Contextualizing Military Information Support Operations (MISO) in Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Operations

Toward Enhancing Operational Effectiveness

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.12700/jceeas.2026.6.3.520

Keywords:

Military Information Support Operations; Psychological Operations; Counterinsurgency; Operational Effectiveness; Counterterrorism.

Abstract

Military Information Support Operations (MISO) plays a crucial role in counterinsurgency by influencing perceptions, behaviours, and decision-making, which helps to enhance operational effectiveness. However, in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations, MISO is hardly visible, as it is poorly employed, resulting in severe alienation of the local population, loss of institutional credibility and a rise in misinformation, which are at the core of strengthening insurgent movements and weakening operational effectiveness. Using a qualitative research method, dwelling largely on documented evidence and a thematic review of extant literature, the paper examines MISO within Nigeria’s ongoing COIN efforts against insurgency in the northern region. It found that despite its recognition in Nigeria’s National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), its application in COIN operations has been poor, limited and secondary, detaching it from the overall counterinsurgency strategy, with severe implications on operational effectiveness. The study, therefore, advances full integration of MISO as a major part of the CTCOIN strategy with clear objectives that align with mission objectives to enhance operational effectiveness. The theoretical frame of analysis adopted by this study is the soft power theory developed by Joseph Nye.

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Published

2026-11-15

How to Cite

Ukaeje, O. (2026). Contextualizing Military Information Support Operations (MISO) in Nigeria’s Counterinsurgency Operations: Toward Enhancing Operational Effectiveness . Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies, 6(3), 241–256. https://doi.org/10.12700/jceeas.2026.6.3.520