher education in Cuba (see https://www.spsrasd.info/news/en/articles/2020/10/23/28015.html).

[10] Later, more than 20 of these countries have revoked the recognition of the SADR.

[11] See https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1784113/.

[12] It consists of delegates participating in the POLISARIO Front from the People's Congress in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, the National Union of Sahrawi Women, the Sahrawi Youth Union, the Sahrawi Trade Union, the Union of Students and the Armed Forces. The number of delegates is not constant (est. 1500-2000).

Economic Development of SADR

The economy of SADR is still dominated by subsistence farming,[13] economic development is fraught with great difficulties. Promising deposits of phosphorites, iron ore (including titanium and vanadium), copper ore (including gold), uranium, antimony, and salt mines have been discovered on the territory of Western Sahara. Oil reserves have also been discovered in the fish-rich shelf zone (Mohamed Fadel, 2010).

The POLISARIO Front de facto controls neither the fish-rich shelf zone of Western Sahara, nor the extraction of phosphates, the main resource potential of Western Sahara (Angelillo, 2017). The extraction and export of phosphates from the only Western Sahara deposit of Bu-Kraa[14] is currently carried out in the interests of Morocco (Noskov, 2015; Veselov, 2016), even though the independence movement was born in the early 70s exactly among the Sahrawi workers of this deposit.

The largest cities of Western Sahara with a combined population of more than 400,000 people stay also under the control of Morocco (Orlov, 2017).

Monetary Circulation Within Western Sahara

Until the end of the 19th century, natural exchange was a common practice in economic relations on the territory of Western Sahara, which was controlled by Sahrawi Arab tribes and Berbers (Mohamed Fadel, 2010; Podtserob, 2017). When negotiating with residents of neighboring African countries, salt was often used in the role of money (as a valuable commodity and a useful medicine for iodine deficiency in food) (Artica, 2002).

During the Spanish colonial rule, from the last quarter of the 19th century until 1976, the Spanish peseta was used as the main currency.

Since 1976 up to the present, in the territory of the SADR as well as in the camps of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, the Algerian dinar is mainly used in monetary circulation.[15] One can also find the Mauritanian ugia, Moroccan dirhams, US dollars, and euros.[16] In the territory of the so-called "Southern Provinces" of Morocco, the Moroccan dirham is used in monetary circulation.

The official[17] monetary unit of the SADR is the Sahrawi peseta (الصحراوي البياتا or peseta saharaui), approved by the decree of the President of the SADR dated January 10, 1996 on the

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[13] Cattle breeding (camels, sheep, goats), oasis farming (barley, wheat, millet, dates, fruits, vegetables) (Orlov, 2017).

[14] The deposit was discovered in 1945 and has been in operation since 1962. Proven reserves of phosphate ores are 1.7 billion tons, estimated reserves are 10 billion tons. For comparison, global reserves are estimated at 71 billion tons, of which Morocco (including Bu-Kraa) accounts for 50 billion tons (U.S. Geological Survey data, January 2022).

[15] It is curious that at least in the early 2000s, the Sahrawi nevertheless set prices in the Sahrawi peseta, using Algerian banknotes and taking into account the conditional exchange rate of the Algerian dinar to the Sahrawi peseta (San Martin, 2005).

[16] From 1976 to 2002, the Spanish peseta was used instead of the euro.

[17] In the study, the term "official" in relation to the SADR is understood as "under control by the POLISARIO Front".

issue of the first commemorative coin of the SADR. The name of the currency is due to the almost century-old history of the Spanish presence in Western Sahara. The rate of the Sahrawi peseta was linked to the rate of the Spanish peseta in a ratio of 1 to 1, so since 2002, after the introduction of the euro, it has become 166.4 to 1 euro. The SADR does not have its own central bank, so the POLISARIO Front can be considered as the official issuer of the SADR coins. The SADR coins do not participate in monetary circulation, and official issues of the SADR banknotes have not appeared yet.

The SADR economy is in its infancy, and the people of Western Sahara still need to make an effort to create and develop their own independent monetary system (Miguel et al., 2018).

Official Commemorative Coins of the SADR

The stabilization of the political and economic situation in the SADR after 1991-1992 can be considered as the main prerequisite for the issue of commemorative coins.

The first series of three SADR commemorative coins was issued in 1996 in honor of the 20th Anniversary of the declaration of independence of the SADR.[18] The plot of one copper and two silver coins tells us about the ongoing armed struggle for sovereignty: a Sahrawi man with a machine gun, a girl with a rifle, a land-rover with militia fighters of the POLISARIO Front (Standard Catalog of World Coins, 1901-2000, 2018).

Probably, the demonstration of excessive militarism did not contribute to successful negotiations with representatives of Morocco. Anyhow, the plot of the second series of 3 SADR commemorative coins, issued in 1997, differs significantly. The first silver coin is dedicated to the 450th anniversary of the birth of the great Spanish writer Miguel de Cervantes. The SADR, as the only Spanish-speaking country in the Arab world, thus pays homage to Spanish culture. Two other copper and silver coins with the motto "Libertad, Soberanía, Paz"[19] and a stylized image of the dove of peace were issued on the eve of the referendum on self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, which was expected in 1998.

It is worth noting the absence of Sahrawi commemorative coins dedicated to both Algeria, a long-term sponsor of the SADR and an ally in the struggle for independence (Zayats, 2020), and the UN, which for many years through MINURSO has been ensuring compliance with the ceasefire and the relatively peaceful life of Sahrawi (Mohamed Fadel, 2009).

The SADR commemorative coins have low mintage, but exact information about its mintages is available only for silver coins of the first series. Servicios Documentales Filatélicos y Numismáticos (SDFN) S.A. (Madrid, Spain) provided assistance in the production[20] and

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[18] For example, in partially recognized Abkhazia, the first commemorative coins were issued 14 years after, and in South Ossetia 22 years after the declaration of independence (respectively, the issues of 2008 and 2013).

[19] Freedom, sovereignty, peace (in Spanish).

[20] Copper coins by 200 Sahrawi pesetas of 1996 were minted by a manual impact press.

distribution, while the data about producer are not disclosed. In 1996, the president of SDFN, Jorge Martín de la Salud personally presented samples of the SADR commemorative coins of the first series to Mohammed Abdelaziz, the President of the SADR (Crónica Numismática, №69, 1996). Since that time the coins are in use as souvenirs by representatives of the POLISARIO Front in order to promote the independence of The SADR and attract the attention of world public figures to the problems of Sahrawi refugees (San Martin, 2005).

Unofficial Tokens Under the Name of the SADR

Since 1990, over 150 tokens[21] with elements of the official symbols of the SADR have been entering the international numismatic market. There is no information about the producer and the mintage of most tokens. Such tokens are not recognized by the POLISARIO Front as legal tender on the territory of the SADR, and in this sense we cannot consider them as coins.

The first tokens under the name of the SADR appeared in 1990 (San Martin, 2010), which coincided with the report of the UN Security Council Secretary-General "The situation concerning Western Sahara" (S/21360 of June 20, 1990)[22] and the corresponding UN Security Council Resolution No. 658 of June 27, 1990. The tokens are most likely[23] minted at the Cuban Mint (La Casa de Moneda de Cuba) in Havana (Crónica Numismática, №125, 2005). Cuba recognized the independence of the SADR back in 1980, so the first tokens could have been a kind of gift for the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the SADR. Commemorative Cuban tokens were issued up to 2001 and are currently the most numerous series in terms of quantity (about 50 pieces), face values (1, 2, 5, 50, 100, 500, 1000 pesetas), variety of plots and metals used in its production (brass, copper, nickel-clad-copper, nickel-clad-steel, silver, gold) (Standard Catalog of World Coins, 2018). According to the testimony of MINURSO military observers (Ivanchenko, 2018; Kalanchin, 2007), Cuban tokens issued 1990-2000 were not found in monetary circulation on the territory of Western Sahara and in the camps of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria either in 1992-1993 or later in 2002-2003. Thus, we cannot consider reliable the information about the monetary circulation of Cuban tokens of 1990-1992.[24] Meanwhile, Cuban tokens were actively being sold directly in Havana.

In 1997, low-mintage silver and gold tokens appeared in honor of the 15th anniversary of friendship between the SADR and Venezuela.[25] Both tokens depict national heroes Simon

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[21] In the study, the term "token" means a non-legal tender souvenir token, which has the main visual features of a coin (i.e. face value, symbolism of the issuing state). However, the issuing state designated on the token either does not exist, or does not officially recognize the token as a legal tender on its territory. As a rule, the token producer is unknown. In the English-language literature, the term "token" corresponds to the term "unusual coin" or "fantasy coin".

[22] See https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/94688 (accessed March 01, 2022).

[23] That could be indirectly confirmed by the characteristics of tokens (weight, diameter, metal, design elements), similar to the characteristics of Cuban coins of that time, as well as by the photo of a coin stamp with the SADR coat of arms at the Cuban Mint in Havana (Aledon, 1999, p. 28).

[24] See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahrawi_peseta.

[25] In 1982, Venezuela recognized the independence of the SADR, diplomatic relations were established, and the SADR embassy was opened in Caracas.

Bolivar and El Uali.[26] The producer of the "Venezuelan" tokens is not reliably known,[27] but presumably they were minted at the mint of Metalor Acuñaciones, C.A. (Caracas, Venezuela) by order of Italcambio C.A. (Caracas, Venezuela) with the participation of Vladimir Gamboa and Ali Moukhtar.

The SADR remains one of the states whose name is most often used by unscrupulous manufacturers of various souvenir products under the guise of coins. The tokens design meets the demand from unsophisticated coin collectors in the most popular segments (coins with images of the animal world, bimetallic coins, coins of unusual design).

In 1992, a token with a double face value of 1000 pesetas and 10 ECU appeared, dedicated to European unity and the new currency of the united Europe, the ecu.

In 1996, the "World of Adventures" series of 6 silver tokens was released with two SADR tokens among them: the first was dedicated to the voyage of Thor Heyerdahl from Morocco to the shores of South America, the second was dedicated to the corsair brothers Oruç Reis and Hayreddin Barbarossa, medieval conquerors and rulers of Algeria.

In 1996-1999, the series "Pioneers and Discoverers: Triumph and Adventures" of 36 (!) copper-nickel tokens were issued.

In 1997, a pair of silver tokens on the eve of the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France (within a series of six tokens under the name of Benin, Congo, and the SADR), and a silver token in honour of Count von Zeppelin (within a series of four tokens under the name of Benin, Congo, the SADR) were issued.

In 1998, a silver token was issued as part of a series of six tokens dedicated to the cruise liners, under the name of Benin, Congo, Cuba, North Korea, the SADR, and Somalia.

In 1999, a silver token was issued as part of a series of six tokens dedicated to the fauna of Africa, under the name of Benin, Chad, Congo, the SADR, Somalia, and Togo.

In 2002, two silver tokens were issued: one dedicated to the 1982 FIFA World Cup in Spain, the second depicts camels (Standard Catalog of World Coins, 2011-Date, 2018).

In 2004, a pair[28] of bimetallic tokens dedicated to the nature of Western Sahara (i.e. fennec-foxes[29]) and the 28th anniversary of the independence of the SADR were issued (Unusual World Coins, 2011).

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[26] Leader, co-founder, General Secretary of the POLISARIO Front and the first President of the SADR.
[27] There is an opinion that The Royal Spanish Mint (FNMT) was the producer (Enciclopedia Guanche, 2008). However, its representatives publicly refute the information about the production of any "official" issues of the SADR coins (Las pesetas saharauis, 2013).
[28] There are varieties in different metals: steel and bronze, gold and silver, silver.
[29] The fauna of Western Sahara is poor: there are Dorcas gazelles, jackals, striped hyenas, and fennec-foxes (Orlov, 2017).

In 2010, the series was continued with the release of two tokens dedicated to Arab culture (the European Antiques Exhibition in Namur, Belgium) and the meeting of Pope John Paul II with Juan Carlos I, King of Spain.

In 2013, a series of 12 tokens with images of prehistoric animals (including ichthyosaurus, stegosaurus, tyrannosaurus) was released, which echoes the plots of the Cuban tokens of 1993-1994 with dinosaurs. In this series, a small face value of 50 centimo appeared for the first time.

In 2016, a private Chinese company issued four silver-plated iron tokens dedicated to Egyptian gods and pharaohs.

In 2018, a series of five tokens was released, which exploits the plots of the Cuban tokens and the SADR commemorative coin. The tokens of 1, 2 and 5 pesetas repeat the series of Cuban tokens of 1992 of the same face values. The 10 pesetas token corresponds to 100 pesetas of 1990. The 25 pesetas token is stylized as the SADR commemorative coin of 1996 by 200 Sahrawi pesetas.

In 2019, a series of five tokens of 10 pesetas was minted, which is dedicated to predatory birds. The tokens are made of brass, with a colored paper sticker on each side. The series was continued in 2020, the next five tokens were dedicated to dinosaurs.

In 2020, a new series of five tokens was released, which depict a lovebird parrot, a buffalo, a lion, a hippopotamus, and a gorilla. All these birds and animals can be found in Africa, but not on the territory of Western Sahara.

Separately, it is worth mentioning the issues under the name of Cabo Dakhla[30]: a series of eight tokens of 2006 and a series of six souvenir banknotes of 2014 of the non-existent Bank of Cabo Dakhla.

Differences Between the SADR Coins and Tokens Under the Name of the SADR

The production quality of most of these tokens is low, both from a technical and artistic points of view. The plots of the few official commemorative coins of the SADR are dedicated to the struggle for independence, to peace, and to the culture and traditions of the SADR. At the same time, the plots of unofficial tokens are very diverse, although almost all have nothing in common with the SADR or Western Sahara: the animal world of Africa, dinosaurs, inventors, navigators and travelers, sports, transport, and religion.

On most tokens under the name of the SADR, the "peseta" is indicated as the currency, while the official currency of the SADR is the "Sahrawi peseta". The face values of tokens vary

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[30] Dakhla (Villa Cisneros) is the administrative center of the province of Río de Oro under the control of Morocco on a narrow peninsula near the Atlantic Ocean. The city was founded in 1502 by Spanish colonists.

from series to series in a wide range from 1 to 40,000, while the official face values were just 200, 1,000 and 5,000 Sahrawi pesetas.

The name of the state sounds like "REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SAHARAUI DEMOCRÁTICA" (on tokens of 1990-1992), or "REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SAHARAUI" (on tokens of 1997-1998), or "REPÚBLICA SAHARAUI DEMOCRÁTICA" (on tokens of 2018 and 2020). The name coincides with the official one ("REPÚBLICA SAHARAUI") only on a series of tokens of 1996-1999 and Cuban tokens of 1997-2000.

Figure 2. The official coat of arms of the SADR of 1976

Figure 3. The official coat of arms of the SADR after modification in 1991

The stylized coat of arms of the SADR on tokens differs much from the official coat of arms. The photo in Figure 2 shows the official coat of arms of the SADR of 1976 type, for which in 1979, Mohammed Abdelaziz, the President of the SADR, receives a letter of credence from the Ambassador of Mexico to the SADR (La República Árabe Saharaui Democrática: Pasado y Presente, 1985).

In June 1991, the official coat of arms was modified: an artificial non-heraldic hammer figure placed between crossed rifles disappeared from the shield (Figure 3).

Despite this, the stylized coat of arms of the SADR before modification is used on Cuban tokens of 1990-1997, as well as on bimetallic tokens of 2004-2010 and the series of tokens of 2018 and 2020.

Figure 4. The ribbon of the official coat of arms of the SADR

Figure 4 shows the official motto "حرية ديمقراطية وحدة"[31] of the POLISARIO Front on the ribbon of the coat of arms of the SADR on the commemorative coins.

In stylized coats of arms on tokens, the motto on the ribbon (as well as the ribbon itself) may be absent or may contain spelling inaccuracies (Figure 5).

Figure 5. The ribbons of the stylized coat of arms

Conclusion

Unlike the authorities of some other partially recognized states,[32] the leadership of the POLISARIO Front pays insufficient attention to official publications about commemorative coins of the SADR. The common catalog of the SADR commemorative coins and tokens, compiled by the author, became the first attempt to systematize the information available on this issue.[33]

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[31] Freedom, democracy, unity (in Arab).

[32] For example, Transniestrian Moldovan Republic, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, Republic of China (Taiwan).

[33] The catalog could be uploaded from here: https://www.academia.edu/76844372.

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Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

Anton Andreev has a PhD in Economics. His interests include credit risk management, numismatics, modern world coins, monetary circulation in partially recognized states.

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The ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in Focus of West African Integration Efforts

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Abstract:

The Economic Community of West African States, with French and Portuguese abbreviation: CEDEAO, abbreviated in English: ECOWAS, has currently fifteen members. The mainly political and economic regional cooperation, established in 1975 in the former French, Portuguese, and English territories, is the most significant form of integrated cooperation in West Africa. One of the eight African Regional Communities, and two of the six African Sub-Regional Economic Communities are members of the ECOWAS; it has eight members from the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Community) and three out of fifteen members of the MRU (Mano River Union).

The aim of this paper is to outline the integration mechanism of the ECOWAS, from historical backgrounds (including colonial heritage) to the integration of the decolonization process, its organizational structure, economic and monetary role, and its role in Africa. The analysis also looks at the proactive role of the ECOWAS member states in the continent's integration efforts.

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Historical Background Based on the Colonial Approach

From French West Africa to decolonization efforts

The integration of the CEDEAO area, from present-day Senegal to Niger and from Mali to Ivory Coast, is largely due to the French colonization in these areas, apart from some historical and imperial antecedents.[2] French West Africa (Afrique-Occidentale française AOF, 1895-1958) – initially consisting of four colonies, namely Senegal, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, French Sudan (then Mali) and then having gradually gained the Upper Volta (future Burkina Faso, in the detached area of Sudan), Dahomey (future Benin), Mauritania, and Niger – was formed on June 16, 1895 as a federation of eight French colonies. At the time of its dissolution, 25 million people lived on its territory.

The aim of the AOF is to organize these areas under a unified French administration, with Saint-Louis (1895-1902) and then Dakar (1902-) as its capital in Senegal. In 1901, the Central Bank of Senegal was transformed into the (central) Bank of West Africa, operating in the form of a joint stock company with the authority to issue bonds. The AOF was governed by a French governor-general, who, in the early period, held the position of governor of Senegal and was also a representative of the (Parisian) Ministry of Colonial Affairs. Between 1957-1959, he was appointed High Commissioner and several lieutenant governors were subordinate to him. Over time, the basic unit of administrative organization became the district (*cercle*) and its subunits, headed by the district commander, who for the Africans essentially personified colonial power. They decided on the head tax, the levies, and organized the necessary public works. Indigenous people were virtually completely excluded from the decision-making process of the administration. The borders of the French West African colonies were established by conventions with the neighbouring powers and, in the case of the colonies by the Franco-neighbourhood, by a simple administrative decision (Lugan 2009, p. 607).

In 1946, France slightly transformed its relationship with its former colonies, creating the French Union (*Union française*) of the Fourth Republic, which was reorganized in 1958 by the Fifth Republic to the French Community (*Communauté française*). The African partners were disappointed in both, and the latter's efforts to integrate soon became futile[3] in the wake of the decolonization wave starting in 1960. Regarding the British colonial territories, the British Commonwealth was formed in 1949, providing a looser forum for cooperation, considering the Queen as the common head of state. From the region, Ghana became a member in 1957, Nigeria in 1960, and Sierra Leone in 1961.

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[2] Historical background: The area of Mauritania in Roman times was roughly the area of Morocco-Algeria. Between 300 and 1240, the Empire of Ghana covered parts of present-day Senegal, Mali and Mauritania, and between 1230 and 1545, the Empire of Mali covered parts of Senegal, the Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali and Niger. The Songhai Empire, from 1464 to 1591, roughly covered the territory of the Empire of Mali, supplemented by parts of present-day Burkina Faso, Benin, and Nigeria. Thus, the "integration effect" in the region could have been exerted by the previous historical imperial formations, but these, with the exception of the current eras, did not prove to be long-lived, partly because they seemed to be quite minimal in the political and economic spheres, and also because they were only temporary. (Source we used: Europa Varietas Institute CERPESC project databases: http://www.europavarietas.org/csdp/fr/geopolitique)

[3] The Community only operated *de facto* until the year of 1959, although *de jure* lasted until 1995.

The states of the region have played an important leading role in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OUA) on May 25, 1963, with their leaders at the forefront of this initiative: Presidents Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Sékou Touré (Guinea). As leaders of the Casablanca Group, partly encouraged by the achievements of European integration, they called for the creation of a federation similar to the United States of Amercia (African Community), with the left-wing leaders of the UAR (United Arab Republic), Algeria, Libya, Mali, and Morocco supporting the idea. The African Common Market (MCA) was set up on April 2, 1962 with the participation of Algeria, the EAW, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco, but this only operated until the OUA was set up. The Monrovia group included supporters of a more moderate cooperation effort; Of the 21 sub-Saharan states, I would like to highlight Senegal (President Léopold Sédar Senghor, leader of the group) and Nigeria in the region, but most of the Francophone states were included as well. This group envisioned a much looser, confederate form of cooperation that respected the (full) sovereignty of states, urging them to continue working closely with former colonial metropolises for the economic consideration of providing them with the capital they needed to start developing.

What conclusions can be drawn about the region from all this? Thus, the states here took the initiative, but on several fronts, they also differed significantly in terms of the depth of cooperation within the organizational framework: on the one hand, there were major divisions between those who wanted a close federation and those who preferred a loose confederation, and on the other hand, there have been major divergences in closer or looser relations with former colonial countries. The dilemma of what would happen to them after their independence, without any capital and political experience and with weak economic foundations, was marked. Can the regional cooperation(s) organized on the basis of the "blind leading the blind" method succeed whether the model of the European Economic Community, established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, can succeed, or is it simply indispensable long-term to "keep the umbilical cords" with former colonial states? The signing of the Organization of African Unity Charter, drawn up by the presidents Modibo Keïta from Mali and Sylvanus Olympio from Togo, also meant that the new African states would *de jure* recognize the finality and inviolability of the borders, previously completely arbitrarily established by the colonizers: Emphasizing political-economic stability with the inviolability of state sovereignty (principle of non-intervention). The latter resulted in serious problems – narrowing down to the examined area – in the crisis management mechanism in Nigeria of the Biafra`s separatist aspiration (1967-1970) supported by France (Türke 2021). In this context, the rivalry of the Francophone-Anglo-Saxon states and territories in the region should be singled out as a factor working against integration, and this opposition was often exacerbated from the background by the former colonizers on the basis of the *divide et impera* principle. In the Cold War era of the superpowers, this was further overshadowed by the intrusion of Soviet and American ideological divisions into the region, supplemented by non-aligned African states (Ghana and Guinea) that joined the strongly anti-colonialist movements. The new, independent states were characterized by strong ethnic and religious diversity, and in many cases artificial borders split (related) tribes and ethnicities (Benkes 1999, pp. 156-161).

In the midst of the decolonization wave, the former British Colony (*Gold Coast*) Ghana,[4] led by Kwame Nkrumah towards independence in 1957, was the flagship of both independence and cooperation on the continent, where between 1960 and 1980, nearly 200 forms of cross-border multisectoral economic cooperation and more than 120 forms of intergovernmental and bilateral cooperation emerged. The first major divisive factor between the Francophone states of West Africa was the attitude towards the French Community. A decision was made about it in a referendum on the new French constitution on September 28, 1958: Senghor Senegal and Keïta French Sudan supported it, while Guinea (Sékou Touré) and Niger (Bakari Djibo) voted against. In Guinea, the majority of the population also voted against the Community, making it completely independent of the other former AOF states that became autonomous states within the Community.[5]

From the Sahel-Benin Union to the Mano River Union

The first effort to cooperate in the region was the short-lived Sahel-Benin Union (1958-59), intended to create a platform of political, economic, and military cooperation. It was created by four former AOF members: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and Niger. Councils of Heads of State and Government, Commonwealth Ministers and Speakers of National Assemblies have been established. In their ambitious plans, just one year after the 1957 Treaty of Rome, they had already decided to set up a customs union and a repayment fund. However, the formation of the Federation of Mali significantly changed the plans. On December 29-30, 1958, Senegal (presided over by Senghor), French Sudan (the future Republic of Sudan: Mali), Upper-Volta, and Dahomey formed a similarly short-lived Federation of Mali.[6] Felix Houphouët-Boigny's Ivory Coast was also invited to the Federation, but it said it did not want to become the federation's "dairy cow". The grand politics of France has done everything to undermine the integration efforts that run counter to these interests: in 1959, President Maurice Yaméogo of Upper Volta, under Ivory Coast's (and French) influence,[7] withdrew from the federation and announced his need to join the French Community. In Dahomey, the supporters of the federation failed, and the country eventually did not join.

As a counter-pole, the response of the countries of the Sahel-Benin Union to the rival integration aspirations has been the expansion and significant reorganization of the union, essentially by abandoning and leaching out the original goals of close integration. In 1959, the Council of Agreement (*Conseil d`entente*) was established under French tutelage. This mainly economic organization is still the oldest of the existing forms of integrational cooperation in West Africa (Togo joined in 1966). Within the Federation of Mali, the main differences arose

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[4] We should note that Liberia, a former American colony, was the first African colony to became independent in 1847.

[5] According to this version of the French Constitution, a member declaring its independence must leave the Community. This has been changed by the constitutional amendment on June 4, 1960, only after noticing the overwhelming wave of decolonization. This ammendment allowed members who had declared their independence to remain members of the Community by contract (and in fact allowed other independent states to join, but this scenario never happened).

[6] The Federation of Mali thus essentially existed earlier than the future Republic of Mali (1960-), while the eponymous historical Mali Empire (13-16th century) roughly covered the territory of present-day Mali. (Türke 2018, 16)

[7] Here we should mention the name of Jacques Foccart, the strong influence of the father of Françafrique in the region, who ran the General Secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs (SGAAM) of the Palace of the Élysée from 1960 to 1974.

between Senegal and Sudan: the Sudanese urged for a merger of the two nations as soon as possible and opposed Senghor to replace Keïta as president. In August 1960, Keïta sharply condemned the French experimental nuclear explosions in the Sahara, which added tensions with the french-friendly Senegal as well. The Mali Confederation was absolutely pushed towards the edge, but he was pardoned by the fact that on September 22, 1960, Keïta proclaimed the independence of French Sudan, creating the Republic of Mali and joining the movement of non-aligned countries. Meanwhile, another important form of cooperation emerged in 1959, called the West African Customs Union (WACU, UDOA), which established a form of cooperation between the member states of the Council of Consensus and Mali and was essentially the forerunner and "ancestor" of ECOWAS. On May 12 1962, in addition to the WACU, another subregional economic community, the WAMU (West African Monetary Union, *UMOA*), lined up. The WAMU included former members of the AOF (with the exception of Mauritania but with the former Portuguese Guinea-Bissau), namely Benin (Dahomey), Burkina Faso, (Upper Volta), Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The headquarter of the community is in Abidjan, in Ivory Coast and its bank is the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO), which is authorized to issue the CFA franc (FCFA) of the African Financial Community (CFA: formerly AOF and AEF). Thus, according to some, the WAMU can be seen as a "restoration" of the AOF (and AEF) and has become an important tool for *Françafrique*.

On July 1, 1962, Mali left the WAMU, which generated new tensions between Paris and Bamako. The government has switched from the CFA franc to the self-issued non-convertible Mali franc. Ownership of the former was banned, making things extremely difficult for traders. The Malian franc began to inflate rapidly, a black market developed soon, traders sold their animals or seeds in neighbouring countries and bought imported goods for resale in Mali without paying any duties or customs fee. All these actions significantly disturbed the foreign trade balance and the state budget, the latter even plunged into deficit between 1960-68. The attempt at independence thus failed in the young state, which had just gained its independence and refused all kinds of attachment and regional monetary-financial cooperation (under French tutelage). Mali thus applied to the CFA for reintegration into the Franc zone in 1967. This attempt at independence provided a serious lesson for the rest of the region (Sylvestre-Sidibe 2019).

In 1973, the WAMU Treaty was revised, the BCEAO was given new status and the West African Development Bank (WADB, *BOAD*) was established, and new cooperation agreements were signed with France. The new texts include regulatory mechanisms, with passages guaranteeing the cohesion and stability of the Union. Due to the French background of the CFA franc (half of the central bank reserves of the states must be deposited with the *Banque de France*, from which it lends and pays interest), the common currency of the region, WAMU members had better economic performance on average than other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The French franc was to be depreciated twice by 20% in June 1958, by 17.55% in December 1958 and by 11% on August 8, 1969. The strong French franc made it more difficult for states using the CFA franc to export to countries in the region, but the weakening of the

franc in the 1970s also gradually "cut off" this disadvantage. Another positive factor is that the pace of economic development has generally outpaced the speed of demographic development, so the living conditions of the population have also improved. However, this period of positive economic activity has also ended with the end of the "*Trentes Glorieuses*"[8] in West African countries. In addition, the region was doubly affected by the negative effects: after the oil crisis in the 1980s, not only commodity prices (their primary income) fell, but even the French franc was devalued (several times),[9] leading to an automatic devaluation of the CFA franc. As a result, what previously created monetary stability in the region and guaranteed a relatively stable environment for foreign investment capital has now been reversed to the point where the weakness of the French franc, which has been helping exports so far, has fallen sharply.[10]

As a result, the macroeconomic and financial indicators of the WAMU states began to decline rapidly, culminating in a severe economic crisis. The organization found the answer to the challenge by further deepening integration, that is, supplementing monetary union by deepening economic integration. Monetary stability was therefore planned to be strengthened by economic reforms, which were entrusted to the governor of the BCEAO. After the redemption of the CFA franc into the French franc was suspended in August 1993, the CFA franc was halved on January 1, 1994 (1 franc = 100 FCFA), and on August 1, 1994, the WAMU was transformed into the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The devaluation was a severe shock to the urban population due to a reduction in their purchasing power, but it also contributed significantly to the recovery of coffee and cocoa production in Ivory Coast, for example. (It must be said that those who have benefited from it are foreign companies and not the local population.) The positive effect of devaluation has been greatly reduced thanks to corrupt regimes and foreign (French) politicians cooperating with them in their dubious dealings on the one hand, and newer, protracted local conflicts on the other (Larané 2018). With the introduction of the euro, the FCFA has also been pegged to the euro, and the region is once again facing export problems due to its strength.

In addition, as the precursors of ECOWAS-integration, the WARDA and the Mano River Union should be highlighted as active, living examples to this day. The West African Rice Production Development Association (WARDA, *ADRAO*) was established in 1971 and was the only major West African regional integration organization to bring together both the Francophone and Anglo-Saxon states before the ECOWAS was established. This functionalist organization covered a very limited area of activity, but in a sectoral area it "brought the

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[8] The „Glorious Thirty" was the thirty years from 1945 to 1975 following the end of the Second World War in France.

[9] On October 4, 1981, it was 3% and on June 12, 1982, it was 5.75%. On March 21, 1983, the German mark and the Dutch florin were appreciated by 4.25% against all other currencies in the EMS, when the French franc was depreciated by 8% against the mark. (Türke 2021, I. 138-139)

[10] For a period of time, it has become "fashionable" to present the CFA franc zone exclusively as a means of "French exploitation" of the affected African states, citing sources of dubious origin (often hoaxes) in the Hungarian press as well. The zone has undoubtedly given France great influence, but as we can see, it is a much more complex phenomenon from an economic and monetary point of view, with its positive and negative effects which largely reflect the fluctuations in the world economy.

participants closer together" with essentially the same effectiveness as the ECSC in Europe. The area of cooperation has therefore not even affected the political and economic principles of the Member States. WARDA was transformed into *Africa Rice* in 2003 and now has 28 members, covering all regions of Africa and a research centre to do agricultural research and fight against hunger. It is currently headquartered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.[11] The Mano River Union (MRU) was established in 1973 by Liberia and Sierra Leone, followed by French-speaking Guinea in 1980, and Ivory Coast in 2008. The aim was to promote economic cooperation. The Mano River originates in the Nimba Mountains (connecting Guinea and Ivory Coast) and functions as a border river between Liberia and Sierra Leone. As the former in the region was paralyzed by long civil wars in the 1990s, the Union essentially existed at its initial state – the staff of 600 people in 1986 has been reduced to 300 in 1993 and 48 in 2000. On May 20, 2004 the presidents of Guinea (Lansana Conte), Sierra Leone (Ahmad Tejan Kabbah), and Liberia (Gyude Bryant) decided to restart the cooperation. The union is run by a secretariat in Freetown (Sierra Leone), headed by the secretary-general's regional offices in Conakry (Guinea) and Monrovia (Liberia).

The Economic Role and New Perspectives of the ECOWAS/CEDEAO

Establishment, membership, structure, and budget of the ECOWAS

As shown above, the road to the creation of the CEDEAO has been rife with various levels of integration efforts, which have been largely unsuccessful, with the exception of the WARDA, which includes France's heavily patronized WAMU and the Anglo-Saxon states and is limited to sectoral cooperation. This is mostly due to the somewhat hasty nature of the creation of the organizations (as they were created by newly independent countries with little consolidation in their statehood) and overly ambitious goals and deepened integration goals among them. Influx of world political ideologies (Marxism) formed additional disintegration fault lines. Let us see why the ECOWAS has become a permanent formation, what the mistakes it did not make are and what it did, and what the key to its success is?

In 1968, in Monrovia, the Heads of State and Government of West Africa, in the absence of four members of the Cooperation Council and Sierra Leone, decided to set up the West African Regional Group (WARG, *GRAO*), the protocol of which included an association protocol with the West African Economic Community (WAEC, *CEAO*) for 1974. The latter meant a grouping of six ("Francophone") states, historically, geographically, and connected by a common language and currency, with the participation of Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Although this initiative still failed, the goal of uniting the states of the subregion into one economic community was not given up. The WAEC was soon

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[11] It was originally centered in Bouaké, Ivory Coast, but was relocated to Cotonou, Benin, for some time due to political unrest. It has regional centers in Saint-Louis (Senegal), Ibadan (Nigeria) ünd Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania). Of the Maghreb area, the only member is Egypt, but all states of Western and Central Africa are members. Sudan and South Sudan are not members, but Ethiopia is bounded on the south by the Gabon-Congo-DRC-Uganda-Kenya line; Mozambique and Madagascar (*Africa Rice* 2021).

attacked by an "Anglo-Saxon" rival in the region, the Mano River Union already outlined above. The two (rival) initiatives have since led to trade problems in the West African region, and with the exception of Ivory Coast, the WAEC states belong to the Sahel, which face specific, common challenges.

The ECOWAS, which classifies the WAMU as its "ancestors", was established on 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria, with the aim of establishing the West African Economic and Monetary Union. This treaty was revised in 1993 to include peace and security. The 15 members of the ECOWAS include the countries of the three regional blocs in the West African region, most of which have been members since 1975:

- among Sahel-African countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger (Mauritania is not a member – withdrew in 2000[12] – as is Chad, which is sometimes included in this group);
- the totality of the so-called countries of the Far West Africa: Cape Verde[13] (member only since 1976), Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia;
- and the totality of the Guinean Gulf countries: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria.

In 2017, although Morocco (Feb. 24), Mauritania, and Tunisia applied for (re)accession, they were granted observer status, but by September 2021, the situation has remained still unchanged. Both Morocco and the five commissioned states of the ECOWAS, which were entrusted with accession affairs, were in favour of the "general nonchalance". Even in 2021, Tunisia was not aware of what observer membership would entitle it to (it means a simple right to attend meetings or more). Enlargement is further hampered by the political attitude of Nigeria, which has traditionally befriended Polisario, which opposes Morocco. And economically, Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, which account for 40% of regional trade, are seriously afraid of the strong king-supported economic competition from Morocco. Not unjustifiably so, because Morocco has become the continent's fifth strongest economy and the number one investor country in West Africa (Kozlowski 2021). For the above reasons, Nigeria did not sign the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA, *ZLEC*, see below) on March 21, 2018, but by June 2018, it had refined its economic interests and signed a $25 billion Nigeria-Morocco 5,600-km gas pipeline project with Morocco, which offers an important alternative to Morocco, which has so far been heavily dependent on Algerian gas.

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[12] Despite its founding membership, in order to become a member of the Maghreb Union (AMU), it was soon stranded because of the Western Sahara dossier. Then, in August 2017 in Lomé, an association agreement was signed with the ECOWAS at the Africa-America Forum, set up under the AGOA, where the question of the reintegration into the free trade area until January 2019 arose. But in January 2020, Mauritania was still ready to join and was asked to submit a new application (Barma 2017).
[13] Interestingly, along with Algeria (AMU) and Mozambique (SADC), only these three countries in Africa are members of only one regional bloc.

After the membership problems, let's review the main institutions of the ECOWAS (Communauté 2021):

- Conference of Heads of State and Government
- Council of Ministers
- Parliament of the Community
- Economic and Social Council
- Court of Justice
- Commission (The Executive Secretariat)
- The Cooperation, Compensation and Development Fund
- ECOWAS Investment and Development Bank
- West African Health Organization
- Special Technical Committees

At the Abuja Conference on June 14, 2006, the leaders of the Member States changed the structure, replacing the Secretariat with a 9-member Committee, appointed by the Member States on a rotating basis for four years each. The first committee, with representatives from Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo, became operational in January 2007, with the Ghanaian Vice-Presidency in Burkina Faso. In addition to the above, it has eleven specialized institutions, including the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA, *AMAO*) and the Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food (RAAF, *ARAA*). The ECOWAS is chaired by members on an approximately annual rotation. Nana Akufo-Addo from Ghana has been the chairman since September 7, 2020. The ECOWAS had a budget of $265.5 million USD in 2012 (and only 207 million in 2021, an increase of 6.5% compared to 2020 due to the COVID pandemic), 80% of which consists of contributions from Member States through a Community Levy (0.5% of the import duty outside of the Community). The organization employs 600 people, one director above them. By way of comparison, the WAEMU had a budget of $318 million and a staff of 232 in 2012, while the African Union had a budget of $250 million and other major African regional integration organizations a budget of $54-84 million (Mamaty, 2012, 22).

Plans for future integration: Eco and AfCFTA (ZLEC)

The ECOWAS Vision 2020 (Community Development Program), endorsed in June 2010, identified ten strategic axes: 1) Population integration; 2) Increased cooperation between Member States; 3) Agricultural policy and Community industry; 4) Interconnection of transport infrastructure; 5) Interconnection of TIC (Information and Communication Technology); 6) Interconnection of energy and hydraulics; 7) Financial and monetary integration; 8) Human development; 9) R&D and innovation; 10) Natural and environmental resources. The ECOWAS Vision 2050, which is still being developed, sets similar goals and is in line with the African Union's *Agenda 2063* ambitions.

Figure 1. African currency unions. Source: Economist.com

Looking back to 1960, it was originally planned that in December 2009, the *eco*, modeled after the euro, would replace the CFA franc[14] as the future common currency of the ECOWAS member states, but the economic crisis has intervened, and the date has been first postponed to 2015. In 2018, they started designing a logo and applying for its name (the name *eco* was born in 2019). In the second half of 2020, its introduction was again postponed, now without a deadline. The area of *eco*-users is expected to merge two current monetary zones, one of which is the five members (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone) of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ, *ZMOA*) – eco-project initiators currently use their own national currency and depend on the WAEMU (*UEMOA*). The other zone consists of the WAEMU member states, which are users of one or the other of the two versions of the CFA franc. These states joined the *eco* project in 2013. Within the framework of the African Union, negotiations are also under way to include additional economic zones (e.g. CAEMC, *CEMAC* – Central African Economic and Monetary Community and EAC – East African Community).

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[14] The CFA franc was created on December 26, 1945 and depreciated in 1994. Note: Réunion used it until 1975 and Mayotte until 1976. 1 French franc was worth 50 CFA francs until the 1994 devaluation.

The establishing of the African Free Trade Area (AFTZ) was decided on October 22, 2008 by the SADC (Southern African Development Community), the EAC (East African Community), and the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). In 2012, the idea arose to expand the zone to the ECOWAS in addition to the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS, *CEEAC*) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). And then, negotiations began in 2015 to extend the free trade zone to the whole of Africa as the Continental Free Trade Zone (CFTA, *ZLEC*) until 2017. On January 1, 2015, common external tariffs entered into force within the ECOWAS (customs union), but only nine Member States were able to apply them *de facto*. These common customs tariffs are intended to replace the 2008 WAEMU tariffs. The CFTA (or AfCFTA) agreement of 21 March 2018 was eventually signed by 54 African states,[15] with the exception of Eritrea, and the agreement provided for the elimination of customs duties on 90% of Member States' products. The CFTA entered into force on 1 January 1 2021 as part of the ratification process (due to Covid-19 only).

Sequence of development and energy cooperation

In 2017, the GDP of the ECOWAS states totaled $565 million (2021: $557 million) – in 2013, this value was $674.34 billion and was accounted as the 20 largest economic powers. The organization makes a significant contribution to the development of regional infrastructure in the fields of transportation and telecommunications.

	Country	GDP 2020 (MILLION $)	GDP 2019 (MILLION $)	Growth
1	Nigeria	468 600,34	477 161,83	-2%
2	Ghana	57 430,58	57 193,54	+0,41%
3	Ivory Coast	45 226,63	44 419,77	+2%
4	Senegal	25 119,9	24 903,14	+1%
5	Burkina Faso	17 046,22	16 708,32	+2%
6	Benin	15 439,39	14 867,19	+4%
7	Mali	15 307,66	15 564,36	-2%
8	Niger	13 324,32	13 127,41	+1%
9	Guinea	12 607,20	11 783,69	+7%
10	Togo	5 733,08	5 634,32	+2%

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[15] Benin, Botswana, Nigeria, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau only in 2019; the majority has ratified it already with the exception of Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Seychelles Islands, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan). Some tend to see the states' "suicide attempt" in their quest, saying the CFTA will only favor multinationalist corporations (Berthelot 2016).

11	Sierra Leone	3 737,17	3 819,77	-2%
12	Liberia	2 475,78	2 548,95	-3%
13	Gambia	1 913,89	1 913,89	-
14	Cape Verde	1 832,27	2 148,96	-15%
15	Guinea Bissao	1 161,50	1 190,06	-2%

Table 1. The biggest economies of the ECOWAS (2020) Source: Sikafinance.com

What is the ranking of forces within the ECOWAS and where in the world can its states be located? The 3 economically strongest states in the ECOWAS were Nigeria ($468,600 million USD), Ghana (57,431), and Ivory Coast (45,227), and the three weakest states were Gambia (1914), Cape Verde (1831), and Guinea-Bissau (1162). Nigeria's GDP alone is more than double the GDP of all other ECOWAS members (218,355). The organization is therefore quite "top-heavy", moreover, in the case of Nigeria, we are talking about an "Anglo-Saxon" state, while the performance of the strongest Francophone states is only sufficient for the 3rd-10th placements. The political weight of Nigeria and Ghana is also significant, Kofi Annan, for example, was a UN Secretary-General as a Ghanaian diplomat from 1997-2006. Benin produced the highest economic growth with 3.83% in 2002, the largest decline (due to the COVID-19 epidemic) was in the Cape Verde Islands (-15%), and the decline in Nigeria in 2020 was 2% (Yao, 2021).

Globally, Nigeria's GDP – as the most developed African state – is sufficient for the 27th place, while Guinea-Bissau is 192nd out of 213 in the 2021 IMF rankings. Adding to the economic gap is the demographic gap, with a population of 1.8 million in Guinea-Bissau and more than a hundred times the population at 190.8 million in Nigeria. In terms of GDP per capita, the IMF ranks Cape Verde as the lead in the region ($6,837), ranked 156th in the world, Nigeria is only the 172nd ($5,280) behind Ghana, Mauritania, and Ivory Coast, and at the end followed by Niger on the 220th place ($1,320). All this shows the huge economic disparities within the ECOWAS, which distorts integration mechanisms. The forms of internal cooperation between smaller states (such as the Mano River Union) are hardly able to be in political-economic parity with Nigeria, for example. While, according to historical examples, the requirement for successful integration lies in the cooperation of Member States with almost the same economic potential.

Together with the other 5 regional cooperation organizations, the ECOWAS is pushing for the establishment of a common energy network,[16] the local institution of which is the West African Power Tool (WAPP / EEEOA[17]), established in 1999. The West African Energy

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[16] The other four regional energy agglomerations are: COMELEC (*Comité Maghrébin de l'Electricité*)> AMU; CAPP (Central African Power Pool, *PEAC*); EAPP (East African Power Pool)> COMESA; SAPP (Southern African Power Pool)> SADC

[17] It includes the following energy companies interested in energy production, transmission and distribution: NAWEC, SENELEC (Senegal) - EDSA (Sierra Leone) - LEC (Liberia) - EDM-SA, SOGEM (Mali) - CIE (Ivory Coast) - SONABEL (Burkina Faso) - VRA,

Distribution System was set up by decree A/DEC.5/12/99 in 1999, at the 22nd conference of the ECOWAS heads of state and heads of government. The Convention on the Organization and Operation of the WAPP was adopted at the 29th Conference in Niamey by decree A/DEC.18/01/06, at the same time as decree A/DEC.20/01/06, which granted it the status of a specialized institution. It therefore aims to integrate national electricity systems into a unified regional energy market, with a view to ensuring a regular and reliable supply of electricity to the population of the ECOWAS Member States at competitive prices in the medium and long term. The WAPP has been based in Cotonou (Benin) since 2006 (Türke 2018, 61-66).

The Role of the CEDEAO in the Security Architecture of the Region

The ECOMOG's controversial crisis management activities

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter refers to the role of regional organizations in maintaining peace and security. Although initially its role was purely economic, the ECOWAS was soon involved in peacekeeping issues. The problems between Member States as well as their internal problems made it clear soon that a union could hardly succeed if it ignored security policy aspects. As we have seen, the Organization of African Unity has previously virtually withdrawn itself by recognizing state sovereignty and proclaiming the principle of non-interference. As early as 1978, the ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on Non-Aggression, followed by the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, – signed in Freetown (Sierra Leone) – and the Declaration of Political Principles of July 1, 1991. An even more significant factor is that in 1990, the jurisdiction of the community was extended to preserve regional stability. The ECOWAS Defense Assistance Protocol on the Establishment of an Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC, *FAAC*) is the first protocol signed by African states which can be used in internal conflicts.

It was then that the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG (ECOWAS 2014, Assemblée 204, 36), was set up to somehow control the first Liberian civil war (1989-1996). During the ethnic and economic conflict, Charles Taylor's guerrilla troops overthrew the regime of Samuel Doe in September 1990, who came to power with a coup d`état in 1980 as a representative of the local population (*khran* ethnic). A long struggle of six major military groups began with this, causing 150,000 deaths and the collapse of an economy based on iron ore and raw rubber. The peace plan drawn up by the ECOMOG in August 1995 was violated by the parties in 1996. A new peace plan was signed in August 1996 with the active participation of the heads of state of Nigeria and Ghana, which led to the start of the disarmament and the conversion to parties of the fighting sides in 1997 (Fage – Tordoff 2004, 472-477). During the intervention, the ECOMOG gained a very bad reputation, and it was not

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NEDCO, GTS Engineering Service, KARPOWERSHIP, ECG, GTG Energie, CENIT Energie, GRIDCO, CENPOWER, (Ghana) - CONTOURGLOBAL, CEET, CEB (Togo) - SBEE (Benin) - NIGELEC (Niger) - NBET (Nigeria) + ONE (Morocco).

without reason that the nickname ECOMOG ("Every Car or Movable Object Gone") got attached to it. Its troops were poorly prepared and equipped, unpaid, and completely demoralized, and also suffered significant losses (Faria 2004, 13, 18-20). In addition, there was a lack of political will to sustain the ECOMOG in the longer term. In September 1998, another coup attempt was made in Liberia, where President Taylor suspected Guinea and Sierra Leone in the background, and since troops from both countries had participated in the ECOMOG, the latter was accused of interfering in Liberian internal affairs. Meanwhile, the diamond issue has escalated. Taylor was interested in doing business with the Sierra Leone insurgents (Revolutionary United Front) to receive some of the profit from the Sierra Leone diamond fields occupied by the RUF in exchange for arms shipments. The peacekeeping attempt of the ECOWAS has thus been discredited by the intervention of the militants of non-neutral neighboring states and the common political settlement in the Community has been overridden by mediation through bilateral channels, which seems to be truly (more) neutral.

The ECOMOG came into being as formation with weak authority, similarly to Article VI of the UN Charter, but as a result of the events, it quickly transformed into being similar to Article VII of the UN Charter, an up to 20,000-strong peacekeeping force, deployed in Sierra Leone (1997) and Guinea-Bissau (1999) in addition to Liberia. In Sierra Leone, President Joseph S. Momoh introduced political reforms in October 1991, allowed the multi-party system, but was removed by Valentine Strasser 6 months later. The struggle between the RUF and government troops led to a humanitarian disaster. Strasser eventually saw the calling of the ECOMOG as a solution to the problem, but he was also overthrown by a coup d`état before the 1996 presidential election. Thanks to the mediation of Ivory Coast, in November 1996, the RUF and the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Tejan Kabba, who returned to power at the elections, signed a peace agreement. In 1997, the army carried out another coup, and Colonel Johnny Koroma entered an alliance with the RUF. The ECOMOG troops, mandated by the UN Security Council on October 8, 1997 to impose an oil and arms embargo, stood in vain this time with a vast majority of neutral (and distant) Nigerian troops (while to a lesser extent still made up of neighboring Guinean troops). The ECOWAS peacekeepers, allied with the popular militias behind Kabba, have been essentially active in intervening with one of the warring parties, violating the requirement of neutrality for peacekeeping. But at least this time the performance was crowned with success, Koroma forces (AFCR) were expelled from and around Freetown, and Kabba was allowed to return by March 1998. However, the civil war continued – mainly over the possession of diamond fields –, and the conflict was eventually resolved by 2002, not by the ECOMOG, but by the 6,000-strong, although initially struggling UN mission (UNAMSIL).

A civil war[18] broke out in Bissau-Guinea on June 7, 1998 between forces loyal to President Nino Vieira and the insurgents led by Ansumane Mané, and lasted until May 7, 1999. In order to deal with the growing tension, on December 26, 1998, at the request of the President, the ECOWAS headed the ECOMOG to Guinea-Bissau to monitor compliance with the ceasefire

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[18] For Guinea-Bissau's modern history and the detailed presentation of the conflict see (Türke 2009)

agreement. Once again, the "peacekeeping" battalion was not neutral: neighboring Senegalese and Guinean troops provided support to forces loyal to the president, as most of the armed forces lined up alongside General Mané (ECOMOG 2014). Vieira called on Senegal and Guinea-Conakry to intervene militarily in support of him, in accordance with the reciprocal defense agreements signed by the three countries, but those agreements would have provided military assistance only in the event of external aggression, which was not the present case. The conflict in Guinea-Bissau and its outcome were extremely important for Senegal,[19] anticipating the victory of the military dictatorship, it took part with greater enthusiasm in the fight against the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), being that a secessionist movement in the area wanted to join the related Guinea-Bissau, detached from Senegal since the war that started in 1982. After the news of the summoning of foreign troops, the support of the rebels gradually increased. In 1999, France organized a Senegalese-French operation involving the secret commando of the warship TCD Foudre, with the aim of Senegal occupying a neighboring country. Paris has officially denied its involvement as well as the real purpose of the action, which is to overthrow its "new ally" (Verschave, 2000, 76), Vieira, and to inaugurate General Mané. Paris only officially acknowledged that during the military operations in the Gulf of Guinea (*Corymbe, Recamp Bissau, Aramis*) between January and March 1999, TCD[20] Siroco (and Foudre) warships transported the ECOMOG troops to Guinea-Bissau and evacuated residents. After a short period of defeat by the rebel forces during the fighting, a peace agreement was reached under the auspices of the Francophone Member States of the ECOWAS, which was signed on November 1, 1998 in Abuja (Nigeria). The peace treaty provided for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the deployment of the CEDEAO peacekeeping troops on the Senegalese border (which took place on March 17, 1999). The 600-strong peacekeeping force was tasked with monitoring the withdrawal of Guinean and Senegalese troops and overseeing the election. However, opposing the Abuja peace treaties, Vieira's presidential guard (a new "army" of 600 militiamen, *Aguendas*) was trained by French officers, and Paris and Dakar continued to maintain a base on the island of Bubaque.

In 1999, as a result of the various civil wars, the ECOWAS Member States decided to set up a stand-by force, retaining the ECOMOG name, whose main tasks included monitoring and reviewing ceasefire agreements, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, preventive presence, peace building, disarmament and demilitarization. On October 1, 2003, under pressure from the United States, the ECOWAS launched a similar mission called ECOMIL (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia) to reclaim Monrovia from rebel forces and then work for peace in the Second Liberian Civil War (1999-2003). The problem was that while CEDEAO deployed "principally neutral" contingents of a total of 3,563 from Nigeria, Mali, and Senegal on an "integrated level" (initially acting as a UN blue helmet), other members did not remain neutral

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[19] The intervention of Senegal bore the name "Gabu operation", the contingent was led by Colonel Abdoulaye Fall. In the case of Guinea-Conakry, the intervention was mainly due to the good relationship between Vieira, President Lansana Conté and Force Commander Samy Tamba. Samy Tamba lost his life during the fights.
[20] Special military cargo ships, predecessors of BPCs.

in the conflict at all. As President Charles Taylor's sovereignty shrunk to one-third of its country, Ghana (and to a lesser extent Sierra Leone) actively supported the insurgent organization MODEL. The UN mission, the UNMIL, also had the task of settling between the warring parties and quickly reached its goal (Türke, 2016, 160).

The ECOMOG's activities during the civil wars in Liberia (1990-97, 1999-2003), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea-Bissau (1998-99), and Ivory Coast (2002) were therefore of limited success. Nigeria's political and military weight has heightened fears and rivalries between English and French-speaking countries, and the deployment of the ECOMOG has proven rather slow. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was unable to fully control the various national contingents and only Nigeria had naval and air military transport capacity. Another problem was the language differences, as well as the lack of air defense missiles, logistical support, financial resources and, in some cases, internal consensus (Faria 2004, 18-20). In 2000, a Security and Defense Policy Committee was established in Monrovia to set up a "Community of West African States Expeditionary Corps" (Sourd, 2005, 13). On June 18, the ECOWAS decided in Abuja, Nigeria, to set up a 6,500-strong force to be deployed in crisis situations. This force also included a rapid reaction force of 1,500 (Türke, 2016, 43). On December 14, 2009, the ECOWAS offered the CNDD junta, which took power in Guinea after the death of Lansana Conté in December 2008, to send an intervention force here as well, but it rejected the offer.

On December 7, 2010, Laurent Gbagbo, the former President, considered the winner by the Constitutional Council of Ivory Coast, did not want to hand over power after the presidential election to Alassane Ouattara, who was recognized by the Independent Electoral Commission, the majority of states, the UN, and the AU as the winner after the 2010 presidential election. The ECOWAS then suspended Ivory Coast's membership and all work in progress with it, and the country was only reclaimed with Ouattara's April 2011 victory. On October 12, 2012, the UN Security Council mandated ECOWAS countries to jointly develop a plan for the military recapture of northern Mali (Besenyő, 2013), occupied by the Tuareg and the extremist Islamist armed groups AQMI, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine (between 2012-2013 Azawad, an internationally unrecognized state). The ECOWAS mission was planned for 3,000 people with the participation of Senegal, Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Benin, and at first France seemed to be confident that this force would be able to recapture Azawad and keep peace there, albeit with French logistical support. On January 11, 2013, however, Ansar Dine (AQMI, MUJAO), with its all-terrain-mounted machine guns and small heavy artillery, reached the border between Azawad and "Remnant Mali", and even occupied Konna, a strategically important point in defending the capital, Bamako. It then became clear to France that it was no longer possible to delay and wait for the ECOWAS to resolve the problem, so they took over with *Operation Serval*. In addition, at the urging of President Ouattara, the ECOWAS set up its own 6,000-strong international mission, MISMA, on January 16, 2013, in which all countries of the community (except Gambia and Ivory Coast) were joined by Chad, Kenya, and Burundi, but it then molded into the MINUSMA UN mission in July 2013. The

community did not have a scenario to deal with the crisis in Mali, they did not know how to act (Türke, 2021, I. 357).

In January 2017, the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF, *FAC*, changed from ECOMOG) of 5 national contingents was deployed in the Gambia as part of the ECOMOG mission. Its task was to restore democracy with an UNSC and ECOWAS mandate, after President Yahya Jammeh, who lost the December 2016 presidential election, refused to hand over the power. The ESF of 7,000 people was assembled from Nigerian, Senegalese, Ghanaian, Togolese, and Malian contingents, sown under Senegalese command.[21] It was launched in a surprisingly short time, under strong political pressure from Senegal, according to a previously developed scenario, not using the traditional (slow) offering capability generation system: According to the current scheme, each Member State is required to maintain a 500-strong, in 30 days deployable contingent for ESF – organized since 2004 –, trained for peacekeeping, made up of military, police, and civilian personnel. Nigeria remains the main contributor and the mechanism continues to be hampered by chronic money shortages. The mandate of ECOMOG has been extended until the end of December 2021, despite protests from half of the Gambian population (Carlier 2017).

Cooperation between the ECOWAS and the European Union

On the African stage, the European Union is the initiator of regionalism in West Africa and its main sub-regional partner in the region is the ECOWAS. Cooperation in the military field was launched in the framework of the 1997 RECAMP (Strengthening African Peacekeeping Skills) program initiated by France. In doing so, France handed/is handing over to its African partners the skills needed for peacekeeping. Above all, the program involves the training of military observers and the training of battalions and brigades. Several multinational exercises (RECAMP I-V) were carried out (Faria 2004, 22-23) as part of the multi-ethnic training with regional objectives, for which France provided the teams and equipment, as well as financial support and logistics.[22] Following the closure of some of the French military bases in Africa, the bases in Senegal, Gabon and Djibouti may continue to operate (Besenyő - Hetényi 2011). French military schools operate either in the capitals or in a peacekeeping school relocated from Zambakro (Ivory Coast) to Koulikoum (Mali). France was less and less capable of funding this program on its own, so it needed the support of other donor countries (Assemblée 2004, 22-23). Of the five cycles of the RECAMP program, the preparation of the ECOWAS was concerned with:

- 1996-1998: Guidimakha exercise in Senegal, mainly with the participation of the ECOWAS, in the framework of RECAMP I in February-March 1998, organized by

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[21] Senegal had previous experience of intervention in Gambia after intervening in 1981 to defend President Dawda Jawara to prevent a coup d`état.

[22] In terms of asset disposal, France had three warehouses in Africa in 2002: one in Dakar, one in Libreville and one in Djibouti. These warehouses containing French-made weapons were used to equip and supply a 600-strong infantry battalion. Assault rifles, light machine guns, vehicles, and other equipment were stored in the warehouses.

France, Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, the 2,600-strong international force was contributed to by Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Ghana.

- 2004-2005: Military exercise in Benin with the participation of the ECOWAS in the RECAMP IV framework.

The RECAMP program was raised to the EU level in the framework of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership at the 2007 Lisbon Conference under the name EURORECAMP, with the aim of enabling African (sub)regional communities[23] to set up their own potential peacekeeping forces within the foreseeable future. Complicating matters is the fact that there are several African countries that are members of two regional economic communities at the same time. The partners for each workshop/brigade team (SBRIGs) are as follows: In all cases, with the exception of the ECOWAS and the SADC, a decision by the African Union authorizes their deployment. The ECOWAS Brigade was initially called WASBRIG and was renamed ECOBRIG (West African Brigade; *FAAO*) or more commonly used as ESF (Standby Force). This force has been in the planning stage for a long time and the European Union is supporting its existence; without this financial source, it would still be inoperable today. The goal was to set up an action group of 1,500 soldiers ready to be deployed in 30 days and a brigade of 5,000 soldiers ready to be deployed in 90 days. Together with the four brigades of the other four African (sub)regional organizations, they could be deployed in the following six scenarios:

Scenario 1 – political mission (example: Ivory Coast) – within 30 days;

Scenario 2 – joint AU/regional cooperation and UN monitoring mission (e.g. UNMEE,[24] African Union Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea; Sudan) – within 30 days;

Scenario 3 – independent AU/regional cooperation monitoring mission (e.g. Burundi / AMIB, Comoros / AMIC) – within 30 days;

Scenario 4 – AU/regional co-operation regional peacekeeping force under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (for example: Burundi / AMIB) – within 30 days;

Scenario 5 – AU peacekeeping force for multidimensional complex peacekeeping missions – within 90 days (within 30 days for military components);

Scenario 6 – African Union intervention, for example in the event of genocide, if the international community fails to respond appropriately – within 14 days.

The implementation of the first three scenarios requires minimal management skills and few financial resources, and the implementation of the first four scenarios can be carried out by a single regional brigade (Laborderie, 2008). In contrast, Scenarios 5 and 6 require a higher level of management capacity as well as continental participation. These missions can only be carried out in the second phase.

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[23] In addition to CEDEAO, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMAC), established in 1994 and operating since 1999, and the Economic and Social Committee of West Africa Monetary Union (WAMU, 1962)

[24] African Union Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)

Conclusion

The relative success of the ECOWAS is due to the fact that it was created at a later, more mature stage in the African integration process, following the (relative) consolidation of new state entities that have not existed in this form previously, with more moderate, achievable goals and within a looser cooperation. As a result, despite huge demographic, economic (etc.) differences between members and the Francophone-Anglo-Saxon fault line, a relatively effective form of cooperation has been established. ECOWAS member states have been able to act as engines of pan-African integration efforts, remaining open to in-depth cooperation with integration bodies in other regions, such as the introduction of the *eco*. Steps towards security in the region are also significant, but they are still almost 100% dependent on external funding and, in the event of a major crisis, need the help of the UN, the EU, or even a former colonizing state of the region. Contrary to the peacekeeping principles of the 2000 Brahimi Report, states providing ECOMOG/ESF contingents are involved in a significant number of cases as neighbors and as parties with a strong interest in the conflict or on their own side, in violation of the principle of neutrality. In fact, they often intervene alongside their political allies completely arbitrarily in the domestic political struggles of one state or another, in several cases in a kind of gendarmerie role.

Conflict of Interest

The author hereby declares that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

Notes on Contributor

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The GERD Debates and Possible Consequences

An Overview

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Abstract:

The Greek historian, Herodotus (c. 484 – c. 425 BC), formulated the proverb often used today that "Egypt is a gift of the Nile". This finding is a good reflection of the thousands-of-years-old firm belief that the river and the country form an inseparable, organic entity. This conspicuous consensus in Egyptian society over the Nile goes beyond the historical heritage that the river played in the formation and survival of Egyptian civilizations. The existence of Egypt is still closely intertwined with the life-giving river, which accounts for 90% of the Arab state's freshwater needs. The steady flow of the water of the Nile is therefore almost synonymous with survival for the country. The dam built by Ethiopia along the Nile could therefore lead to a serious water crisis in Egypt, as in other neighbouring states, which is otherwise a common cause of armed conflicts. Cairo considered the situation so critical that it was described as a threat to security and peace in the region. At the same time, Ethiopia's priority is to ensure its own economic development and improve the livelihoods of its citizens, rather than the stability of the region. It hopes to implement the latter from Africa's largest hydropower plant to date, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

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Introduction

On 22 February 2022, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam facility began generating electricity in the Benishangul-Gumuz region of western Ethiopia. The hydropower plant has been built on the Blue Nile, the most important tributary of the Nile, since 2011. Its importance is well illustrated by the fact that about 85% of the total water flow of the Nile reaches Egypt on this branch. In addition, the river is also of paramount importance to Sudan due to the Roseires[3] and Sennar[4] dams that together produce 80% of the country's energy production. In addition, these dams contribute to the irrigation of the Gezira system,[5] which is renowned for its high-quality cotton, wheat, and fodder production. For this reason, the possible decline in the amount of water available has been a matter of serious concern in both states. As tensions escalated, Egypt, not for the first time in history, threatened Ethiopia with military intervention to enforce its interests and will. However, neither the threat of armed intervention nor the influence of the international public has been able to force Ethiopia to abandon its plans or try to resolve the current crisis through legal means.

Conventions on the Use of the Nile

The Nile, one of the longest rivers in the world, and its three main tributaries (the White Nile, the Blue Nile, and the Tekeze-Atbara), passes through 11 African countries from its sources to its estuary. Disputes over the yield of its water cannot therefore be considered new, it has already been regulated in several agreements between the parties involved. Regarding the latter, Egypt had practically occupied a dominant position for millennia. Its privileged position had persisted after the emergence and settlement of European colonial powers in the region. Its special strategic position, especially following the handover of the Suez Canal, also required cooperation between rival colonizers and made it essential to ensure the smooth functioning of the Egyptian state. To guarantee the latter, the Contracting States had consistently recognized Egypt's "natural and historical rights" and had undertaken to refrain from any investment along the entire length of the river which could had disrupted the flow of the Nile and/or reduced the inflow of water into Egyptian territory. All these principles were clearly set out, inter alia, in the Rome Convention between Great Britain and Italy occupying Eritrea, signed on 15 April 1891, in the Addis Ababa Agreement between Great Britain and Ethiopia of 15 May 1902, the Treaty of British-French-Italian (London) of 13 December 1906, and the 1925 Treaty of Rome (ALJAZEERA, 2009). However, the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Britain went beyond all this. The right of veto enshrined in the treaty empowered Egypt to prevent any threating investment in neighbouring states which could have adversely affected its share of the waters (Okoth-Owira, 2004, pp. 7-8). The latter convention was revised 30 years later after Sudan also began using the Nile extensively for irrigation (Agreement…, 1959). However, a serious shortcoming of the 1959 agreement was that while

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[3] It was constructed on the Blue Nile in Sudan and it consists of a concrete buttress dam 1 km wide with a maximum height of 68 m.

[4] It was built on the Blue Nile, approximately 320 kilometres southeast from the Sudanese Capital and 270 kilometres downstream of the Roseires Dam.

[5] An Arabic term, meaning Island System.

Egypt allocated 55.5 billion cubic metres (BCM) and Sudan 15 BCM, it did not take into account the water needs of the other Nile-affected states at all (Abedje, 2020; Swain, 1997).

However, Ethiopia and the states along the upper reaches of the Nile were not willing to accept agreements that were detrimental to them. Therefore, as a kind of compromise, the water ministers of the nine countries[6] sharing the river established the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in February 1999 as a kind of forum for coordination and cooperation for a more equitable use of water resources. However, Ethiopia and three other states still considered it unfair that the implementation of their development visions continued to depend on Egypt's approval, so in 2010 they signed the so-called Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The convention found an extremely fierce rejection in Egypt and Sudan, which had previously enjoyed a hegemonic status over the Nile. The two states openly threatened the signatory countries to stop their cooperation with them completely if they would try to force the implementation of the document (Ibrahim, 2011, pp. 301-302). Cairo had consistently adhered to its rejection position in the case and failed to reach the hoped-for compromise during Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's[7] personal talks with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak[8] and Omar Suleiman,[9] the head of Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS).[10] Ethiopia did not start building the dam as long as the situation in Egypt was stable, avoiding any confrontation with the militarily and economically superior Cairo. Taking advantage of developments in the Arab Spring, it began construction of the dam unilaterally in March 2011, without consulting Egypt, rejecting all political pressure, and refusing to back down. (Bakri, 2015, pp. 12-14).

The Special Ethiopian Interests

With a total investment cost of $4.6 billion, the Ethiopian government originally planned to build the GERD in five years. However, the construction work has been dragged on due to diplomatic tensions and domestic political crises. The works are carried out by Webuild Group,[11] a subsidiary of Salini Costruttori SpA, Italy, awarded the contract without competitive

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[6] Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Eritrea only attended the meeting as an observer.

[7] Meles Zenawi Asres - born Legesse Zenawi Asres - (Adwa, 9 May 1955 - Brussels, 20 August 2012) was an Ethiopian soldier and politician. He joined the Tigray People's Liberation Front in 1985 and was its chairman from 1989. He was also elected leader of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, which was formed in 1988. He governed Ethiopia from 1991 to 1995 as president and from 1995 as prime minister until his death in 2012.

[8] Mohamed Hosni El-Sayed Mubarak (Kafr-El Meselha, May 4, 1928 - Cairo, February 25, 2020) was an Egyptian military officer, politician, and the fourth President of the country from 1981 to 2011. During his pragmatic dictatorship, Egypt was one of the most important allies of the West, especially the United States, in the Middle East, and represented a moderate trend in the Arab world. Throughout his presidency, he respected the Camp David Accords and managed to maintain relations with the Jewish state while his country was able to return to the Arab League in 1989. Finally, the 2011 revolution caused his downfall.

[9] Omar Mahmoud Suleiman (Kena, 2 July 1936 - Cleveland, 19 July 2012) was an Egyptian soldier, politician, and diplomat. He served as the director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service from 1993 to 2011 and then Vice-President of the country from 29 January 2011 to 11 February 2011.

[10] At the above-mentioned Zenawi-Mubarak-Suleiman meeting, the Egyptian side firmly refused its consent to the construction of the planned Ethiopian facility and stressed that "such a dam should not be built. There can be no question about that. We will not allow it. If you start, we will bomb it immediately. For us, it is a matter of life and death". (Bakri, 2015, pp. 12–14).

[11] The Milan-based Webuild SpA is a company managed and coordinated by Salini Costruttori SpA with a share capital of EUR 600,000,000. For more information about the Company, see: https://www.webuildgroup.com/en

tender, for Electric Power, which is owned by the Ethiopian state. Upon completion, it will consist of a 145-metre-high main dam as well as two power plants on the right and left banks of the river. The filling of the reservoir has already started in July 2020 and the amount of 13.5 BCM of water needed to start energy production had already been collected in June 2021. It is estimated that it will store about 74 BCM of water after its full commissioning, which is about one and a half times the average annual flow of the Blue Nile (49 BCM) (Ashton, 2007; El-Fekki–Malsin, 2021). This will allow the production of 5.15 gigawatts of power, which alone is 22% more than Ethiopia's current 4.2 gigawatts of capacity.[12] The latter is particularly important for the political leadership, as the country is currently facing severe electricity shortages and about 65% of the population is not connected to the electricity grid[13] (Mutahi, 2020). According to the Ethiopian government, the full implementation of the investment would therefore allow both the full satisfaction of domestic energy needs by 2030 and the sale of the remaining surplus energy on the international market, which could provide a significant source of revenue for the state. And the latter has a very serious chance, as only several of the neighbouring states, namely Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, and Djibouti, are forced to deal with huge energy shortages every day.[14] For all these reasons, Ethiopia considers Africa's largest hydroelectric plant to be the country's industrial symbol and a fundamental national interest[15] (Schipani–Saleh, 2022). The implementation of the project is mainly financed from private sources, government bond issues and donations.[16] The main reason for this is, on the one hand, the absence of foreign investors, who consider the investment to be too risky due to a possible outbreak of a regional conflict. On the other hand, Ethiopia cannot count on the World Bank's financial assistance either, as it has not yet received the necessary approval from Egypt for its participation (Abdulrahman, 2018, p. 140). Finally, the declared goal of Addis Ababa was to eliminate all attempts at foreign influence, for which it was prepared to reject the substantial financial contributions offered. To maintain exclusive control, it also rejected an offer to allow Cairo to make a significant contribution to the financing of the construction of the dam, as this would have given it access to the works and the right to supervise its operation once the dam is completed (Reuters, 2014). For all these reasons, the project was practically supported only by China. As early as 2013, it became involved in other infrastructure developments related to the project and provided a $1.2

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[12] Based on the original 6.4-gigawatt project, the facility would have been equipped with 16 375-megawatt Francis hydro turbines. However, Ethiopian officials changed the volume of investment in 2019, reducing the number of turbines to 13. It is calculated that even under the changed conditions, the annual production of the dam will reach 15.76 terawatt hours (Patel, 2022).

[13] The picture is further nuanced by the fact that while in cities about 85% of the population has access to electricity, in rural areas this proportion is only 29%.

[14] Another important aspect for Sudan is that the dam would be able to regulate the flow of the Nile evenly throughout the year, thus eliminating the severe flooding that often occurs in August and September.

[15] The expectations and sentiment associated with GERD are well illustrated, among other things, by the fact that a number of poems and reggae songs have been written in honour of the facility, which is considered a symbol of national pride.

[16] Donations exceeded 13 billion Ethiopian birr between 2011 and 2020, equivalent to about $41 million. See the article in the Egyptian Almal Economic Gazette for more details:
https://almalnews.com/%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%87%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A4/ (Accessed: 9 March 2022).

billion loan to build power transmission lines connecting the dam with nearby towns and cities. This was followed in 2017 by another $652 million loan, and Chinese companies were commissioned to carry out construction work and accelerate developments that had stalled in the meantime (Piliero, 2021).

However, the on-site impact studies carried out at the same time as the work highlighted a number of risk factors in addition to the benefits. First of all, it was pointed out that changing the flow of the river will certainly significantly reduce the damage caused by the floods in the rainy seasons. At the same time, this will have a very negative effect on agricultural activity in the river valley below the dam, as it will deprive the arable land there of the natural water supply necessary for its irrigation. In addition, nearly 12,500 people had to be relocated from the area designated as a reservoir and below the river. In addition, the livelihoods of local families rely heavily on the region's forests and river ecosystem. All of this is threatened by the fact that the reservoir will flood 1,680 square kilometres, 90% of which is forest, while unfavourable changes could occur in the river's fish population. Finally, experts have emphasized that the greatest risk is from the sedimentation of the reservoir, which, in addition to the environment, could adversely affect the performance of the dam itself and, ultimately, its lifespan (International Rivers, 2013).

Position of Egypt and Sudan

Of the Nile's 84 BCM of annual waterflow, 55.5 billion is currently used by Egypt and 18.5 billion by Sudan, while the remaining 10 BCM are virtually lost due to evaporation. Egypt covers 90% of the freshwater needs of its more than 102 million people[17] from this share of water (El-Fekki–Malsin, 2021). The remaining 10% can be replaced by rainwater and groundwater[18], or only by extremely costly methods such as wastewater recycling, seawater desalination, or just importing the amount of water that is still needed. Egyptian experts have particularly complained that the country's per capita freshwater share has been steadily fluctuating between 550 and 560 cubic metres a year for decades, regardless of the population growth that has taken place in the meantime, while at least 114 BCM would be needed. All this is fundamentally slowing down the development of industry, endangering agricultural production, which uses 82% of the water, and therefore requires radical changes as well as increasing the salinisation of cropland and the country's vulnerability to importing water-intensive food crops.[19] Projects launched by the Egyptian government (construction of aqueducts, drilling of water wells or start-up of water treatment and desalination plants) to

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[17] Based on 2020 estimates and statistics.

[18] The country has significant groundwater reserves primarily in the western desert.

[19] Due to the scarcity of water resources, for example, the Cairo government was forced to order a significant reduction in rice production (around 35%) as early as 2018, and farmers who violated the rules could be fined or even imprisoned under a law passed back in April 2017. Due to the gradual cessation of cultivation, half of the rice stocks had to be covered by imports, which, in addition to the country's consumption rate of four million tons, meant an additional cost to the state of $1 billion a year. In addition, instead of sugar cane, they were forced to gradually switch to less water-intensive sugar beet growing in the northern part of the country, which at the same time increased unemployment in the industries related to the processing of sugar cane plantations. A similar situation has arisen in the cultivation of bananas and broadleaf vegetables (NOUREDDINE, 2018).

recover and recycle water are only a symptomatic treatment of the problem and are not a reassuring solution in the long run. In view of all this, it was considered particularly damaging that, while the average rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands is roughly 936 million cubic metres, Egypt and Sudan can only benefit from less than 10% of it, which has officially plunged them into water poverty[20] (Al-Kady, 2022). The Cairo political leadership has therefore officially declared that "the Ethiopian dam is one of the biggest challenges facing Egypt today, especially in light of the unilateral measures taken by the Ethiopian side to fill and operate the dam. The huge negative consequences of unilateral measures will not be accepted by the Egyptian state". (State Information of Egypt, 2021)

The Egyptian leadership has therefore expressed serious concerns about the project from the outset, which it sees as an existential threat. Above all, it feared that the dam could further restrict the already scarce water supply of the Nile, which is almost the only source of water for its citizens. Experts also agreed that the full commissioning of the dam would certainly reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt, not least because the amount of water captured in the reservoir would evaporate on a much larger surface than the narrow water-plane of the Blue Nile. A further concern was that lower water levels could limit traffic and transport on the river and could have an extremely negative impact on the livelihoods of some 2 million farmers who use the water of the Nile for irrigation in their agricultural activities. In addition, the country suffered from severe electricity shortages in some months, mainly in the summer, due to aging infrastructure and insufficient generation and transmission capacity between 2011 and 2016. This has raised serious fears that a reduction in water flow would also adversely affect Lake Nasser, the reservoir behind the Aswan Dam, which could have led to a 25–40% drop[21] in the country's electricity production (Aljazeera, 2013). Finally, according to Egyptian, Sudanese, and international experts, the dam is one of the most dangerous projects in the world, the construction and operation of which will endanger the security and viability of the region. Dr Hisham Bakhit, a professor of hydraulics at the Cairo University's Faculty of Engineering and a member of the Egyptian delegation to the GERD talks, said the geological conditions in the area were extremely likely to cause the dam to collapse, which would result in a catastrophic situation in Sudan. Dr Mohamed Abdel-Ati, Egyptian Minister of Water and Irrigation, also said that the dam had serious flaws, some of which had already been reported to the Ethiopian side, but no substantive response to their inquiries had been received (Alarabiya, 2021).

At first, Sudan also acknowledged on the one hand that the Ethiopian facility could help regulate water levels in the Nile, thereby reducing land and housing damage caused by floods.[22] Experts, on the other hand, pointed out that the changes would adversely affect the

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[20] According to the World Bank, a country can be considered water poor if its renewable freshwater supply does not reach a minimum of 1,000 cubic metres per capita, which would be essential to meet the balanced water and food needs of its citizens.

[21] Regarding the above statistics, it should be noted that hydropower utilization has accounted for barely 7.2% of Egypt's total energy production in recent years. The 25% reduction in the statement therefore actually represents a fall of around 1.8% in total energy production. (US ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 2018).

[22] The Sudanese statements at the time were clearly aimed at exerting a kind of pressure on Egypt, which significantly increased tensions between the two states during this period.

Blue Nile and Kassala[23] regions in particular, where Nile floods had previously provided soil fertility. For this reason, Sudan, like Egypt, must change its previous agricultural strategy and switch to irrigated production at least in these areas. All of this affects some one million hectares, where it would only be possible to build the necessary sewers and drainage networks at a cost of billions, the financing of which the Sudanese economy is unlikely to be capable of affording. In addition, maintaining the fertility of the land would make the use of fertilizers and pesticides essential, which are often harmful (Noureddin, 2018).

Khartoum expressed concern about the project's negative impact on the efficiency of the 280-megawatt Roseries dam and strongly condemned the unilateral Ethiopian steps to fill GERD's reservoirs[24] (Patel, 2022). Its fears about the latter in particular were confirmed when the first-stage filling of the reservoir caused serious disruption to Sudan's water treatment plants, leaving thousands of households without water for days in July 2020. It was feared that the second phase of the reservoir planned for 2021 could endanger the lives of 20 million Sudanese citizens, which had contributed significantly to the escalation of tensions with Ethiopia (Hendawi, 2021).

Deepening of the Conflict

Egypt has on several occasions given clear signals in recent decades that it is sufficiently determined to safeguard its specific national interests and maintain the status quo. For example, almost after the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat stated that "the only thing that could lead Egypt into war again is water" (Gleick, 1993, p. 86). On another occasion, he also declared that "any action that endangers the waters of the Blue Nile will face a determined response from Egypt, even if it leads to the outbreak of war" (Kendie, 1999, p. 141). A similar statement was made by Boutros Boutros-Ghali[25] even as Egyptian foreign minister when he said that "the next war in our region will erupt because of water, not politics" (Klare, 2001, p. 59.).

It is therefore particularly worrying that the dialogue with Ethiopia on this issue for more than 10 years has so far not yielded any substantive results and that no legally binding agreement has been reached on the filling and operation of the dam (Raafat, 2020). From the

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[23] It regularly provided shelters for refugees from the protracted Ethiopian civil war.

[24] The other side of the coin, however, is that GERD will undoubtedly prevent the accumulation of sludge in the reservoirs of the Sennar and Roseires dams, which will significantly increase their water storage capacity (NOUREDDIN, 2018).

[25] Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Cairo, 14 November 1922 - Cairo, 16 February 2016) was an Egyptian politician, diplomat and sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations. He was a member of the Central Committee of the ruling Arab Socialist Union from 1974 to 1977 and then Egyptian Foreign Minister from 1977 to 1991. In this capacity, he accompanied President Anwar al-Sadat to his historic visit to Jerusalem, played a key role in the summit in Camp David, and played an important peace-building role in the Organisation of African Unity. He served as Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from 1977 until early 1991 and then he became Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for several months before he was elected UN Secretary-General. Under his secretariat, the UN has been idle in monitoring several conflicts (such as the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Angolan civil war or the Rwandan genocide), and Boutros had opposed NATO bombings during the Bosnian war. As a result, he lost support from the United States, which vetoed his re-election in 1996. After his resignation, he was Secretary-General of La Francophonie, an organisation of French-speaking nations, from 1997 to 2002, and then Director of the National Council for Human Rights in Egypt from 2003 to 2012. See for more details: AL-NAGGAR AND PRANTNER, 2021, pp. 84–85.

outset, it was an insurmountable problem that Egypt wanted to obtain permission to oversee the design and construction of the dam itself in order to allay its concerns. However, Ethiopia would have been willing to do so only if Egypt had renounced its veto over water distribution, which in turn was an unacceptable option for Cairo (Egypt Independent, 2011). Due to the lack of agreement, it has been increasingly said in Egypt since 2011 that the country's existence depends on the Nile not only in the past millennia, but even today. To increase mass support, the government has communicated virtually openly to the general public that if diplomatic means fail, they will not shy away even from war to prevent Ethiopia from limiting the flow of the river for years to completely fill the reservoir after the dam is completed, endangering thereby the livelihoods of the Egyptians. This was implied, among other things, by statements by then-President Mohamed Morsi,[26] and then a secret recording was also leaked in 2013 in which Egyptian politicians had proposed sabotage, support for Ethiopian rebels or even direct military intervention against Ethiopia to prevent the construction of the dam, which was seen as a threat to national security[27] (Alarabiya News, 2013). The subsequent changes in the Egyptian leadership have not changed anything about this determined position. President Sisi has also repeatedly made clear in his statements that his country is ready to take whatever steps it deems necessary to protect their rights to the Nile. However, all this only further increased the Ethiopians' determination to carry out the investment.

The escalating tensions seemed to ease in 2015, when stakeholders signed a tripartite declaration in Khartoum, committing themselves to a joint effort to resolve issues surrounding GERD.[28] The ministers of the three states, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, held a joint visit to the construction site in October 2017, and at the UN General Assembly, Ethiopia and Sudan pledged to share their analyses and impact studies on the dam with Egypt (Shaban, 2017). Barely half a year later, it was also agreed that the three states would set up a common platform to answer questions about the dam and hold regular summit meetings every six months specifically to review current affairs in GERD, always in another of the three capitals. Political thaw was not hampered by the fact that Ethiopia and Sudan also concluded a special agreement to set up a joint military contingent to protect GERD. The positions converged best in June 2018, when Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed Ali made an open commitment that his country would not reduce Egypt's share of the waters of the Nile. In return, President Sisi stressed that they were working to finalize an agreement that would simultaneously ensure both a fair share for Egypt of the Nile and the development of Ethiopia. He also firmly ruled out the use of armed force by his country to prevent construction.

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[26] Although President Morsi stressed that "we do not want a war," many had interpreted his announcement as a covert threat that "no one can compromise Egypt's water security and we will not shy away from any means in this matter". However, he placed special emphasis on what was said with a quote from an ancient song about the Nile that " even if it diminishes by one drop then our blood is the alternative." (BBC NEWS, 2013)

[27] On the above-mentioned incident, the contemporary Egyptian president convened Egyptian politicians and opposition party leaders to discuss the water issue on 3 June 2013. The meeting was broadcast live without the knowledge of the participants, who were not informed of the recording by the Office of the President. The latter was the reason why opposition MPs articulated their thoughts more openly when they called for military intervention. For more information, see the BBC Arabic detailed report: www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/06/130604_egypt_nile_meeting (Accessed: 9 March 2022.)

[28] See the text of the agreement: AGREEMENT ON DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ... 2015.

Political rapprochement, on the other hand, was soon overshadowed when Simegnew Bekele, the GERD project manager and chief engineer, was found dead in his vehicle in a busy square in Addis Ababa on 26 July 2018. Although official investigation concluded that the chief engineer had committed suicide, there was widespread speculation that he was killed by the Egyptian secret service (Champion–Manek, 2019). Another defining development was the coup against President Omar al-Bashir on 11 April 2019. The former Sudanese leader and his regime, despite their reservations, supported the establishment of GERD. Because of this, Ethiopia lost a valuable ally with their fall (Ahmady, 2022). By 2019, the propaganda war had reached a critical level, when the International Crisis Group had already issued a warning about a possible outbreak of the conflict. Finally, the two states invited their common ally, the United States, as well as the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union, to mediate in the conflict to avoid a possible outbreak of war (Hendawi, 2021).

Since June 2020, the African Union has made several attempts at mediation between the parties, to no avail. The stalemate has not been resolved, despite the fact that the United States suspended some of its aid to Ethiopia in September 2020, as a kind of pressure (Aljazeera, 2020). The failure to reach an agreement deepened tensions again between the three states, especially following the violent clashes on the Sudan-Ethiopian border in November 2020[29] (Reuters Staff, 2020). While cooperation and coordination between Egypt and Sudan intensified on issues affecting both the interests and national security of the two states following the armed border incident, Khartoum's position on GERD became more rigid.[30] Therefore, Sudan completely refused Ethiopian proposals *that do not say anything new*, and declared African Union mediation attempts useless (Aman, 2021). On the other hand, it strengthened its military ties with Egypt by signing a military cooperation agreement and conducting joint air, naval and land exercises (Hendawi, 2021).

The situation was further exacerbated when, in early September 2021, Ethiopia implicitly accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting the Tigray People's Liberation Front, which was fighting with government forces in the northeast of the country, in order to prevent the completion of GERD. However, experts stressed that despite political pressure,[31] neither Cairo nor Khartoum had an interest in the outbreak of the armed struggle, as it would naturally have dissipated the Ethiopian government's remaining willingness to compromise in the GERD negotiations. The Ethiopian accusation was therefore declared an untrue conspiracy theory to provide some sort of explanation to the Ethiopian public for the delay in completing GERD and starting power generation (Saied, 2021). This seemed to be justified by the fact that in February 2022, the Ethiopian side reiterated its allegations of cooperation between Egypt and Sudan

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[29] The disputed al-Fashqa area is officially located within Sudan's international borders, but Ethiopian farmers have settled on it and cultivated hundreds of acres of fertile agricultural land there since the mid-1990s.

[30] Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, then the adviser to the head of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, had already openly envisioned the outbreak of an unimaginable water war if no solution could be found (BBC News, 2021).

[31] Egyptian President Sisi, for example, declared on 30 March 2021, that "I say once again, no one can take a drop from Egypt's water, and if it happens, there will be inconceivable instability in the region". (Aljazeera, 2021).

and the Tigray rebels without providing concrete and clear evidence after failing to restart previously stalled talks (Saied, 2022b)

The Current Situation

According to Ethiopia's announcement, 82% of the total investment was completed in November 2021 and one of the 13 turbine units started operating on 20 February 2022 (Africa News, 2022). The second turbine is scheduled to be commissioned in just a few months and the dam is expected to be fully completed by 2024. Cairo immediately protested the commissioning of the first turbine and accused Addis Ababa of violating the Declaration of Principles for the Project signed by the three nations in 2015 (Aman, 2022). At the same time, experts assessed the launch of GERD as an extremely positive development that could alleviate the divisions in the country caused by the fight against the Tigray rebels and could give a new impetus to the recovery of the economy affected by the combined adverse effects of armed conflict, rising fuel prices, and the Covid-19 pandemic (Aljazeera, 2022). A similarly positive statement was made by Redwan Hussein, Ethiopia's ambassador to Eritrea, who emphasized above all the importance of the interests of the Sudanese people and ruled out the possibility that the border conflict could only be resolved in an armed manner on a lasting basis. He also stressed that Egypt should encourage Ethiopia to complete GERD as soon as possible, which could then, at Cairo's request and taking into account its specific interests, even serve as a water bank and lifeline during the drought season (Ethio12.com, 2022). Despite reassuring announcements, analysts have drawn attention to the fact that Addis Ababa's intransigence on the issue makes it extremely difficult to resume stalled talks. At the same time, it was emphasized that, although the likelihood of a military action based on recent developments was low despite the threats made in Egypt, the possibility of an armed confrontation with unpredictable consequences for the already volatile region could not be ruled out (Saied, 2022a). Avoiding the latter is not only a regional, but also a global interest due to the nearby Red Sea and the maritime transport that takes place on it. For this reason, for example, the European Union, which handles around 20% of its trade on this vital maritime route, has already indicated its readiness to work more closely with the three countries to reach a common agreement. (Kotb, 2022). Furthermore the development of a common, reassuring consensus position has become increasingly urgent, especially since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, given Egypt's vulnerability to the dependence on Russian and Ukrainian wheat imports. As a result of the conflict, the price of the food crop per tonne skyrocketed, surpassing even the most pessimistic expectations. For this reason, the Cairo government cannot allow even a single hectare from cultivated land to be lost due to water shortages (Ahmady, 2022).

Conflict of Interest

The authors hereby declare that no competing financial interest exists for this manuscript.

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MENA through the Lens of Political Economy

A Review of: "A Critical Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa" edited by Joel Beinin, Bassam Haddad, Sherene Seikaly[1]

Bálint Fetter[2], Szabolcs Pásztor[3]

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Both of these regions are rich in mineral resources, and in political, economic tensions. The below reviewed book presents the distinct dimensions of development, policymaking and priorities of the two regions in detail.

The book includes eleven interesting and accurate essays about the critical political economic effects of the Middle East and North Africa. This is the first writing to deal with this topic comprehensively. The works of many erudite professors and researchers were edited by Joel Benin (Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History and professor of Middle East history, Emeritus, at Stanford University), Bassam Haddad (director of the Middle East and Islamic Studies Program and an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University) and Sherene Seikaly (associate professor of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara). Among the two major parts, the first one (Categories of analysis) contains chapters 1-4., the second (Country/Regional studies) chapters 5-11.

The first chapter (*Landed Property, Capital Accumulation, and Polymorphous Capitalism:*

Egypt and the Levant) is written by Kristen Alff (assistant professor of history and international studies at North Carolina State University). First of all, this section gives us a historical overview about the economic development of Egypt and the Levant. Capitalism (and of course: capital) in the mentioned regions make up an important part of the chapter too. Finally, the dark side of capitalism is presented, through the abstraction of labour power, which makes the representatives of the working class rather „thing-like" creatures than humans.

In the second chapter (*State, market and class*) Max Ajl (post-doctoral researcher at Wageningen University), Bassam Haddad and Zeinab Abul-Magd (professor of Middle Eastern history at Oberlin College) are presenting us the way from colonial capitalism to independence in the case of Egypt, Syria, Tunisia. It also details the effects-reduced export revenues and remittance income of the oil bust (1986) on the economic development of the Arab states.

In chapter three (*Ten propositions on oil*) Timothy Mitchell (Ransford Professor of Middle

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Eastern Studies at Columbia University) presents how easily oil can lead to war in the Middle East, which has the world's largest reserves of hydrocarbons. As we can see, the area is highly energy determined. This fact gives great importance and a key role to oil. Mitchell deals with this topic through ten descriptive statements.

In the upcoming, fourth chapter (*Regional militaries and the global military-industrial complex*) by associate director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University Shana Marshall, we can observe how strong military establishment impacted the whole political/economic progress in the Middle East and in North Africa. The organization of modern regional militaries, their motivation and privileges as well as the regional weapon development are the key concepts to understand why this region is so extremely delicate and divided.

The fifth chapter (*Rethinking class and state in the Gulf Cooperation Council*) by Adam Hanieh- reader in development studies at SOAS, University of London, deals with the nature of the capitalist class and with the labour and citizenship in the Gulf. The Gulf Cooperation Council organizes several states in the Middle East, for example Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. The Council and its member states are building a specific area in the Middle East politically and economically too. The labour forces here are mostly migrants, without any basic human rights. The gloomy sides of capitalism are also presented here.

Aaron G. Jakes (assistant professor of history at the New School) and Ahmad Shokr (assistant professor of history at Swarthmore) note chapter six, with the title *Capitalism in Egypt, not Egyptian Capitalism*. The writers present the revisited colonial capitalism, national development and neoliberalism in Egypt, through the reinterpretation of capitalist and economic history of the state across the past two centuries.

Chapter seven (*State, Oil, and War in the formation of Iraq*)by Nida Alahmad, lecturer at the University of Edinburgh's Politics and International Relations department, presents how deep the mentioned three factors are forming the political discourse in Iraq. Although the 2003 war had a bad affect on the state arrangement and infrastructure networks, oil means a copious source for development programmes (and perhaps causes other regional and international conflicts).

Chapter eight, *Colonial capitalism and imperial myth in French North Africa* (constructed by Muriam Haleh Davis, assistant professor of history at the University of California, Santa Cruz) seeks the answer a fundamental question in this topic: was the capitalist greed and interest a basic factor/reason in the process of decolonisation? The chapter tries to present the diverse socioeconomic development of the states in North Africa, which was strongly predestined by the French domination in the years of colonisation.

Lebanon beyond exceptionalism is the title of the ninth chapter, which was written by a visiting associate professor of human rights at Bard College namely Ziad M. Abu-Rish. We can ascertain that the political economic development of Lebanon was way different than any of

the other states in the Middle East. This process is presented through different terms of Lebanese history. Many of the actual political and business leaders of Lebanon are former militia leaders. This fact has a major effect on nowadays tactical decision-making, too.

Chapter 10 (*The US-Israeli Alliance*) by Joel Benin shows us those unavoidable factors, which make the covenant of the two states tight. For example, the Democratic Party has many Jewish supporters, who have considerable political power. The chapter gives an overview about the beginning of this relationship, furthermore about the politic, economic interests of both sides. Antiterrorism, security and defence policy priorities are also explained.

Samia Al-Botmeh, assistant professor of economics at Birzeit University notes the eleventh and final chapter: *Repercussions of colonialism in the occupied Palestinian territories*. The political economy of the Palestinian areas is presented, which was obviously formed by a major factor, Israeli colonialism. In the end, we can assess that the lifeway of the Palestinian economy was „held hostage" to the interests and will of colonialism.

This book must be on the shelves of university libraries and on the desks of researchers as it approaches the complex issues of the MENA region from a special point of view, from the angle of political economy. A number of events have taken place in this region since the turn of the new millennium and this piece offers a detailed view on understanding the fundamental changes and challenges. Anyone who reads this book will have a better understanding of MENA.

A Review of: "Horn, Sahel, and Rift: Fault-lines of the African Jihad" by Stig Jarle Hansen[1]

Colin D. Robinson[2]

Stig Jarle Hansen first heard the name "Al-Shabaab" in 2006 while doing research in Mogadishu. Since his acclaimed volume "Al-Shabaab in Somalia", which appeared in 2013, he has extended his survey of jihadi organisations well beyond eastern Africa. The resulting Horn, Sahel, and Rift is an attempt to build a series of detailed local studies into a comparative analysis (p. vii). In Kilcullen's terms what Hansen analyses in this volume is takfirism (Kilcullen, 2011, xviii-xix) which Hansen defines as the desire by some Muslims to condemn other Muslims for their beliefs: intra-religious sectarianism. However Kilcullen was not focused on such deep African comparative analysis, rather, pushing the counter-insurgency debate forward. Hansen addresses currents of takfirism as well as anti-modernity at pages 47-48.

In hearing of jihadi setbacks Hansen began to wonder whether there was something about their resilience which the world failed to understand, in terms of their absorbing defeat and transforming themselves to survive (p.2). Hansen argues that jihadi groups are only seldom completely eradicated. Instead of total destruction, he argues, they may relinquish significant territorial control but still survive. In this emphasis on territorial control commonalities with Hansen's ideas can be seen with theories of revolutionary and guerrilla warfare dating back to Mao Tse-Tung. Importantly the book "explores variations over time in the different organisations rather than searching for a static, timeless 'essence'" – Hansen's theorizing is dynamic, rather than static, emphasizing how important context is (p.3).

In Chapter 2 (pp 17-50) Hansen lays out his theory, that changing African jihadi organisms can be organized according to four, growingly more intensive, levels of territorial presence: clandestine, accepted presence; semi-territoriality; and territorial control. The first level, clandestine network, is where Al-Hijra/al-Muhajiroun, a recent formed and somewhat amorphous group in Tanzania, sits. Jihadist groups in these situations are unable to build much more than cell networks because the state is too strong. For the next level up Hansen examines al-Qaeda in Sudan, though beyond Africa al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, or even to some degree the Palestine Liberation Organisation's saga in Jordan before Black September in 1970 might reward closer comparison. In this single-African-case analysis Hansen argues that in Sudan after Al-Bashir's 1989 coup, al-Qaeda helped to do three things: to quell the vibrant Southern insurgency recognising Al-Bashir's limited means; to aid Sudan's foreign policy and face regional rivals; and to alleviate the distressed economy (p.55). But al-Qaeda's presence

in Sudan was not always easy, and they were eventually evicted.

The majority of the groups Hansen discusses has what he describes as a 'semi-territorial' presence, in which they exercise some level of control over (usually) rural areas where the state or international forces are unable to provide security. These include Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin' in Mali and beyond, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the Allied Democratic Forces in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Islamic State in Somalia and Boko Haram (both factions) on Nigeria's periphery. Hansen argues that such bodies do not "need full control of a territory to implement rudimentary forms of governance, contrary to the conclusions of many scholars" (p.28). One does have to wonder at this point if these earlier "many scholars" had critically examined Mao's theory of revolutionary war (Katzenbach and Hanrahan, 1955) in its first and second stages, with Communist cadres increasing visiting remote villages, providing alternatives to central government services. If they had, they might have revised their scepticism.

Territorial control, the final variant, is also illuminated by only a single case: Harakat al-Shabaab in Somalia. The most widely known examples however are non-African, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the Taliban now again in Afghanistan. These kinds of organisms emerging from the shadows are able to build something 'resembling a state structure and having a more permanent presence' (p. 31) This stage of extensive control has been reached three times in Africa, created by the possibilities of civil war (p. 31). When forced back, reverting to a lesser level of territorial control is a survival/resilience strategy that can enable these groups to maintain their position, effectiveness, or status.

This reviewer comes late to reading this book: Horn, Sahel, and Rift was first published in 2019. Since publication at least four separate reviews have appeared (Abdalla 2020; de Monclos 2020; Pflaum 2020; and StJohn 2019) which vary in the depth of their analysis. De Monclos is the best of the four this reviewer has seen. de Monclos argues that Hansen "..underestimates the role of African governments in prolonging conflicts." (de Montclos, 2020, p. 206) This is a significant potential problem, given Christopher Clapham's axiom that in analysing African conflicts the best place to start is with the government in power.

Hansen "does not seriously investigate how the abuses, the corruption and the predation of security forces contributed to push some youth" towards African jihadis (de Montclos, 2020, p. 206). With this reviewer's explicit focus on African armies, some comments on this issue are perhaps where this piece can best drive the debate forward. There are no particular magic tricks to building up the strength, or integrity, of weak states. In Africa state boundaries are effectively fixed, though Eritrea, South Sudan, and Somaliland demonstrate that there can be exceptions and evolutions. Tilly style political evolution through war did not develop. Instead many of the groups that led Africans to independence seized the state as booty for one political or ethnic group over another and then proceeded to both exploit it and try to deny it to other groups (Somerville 2016). In this process effective armies and other security forces, as Howe well explains, often become a threat to personalist African leaders (Howe

2005, p. 35).

The over-normative concept of 'security sector reform' conceptualized from 1998[3] denies the extent of non-state actors' power in Africa, over-privileging the state to a very distorting degree. What 'security sector reform' does do however at its root is remind us of the power and lure of being able to help make ones' own political decisions – democracy. Such democratic upheavals upsetting entrenched power structures have however been scant in Sub-Saharan Africa in the last decade. But the only way that more light will shine on abuses, corruption, and predation of security forces are greater democratic freedoms. The spate of recent coups around Africa, and democracy's, current, relative, retreat more widely do not hold out much immediate hope. In addition, as climate change coupled with population pressure destroys much of the current African way of life in the remainder of this century and beyond (Vince 2019), established political forces, not democratic upwellings, will stand to benefit most. But that does not change the potential power and lure of seizing more participation in ones' own political affairs, as perhaps the continued resistance to military rule in Sudan shows most clearly.

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[3] the original speech (13 May 1998) is visible at https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk /ukgwa/20020824040451/ http://www.dfid.gov.uk:80/News/Speeches/files/sp13may.html

A Review of: "The Country That Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland" by Gérard Prunier[1]

Gábor Sinkó[2]

A renowned academic and historian specializing in the contemporary history of the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes region[3], Gérard Prunier provides an overarching and comprehensive narrative of events that have paved the way to the 'rebirth' of Somaliland – which has been in fact independent from Somalia since 1991 – through its own achievements of sovereignty, democratic elections and peace. The country, however, remains plagued by economic and diplomatic problems, and most importantly "by the world's legal standards, it does not exist" (p. vii).

It is a gripping and informative book that has been extensively researched and gives evidence of the author's vast knowledge of not only the contemporary history, but also the pre-colonial and colonial period of the Horn of Africa region. While providing a unique account of Somaliland's history, Prunier's analysis is also complemented by personal experiences, which makes it an even more compelling read. The book is about the unrecognized solo effort of Somaliland in achieving peace yet to be rewarded by the international community.

The Country That Does Not Exist can be divided into eleven chapters. The lengthy notes and indexes at the end of the book provide a great source of information and may be especially useful for those who need additional material. Chapter 1 recounts the Somalis' pre-colonial history with special emphasis to the clan system. Prunier stresses that "the Somali social model is clanic...[but] it is also highly conscious of...its cultural unity" (p. 6). Neglecting the basic differences, cultural homogeneity boosted the Somalis' nationalism that led to the development of pan-Somalism[4] and the embodiment of the Greater Somalia concept. It meant the bonding of previously not unified territories, including Côte Française des Somalis, British Somaliland, Somalia Italiana, Kenya's Northern Frontier District (NFD) and the Ethiopian Ogaden province.

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[3] Some of his books include 'The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994: History of a Genocide', Hurst, 1998; 'Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide', Hurst, 2005; 'From Genocide to Continental War: The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa', Hurst, 2009; 'Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi' (Edited together with Éloi Ficquet), Hurst, 2015
[4] Pan-Somalism has always been an act of faith for the Somalis. They believed that all different territories and clans need to be unified for the Somali state to possess enough power to be able to become more dominant than the prevailing clan system. They also hoped that trans-clanic connections and the sheer size of unified Somalia will solve all the problems kinship has created.

Chapter 2 details the process of national unification between British Somaliland and Somalia Italiana. The author is right to point out the lack of constitutional and international basis of the merger, arguing it had been "mostly an ideological and emotional thing, while the practicalities had been seen as secondary…" (p. 20). However, driven by pan-Somalism, Kenya's NFD and the Ogaden region were attempted to be annexed, but the Shifta War (1963-1967) and the Ethio-Somali War (1977-1978) both ended in Somali failure. Pan-Somalism had also been what legitimized the coup of Siad Barre in 1969. Being half Marehan, half Ogaden/Darood his presence meant an increasing clanic weight, since "the Darood were the silent majority of post-colonial Somalia, and they had every intention of recovering what they considered to be their birthright" (p. 25).

The following chapters (Chapter 3 – Chapter 7) guide the readers through the history of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and its continuous struggles with the Siad Barre regime. After the unsuccessful outcome of the Ogaden War, a clanic nightmare (coupled with economic, financial and military problems) started to unfold, with the Issaq[5] paying the price for the defeat. As Prunier states: "In all cases of social discrimination in ethnically (and religiously) homogeneous societies, the victims are perceived as separate, strange or unduly prosperous. This was the case with the Issaq, both because they had prospered in commerce...and because they had been a military enemy in the past" (pp. 41-42).

The goal of the SNM was the liberation of Somalia; however, in the beginning of the 1980s they did not have a 'base', medical centers, transportation, a central depot for guns, any central message and strong intelligence. Later in the decade, the SNM faced other challenges, including bad logistics, poor management and insufficient training. Besides, there were ideological clashes between SNM members promoting regime change versus the secession of the north.[6] The 1988 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia was one of the most emblematic moments in the history of the SNM and it was what eventually paved the way to the liberation of the north.

On top of the arrests, looting and executions in the north, the government decided to use heavy artillery to flush out the SNM of Hargeisa. It has been "particularly brutal and without any regard to civilian casualties – in fact there is ample evidence that civilian casualties have been deliberately inflicted so as to destroy the support base of the SNM, which is mainly comprised of people from the Issaq clan" (p. 103). Not only did they cause the death of tens of thousands of people, but the government response also contributed to migration to neighboring Ethiopia. Although it has never been said, it was pure genocide and it put an end to Somali unification attempts.

The next three chapters (Chapter 8 – Chapter 10) offer an insight into the breakup of the North and South and the (re)proclamation of Somaliland's independence, which was followed

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[5] More than 80% of the current population in Somaliland is linked to the Issaq clan family.

[6] Initially secession was not part of the constitution and the ideology of SNM, since the northerners were aware they would have problems with international recognition and the Issaq own the biggest lands in Mogadishu. Most importantly, however, Somaliland did not have adequate natural resources to cope on their own.

by chaos, disorganization, foreign intervention, humanitarian crises and later on peace- and state-building efforts.[7] By 1991, the Siad Barre regime had been on the verge of collapse with "each local clan or sub-clan attempting to position itself in the free-for-all to defend its own group interests" (p. 135). Since there were not enough resources and the Somali administrative system was far from being effective, competition over limited international aid led to civil strife. The lack of resources and the possession of guns spurred people to loot, rob and even kill.

While President Egal started the stabilization of Somaliland both administratively[8] and economically, international recognition would have been needed for the further strengthening of country. In 2001, a referendum on the independence of Somaliland was conducted in a fair and open manner; however, the international community – fearing it would encourage other secessionist movements – did not change its stance towards the country. The UN was striving to recreate the resemblance of a state in Somalia, so that it could operate in the nation-state system. As long as it did not fulfil the role of socio-economic management and public administration, Somali warlords could accept having a 'state' "provided they could control it and use it to plunder the rural areas by force while siphoning off large amounts of 'foreign aid'" (p. 176).

Chapter 11 illustrates the history of Somaliland between 2007 and 2020. Prunier reasons that the country had to face two major challenges: "a centralist threat from whoever was in control of Mogadishu and internal Islamist subversion" (p. 195). Additionally, illegal migration to Europe rocketed and the economy was characterized by lack of foreign investment and stagnation. Somaliland's problems continued through the 2010s, including reduced export volumes, food rationing, high unemployment, massive drought, the Khatumo secession and the large influx of refugees fleeing from al-Shabaab terrorism.

Having denied their right to officially exist, what kind of future can a 'virtual' Somaliland expect? The author speculates that Somaliland may be able to reap the benefits of becoming a satellite of the United Arab Emirates both commercially and economically. Besides – using the TAIPEI Act of 2019[9] – Somaliland formally recognized the Republic of China (RoC, Taiwan) as 'a representative of China', intending to build stronger ties with the country diplomatically (p. 217). Angered by the political implications of the move as well as worrying about the future of the Djibouti port they control[10], China agreed with Somalia to conduct joint naval patrols

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[7] For more information, see Sinkó, G. (2021). Different times, same methods: The impact of the National Security Service on the operations of the National Intelligence and Security Agency. Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies, 1(1-2). DOI: 10.38146/BSZ.SPEC.2021.1.7 and Sinkó, G. and Besenyő, J. Comparison of the Secret Service of al-Shabaab, the Amniyat, and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (Somalia). International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence. DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2021.1987143

[8] For instance, at the 1995 'founding congress' in Hargeisa plans were laid down for creating the basis of administration, cabinet members were appointed and peace agreements were signed in order to stop clan-based, internal fighting.

[9] The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 aims to increase the scope of U.S. relations with the island nation and encourage other states and international organizations to build stronger ties with Taiwan.

[10] Djibouti's debt to China is 71% of the country's GDP; however, the foreign affairs minister said Djibouti needed Chinese infrastructure. For more information, see https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-strategic-djibouti-a-microcosm-of-chinas-growing-foothold-in-africa/2019/12/29/a6e664ea-beab-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html (Accessed: 12

on the territorial waters of Somaliland. The port of Berbera is of strategic importance and it amounts to about 40 percent of Somaliland's budget (p. 181). Djibouti may rightfully be afraid of the devastating economic consequences of Berbera taking over parts of Ethiopia's cargo volume as it would mean additional stability for the impoverished Somaliland. However, terrorism in neighboring Somalia may endanger infrastructure and foreigners in the north. Furthermore, the Somali, Chinese and Djibouti propaganda efforts may put further obstacles in the way of the impoverished country's economic growth.[11]

The Country That Does Not Exist is an exceptional book on the history and aspirations of Somaliland. It is a critical – albeit impartial – account of the inception, efforts to its realization and then collapse of the Dream, which was the unification of all Somali territories. Prunier does not make the mistake of analyzing Somalia only through the lens of the Cold War as he highlights that the military aid pact with the Soviet regime was not the result of ideological sympathy towards the U.S.S.R., but rather Somalia's opposition to Ethiopia and Kenya (both U.S. allies) and the pro-Soviet stance of the Arab countries (some of which provided help to Somalia). Also, he dispels any misconceptions about the basic cause of internal struggles in Somaliland, arguing that they were more related to material problems (shortage of food and money) as opposed to clanic or political reasons.[12]

I, nonetheless, do not agree with the author that the past – or more precisely – colonial history is neglected by contemporary researchers (p. 80). I rather believe that many times it is beyond the scope of the study to cover the complete history of a particular location. The other small detail I wish to point out is the confusion of two different individuals, Mohamed Hashi Deria, better known as 'Lixle'[13], commander of the SNM and Eng. Mohamed Hashi Elmi, Minister of Finance of Somaliland (2010-2012). As Prunier (incorrectly) states: "The man who brought all of them together was Engineer (later Colonel) Mohamed Hashi" (p. 44).

By all means it is a comprehensive, relevant and timely book I would recommend to anyone who would like to gain a better insight into the historical challenges of Somaliland. The book can be of great interest to readers who wish to extend their knowledge in topics related to the Horn of Africa region. *The Country That Does Not Exist* is not only a thought-provoking read to scholars, academics and experts, but anyone who would like to get a clearer picture of the future of Africa – U.S., Africa – China and African Union – United Nations relations.

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[11] For example, in this article (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/08/analysis-somalilands-lingering-jihadi-threat.php, Accessed: 12 September 2022) the following can be read "In Somaliland's major cities such as Hargeisa, Burco, and Berbera, Shabaab is also thought to maintain sleeper cells". Nevertheless, there has not been any terrorist attack in Somaliland since 2008.

[12] While clans cannot be blamed for the beginning of the fighting, they have certainly contributed to the fact they lasted and spread.

[13] 'Lixle' has been consistently used throughout the book, although it is the Somali version. The English one is 'Lihle'.

A Review of: "Why Europe Intervenes in Africa? Security, Prestige, and the Legacy of Colonialism" by Catherine Gegout[1]

Zsolt Szabó[2]

The intervention of European and other forces in Africa is a very actual and interesting topic in the light of the latest developments in the region. The migration trends since 2015 and the recent terrorism activities in the Sahel region makes it difficult to disregard the importance of what connections exist between the two areas, which is actually a common zone called the Mediterranean. The present book by Catherine Gegout endeavours to analyse the historical past and the contemporary issues concerning the two territories, to what extent have their relationships changed and why does Europe still feel the need to intervene in the affairs of Africa. The work relies on various sources from primary and secondary documents to interviews as well. Overall, it is an interesting book to read not only for those who are researchers of the topic, but for the average reader as well who wants to know better the intents of the European countries and organizations towards the southern continent.

After a short introduction, the book consists of 7 chapters, which are arranged in an orderly fashion built up to systematically comprehend the themes about the interventions in Africa by Europe. In the beginning pages, the author lays down the goals of the book – the explanation of the concept of conflict, the interpretation of the types of interventions by Europe in Africa and the complementary view about the other global powers (UN, China, USA) which can contribute to the situation of the African countries. The book aims as well to collect the European interests that can influence the security relations between Europe and Africa and it enumerates the interventions starting from the 1980's. Gegout uses an effective methodology in separating four causes for which European states would consider interfering in an African country's affairs. These four principles are: core/security realism, economic realism, normative/prestige realism and humanitarian realism.

In the first chapter, the writer elaborates the abovementioned four categories, after she enumerates the types of interventions that is possible to imagine. First of all, according to her, it can be either direct or indirect, and also there are several types of interferences that are important to understand: economic, political, cultural, institutional, legal, medical or environmental as well. After explaining these phenomena, the four basic norms for intervention are coming into focus. Core realism is important for the security and political interest of the European countries, economic realism comes into mind concerning trade and

monetary interests, normative realism is the basis of the prestige of a leader or a country while ethical or humanitarian realism is a supportive principle, which is to help the given African country by aid or other methods. At the end of the chapter, Gegout stresses the importance of the post-colonialism, which is still present in the mind of the greater powers: basicly it is the memory of the former colonial power which made the European great powers in their own eyes superior to their African counterparts.

The second chapter gives a summary of the conflicts from the 1980's up until now. It enumerates the Romans, then the European medieval conquerers who started to exploit the riches of the African continent. She mentiones the slave trade, the famous explorers like Stanley, Livingstone, Mungo Park, etc. Gegout finally arrives at the time of the 'scramble for Africa', when every great power in Europe was trying to carve out a piece for itself from the continent. In the following pages, the Berlin Conference (1884-5) is discussed, where the French, English, Spanish, Italians, Belgians and Germans split up Africa among themselves. The European countries of that time felt superior to the Africans, economically and elsehow. We become aware that they had a strong messianistic civilizing urge, and they wanted to evangelize the animist African tribes. Gegout calls this attitude towards the Africans in modern times Eurocentrism. However, from the 1930's, independence movements started to appear, and from the 1950's African countries started to become independent. The two greatest powers, the French and the British left the scene differently: the French insisted more on their territories, while the British left more easily. Nevertheless, even after the independence of the African countries, the two powers wanted to hold onto their previous influence. Then another phenomenon became obvious: during the Cold War, the African countries became the center of the proxy wars of the USA and the USSR, who supported opposing civil war parties on the disturbed continent.

After describing the historical background of the conflicts on Africa, the book turns to the African countries participating in the contest and the global actors who wanted to exploit the black continent: namely China and the USA. The chapter first and foremost takes into consideration the African states and their efforts to organize themselves against the great powers in the world who tried to take advantage of them. The Africans also created their respective institutions: for example, the ECOWAS (1975), which is a regional security organization, consisting of 3000 soldiers. Then there is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998. One of the most important is the African Union established in July 2002, which represents the interests of the African countries. It has a special relationship with the EU and the UN and has developed considerable diplomatic ties with other states and organizations. It relies on the ECOWAS and the SADC for example in the time of need for asssistance in peacekeeping. It participates in heeling the wounds of the conflict-ridden areas in Africa. It is interesting to know that the UN is also present in the area from the 1980's on. It has participated in several peacekeeping operations such as in Western Sahara – MINURSO (1991-) or Rwanda – UNAMIR (1993-6). The chapter describes the influence of China as well on the continent. China is

interested in Africa since the Badung Conference of 1955, and it is now the second biggest trading partner of Africa after the EU, and it exports twice as much as the USA to the black continent. According to Gegout, the large country has four security policy principles to follow: it participates in UN missions, it creates bilateral cooperations with African states, it has established a military base in Djibouti in 2016, and it takes part in the arms trade with the African states. Lastly, the chapter treats the influence of the USA in Africa. The main goal of the superpower is to ensure its security goals. After 9/11, its main concern became terrorism and it is fighting it since then. For example, it created the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which supports the fight against terrorism in the Sub-Saharan region. It took part in some of the missions in Africa, but after Somalia in 1992/3 (Operation Restore Hope) including 28000 soldiers, it usually rarely takes part in operations in Africa. Exeptions are for example Libya, against which it took part in the international coalition against Colonel Gaddafi in 2011, and the USA helped Chad as well. The main role of the USA is thus is to fight against terrorism but intervene only on a low scale.

The fourth chapter discusses the effect of France in Africa. The French have several ties to the continent even after their independence. The most important for them is the security issue and the prestige motive of the four principles listed by the author. *Françafrique* is a term familiar to the French up until now, and it means the systematic exploitation of the past colonies by the European great power. The French have to defend their citizens in the respective African countries as well, where they can be found in the ten thousands as citizens of those states. The African former colonies' economy is of great relevance to the French, because some of them are still using the CFA franc system, which makes them dependent on each other. The diplomatic and cultural ties are still ongoing, so the African states have special relations with their French counterparts. France has a lot of military bases, training missions, defence contracts at the scene, so they seem close to their African partners and vica versa. In 1993, there were 13000 French soldiers in Africa, in 2017 there were 9000, which is a considerable number. France is also fighting against terrorism, just like the USA. It has intervened in lot of places, for example several times in the Central African Republic, and also in Ivory Coast. This was a turning point in the reaction of the French forces: after the 2004 bombing of French soldiers, it is reluctant to intervene unilaterally, and it prefers multilateral action concerning peacekeeping missions in Africa. Another example was in Mali, when in 2012 France interfered to stop the jihadist movement in the country – they deployed 4000 soldiers. Of the four principle, core, economic and normative realism is applicable to France, and if it doesn't collide with the first three, humanitarian action is also possible, but it comes last.

The fifth chapter talks about the role of the United Kingdom in Africa. Its role is somewhat different of that of the French. The British don't concern themselves with economic interests, they are more affected by the prestige they gain by intervening in Africa. They rarely enter in a conflict, and one of the only mission they participated in was the one in Libya in 2011. It is characteristic, that they only interfere somewhere if the USA needs support. They prefer

staying out of the way, but they also fight against terrorism. One of the few examples of their intervention was in Sierra Leone, where first they supported President Ahmad Kabbah, then they left him, only to restore the relationship soon after with Kabbah (1997-2000). Zimbabwe is interesting for them because of their colonial history there, but they didn't interfere in that conflict as well. In summary, the British prefer the status quo and they only intervene when they fight terrorism, thus the UK could be called a non-interventionalist power.

The sixth chapter describes the role of the European Union in Africa and its interventionalist policies. The EU mainly avoids interfering with the African states' conflicts, but it usually takes part in training missions, which help the given country's army. To cite examples: EUTM Mali (2013), Operation Artemis in the Republic of the Congo, or we can mention the AMIS mission in Darfur. Since 2015, one of the EU's main goals became the fight against migration. The EU willingly turns to the tools of diplomacy instead of military solutions. Its main concerns are security and acquiring prestige. By that, it not only increases its own reputation, but it proves itself in front of the NATO and the United States as well.

Lastly, Gegout turns to the future, what fate is there for Africa and the EU? She concludes, that the African states will need furthermore the help of their European counterparts, but they will become stronger as time passes. She expresses her hope that the humanitarian aspect of the conflict handling will improve, and thus Africa will be a better place to live in. The author prospects that the European nations will want to handle their conflict management without the European Union, maybe via NATO. However, Donald Trump's protectionist politics and the Brexit would weaken this approach. Gegout thinks that the interventions will not falter, but instead, they will go on continuously, and the Europeans' main goal will be the fight agaisnt terrorism. She expresses her hope that with time passing by, the humanitarian approach to the interventionist politics will be embraced.

To conclude, I would like to add that Catherine Gegout summarized the different problematics of the European intervention in Africa very thoroughly, and with the help of sufficient sources she was able to comprehend the essence of the conflicts and interventions between the two sides. Maybe with the help of this book, the interference of the European powers and their African counterparts will become more sophisticated, and thus the dialogue between the two sides can be brought closer to each other.

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